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THE WILL

AND ITS

WORLD.

PSYCHICAL AND ETHICAL.

BY

DENTON J. SNIDER.

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INTRODUCTION.

Another book on the Will; the subject cannot settle itself and get quiet, as it ought, after having produced so much controversy. Moreover, the whole work turns upon Free Will as its center and pivot — that Free Will which in recent years has so often been supposed to be an old worn-out coat belonging to the past, and unworthy of even being looked at by any man with modern ideas.

Still the matter will not sink itself out of sight at the bidding of science or of any other authority, and there is no final resting-place in this as in so many other things. Each generation, and in some degree each man born into the world, has to fight anew the battle of Free Will, which is verily the soul of every kind of freedom, moral,

political, social, religious; life itself may be regarded as a winning or a losing of the battle for freedom.

During a long time theology was the chief scene of this conflict, and the Church divided upon the lines of Necessitarianism and Libertarianism; but the past generation has seen a new kind of Necessitarianism arising, that of physical science, which has leaped into the arena with a mighty flourish of trumpets, loudly proclaiming the defeat and total disappearance of Free Will from the face of the earth, and triumphantly pointing to its last evanishment down the all-devouring throat of unalterable, irresistible Law. Such a proclamation is made with great assurance and even haughtiness by the philosopher of science, Mr. Herbert Spencer (and it is repeated in chorus by a large number of his disciples); it is he who declares, in his well-known treatise on Psychology, that Free Will is born of "an illusion," and therewith dismisses contemptuously the whole subject, disdaining to discuss it at any length in his rather lengthy book.

A somewhat different yet decidedly significant attitude is taken by a distinguished writer on Ethics, Professor Sidgwick, who proposes to eliminate "the theoretical question as to the freedom of the Will" from the sphere of ethical science entirely (see his *Methods of Ethics*,

5th ed., p. 66). This famous moral teacher, accordingly, gives us much instruction in a morality which has no need of freedom, and seeks to unfold a responsibility which has no connection with the liberty of choice. So he is going to make "no decision" upon this subject, but will get along somehow without entering upon the exceedingly vexatious discussion of Free Will. It is not an easy, still a very necessary task, one may well think. This utterance of Prof. Sidgwick, which seems to have in it the note of despair, has been oftener cited than any other opinion in his book probably, so characteristic is it as an echo of the worried thought of the present age. "The conflict of arguments" between the two opposing sides is indeed wearisome, and frequently profitless; but what if there be a different way of winning the fortress of Free Will? It may here be added that another equally distinguished writer on Ethics, Dr. James Martineau (*Types of Ethical Theory*, 3rd ed., Vol. II., p. 42), emphatically protests against such a "neutral" position in ethical science on the subject of Free Will, as that which has just been considered.

It is an amusing fact that the very words in which Free Will has at divers times expressed itself, have found bitter enemies. A well-known Professor of Psychology in Harvard University has thought that the problem would be much

illuminated, and made more easy of solution, by getting rid of the term *freedom* in all discussion of the subject. So he proceeds to carry out his plan in a specimen essay which he has given to the world. But the promised relief does not seem to come, the old difficulty remains, as it does not lie in the word but in the thing. Then why banish that favorite vocable of our nation, yea of the whole world? If nobody else, the schoolboy will not suffer it to die, since it is always the burden of his chosen declamation. For our part, we do not conceal our liking for the word, and we also cherish a belief in its great usefulness, when employed aright, in Psychology.

In a far more savage manner the word *self-determination* has been condemned by a Professor in Columbia University. Hear his cry of damnation, which becomes almost frantic: "Self-determination is a term to juggle with, and for that reason every scientific psychologist ought to detest it." (Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, p. 381.) We had heard that science did not detest anything or anybody, but had reached the lofty, serene point of accepting all, yea the devil himself, as a necessary stage in the grand universal movement of evolution. But the Professor vehemently calls upon his brethren, the scientific psychologists, to hate that damnable word *self-determination* in language

which recalls that of Macbeth when he finds out that he has been deceived by the lying oracles of the witches, and through them brought face to face with grim death:

> **And be these juggling fiends no more believed**
> **That keep the word of promise to our ear**
> **But break it to our hope.**

The query will rise, Who has been deceiving the Professor, juggling with that detestable compound *self-determination?* Let the culprit be pointed out that he receive the penalty due to his misdeeds. So we start out in search of the rascal with no little zeal, but we soon find that just this word or its equivalent has been employed by the greatest thinkers, sages, and moralists from antiquity down to the present time. Plato and Aristotle are, then, the offenders in the old ages; Kant and Hegel employ the term in our century, not juggling with it, but having evidently an honest purpose in the pursuit of truth; in our own generation and in our own tongue the word is found scattered up and down the pages of Thomas Henry Green, one of the sincerest souls and probably the greatest ethical writer that the Anglo-Saxon race has produced. These are some of the jugglers, we suppose; not till Mr. Herbert Spencer arrived with his evangel proclaiming that Free Will is a cheat and an illusion did we get the

truth or even an honest expression of it among men. Such is one of the recent utterances of what may be called scientific dogmatism upon the subject of Free Will, scaling heights which theological dogmatism hardly attained in its palmiest days.

Assured now that we are in good company, we shall still find use for the word self-determination, making it the central fact of the present book, showing it to be the great end which human activity is seeking to realize. Indeed the very conception and starting-point of the Will rests upon what we shall call the self-determined.

And now let it be confessed there is a good reason for the repugnance which some writers have shown to all discussion of the freedom of the Will. That it has often been fruitless, landing the reader into an intolerable dualism which leaves only discord in his soul, is apparent enough. But the old method of discussing this subject need not be deemed the final one, or the only way of closing with the problem. That method may be named argumentation by criss-cross; it piles up a great breastwork of so-called arguments on one side, then it makes a similar pile on the other side, while from both opposing sides is kept up an eternal cross-fire of assertions, denials, rebuttals, and re-assertions. But it is found that, after a thunderous fire and a prodigious noise lasting through generations, each

side continues to hold its own fort in about the same condition as when the battle started. Thus the whole thing has the appearance of a prolonged sham-battle, in which nobody gets hurt. No wonder that earnest people, with work to do in the world, become disgusted and resolve to enlist on neither side of such a resultless conflict, sweeping the entire matter out of their mental horizon.

Still the subject is sure to come back, it cannot be wholly excluded from our soul, being just the subject of man's freedom. The question will arise: if you can get nothing in that way, why not cast about for another way? And here we brush upon the secret hope from which has sprung the present book. Let it be imparted in a whisper to the reader that the author has endeavored to strike out into a new path in this exposition of the Will. Not a mass of new arguments but a new method is the claim, possibly delusive, but honestly believed; so much of faith in his own work will be charitably tolerated in an author by his readers, for every author simply has to be something of an Egotist, else he would not write a book. He must think that he has done a deed which no one else has done, otherwise what is the use of his giving himself so much trouble to do a piece of work over again? Some points of this procedure may be here set forth.

I. The exposition which does not rest in mere argumentation, external definition, or arbitrary division, but regards these simply as stages or a stage in the movement of mind, belongs to what we have called the Psychosis. The science of Psychology must show an inner unfolding; it must have distinctions, but these are to spring from its own internal process, self-generated, not projected from the outside into the science at any point, according to some external criterion of the psychologist. He must indeed have insight, but insight into the very process of his Ego, which is itself insight. The self-activity of mind is to be made real, objective in its own procedure; not simply the Ego but the science of the Ego is to be self-active, moving forward through itself and positing its own distinctions.

The Psychosis, then, is the Ego or mind itself grasping the movement of mind in every special activity of itself. However minutely specialized the mental act may be, the total process of mind is present and cannot be separated from its own specialization. That is, both elements, the particular and the universal, are not only on hand and united, but united in a process, which is the soul of both; this process knowing itself, and setting itself forth in its distinctive stages as process, is the Psychosis. The complete movement of Psychology must, therefore, be an evolution which shows, on the one hand, the special act or

the so-called faculty (the phase of distinction or specialization), and, on the other hand, the total activity of the Ego in that special act.

Such a procedure, as far as we are aware, is opposed to the usual method of psychologists, who have the habit of making their distinctions anywhere and as they please, and of arranging these distinctions in any order which may happen to be convenient. We have a strong conviction that this is a fundamental defect in the psychological science of to-day. It is handed over to boundless caprice which means chaos, and there is rarely the attempt to reveal the mind as ordered from within throughout its manifold activities. But it has not only an order, it has also a principle of ordering, both of which go together, are indeed one process, which, however, must separate itself and posit its distinctions as essential.

Thus we witness in mind everywhere the Psychosis with its threefold movement. Such is the ordering principle which unifies all mental phenomena and makes a science of mind possible. (The threefold movement of the Ego or of mind we have more fully set forth in another work. See *Psychology and the Psychosis, Introduction passim.*)

II. This recurring triplicity often rouses objection. It is declared to be something artificial or something foisted upon the mental process from the outside. Still the claim here made is that

such is the very movement of mind itself, its fundamental form, which it, being self-conscious, must see and unfold as its own.

Again it is objected that this perpetual iteration of the threefold process confines the spirit, forces it by an iron necessity into a pre-determined system, and is thus prejudicial to that freedom which should at least reign within the domain of thought. But such a freedom is really disorder, it subjects the science to caprice and takes it away from the control of law, to discover and to utter which is the psychologist's business. Now we believe most fervently in freedom, outer and inner; but freedom, too, must be ordered, must have its principle, which is just the ground of its necessity. That is, freedom is necessary; note the two opposing terms in this sentence, which, however, are smelted into one thought by the process just described. Liberty and law must be united in the psychological as well as in the political sphere. Mind becomes scientifically free only in following the law of mind, just as the citizen is free only in obeying the law of the land. We must see the universal principle working in every detail, ordering it and holding it united in the total movement of the science.

We should never forget, however, that this ordering of the Ego is its own; this law imposed on itself is its own law, made by itself

for itself. In other words, it is self-legislative, like the free nation; its government is self-government, which constitutes the liberty of science as well as of the State. Otherwise freedom may lead to anarchy in both. Nor again should the law be external, applied from the outside and forcing conformity to itself; thus we begin to feel this tyranny of system which is always the forerunner of rebellion and overthrow.

So we affirm that in a true method alone can the science of mind find its true freedom. The Ego is unquestionably limit-transcending by its very nature, but just this characteristic is what must be taken up and incorporated into its process. It posits all distinction, limitation, specialization; then it reaches beyond these and returns to itself as the source; in this way it is the self-limited, self-differentiated, self-determined. Hence its fundamental act manifests the law of its freedom and not its freedom from law; hence, too, it shows not simply an outward order in Psychology but a self-ordering, not simply an outward restraint in morals, but self-restraint, not simply an outward government in institutions, but self-government. Therein the externality of law is always moving out of itself and becoming internal, and the tyranny of system is perpetually correcting itself, through an inner and not an outer revolution, the former of which

means a ceaseless unfolding within, while the latter is the shock of violence from without, whether this be political, physical, or psychical.

III. We shall, accordingly, apply the Psychosis throughout the present book as the only true method by which the freedom of the Will can be maintained in its pure movement, and at the same time can be brought into an order, or into a system, if you please; for there is no science of anything without some kind of a system. Liberty and order must be united; just that which is ordered is the free, self-active mind, which is also the orderer. The very essence of the Will is freedom, hence our subject by its very nature is strongly recalcitrant to any subordination of any kind; still the need is so much the greater, for the sake of freedom itself, which is always running the danger of flying off into chaos both theoretically and practically, both in a book and in a society.

When the psychologist throws in his distinctions at any place, without indicating their genesis or inner process, he is capricious, we might say, anarchic in his method; he abuses his freedom, which becomes license in his work. On the other hand, when the psychologist forces his distinctions from the outside at a given place in his exposition, because his theory demands that they appear just there, without the inner self-unfolding which is the characteristic of mind, he

is tyrannical, he is a psychological despot in the city of his science. Psychology, however, will endure neither the anarchist nor the tyrant in the long run; its true administration must not be chaotic nor despotic, subject neither to capricious freedom nor to iron necessity. Still it must have both freedom and necessity in their positive union, which is the Psychosis.

IV. It will be our object, therefore, to eschew the old expository method, as far as we may be able, the method which imports its distinctions into the science from the outside, and thus makes it wholly separative, unfree in its movement, determined externally by the capricious Ego of the expositor. This separative stage, which gives psychological distinctions, is indeed necessary to the science, but it must not be dragged in externally, it must be unfolded through the inner movement of the subject-matter; its distinctions, even when valid in content, ought not to be capricious in the ordering.

For instance, the distinction of Intellect into Sense-perception, Representation, and Thought, taken externally, is separative, yet they must be seen to be one process, which is that of the Ego itself. Out of every division unity is to be restored. Still the divisive act must be, the separation into activities or into the so-called faculties cannot be thrown out of psychology; but we must not stop with that, we must unify the mind,

which is also present in separation, by the Psychosis. For the Ego which is making divisions in itself, is one, and is to attain that oneness through its division, and is also to formulate just this process of itself as the basic principle of its method. Your Ego is not to leave out itself in distinguishing itself into Sense-perception, Representation, and Thought; on the contrary, it is always to come back to itself and behold its own process; thus it is the process of Self beholding the process of Self.

V. In like manner the scientific method (that of physical science) must be eschewed as alien to Psychology, specially alien to the Psychology of the Will; in fact, it notoriously leaves Free Will out of its horizon, having no concept or category, whereby it can account for or express the same. For this reason scientists as a body are, and cannot help being, determinists. To be sure they may in individual cases rise out of the limits of their vocation, which, however, is not easy. Really the Ego has to account for science, science cannot account for the Ego.

The scientificially trained man, when he enters the domain of Psychology is pretty sure to become the victim of his method. He is apt to take the procedure derived from Natural Science and clap it on anywhere and everywhere, to the free movement of the Ego. Who cannot see that Mr. Herbert Spencer is often completely

victimized by his system, especially when he enters a spiritual realm, like Ethics and Religion? The essential point is frequently left out, remaining probably unseen, because it does fit into the fore-ordained formulas of his system.

We make haste to apply the same criticism to a pre-established metaphysical method, which can proceed just as externally as a physical method. Both commit the same mistake though coming from opposite poles of thought. Every student will feel this difficulty sooner or later in the case of Hegel, though on many points sympathetic with the great thinker. His massive terminology is not infrequently thrust upon some domain of nature or spirit, regardless of inner development. The result is a tyranny of system which affects the free reader, somewhat as German militarism affects the free citizen.

Still we shall have to re-affirm that the Ego must have a system, if it is to have a science; but this system is to be its own, self-derived, not taken from physical or metaphysical systems external to it and hence alien. The system of Psychology must be a free one, generated out of the Ego by itself and imposed upon itself through itself. Thus the free system can become the system of freedom, and can unfold and formulate the Will, whose essence is just this freedom or self-determination.

So the danger of system is great, but the

danger of no-system is even greater, the latter being disorder, a headlong topple toward chaos. If the system is inadequate, let it be revised, or transformed, or supplanted by something better; but let us not rush to the opposite extreme and think of getting rid of all system — a state of mind which finds so much expression in these days.

In this book, therefore, we shall have a system, and not fail to make a strict use of it, but the very object of such a system is to secure, to order, and to formulate the absolute freedom of the Ego. Perfect order united with absolute freedom is the ideal striven for, though doubtless often unattained; still the effort is something, even if unsuccessful. Whenever the triplicity herein employed becomes burdensome, formal, cramping, it may be the fault of the author, and sometimes it is that of the reader; the exposition may get stilted and mechanical, not making the forms of thinking fluid to thinking; or the effort may not be given to understand it or make it real, by the spirit of the reader, whose function it is to fuse all this formulation into the pure activity of his own Ego. Be careful, then, not to be the victim of my system, which you will be, if you merely take its ordering externally and learn that by the way of memory and of information. All these distinctions and definitions belong to the separative stage of the

Ego, till the latter brings them back into the process of itself by an original fiat of its own. This is the reader's part, which no book can give him, however much it may stimulate him; his self-activity must come from himself, this being just what makes him an Ego.

System, then, is not to be abolished, in spite of much frantic declamation against it, but it must be elevated into a system of freedom. Especially is this requirement imperative in a book on the Will, whose essence is the self-determined.

VI. Very intense in certain quarters is the protest against the old faculty-psychology. But the protesters themselves will always be found, sooner or later, using its divisions. The truth is, we must have division, the faculties so-called; equally certain is it that we must see the mind as one and a process. Hence the strong demand is for a method which will give both sides and give them together — the separative and the unitary; a method which, in specializing the mind, reveals its oneness. We are not going to get rid of the old faculty-psychology, which is a genuine evolution of the ages; still we must supplement it by a procedure which will counteract its divisive, analytic, scattered character. The Psychosis, rightly seen into and applied, is intended to furnish all the division one wants and all the unity one wants; indeed it employs

these as stages of the fundamental process of mind.

The Will, which is the theme of the present work, belongs primordially to the separative stage of the Ego, as we shall soon attempt to show; still in this separation there is the total process of mind, which is also present in the method. The Will, though it be determined, must come back to itself, and thus be self-determined, too; both belong to its movement, and the procedure which leaves out one or the other, either the Determined or the Self-determined, or leaves them in an unreconciled opposition, must be pronounced inadequate.

In the present book we shall have to acknowledge the old faculty-psychology in its proper sphere; indeed we cannot well help ourselves, since from it is derived quite the sum total of psychological nomenclature. One of its terms is the word *Will* itself, as distinct from Intellect, we cannot well abolish the language of our science, which is indeed the growth of ages and is inwoven into the very texture of our thinking. Still we may very properly seek to remedy the one-sidedness of the old faculty-psychology, which so exclusively dealt in and dwelt in the separative stage of the mind, and thereby lost sight of the latter's unity. But the remedy does not lie in its abolition, which would leave us a unity just as one-sided as separation, but in the

process which gives full validity to both sides. This process, as already stated, is the method of the present work, explicitly formulated and employed in every portion.

VII. We cannot, therefore, bring ourselves to give up theoretical Free Will; just as little can we think of surrendering practical Free Will, as realized in moral conduct and in the institutions of civilization, specially in the State. The denial of inner liberty involves the denial of outer liberty; if there be no theoretical ground for individual freedom, there is no such ground for political freedom. The latter, indeed, springs from the former, as its eternal life-giving source. A discussion of Free Will is not purely a speculative play of idle minds; in these days man cannot think irrationally and act rationally; thought and action, Will and Intellect, must go hand in hand, and find their complete harmony and reconciliation in the deed. A free country rests upon a Free Will; a conviction of the excellence of free institutions comes not out of a belief in an enslaved volition. Determinism means absolutism in some form; assuredly it cannot be realized into the works of liberty, which signifies the self-determined. So in this inner realm of Will one can fling his banner to the breeze, inscribing on it the famous, all-compelling word, and "shouting the battle-cry of freedom."

The reader naturally tries to reach down, as soon as possible, to the fundamental fact of the Will. Let him bring before his mind his simplest action, he will be aware of a going forth out of himself, a separation within and a making of himself into an object of some sort. This is the primal manifestation of Will; the Ego as Will divides itself through its own inherent originative power of selfhood, and carries itself out into an action, which is different from itself as Ego, yet is its own, its very Self and essence.

At this point we undoubtedly have to think, and, to think the Will (or anything else), it must be seen in its process of creation, in fact creating itself. Let us, then, try to grasp the following statement: The Ego as Will passes with itself

over into the object, but just in such a separation and objectifying of itself, it remains truly itself. In such an act the Ego is original, indeed self-originative and is Will.

When I reach forth my hand to pluck a flower, there is a going forth of me out of myself, and a realizing of myself in an action; yet I remain one with myself in that action; if I divide within, and project myself into plucking the flower, I am the inner division and the outer deed. It is true that what I do is different from myself, yea, I make myself different from myself, still this difference is mine, is my Ego, or a stage of its process.

Here, then, we are trying to penetrate to the fundamental fact of the Will. We may now see it to be the stage of separation in the process of the Ego, the second grand phase of its movement, which has, in the complete science of Psychology, two other stages — one going before, which is Feeling, and one coming after, which is Intellect. The Ego as Will is, therefore, primordially separative, and this characteristic it will manifest through all its development, which is to be set forth in the following treatise. Herein lies its contrast with the sphere of the Intellect, which is essentially the return or the third stage of the Ego, though, of course, there is no intellection without volition. We are never to forget that every stage has in it implicitly all stages,

and thereby in its unfolding reveals the Psychosis, which is the total process of the Ego in each special activity, however minute this may be.

Will is, accordingly, involved in every act of consciousness, in the very nature of the Ego as subject-object. For we cannot be conscious without making ourselves an object to ourselves, without Will, whereby the Ego renders itself objective, actual. We must, therefore, see that before the Ego can know itself or know at all, it must make this self-separation, which is the primordial act of volition. Before all intellection must be Will, the Ego must *outer* or utter itself, must *other* or difference itself before it can return, which is the act of knowledge. Intellect presupposes the object, which it internalizes and so knows; but the Will has to go in advance and posit the object, or the world, ere the Intellect can have any content.

This fact has an important educational bearing, and is the ground for the maxim applied to the child: Learn by doing (Comenius). It must make the object, posit the same through the Will, ere it can understand this object. The act of creation is the act of Will, which then becomes the mind's store. The child must imitate, must do in order to be, must create in order to possess. Outer creation through the body is followed by inner creation through the mind. The Will is

the primordial separation of the Ego whereby the latter passes from potentiality to reality.

The Will is, therefore, the Ego as self-projecting — the Ego making itself different from itself, or making itself just the different, which, however, is still itself. Object, other, outer, external, different, are all terms going back to the Will as this primary process of the Ego. The Will is the world-maker, creator of all things, the origin of all origination.

And now we must mention a word which, in the present book, will be the main category to be applied to the Will. This is the word *determine* with its derivatives. As previously described, the Ego as Will makes itself object, other, different; it places a boundary line within itself upon itself; it limits itself, fixes, defines itself; this is what we shall name *determine*. Terminus was the old Roman God of boundaries; that people of the Will (the Roman) used him metaphorically in the act of *determination*. The preposition *de* seems to imply that the old God was an active Will-power, and directed from his site the Will of mortals; he is the might which governs volition. A family of words is born of the parent — *determining*, *determined*, *undetermined*, *self-determined*, and a number of others. Especially we shall employ that cardinal expression: *the Will determines itself* in many relations, for just that is the inherent character of the Ego

as Will. The subjective Ego making itself objective, realizing itself, determining itself, is the Will. Still further the Ego defining itself as real in the world is Will.

It may be well to mention here at the start, a possible ambiguity, which, in the English language, accompanies these terms. When I say, for instance, *I am determined to do it*, I mean in ordinary speech, I am resolved to do it; but this is not the signification above given, which is that something moves me to the act, and thus I am determined to project myself outward. Resolution puts the stress rather upon self-determination than upon determination, and regards the Ego more in its active condition than in its passive. The word *determinism*, however, emphasizes this passive condition of the Will, the fact of its being determined by a motive or some influence external to itself. Both meanings are known to English usage. Moreover the root gives the words *self-determined* and *self-determination*, which suggest by their very form the essence as well as the innermost process of the Will. They indeed furnish the pivotal thought of the Will, and its world.

What shall we embrace in the total sweep of the Will and the objectivity which it calls forth? It is a vast process of putting Self into the world and therein of making the world over into Self. The Will evidently has its beginning in the sub-

ject, but its very destiny is to become object. But when is it completely object? When it has realized itself in an existence which is also Will, and furthermore is a Will which wills just this realization of Will. That is, the end of the Ego as Will is to put itself in its total process into the world. This form of the Will, which is the ultimate, we shall see later to be that which goes under the name of Institutional Will. The three stages which constitute the Will and its world make the three grand divisions of the present work, and are as follows:—

I. The Psychological Will, and its world.— Psychics.

II. The Moral Will and its world.— Ethics.

III. The Institutional Will and its world.— Institutions.

The ground of this distinction is not to be seen fully till the end of the book, which proves, or ought to prove, the beginning. The last chapter properly mediates and vindicates the first chapter; still we have to begin with the first. A short description of each of the above divisions we may send out in advance.

I. The Psychological Will treats of the purely psychical side of the Will, and its world is the inner one; it is the Will as subjective. The Ego beholds its internal process as Will, and develops the same into all of its activities, each of which

shows the total movement of the Ego or the Psychosis.

The Psychological Will starts necessarily with the conception of the Will, or the Ego conceiving itself as Will through its own creative act, which act is itself Will in its primal genesis. From this stage the Will unfolds into its final stage, in which it determines itself to be the Self-determined, or the Free Will which has as its end and content the Free Will. This we may call the pure idea of Freedom as psychical.

II. The Moral Will takes up this purely psychical idea of Freedom and seeks to realize it in human conduct. The Ego as Moral Will has its ideal End, to the pursuit of which it readjusts and transforms all its activities. The Moral Individual endeavors to make real in the sum total of his actions the Free Will whose grand object is just the realization of Free Will. Life is to be moralized through and through by the ideal End, which is, in general, that freedom which is always securing and realizing freedom.

Not Pleasure, not Happiness, not even Benevolence is the foundation of moral obligation, or the true content of the Will in morality. The Free Will must have itself as its own supreme content and end, as the Highest Good. Man is to determine himself as the Self-determined in his conduct, in the total cycle of his deeds. Such is the moralization of life — the free individual

in his free inner world realizing himself in his outer acts. Still in the present realm of morality the Free Will is subjective and individual; next it must become objective and universal.

III. The Institutional Will is the Free Will as existent in the world, not only realized in individual conduct (which is the fact of the Moral Will), but actualized in an object which is itself a Free Will, and that too a Free Will which wills Free Will. Such an object, existent as a Free Will, we call an Institution, and the whole cycle of Institutions we name the Institutional World, as State, Family, Church, etc. Each of these we shall find to be in essence a Free Will not only actualized but also actualizing Free Will.

Naturally the meaning of these terms must be developed in the course of the following work. Here, however, we may note one or two distinctions. The Free Will *realizes* itself in individual conduct, and calls forth the moral sphere; the Free Will *actualizes* itself in an objective existence and calls forth the institutional sphere. We might also say that the Ego as Free Will *objectifies* itself in an action, but *objectivates* itself in an Institution.

Such, then, is the general outline, or the primal Psychosis of the task before us. Here we may append some observations.

1. The above three stages show, first, the Will as potential or subjective, which, unfolded

by the Ego in the form of knowledge, gives the Psychology of the Will or the Science of Volition; secondly, the Will as real, or moralized, which gives what is now called the Science of Ethics; thirdly, the Will as actual, or institutionalized, which gives the Science of Sociology in the broadest sense of the term.

Such are the three Sciences of which some account should be rendered in any treatise which has as its theme the Will. Books on Psychology as a rule contain a statement of the psychical activity of the Will alone; but all moral and institutional life, as well as the sciences pertaining thereto, must be seen to rest upon and to spring out of the Will's process. The Ego as Will has no meaning unless it makes itself object, that is, separating itself from itself and putting itself into the world.

2. Herein we may note the negative side of the Will. As already stated, the act of Will is the Ego making itself object and thus opposite to itself, that is, negative to the subject or Ego, which negation is involved in the very act of consciousness, and of determination. Spinoza expressed this when he said that "all determination is negation." So the Will is a tyrant by nature, hostile to the Self as such or as undetermined. Spinoza accordingly believed in negative control, or unfreedom. But the complete process of the Will overcomes this negative phase

of itself, and wills Will, wills itself specially in the institutional world, which is thus the realm of true freedom.

3. It is Fichte, as far as we are aware, who has most distinctly seen and expressed this connection between the second or separative stage of the Ego and the Will. (See his *Science of Ethics*, translated by A. E. Kroeger, published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., London.) The act of consciousness, in which the Ego makes itself object to itself, is with Fichte an act of Will: "I become conscious of myself only on condition of becoming conscious of myself as willing" (p. 25). Another sentence may be transcribed: "Only in so far as I find myself willing, do I find *myself*, and in so far as I find myself I necessarily find myself willing" (p. 27). But Fichte had no developed Psychosis, though he certainly knows of and expresses the threefold movement of the Ego. He could never get over Kant's Thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*), from which he was hurled back into his own subjectivity, the infinite flux of the spirit, out of which he seemed quite unable to bring any permanent form.

Fichte has little constructive genius; he meanders around in his Ego, through its darkest, most subtle passages, and finds many a hidden gem, yet all seems to close up after him, as if his road lay through water. Herein he is the direct

counterpart to Hegel, who, if anything, was over-constructive, building sometimes anyhow, when he had not the materials for his structure. He is, however, the mighty architectonic genius of the philosophic world.

4. The Will has a very important, in fact the most important place in the philosophy of Schopenhauer. The inner energy which manifests itself in all appearance is Will, according to him; mechanical, chemical, vital forces are but phenomena of volition. Schopenhauer identifies this Will with the Kantian Thing-in-itself, which for Kant and Fichte lay beyond the pale of knowledge, was unknown and unknowable. But Schopenhauer claims to have discovered just what this Thing-in-itself is, and it is Will. "Thing-in-itself is Will and Will only. * * * It is the innermost principle, the kernel of everything particular and likewise of the whole, it appears in each blind-working force of Nature, as well as in the deliberate action of man." (Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, p. 131, ed. Frauenstädt.) In contrast with Will is Representation (Image, Conception, *Vorstellung*), which is object as such or the appearance of Will in the world. "Appearance means Representation and nothing else" (same page as above). Schopenhauer's view of the Will has an advantage and a disadvantage over that of Fichte: he is not hampered by and penned up

in the purely subjective limits of the latter, but he does not trace and apparently does not see with distinctness the source of the Will in the process of the Ego, which Fichte does on the whole.

5. The most influential work on the Will which America has produced is that by Jonathan Edwards, which he called *A careful and strict Inquiry* into the Freedom of the Will. According to Edwards, Will is merely the power of choosing, "that by which the mind chooses anything." Such is, then, our only freedom, but even this is jeoparded in the proposition "that the Will is always determined by the strongest motive." Thus Edwards has in him the dualism of the Will to start with, and, as far as we can see, he is totally unable to get rid of it in spite of his labor. But of this later on.

PART FIRST.

The Psychological Will.

This Part embraces the first of the three general divisions of the present work, and treats of the psychical element of the Will taken by itself. That is, we are now going to look at the Will simply as a mental activity, not in its moral or institutional aspects; we shall regard its internal process rather than its external works, though these may be drawn upon by way of illustration. The complete movement of the Will as psychical, with its inner or subjective world, is the content of this portion of our science.

We must again repeat in this connection that the Will is the second or separative stage of the Ego, which in a volitional act projects itself out

of itself into externality, thereby making itself something real, a thing or object of some kind. This act of the Ego separating itself within itself we have called its determination, which still further divides itself into a multitude of forms or special activities, yet all of these have the one fundamental form or activity. Now the Ego in the Psychological Will is going to examine and to order according to its own inner principle (which is the Psychosis) the forms in which it is determined either through some outer stimulation or through its own native energy. This we may call the immediate stage of the Will, being regarded as it is in itself, as distinct from its externalized reality in works and actions. Undoubtedly the Will must act, to be Will; but the Psychology of the Will is the Ego as Intellect beholding the Will in action and identifying the same with itself, namely with the Ego. So we have a science of Volition in which the Ego contemplates the Will as a phase of the subjective Self, and arranges the same according to its own process.

The Psychological Will, being itself Ego, and being contemplated and ordered by the Ego, will reveal the inner movement of the latter, so often referred to as the Psychosis. This first stage of the Will, subjective, in a sense potential, must be seen constructing itself internally according to its own law, which will show its leading propor-

tions, its architectonic harmony. Herein again we have the threefold principle ordering the subject-matter as follows: —

I. The Conception of the Will or the Will as Conception. The Ego truly conceives the Will when it creates the Will, as the latter is in its essence. The Ego as Will has in this stage to create the Will by its own inner act, and to describe the process thereof. Since the Will is the moving of the Ego from within to without (self-projection, or indeed self-production), such movement is to be seized and unfolded in its Psychosis.

II. The will as determined, or the Determined Will. The movement or the determination is not wholly from within to without, from the Ego to externality, but likewise from without to within, from the external stimulus to the response of the Will in determination. Such external stimulus may be physical or mental, may be a sensation, emotion, idea; still it is outside of the special movement of the Will which is set a-going by it. This is the realm of separation between the movement of the Will and its stimulus, content or purpose.

III. The Free Will, or the Will as self-determined, which is not merely internal, but also external. This is the unification of the two preceding spheres in one process. The movement of Will from within to without makes a world of

Will, of actuality, which reaches its culmination in the institutional world (Family, Society, State) which is Will willing Will, and which therein returns to the Will within, completing the round and finishing the total work of the Will.

The immediate stage of the Will shows it as determined from within itself; the separative stage shows it as determined by something outside, something different from itself, by a world not its own; the third or redintegrative stage shows it as determined by is own world, which it has called forth, and which wills the primal Will.

The Psychological Will, accordingly, deals with the Psychology of the Will. We may also catch a glimpse of the fact that Freedom and Necessity of the Will are simply forms or phases in the total process of the Will.

The Psychological Will, accordingly, has three stages or divisions, which have been above set forth, but which we may emphasize by briefly repeating their captions.

I. The Conception of the Will.

II. The Determined Will.

III. The Free Will.

The reader is not to forget that these three stages, apparently so divided up and separated, are really one process, which the Ego is also to grasp. This development may also be named

the rise from spontaneity to freedom. We may consider the primordial act of Will, which is the first germinal process of the Self-determined within the Ego, as Spontaneous Will. This is the primal conceptive, creative, originative act, without which no Will is possible, round which cluster and out of which unfold all the complex acts of volition. Spontaneity is the first factor, is the basic Conception of the Will, its first generation in and through an act of consciousness. This is what we must next consider, putting the same into its due place in the psychological cosmos.

SECTION FIRST— CONCEPTION OF THE WILL.

The aim is at present to conceive of the Will, to generate it in one thought. Let the reader grasp the following statement and verify it in the laboratory of his own mind: the Ego, conceiving itself as Will, has to be Will in that very act, it wills itself into being through Conception. The thought is subtle, yet fundamental, and must be held fast: the true Conception of the Will is its creation through the original fiat of consciousness.

Conception is, in general, that act of the Ego which calls forth the object conceived, creating the same anew spiritually; it is not a mere abstraction, or a product of external generalization, but a genetic thinking of the thing in hand. It is Conception in its present sense, which seizes the inherent creative process of the object, making itself one with the same, identifying that process with its own.

In fact, all thought worthy of the name, in

thinking itself, that is, in an act of consciousness, is Will; thought has to create itself, and thereby come into being through the power of volition. You cannot think of Will, without willing in that very act; you must will to think in order to think Will; you must create the process ere you can have it and behold it.

An inner verification is the only possible one for this Conception of the Will. Let the student, then, repeat to himself and verify within: The Ego, conceiving Will, is Will in that very act of Conception. The Ego, in conceiving a house for example, is Will; only the Conception puts its stress upon the house or object conceived; but now the house (or external object) must be left out, and the Ego must whirl back, as it were, and seize its own act as its object or content. You must conceive yourself conceiving, which act is the primal separative act of the mind (Will) grasped by the mind (Intellect).

Will is primarily the separation within the Self, when the latter projects itself into an act. The Conception of the Will is that same Self beholding itself in the pure abstract form of an act.

Turning the matter over once more, we must see that fundamentally the Conception of the Will is just the Will as Conception; the Ego, seeking to conceive itself as Will, is the primordial volitional act; it must go through the process of volition in conceiving volition. Such is

the germ of the Will and its world, the unital creative fact out of which will evolve all the forms of the Will hereafter developed.

When Ferris conceived of his huge wheel, he first had the generative principle in his mind, then his Will clothed his conception with reality, transforming it from the ideal into the actual; the wheel turned around in his brain ere it began to revolve in the world. But now you are seeking to conceive, not of some product of the Will, but of the Will itself, whose reality is just its Conception in the present case, and whose Conception is its reality.

The Ego as Will, accordingly, utters itself, projects itself as object; the special word applied here is *determine*. That is, the Conception of the Will is the Ego determining itself, going through its process, its self-active power. Here, then, we shall have the Psychosis, the inherent activity of the Ego, as Will, beholding and going through its inner movement, before taking up into the same the external world.

I. The Ego as Will is the Undetermined.

II. The Ego as Will is the Determined and the Determining.

III. The Ego as Will is the Self-determined.

Such are the three stages of the conceptive Will, which are, however, but one movement, showing the fundamental process of the Ego. Yet the whole sphere of the Will essentially be-

longs to the second or separative stage of the Psychosis; the Ego primarily separates itself within itself in the basic act of Will, which characteristic remains throughout the entire sphere. Still the act of Will is just as well the total process of the Ego; the whole mind is present in the smallest mental activity; the conception of the Will is just the process thereof.

I. The Will as undetermined is in its immediate, unrealized stage. The infant has the Will which has not yet determined itself to any extent, but which soon begins its work. The infantile Will is undeveloped, a potentiality we say, merely the possibility of all determination, which is to be unfolded. But the mature mind has also many possibilities, which are daily realizing themselves, passing from the potential into the actual. Around all that we are is the vast fringe of what we may be; an unborn world of the Undetermined envelops the Determined on every side, quite to infinity; our unrealized Will always remains far more than the realized.

Here we may note also, as we shall see more fully later, that the Will has a tendency to return to the Undetermined out of the Determined; men in certain conditions become discordant with the existent order, which is a realm of determinations of various kinds, and they will to destroy the same; thus they seek to attain freedom, which,

however, is only a negative freedom. But the Ego as Will, even in negation, is something determined, is still determining itself in that very act, and is thus the Determined.

Indeed the inherent movement of the Undetermined, when brought into the process of thought, shows itself becoming the Determined. That is, it is determined as the Undetermined, wherein it gets its special determination, and so becomes the Determined. The Will cannot remain undetermined, else it were indeed no Will; its very essence is determination, it must be the special act, the Determined.

II. The Ego as Will is, accordingly, the Determined; it must separate itself within and go forth, it must utter or outer itself, in order to be active, which is to be itself. This primitive diremption is that of the Ego making itself object; the act of consciousness involves Will, is indeed the first Will; the separation into subject and object on the part of the Ego is the root of all volition.

Moreover this separation of the Ego as Will is the condition of external possession and mastery; I must get out of myself and go forth into the world ere I can have anything. Nay, ere I can have myself, I must take possession of myself in similar fashion; I must make a division within, and thereby determine myself. All action is the passing from the undetermined, undivided Ego

to the determined one, and must go through this stage of inner separation.

But the division has two sides: the Determined must have as its counterpart the Determining; both are within or subjective, as yet in Conception. Herein the second or separative stage of the Ego as Will shows most distinctly its dualism. We may note at this point the correspondence to the Ego as Consciousness, which divides itself into subject and object (see *Psychology and the Psychosis*, p. 19 *et passim*); so here the Ego as Will divides itself into the Determining and the Determined, which division also lies in the act of Consciousness.

The Ego as Will, therefore, far back in the first conscious act, in its very root, bifurcates into these two phases — the Determining and the Determined. But again we observe the process: that which determines is just that which is determined, that which divides itself is that which restores itself to unity. Such is the return out of separation — which stage is next to be considered.

III. The Ego as Will is the Self-determined, or the Self-determining, since both terms now mean quite the same thing; the Ego as Determined is also the Ego as Determining, and both sides have come together, not, however, as a dead unity, but as a living, active, yea self-active process. The complete act of Will has in it always

this process of self-determination. The simplest deed has such a movement coiled up in it as its very germ and generative principle; the Conception of the Will has herein finished its round, or cycle. For this Conception is the Will's originative movement, its very procreation; Conception must show the Ego generating the object which it conceives, and is what the philosophers have called speculative.

We may seek to grasp the present thought by some other designations. The Will in Self-determination has now attained individuality, which involves the going forth of Self and the coming back thereof, self-assertion and self-concentration. The Determined is now completely itself, since it is also the Determining; it is no longer something outside, something alien or *other*, but the movement of the Will itself.

Moreover, the three stages just designated may be taken as so many forms or definitions of freedom. The Undetermined, which is without any limits or determinations, is a freedom which is empty, without content, a mere possibility. The Determined is double: it may be freedom (as caprice) or may be servitude; a man may deem himself enslaved unless he can do just this and nothing else, or have just this and nothing else; that is, unless his caprice is satisfied, he is in a prison. But the true and complete Will is not the Determined, but the Self-determined; in all

its special acts it must come back to itself and so be free, through being truly itself and not something else.

The Conception of true Freedom is, therefore, the total process of the Will, not the vague indeterminate Will which is without limit or content; not the capricious or the enslaved determined Will; it is that Will which determines the Determined, or negates the Negative, yet does not remain negative in such an act, but becomes positive just therein. The Will has inherently a negative power, and is by certain philosophers grasped purely as negative, destructive, which view is the basis of pessimism. The Conception of the Will must rise out of this negative side, that is, must negate the same; thus its negativity is seen to be a positivity, and the Determined in the universe is found to rest upon the Self-determined.

Such is the movement of the Will as Conception; it is a Psychosis with its threefold process, and must be so grasped. Freedom is, therefore, a Psychosis also, at least concrete Freedom is such; hence comes the difficulty of defining it, that is, of determining it, since concrete Freedom is just that which transcends the Determined (here the Defined) and rises into the Self-determined. Still it must be defined, but in the right way.

The Conception of the Will is still subjective;

though it has arrived at self-determination, this is as yet internal, not realized, not actual in the world. It is the acorn but not yet the oak. The inner process has been revealed, which, however, finds itself limited and determined anew by an external world; this is the great outer realm of the Undetermined (by the Ego), which must be mastered by the Will. The Ego as Will, having already mastered itself, transforming its own determinateness into the Self-determined, must next proceed to transform the whole realm of externality into the Self-determined, thus clothing itself with a world as its garment.

Herewith we pass into a new sphere of the Will, the sphere of the Determined Will, or Determinism. But in that sphere we are to keep in mind the Conception of the Will which has revealed that the being of the Will must have an undetermined (potential) element, that the being of the Will must have a determined element, that the being of the Will must have a self-determined element, and moreover must have all three elements in one process, otherwise there is no Will.

Here we shall give a warning in regard to the use of the word *Undetermined*, which has two different aspects or relations. There is an undetermined Ego, as just set forth; then there is an undetermined world outside of the Ego. This external world we call undeter-

mined in relation to the Ego, since it is not determined by the latter, but determines it, specially through the senses. Thus the Undetermined, the world, becomes the determinant of the Ego, which is also the Undetermined before such determination. This process gives a phase of Determination, or of the Determined Will, as we shall see later under the head of Impulse, in which the undetermined world stimulates the undetermined Ego to determine itself or to act.

This nomenclature may be a little troublesome to the student at the beginning, as all nomenclature is, be it chemical, mathematical, or philosophical; still it is the only way to express science with any definiteness. So let the reader be patient in this, as he has to be in many other matters of learning.

Observations. Some general reflections we may add to the preceding development in a more discursive way.

1. The treatment of Conception as such belongs to the Psychology of the Intellect, for which reason we have sought to unfold it with some fullness in another place (see *Psychology and the Psychosis*, p. 478, et seq.). It has its own movement whose stages are there designated as the Universal (or Generic), the Particular (or the Special), and the Individual (or the Singular). The Conception of the Will has the same

stages, which, however, as stages of the volitional process, have their own names — the Undetermined, the Determined, the Self-determined. Still the two sets of terms have and must have a certain degree of interchangeableness; so we shall hear of the Universal Will (as abstract or undetermined), the Particular Will (as special or determined), and the Individual Will (which, being a return to the first stage with a content, is the concretely Universal Will, or the Self-determined). Conception goes back and seizes the primal origination which underlies the whole movement of the Will.

2. The Ego as conscious Intellect, or as subject-object, has its direct correspondence with the Ego as Will. The Ego as determining is the subject, the Ego as determined is the object; the Ego is union of the two, is subject-object as the complete process of consciousness; in like manner the Ego is the union of the Determining and the Determined as the complete process of the Will, which is the Self-determined, as just unfolded. Again we may note that the primary separative act of the conscious Ego involves Will as much as it does Intellect.

3. As this last point pertains to the unity of Intellect and Will, which has an important place in the history of Thought, we may expand it a little. This unity goes back to the simple act of consciousness, the first separation of the Ego

from itself, and the looking at itself. Which act is both a doing and a seeing, both volitional and intellectual or practical and theoretical, in one — that is, Will and Intellect in their primal process. All separation, distinction, differentiation, even negation, are fundamentally of and through the Will; the Ego making itself object, othering itself, is volition. Not without some reason has Will been regarded as the destroyer, the devil of the psychical universe, but that is not the whole of its character.

Thus we behold both Will and Intellect evolving themselves from the first act of consciousness, and constituting with Feeling the primary Psychosis of the Ego, and therein starting to organize the science of Psychology.

An educational remark on this subject may be here made. The Will in the psychical process is before Thinking, the one being separative and the other recognitive in essence. Intellect is fundamentally a return out of separation, which separation is Will. The child has to do before he learns, or rather he has to learn by doing; his Will must first act, his Ego must separate within itself ere it can return in the process of learning. Hence the child's impulse to imitation, it must act the object in order to know the same, for knowledge is a coming back to self after a separation.

4. The second or separative stage in the move-

ment is seen to be an inherent and necessary element of the Will, though it be the source of all finitude, along with evil, pain, and negation generally. The Buddhistic Will proposes to solve the problem by simply wiping out this second stage of the Will, and thus undermining the complete volitional act in its very germ. As Will necessarily springs from the act of consciousness, whereby the Ego determines and finitizes itself, the Buddhistic religion, in order to get rid of the finite and attain the infinite, which is God, has at last to get rid of Will itself, and also of consciousness. This final act of the Will is its own negation, and lands the individual into the will-less and the unconscious, which is the Nirvana.

The Buddhist has, accordingly, his form of renunciation, asceticism, moralism; he roots out desire, he defies suffering; he mortifies the flesh; he wills to get rid of the Will to live, not by suicide, for that does not slay the soul, or even the Will, but by slowly undoing, through a life of religious discipline, the separative stage of consciousness, which is also Will. He tries to solve his problem, not by passing through the third stage (the Self-determined) but by a lapse back into the Undetermined and Unconscious.

5. We must see, therefore, that, in the present sphere of conceptive Will, we are not only conscious of the act of Will, but that we cannot be

conscious without an act of Will, which, as it were, makes the breach or break into consciousness. The act of consciousness bears in itself the act primordial of Will, and the Ego, knowing itself, must know itself as Will just in this self-knowing. Here, in the first step, to know and to will are together in the one process.

Indeed the expression, *act of consciousness*, has in itself the above mentioned twofoldness as well as the process out of the same. First, it is an act (Will, separation); secondly, in such an act the Ego is conscious, which involves the return to self and the recognition, without which one is not conscious. Thus I cannot know myself without willing to know myself.

The idea of causality must be looked for just at this point. The Ego as Will is the first causality, which is thence transferred to nature, to body and to mind. Will is the primordial force, energy, cause, law; it is also selection, even natural selection, and is the fundamental principle running through quite all the categories of Natural Science.

6. In strong contrast with this inner Will as Conception is the outer environment in which it is placed, and which necessarily impinges upon it and stimulates it to action and reaction.

The whole encompassing world around me has to go through my body, and be transformed through my Will into reality. Nature through

a thousand channels pours in upon me, like wheat into a hopper, and I am to grind it over, and throw it out of me into actions. The passing view may make me laugh or weep; the clanking of chains may cause my organism to respond with a shiver; thus I am acted upon by an outer world, which drives me to act; I am determined to be self-determined. For unless my organism were self-moved it could not be moved to move itself. A stone, for instance, can be moved, but cannot be moved to move itself. Through the outer body and its stimulus, the Will becomes outer or uttered, a reality in the world. The Will as Conception, however, is the Will not yet real, not yet determined to the outer act; it is still the germ. But the Determined Will, at which we have now arrived, has its outer Determinant, its inner Determined, and the resultant action.

SECTION SECOND—THE DETERMINED WILL.

We are now to conceive of the Ego as Will placed in an external world which acts upon it from all directions. Whence comes this external world? A very important question, but not to be answered here; at present we shall have to take for granted this external world with the Ego as Will put into it, into its heart as it were. Such are the two fundamental pre-suppositions of Determined Will.

But we may say that the great object of this external world is, in its present relation, to compel the Ego as Will to freedom. That inner purely ideal Conception of the Will already considered is to be made outer, real, through being determined by nature to be self-determined; nature forces man to be free or to perish. The full development of this thought, however, lies far ahead; it is, in fact, the outcome and conclusion of the present work.

It is well to note at the start the two main

words of this caption — the words *determined* and *Will*. They are in thought opposed to each other and thus express the complete dualism and contradiction of the present sphere; this contradiction has, however, to be united in the one process. The two permanent factors are the *determined* and the *self-determined*, both of which must be present in any exposition of the topic before us, which is often called Freedom of the Will and quite as often Determinism, according to the bias of the expositor. We shall try to give due validity to both elements, which may be combined in the expression: I am *determined* to be *self-determined*, which is the fundamental statement of the Determined Will.

In the previous section the leading fact is that the Ego as Will has determined itself, or is the simple Self-determined, which lies in the primordial act of consciousness. But the Ego now finds itself in an external world and hence finds itself determined from the outside, by nature. In Conception, as just treated, it knew itself as internally free; but in the present sphere it begins to find itself unfree, limited on many sides. Such is indeed the scission which faces it throughout this second stage, truly the separative one, being that of the Determined Will, whose whole effort and movement will be to get rid of its own inner contradiction.

The Will, accordingly, must proceed to make

itself real through its own essence, which is the Self-determined; the Will is just the realizer and nothing else; the realizer must realize himself in order to be himself. The Will has shown itself internally, ideally free, in the previous stage of Conception; now its process is to become really so. It has conquered its own inner determinateness as subjective Will; now it must, as self-determination, conquer this new outer determinateness, must make the same its own and thus become a reality; what is *other* to it must be taken up and transformed. The Determined Will, accordingly, has as its end the getting rid of its own determinateness, the freeing itself of the Determined, when, of course, it will be no longer Determined Will, but Free Will. Such is the end toward which we have now set out, with certain intricate labyrinths to be gone through on our path.

We have here introduced the important element of *end*, which in one form or other will stay with us. The universal end of the Will is to transform the world which is other to it or different from it, into its own determination; it impresses upon all externality, being itself external to the same, its own character. What is outside of it must be wrought over and made inside, in one form or other. Or, as in the present sphere, the Will as self-determined, when it finds itself determined, must show itself to be self-

determined, and so determine the external object over against itself by its own end, and thereby make the same a part of its domain. Such is the realization of the Will, the end being carried out and made objective; thus the grand end of the Will, even as determined, is to realize itself, to vindicate its freedom.

It will be obvious why the present sphere has been the great battle-field between the two sets of opponents on the subject of Will, who commonly are known under the names of Determinists (or Necessitarians) and Libertarians. Both sides have ground for their arguments, each can claim a part of the process of the Determined Will, but neither seems to get hold of the total process, which is the true solvent of the difficulty.

The Determined Will is, in the first place, Will; that is, it has the power of origination, of self-activity, else indeed we could not call it Will. Yet it is also determined, is moved from without, herein we behold the contradiction which lies in all Determinism. There must be the primordial act of self-separation of the Ego, else there is no Will; still this primordial act of the Ego, which is its self-determination, is made to function from an external source.

These two elements we find in the simplest act of Will. I reach forth my hand and pluck a flower; the presence of the object stimulates me

to the act. The flower determines me indeed, but determines me to determine myself, that is, determines me to the primordial self-separation of the Ego which is Will.

We can, therefore, say, that in this sphere of Determined Will, *the Ego as Will is determined to determine itself.* But the next question rises: Through what is it thus determined? Only through some phase or form of its own movement, of itself as process. Herein we catch the fundamental movement of Determinism, which will unfold the different ways whereby the Ego as Will is determined to determine itself. These ways are manifold, almost infinitely diversified; but they all show and must show, that one process of the Ego which we have called the Psychosis.

Now the Ego as Will has already revealed in the preceding section its fundamental Psychosis— the Undetermined, the Determined, and the Self-determined. These, then will constitute the three leading stages of Determinism (the sphere of the Determined Will), making the divisions of the subject in hand and also forming its unity. They may be formulated as follows: —

I. *Impulse;* the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined through the Undetermined.

There are three constituents or factors entering into this formula, two of which are the permanent ones belonging to all Determined Will,

while the third is the variable one and characterizes the special sphere of Impulse.

II. *Desire;* the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined through the Determined.

Let the student note again the three factors, two of which are permanent and belong to the total sphere of Determined Will, while the variable factor is what transforms this sphere into Desire.

III. *Choice;* the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined through the Self-determined.

Here again the formula is seen to contain the two permanent factors of Determined Will, while the third factor is variable, and, united with the other two, constitutes Choice.

Note the movement in all three divisions, as well as through all three, since thus the structural character of the Will, its architectural principle, is brought out into strong relief, as it is the builder and the built.

Such are, then, the three stages in the process of the Determined Will — Impulse, Desire, Choice. Observe that in this sphere two factors are constant, both of which are embraced in the statement already employed: The Ego as Will is determined to determine itself. Here are the Determined and the Self-determined interlocked as it were in one act of thought, being the aforesaid constant factors. But the third factor is the variable one, and is what brings forth the

various kinds and degrees of the Determined Will. That is, I can be influenced to act (determined to be self-determined) by an Impulse stimulating my organism, or by a Desire of something imaged in my mind, or by a Choice between two objects of Desire. Many illustrations of these statements will be given later, as well as a full development of their meaning; just now, however, let us note again and keep in memory the two constant factors and the variable factor of Determined Will.

The reader's attention is once more called to the preceding formulas, which are with design set forth in language somewhat exact and exacting. In each expression will be found the process of the Will with its three principles — the active or the determining, the passive or the determined, the self-active or the self-determined. Such is their oneness; but the difference between them should also be noted; each stage has its own way of being determined. In the sphere of Determinism, the Ego as Will is acted upon that it be self-active; herein lies the unity of this sphere. But the Ego as Will is acted upon (determined) in various ways; herein lies the difference, the division and classification of this sphere.

We should observe, too, that, while each of the formulas above given is a Psychosis in itself, all three taken together constitute likewise a Psychosis. As before indicated, the process lies in

the determining principle, in that which determines the Ego to be self-determined, which process, we may again remind the reader, is threefold, the very movement of the Ego as Will, a fact already developed under the Conception of the Will in Section First.

Perhaps a word may be here in place, giving a reason for the rather stiff formalism of the preceding exposition. The Will has a strong mechanical side, it is indeed the mechanical phase of the mind as such, being, as it were, the machine thereof, the working principle, which must go according to an order. Yet, on the other hand, the Will is also the machine-maker supremely, first of all originating itself, or, as we say, self-determining. So it is the machine which ultimately makes all machines, and even has to make itself as machine-maker. The rigid mechanical working of a treatise on the Will is derived really from the theme, and must at least be sympathetically accepted by the reader who wishes to penetrate to the soul of the matter.

Undoubtedly there is much impatience expressed in these days at such "metaphysical jugglery." But impatience is not the attitude of the fair-minded man toward anything, nor is it a very good foundation for criticism.

Note. This seems to be the best place to insert a note on a subject which naturally rises in the

mind at the present conjuncture, but which lies somewhat outside of our contemplated task, and impinges on another realm of thought.

It has been said that the Ego as Will finds itself determined by a world outside of itself, which it is to transform into its own end. A ready-made world evidently — what is its character? Why should it so responsively yield to our Will, or yield at all? Yet seemingly this is just its quality in the present relation: it is formable by Will, penetrable to the purpose and end of Will. The material object which I take in hand subserves my plan, obeys me, has a kind of loyalty to me, when I get on the right side of it; after some struggle at first, it submits to my Will; why should it? What is in me or in it, that we thus come together and fraternize? The difference is manifest; Nature, the material world, taken by itself, is quite the opposite of Will as the self-determined; it is the determined, it has not its center in itself, being ruled and moved from the outside. We may, therefore, say that its chief predicate is the Determined; but determined by whom or what? This clod is determined by gravity, but the earth itself is a clod determined by gravity, so is the solar system. The external world is the Determined, dependent on another than itself.

The Determined, however, can only be through a Will, which determines it, for the reason that

it is determined. But I know that my individual Will did not make this material object as determined; what did? It must have been another Ego as Will, the Divine, Universal Will as absolute Self-determination, veritably the Will of the Universe. This, as Ego, as self-consciousness or self-objectification, must determine itself as other to itself, as the Determined. The Divine Ego, the Will of the Universe, also differentiates itself, it has difference within itself and so is different from itself, just in the process of its own Self. The Divine Person is the center and the circumference of all things, both separately and in unity. The Universal Will as the absolutely Self-determined, must posit the world as the Determined. This is the world into which the finite human Will is born, and through which it must unfold and get itself. The characteristic of such a world is, therefore, the Determined completely and absolutely, it is the Determined of God himself.

Moreover since it has been determined, created, produced, it has just this capacity in it as fundamental, it is capable of being determined, created, produced. That which is determined by the Divine Will must be determinable, is indeed just the determinable in the Universe; that which he creates must be absolutely creatable. So it follows that the external world is permeable to the Will through the divinely creative act, it must

receive the Will as the originative power of the Universe, it is transformable by the Will, being made so by the Supreme Will.

You have really to will God's will in transforming this piece of rock into a grindstone, which has in it your Will. The rock is given you, is a created object, is a Determined by nature, we say, or by nature's Creative Will. But when you change its form and purpose, you determine it anew, your Will creates it over, and it accepts and responds to your Will by its very essence, which is the being determined by Will. As God objectifies himself in the world, so do you objectify yourself in this fragment of His world, making it over through your Will into a grindstone. In doing so you perform afresh His creative act, you have to will his Will in making the humblest fabric of your hands. Not consciously done is such work; still unless you followed the Creative Will, the material would be absolutely impenetrable to your Will.

Undoubtedly the material remains, you do not make that, whatever be its transformation. The grindstone is still a stone, though filled with your purpose. Such is the permanent element in all the change; the Divine Will in its self-objectification is ever present even in the piece of matter transformed by you, indestructible, yea, co-operating always with your Will in its act of self-objectification.

We may note here in passing that not only can you make a grindstone for your own purpose out of the God-given material, but you can make an image of the Divine Giver of the same in his creative act. When man makes out of the stone the divine maker of the stone, he has risen to the realm of Art, whose supreme function is to reveal through the senses the divinely Creative Ego unto mankind. This Universal Will making the world is also made over by the human Will, which thus becomes Artist, Poet, Thinker, according to the material and the manner in which it works and embodies its conception of the Divine.

It was a famous saying of Malebranche that we must see all things in God; in a like significance it must be declared that we must do all things in God. As all our cognizing is a re-cognizing, so all our doing is a re-doing. The material object before us drives us anew to will God's Will; a divinely determined world determines us to be self-determined. The Supreme Will is also the Determinant and the Determined, which latter is the world, through whose mastery we rise into a unity with the Divine Determinant, with the act of the Supreme Will world-creating. But we have to overcome or rather re-create the Determined, even if it be the divinely Determined, in order to attain our spiritual heritage, our freedom.

This determined world, we may call it nature, in which I am placed without my act, determines me, the Ego; it limits me on every side. That I feel to be contrary to my true being, I must be self-determined, limit-transcending, free; thus the struggle of life and liberty begins here. I have to transform the Determined, though it be the divinely Determined, by determining it anew, so that I be not externally enslaved by it, but be liberated from it through my own act. Wherein we see that the grand destiny of man is not only to be free, but to make himself free, to create his freedom every day from the Determined.

But such a work is a process, multiform, labyrinthine, yet transparent, ordered, and realizable. Specially it is the process of what we have called the Determined Will, the thread of which we shall now pick up again.

I. Impulse.

I am passing through the forest, of a sudden I see a dead limb of a tree dropping down upon me. I make a spring, or at least I dodge *immediately*, without reflection, I cannot help performing the act. That is, I am *impelled* to do so, and thus I have an *Impulse*. If I am going along the road and hear a bullet whizzing just above me, I duck my head at once, making the

movement without my own knowledge or consent. In the one case I am reached through the sense of sight, in the other through the sense of hearing; in both cases I am said to have an Impulse, which, in the instances just given, is a sensational Impulse, as will be hereafter seen.

In dodging the bullet, I am moved by an object coming from the outer world; I have nothing to do with sending the bullet which moves me to act. This outer world, by me undetermined, is, therefore, the determinant of my act; I am impelled to move (to determine myself) by something over which I have no control. Or, to state the formula of Impulse, *the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined by the Undetermined.*

But Impulse has in itself a process, it is not something absolutely fixed and crystallized. At first the Ego as Impulse has its determinant in the outer world, but its whole movement is to get hold of this external determinant and to control the same. Impulse is seeking to master itself. Though it be the very nature and definition of Impulse to have its determinant outside of itself, still it is impelled to control itself therein; Impulse impulsely seeks to master Impulse. This fact we shall illustrate more fully later on.

Let the student, then, grasp and bring before his mind the real character of Impulse: it is a battle between the organism (or the organic

Ego) and the determinant (the outer determined world), the question being, which shall have control. There will be at the start a complete yielding of the organism to the outer determinant: then there will be the struggle between the two sides, the organism seeking to inhibit this outer determinant within itself; finally, Impulse will sally forth out of the organism into the external world and attempt to get hold of the determinant in the latter's own field.

Thus the cycle of Impulse is completed. The organism or the organic Ego is at first controlled by the determinant, but it sweeps back and finally controls the determinant, when the process of Impulse is brought to a conclusion.

By the organic Ego we mean, in general, the Self-determined as vital, as animate existence. It is the lowest form of Will, the sensuous substrate thereof, absolutely necessary for a beginning, but something out of which the Will is to rise more and more toward freedom. My body has self-movement, having the power of locomotion within; to this extent it is self-determined and has Will, in common with all animals.

We recollect that in the primal conception of the Ego as Will, there was also the Undetermined, which was internal, a phase of the Ego. Upon this inner undetermined Ego as Will, the outer undetermined world impinges, and the resultant is an activity which we call Impulse.

In general, we may then say that in Impulse the undetermined world determines the undetermined Ego to determine itself. The whizzing bullet, coming from the outside, hence not determined by me, determines me to dodge, to an act which springs from my organic ability to determine myself. A tree cannot impulsively dodge or make a movement from within outwards by a change of place. Thus the outer or undetermined world (in general here called the Undetermined) moves the Conception of the Ego as Will (see p. 41) to its process, that is, determines the undetermined Ego to be self-determined, which statement contains the three factors of the Conception of the Will (Undetermined, Determined, and the Self-determined). Note carefully in the present sphere of Impulse that the *undetermined* world is not to be confounded with the *undetermined* Ego, but that the two are brought together as opposites and produce through the organism the phenomenon of Impulse.

The organic mechanism, which Impulse brings into play, is made up mainly of three parts: the sensory and motor nerves, and their union in the cerebro-spinal center. The stimulation from the outer world is received by the sensory nerve of a sense organ, is carried to the cerebro-spinal center, and then is transferred to the motor nerve, which moves some muscle of the organism. In the case of dodging the bullet there was

no conscious intervention of the Ego, the organic Ego acted immediately, making the direct transfer from the sensory channel into the motor. This is usually called reflex action.

In the process of the Determined Will or Determinism, two factors are constant, but the third is variable, and has the movement of the Psychosis. Still this third, the Undetermined, has in itself difference, and will influence the Ego in various ways; or, to revert to the wording of the formula, the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined by the Undetermined in several modes. These modes of the Undetermined influencing the Ego we shall try to order in a series, in which we may again behold the Psychosis as the generative principle.

There will be, accordingly, three stages in the process of Impulse, which are, briefly outlined, as follows:—

I. The primary stage is simple Organic Impulse, in which the organism is at one with itself, and which executes itself immediately in response to the stimulating world (the Undetermined by me). This stimulating world determines the different ways in which the organic Impulse may be excited.

But this stimulus can interfere with the total process of the organism, and so produce pain, which rouses a new kind of Impulse.

II. The second stage is the Inhibitory Impulse,

which seeks to prevent, negate, inhibit the stimulus coming from the stimulating world (the Undetermined by me). It is still an Impulse, which, however, seeks to inhibit an Impulse; thus Impulse divides within itself and turns against Impulse, hence this is the separative stage. When Impulse can not only negate Impulse, but control it as well, we have reached a new stage; from the negative Mastery of Impulse, we have come to the positive, which is next.

III. The third stage of Impulse is the Mastery of Impulse, therefore a kind of self-mastery, in which the Impulse is to control Impulse. This is a return to positive or active Impulse, but not in its first immediate form; it has now within itself the power of self-inhibition. The stimulating world has in the present stage roused the process of Impulse to master Impulse; or, the externally determining world rouses the organism (or the organic Ego) to a kind of self-determination.

The Mastery of Impulse, therefore, means the Mastery over Impulse by Impulse; Impulse is both the mastered and the master, or the self-mastered. Note the process in it: (1) the immediate organic Impulse; (2) the inhibition of the immediate Impulse; (3) the Impulse which is both executive and inhibitive and hence self-controlling. This last stage is often deemed not

to be Impulse, since it means the suppression of Impulse, but it means the assertion thereof also; all moral beings must have often an Impulse to put down Impulse.

Still we should observe that we are on the threshold of a new transition at this point — the transition out of Impulse into Desire. When the Ego as Impulse is the determinant of Impulse, inhibiting it, or calling it forth, we are manifestly getting out of the sphere of the Undetermined by the Ego, into the Determined by the Ego, whereof the treatment comes later. At present we shall develop the chief details pertaining to the subject in hand, which is Impulse.

The fundamental thought of Impulse is contained in the statement: The Ego as Will being *undetermined* at the start, is *determined* to be *self-determined* through the *Undetermined*. The reader is often inclined to ask: Why such a formulation, which is hard to understand and sounds like a jingling rigmarole? Let him think of the phraseology and he will find that these words interlink in meaning and sound, suggesting through both the process, its oneness as well as its difference.

We may compare a different statement yet with the same meaning: the mind, before *unmoved*, is *influenced* to *action* by the *outside world*. The italicised words correspond in both

statements. The latter may be called a rhetorical or popular statement, intelligible to everybody, while the former is a technical statement, intended for a strict scientific treatment of the subject.

Now, if one is plainer than the other, why not take the plainer? Because the formulated statement, though more difficult at first, links together into unity the whole subject-matter through its terms, while the popular statement leaves out the nexus which is given by the nomenclature. The common root-word *determine* utters the oneness throughout the whole sphere of Will, while its prefixes and suffixes express the varied differentiation in the same sphere.

I. The first stage is Organic or Executive Impulse, in which the Ego as Will is stimulated or determined to a movement or action immediately through an affection of the organism, which may receive its stimulus from within or from without itself. The execution is immediate, not inhibited; or, the motor discharge takes place without any intervention of the conscious Ego. The undetermined world outside thus passes through the body, and determines it to Impulses of various kinds; doubtless every stimulating object stirs the Will to some form of re-action, which, coming from the senses, is often called senso-motor.

We shall designate these stages of Organic Impulse — the automatic, the sensational, and the emotive.

1. We may first take notice of those movements of the corporeal organism called automatic, which seem to come and go at random. The chick in the shell is found to be active, and the fœtus in the womb has its struggles. The child in its play moves from such an inner impulse, which is a necessity of its growth; the organism must be continually transcending what it already is. The young of all animals show this automatic, almost tireless yet apparently purposeless activity, the organism being driven to act from within itself. But such activity is not purposeless, the physical body must realize itself, and it organically determines the Will to such self-realization. The total organism has in itself a stimulus, which produces the impulse to pass from its potential state to its reality; it proceeds of itself, automatically, self-moved, to fulfill its destiny as an organism.

It is manifest from the above instances that the stimulating object and the stimulation are in complete unity, not separated into an external and internal stimulus. The organism seems to be, first of all, its own immediate stimulus to activity. The infantile body moves through itself out of itself; life has in its primordial movement the faint germ and far-off reflec-

tion of self-consciousness. But this unity is only a germ, implicit, unconscious, immediate, which is next to be seen separating within itself, and thereby unfolding into a new stage.

2. Herewith we come to what may be called Sensational Impulse, which is Impulse determined through sensation. The separation is now marked; the stimulating object and the stimulated organism, which gives a sensation, are the two distinct elements, which determine to the impulsive act. An external world impinges upon the senses, which in turn impel the action.

Sensational Impulse has, accordingly, for its stimulus not the total organism, but some specialized part of it, some sense, which is stimulated by something external. Every sensation taken up by the body has probably a motor effect or response. Put an object into the hand of the infant, it will contract and clutch; the sensation at that part rouses the immediate response. The new-born babe starts to breathing at once, doubtless through the fresh stimulus of the air; the sunlight will draw its eye; it will suck and swallow, if something be held to its lips.

Such immediate responses of the organism to a stimulus are often called reflex actions, which are without the intervention of a conscious purpose. The eyelids shut unconsciously when a blow is seen descending; the movement is an im-

mediate response to the sensation. Such activity is often said to be involuntary, which means that the Will is determined to act (or to be self-determined), through something not determined by itself — here a sensation stimulated by an external object. In this case the Will acts, but acts through Impulse, which signifies that its motive power is not its own, but something outside of itself.

As the human body is a vast inlet of sensations, so it is also an outlet of corresponding movements, which fact indicates the endless variety of Impulses. Touch, the most general sense, has its motor counterpart, and each special sense has its special movement. The afferent nerve may bring in a sensation and the efferent nerve may carry out a motion, but the conversion of one into the other is psychical, is an act of Will, even though it be sometimes called involuntary. Such an act of Will is an Impulse, which is a determination through the Undetermined.

Very simple is the case of the eye bathing itself in water to wash away an intruding particle of dust. But Impulses have a tendency to become complex in their grounds, and we are continually making new Impulses. I look at my watch and see the hour, at once I grasp for the clothes brush. Why just that Impulse? It is time to give a lesson, and I must appear

decently; still further, I have had a tendency to forget just this little duty, and have been compelled to make a special resolve of this kind: First of all brush your coat. Thus many experiences and thoughts may lie unconsciously between a Sensation and an Impulse.

It is plain, therefore, that a latent sensation or a chain of latent sensations may help determine the Impulse. The real sensation starts a chain of latent ones, which at last determine the act. Thus our Impulses become often very complicated, and our immediate outer sensation, stimulating inner latent sensations, brings about a remote reaction.

3. Emotive Impulse we name the next phase of Organic Impulse in general. Not only an outer sensation, but an inner one also may have a motor reaction. Such an inner sensation is that of hunger or thirst, each of which has its special location in the organism, and determines the Will to activity.

In Sensational Impulse we saw the sensation becoming internal in the form of latency, which latent sensation requires to be stimulated and started by an external sensation. But now the inner sensation requires no external stimulus; there is felt a lack, a breach, a defect; something is wanting in hunger and thirst and in appetite generally. This inner sensation moves the Will to supply the deficiency, thus begetting

the form of Emotive Impulse, whose stimulus proceeds from within the organism itself. That is, the organism furnishes its own stimulus, through its own inner separation and interference with itself.

Thus we have passed in review the three stages of Organic Impulse, as determined by the nature of its stimulus — the automatic, the sensational, and the emotive. In the latter specially we have found the stimulus to be a deficiency, which moves the Will that it be supplied. Now, if this deficiency be excessive, there sets in a new affection of the organism called pain, which becomes a new stimulus followed by a new Impulse. In like manner, in a sensation, if the stimulus be excessive, there results pain, or at least the disagreeable. The prick of a pin produces not only an impulsive reaction, but the stimulus remains in the form of pain.

Now this excess of stimulus, this pain which the reaction of the organism does not take away immediately by its impulsive movement, and which thus remains, calls forth another kind of Impulse, which seeks to inhibit the stimulus or the pain. That is, an inhibitory Impulse sets in, which moves to reverse or to undo the stimulus in some way. The immediate response to a pin-prick is a jerk, or possibly an outcry; but the pain continuing, we seek to inhibit both the jerk and the outcry, and at the same time to get rid of the pain.

II. This brings us to the Inhibitory Impulse, which is an inner impulsive reaction against the outer organic reaction. Thus the Impulse in its process separates within itself, and reverses itself; the first immediate response it undoes, if the stimulus continues. Very important and significant is this inhibitory power which seems even organic in part; the animal has it and can become stoical to pain; the mule in particular you may belabor cruelly and still you may not be able to make it respond except by a twitch; and the inhibitory power of a balky horse will thwart any persuasive means known to man.

The inhibition is still an Impulse, though in the human subject the higher activities of mind, thought, reason, duty, may play in. The Ego as Will is determined to act (that is, to be self-determined) by the Undetermined, which is now not simply the organic stimulus, but also the reversal of that stimulus. It is true that the first stimulus remains in the form of pain; there is an interference with the organic process, an interruption of function, which is painful or perchance only disagreeable. The Undetermined is, therefore, still present and active, yet limited, inhibited, at least up to a certain point.

In physical pain, therefore, there is a conflict between the total natural healthy process of the organism and the stimulus, which enters from the outside interferingly; the immediate bodily

reaction cannot get rid of the producing stimulus, which thus keeps up its work of interrupting the organic process. The result is, the organism struggles with the intruder, writhes, is restless, and, as we say, in pain, being in a state of separation with itself. It tries to get rid of the interference, and therein reveals the Inhibitory Impulse, which again can be looked at and ordered according to the nature of its stimulus.

The sensational stimulus in its excess produces pain, and therewith evokes the Inhibitory Impulse. A wound, being an interruption of the organic process, causes a painful sensation, which may at first call forth a shout or a paroxysm, but which, being continued, the Will seeks to inhibit, in proportion to its strength and development. The organism naturally is in agreement with itself, in a state of equilibrium; the stimulus is what produces the disagreement, disturbs the equilibrium. Resistance to such disturbance the organism makes through itself, seeking to negate the same, for this Inhibitory Impulse is really the negation of a negative in the physical body.

Mark again that this inhibition is not wholly a conscious act of Will, though it may be partially so; it is still an Impulse, and organic. The undetermined element (that which is not determined by the Ego as Will) continues present in the stimulus, though the latter be now restricted, opposed, reversed. We can, how-

ever, see that the Will is beginning to determine the Undetermined, though from the outside as yet.

The emotive stimulus produces pain not only in its excess but in its deficiency, and in both ways calls forth the Inhibitory Impulse. The sensational stimulus (just considered) works pain by being excessive, in contrast with the emotive stimulus which works pain in two directions. Hunger is such a stimulus, which may become the source of pain by the lack of gratification or by a surfeit, by deficiency or by excess.

There is an inhibition upon eating and drinking set by nature; the bird and the wild animal are, on the whole, not intemperate. All appetites have this double character, with the possibility of the double pain, which is thus divided by the twofoldness of the stimulus, which twofoldness again calls forth the double prohibitory Impulse. The organic Inhibition thus reaches upward and downward, meets and negates excess and deficiency, bringing the organism back to its harmonious round, to its uninterrupted total process.

In the movement of organic Inhibition we can also observe the working of the Psychosis, which shows in this sphere the immediate, the separative, and the returning stages.

1. The most direct, or the immediate form of organic Inhibition, takes place within the body;

the stimulus, interrupting the organism and producing pain, is inhibited, primarily by the organism (though often reinforced by conscious volition); be it automatic, sensational, or emotive, the Impulse is inhibited immediately by an Impulse, also organic at the start. The stoical resistance to pain may be classed here.

2. The separative form of Inhibition is seen when the stimulating object outside the body is inhibited — not appropriated and possessed, but removed, inhibited. It is mainly sensational Impulse which calls forth the present form of Inhibition. The chief point here to be noticed is that the organism, or some member of it, stimulated by some external object, sweeps forth and brushes away, or turns aside and avoids the cause of the stimulation.

3. The third form is the Inhibition of the Inhibition, the negation of the negative, if you choose to think the matter under such terms, or the return of the organism to its settled undisturbed process after the interruption. We may call this also Impulse, since the organism seeks of itself to return to its own harmonious life after interference and inner separation. Such is, then, the movement of organic Inhibition in its threefold sweep; it performs its function of undoing the destructive element of stimulation, when it comes back and undoes itself. Herein we see the purpose and the

outcome of the Inhibitory Impulse: the restoration of the organism from the negative power of the stimulus. Thus we bring before us the battle of the body; the stimulus assails it in one way or other, it turns upon the attacking foe and repels the assault. This is done by Impulse, not through conscious purpose; the organism in its own might and action, will defend itself when assailed. Still, we have here a manifestation of Will, though in its lowest, most trammeled form, being determined to act through a stimulus so largely external.

Undoubtedly this restoration may not take place at once, or even very soon, but only after long and many struggles, and after many means have been employed in aid of the inhibition. A protracted case of illness is an instance; the organism is attacked, it resists, but it has to be supported in its resistance by many auxiliaries in the shape of medical attendance, nursing and remedies. Yet all these may avail not, the assault may arise, must arise in the end, which is death.

At present, however, we are dealing with the organism as restored; it has passed through the negative might of the stimulus and has reached wholeness again, which is health. The process of recovery is pleasant, being an overcoming of pain, of organic interference and separation. Pleasure is, in its more concrete form, just this

process of restoration from its opposite, being mediated through pain, though we grant that there is also an immediate pleasure which is antecedent to such a process.

But we have now recovered the total organism from its inner scission and conflict, it stands before us whole and triumphant. Herewith it begins to manifest a new kind of Impulse embracing this wholeness of the body and springing from a new kind of stimulus. This is the third stage in the movement of Impulse, which we have designated as the mastery of Impulse, which mastery, however, is still an Impulse, yet involving the inhibition of Impulse.

All these stages of inhibition are manifested in many facts pertaining to the child. At first, the infant will suck almost any object placed between its lips; there is an immediate response to the stimulus. But it soon begins to inhibit this response, it will suck only a certain object, the mother's breast, and will inhibit even this stimulus; yet it will also inhibit the inhibition and suck again, when it is hungry. In all of which we see the first immediate response to the stimulus, then the inhibition of such response, then the inhibition of the inhibition — the three acts taking the form of Impulses. In the given case the immediate Impulse of sucking is controlled by the deeper Impulse of appetite.

Impulse is thus getting the mastery of itself. Indeed the child can form no organic habit without going through these three stages — the direct yielding to Impulse, the inhibition of Impulse, and the inhibition of this inhibition. To use another well-known fact: the infant, having taken food, responds to the stimulus in its intestinal canal and evacuates; then it soon begins to inhibit such stimulation and refrains from evacuation for a time; finally, being placed in a proper position, it inhibits this inhibition and evacuates. Thus the movement of Impulse is toward the mastery of Impulse through the inhibitory power, which power in the present sphere is still an Impulse.

III. The third general stage is what we have called the mastery of Impulse, the positive mastery thereof, still through Impulse. Already we have seen that Inhibition is a negative power over Impulse, but now there is a reaching out for a positive power over itself, yet through itself. We have just observed the might of Inhibition exercised against the immediate organic Impulse and negating the same, then followed the Inhibition inhibited, with the restoration of the organism out of its scission and pain.

But it cannot rest quietly in itself as long as there is a stimulating outer world continually rousing it, determining it, impinging upon it through the senses. It is stimulated anew to

master its total cycle of stimulation, not merely the inner effect, but the external cause, it is determined to control its own determination. Such a limit-transcending power the organism showed in inhibition, when it shut down upon the stimulus negatively; but now it will transcend this inhibitory limit, and take positive possession of the world which stimulates it, appropriating externality.

Accordingly this is what may be called in general the appropriative Impulse, which seeks to get possession of the object, indeed of the entire external world, as the latter is, in general, the grand stimulus of the organism. Let us recall that we are still in the realm of Impulse, wherein the Ego as Will is determined to action by something not of its own determination, by something Undetermined. Still it is seeking to get hold of just that something, and is rapidly advancing toward such a result.

When the child runs after the butterfly, trying to appropriate it, to make it his own, with all its color, movement and freedom, he is following the Impulse above designated. He is stimulated by the sight of the object primarily, that object and all the world must become his, he moves his whole body from place to place in pursuit. He makes his movement not merely in response to the external stimulus, but his Will is to appropriate the external object which stimulates him;

he is going to own, and indeed to be, the whole cycle — the object stimulating, the stimulus, and the response to the stimulus.

Herein lies the general distinction between this third stage and the first stage, that of simple organic Impulse. When the infant clutches the stick which touches its tiny fingers, the movement is merely automatic; there is no volitional Impulse to possess the stimulating object, but simply the organic response to the stimulus. But when the infant will possess the stick, making it his own, we come to a new Impulse.

The Appropriative Impulse will also have its movement, its Psychosis, which will manifest itself in three stages.

1. There is, in the first place, the Impulse to Appropriation by immediate seizure. The world stands out against the Ego as Will; the latter must overcome the difference, transcend the bound and take possession. For the Ego by its very nature cannot rest in separation, but its being is just the process out of separation and limitation. The external object through the senses stimulates it to be itself, that is, to reach forth and seize the object stimulating — to overcome the gulf of separation between itself and the world. The little child grasps for quite every thing, and the grown man "wants the earth." There is, accordingly, an immediate

Appropriative Impulse springing from the very essence of the Ego as Will.

The Ego as Will is impelled further to take up the struggle with the external world, and to endure all the pain of such a struggle. As already indicated, the stimulus caused by the object can become an interference with the organic process, producing that inner physical scission called pain. But this too must be mastered, and hence the necessity of reaching over to the stimulating object which causes pain, and getting control of that. Pain gives an impulse to appropriate, to control, as well as to brush aside or get rid of the pain-causing thing in some way.

2. At this point, however, enters a negative side; the effort at appropriation may fail. The child originally must possess what he sees, he will reach for the moon and cry for it possibly. He must possess all externality, such is his ideal Impulse; if he is foiled, he has a feeling of inner disagreement, a pain, which he expresses by crying or by some kind of dissatisfaction.

But through failure and pain the child begins to learn that he cannot appropriate the world immediately, this must be possessed in another way. Great is the discipline of failure for the man as well as for the child; both are forced thereby to surmount the limit, to overcome the inhibition which nature seems to have put upon them. The

child, if he cannot get the moon, will at least make a moon for himself; if he cannot have the thing, he will be the thing; he cannot have that horse, so he will be the horse himself. Thus he is forced to a new and indeed higher appropriation, a spiritual one; if he cannot transfer the object to himself, he will transform himself into the object, obtaining thereby an inward possession.

3. This brings us to the next stage, that of Imitation. In the training of the child, it is an important turning-point when he seeks external appropriation and fails. He is not unreasonable in his attempt to grasp all; still he must fail, and the educative question comes up: What can he do with Failure?

There follows naturally the Impulse to appropriation through imitating the object. It has often been noticed that the child at a certain age has a tendency to imitate everything in his environment, especially the movements and sounds of animals; thereby he is really taking possession of them in their action and character. The horse's motions were wholly alien to this child's mind, till he could imitate them, till he could do what the horse does; then he internally owned the animal. He also plays rider or master; a toy horse he will have and drive; he must make, too, a picture of the horse; thus he shows in many ways his imitative bent.

Man also must imitate as well as the child. He seeks to imitate the highest, to be what it is, make over himself into its image. Poetry is defined by Aristotle to be Imitation, and all art has in it the imitative principle. Of course Imitation has its limits; to copy the particular is not a great matter; but to imitate the true and the universal, and to be the same in thought and deed is the greatest of greatness.

Imitation still is Impulse, having a stimulus from the outside which determines the Ego as Will to action. Yet this stimulus coming from the object has now a peculiar character; the Ego appropriates it internally, copies it through Imitation, and so possesses the copy which it makes. The boy, being stimulated to imitate a horse by its movements, has taken an inner possession of it, owning the copy; he is determined to be self-determined by the Undetermined, yet this Undetermined he has determined through Imitation. Thus he possesses the copy as an inner image which he can call up through his own fiat — he has determined the Undetermined.

If we now recall the movement of Impulse we find that it has passed through various shapes of the Undetermined — the Impulse as purely organic, as inhibitory, and as the mastery of Impulse. The latter has reduced the outer stimulus as object, to an inner stimulus as image, or perchance as mere feeling.

Herewith we have passed into a new stage of the Determined Will. The Ego has stripped the stimulus of its immediate or presentative side which comes from nature and has made it representative or an image. Or, from the stimulus of sense-perception which gives Impulse, we have passed to the stimulus of memory or imagination, which gives Desire. To revert to the formula of the process, the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined by the Determined, that is, by that which is determined by the Ego.

Summary of Impulse. Although we have sought to order the various phenomena of Impulse in the preceding account, unfolding the same according to the inner process of the Ego, of which they are manifestations, we hope it will be of advantage to the student to see a condensed statement like the following.

I. *Organic (or Executive) Impulse;* the bodily organism responds immediately to the stimulus produced by the stimulating object, without reaction or inhibition. Or, in general, an externally determining world determines organic activity directly through its stimulation.

The kinds of such activity or of organic Impulse are three: first, the *automatic*, wherein the stimulating object and the stimulated body are one, unseparated; second, *the sensational*, in which the stimulating object and the stimulated body are separate, the senses being stimulated by

an external world; third, *the emotive* (or appetitive) in which the stimulus is again inside the organism and is seated in a special organ, yet stimulates the whole organism to get rid of the stimulus, which (as in the case of hunger) is a lack or deficiency and hence painful.

II. *Inhibitory Impulse;* the stimulus interferes with the process of the organism, which then inhibits impulsively such stimulus, which in this case becomes some form of pain. Or, the externally determining world begins to be inhibited from determining the organism by the organism itself — the battle of the body

The kinds of such inhibition are three: first, *the stimulus as such, within the organism, is inhibited*, showing the reaction of the organism as a whole against interference or pain; second, *the stimulating object from outside is inhibited;* third, *the inhibition is inhibited*, when the organism restores its natural process, or returns to its equilibrium.

Thus the organism asserts itself against external determination in the form of Impulse, by negativing its own inner stimulation and then negativing this negation or inhibition. Its movement is toward the control of Impulse as the externally determined.

III. *The Mastery of Impulse;* the stimulating world is now seized upon, that externality which stimulates the organism through the senses is

taken possession of by the organism, through Impulse still, wherein Impulse seeks to get control of what stimulates it, and thus reach self-control or self-determination. This, however, is not attained in the present sphere, though we see that Impulse is at bottom the Impulse toward self-end, which is indeed a getting rid of Impulse.

The movement in this mastery of Impulse is threefold: first, *the appropriative Impulse*, which impels to an immediate or real seizure of the external world; second, *Failure of such real seizure*, the world not letting itself be seized in that way; third, *the imitative Impulse*, which impels to the ideal seizure of the external object.

At this point, when through imitation of the sensuous thing, the stimulus passes from the external world to the internal and becomes an idea, image, or ideal end, which in its turn stimulates to action, the realm of Impulse is transcended and we have passed into that of Desire. That is, we have quit the field of stimulation undetermined by the Ego, and have entered the field of stimulation determined by the Ego.

In the mastery of Impulse there is the Impulse to reach over and take possession of the stimulating object outside the organism, or to get control of the external determinant which starts the Impulse. Thus we see that Impulse

seeks ultimately to take up into itself its own starting-point — in which, when it fully succeeds, it is no longer Impulse. In this fact we observe that Impulse moves toward the grand end of the Will, a complete self-determination or freedom.

Observations on Impulse. Casting a look back upon the preceding development of Will as Impulse, we may distinguish the movement of the factors as follows:

I. In the simple psychical Will there is the one constant factor, the Self-determined, which is the very Conception of Will, without which we cannot think Will.

II. In Determined Will there are two constant factors, the Determined and the Self-determined, continually in a process with each other.

III. In Determined Will as Impulse there are three constant factors, the third constant factor being the Determinant, which is the Undetermined (by me). That is, the undetermined world or externality determines me (who am before this an undetermined world internally) to determine myself (to an action).

IV. In Determined Will as Impulse, the Determinant (which is the outer undetermined world) works upon or determines the Ego which responds to such Determinant (or stimulus) with its threefold process, the Psychosis, constituting the three stages or modes of Impulse — executive or immediate, inhibitory or separative, and

the mastery of Impulse, which is the complete cycle of Impulse involving the other stages.

V. Still further, each of these three stages being the Ego roused or stimulated to action by the Determinant, will itself be a Psychosis with a threefold movement. That is, the Ego as executive Impulse is stimulated by the Determinant to go through its immediate psychical process — automatic, sensational, emotive; the Ego as inhibitory Impulse is stimulated to go through the separative (or negative) process of inhibition in its threefold manner; finally the Ego as mastery of Impulse, being stimulated thereto by the Determinant, will have its threefold process.

VI. From the preceding we see that, in the passage of the most general form of Will to its most particular form, that is, from the Will as the separative stage of the Ego to the Sensational Will for instance, there are six steps — the Will as such, the Psychological Will, the Determined Will, Impulse, Executive Impulse, the Sensational phase of Executive Impulse. In each of these divisions, however, there has always been seen the fundamental process of the Ego, the Psychosis, uniting them all.

Moralization of Impulse. Though we are treating of Impulse in this part of our work as a psychical phenomenon, we may look at it for a moment in a different sphere, that of Morals, which, however, depends directly upon the psy-

chical facts of Will. The Ego in the moral sphere has an ideal end which it is endeavoring to realize in conduct, and which is called variously the Good, Virtue, Perfection, Self-realization. Now this ideal end, in order to make itself real in the life of the individual, has to transform all Impulse into the image and bearer of itself. Impulses are not to be permitted to run riot in immediate gratification, nor are they to be savagely rooted out by a rigid asceticism, inasmuch as they are an inherent and necessary portion of the total man; but they are to be transfigured by the ideal end of the moral Ego. Such is the moralization of Impulse, indeed of life itself. The Impulse to eat and drink, the appetites for instance, are therein controlled and filled with a lofty purpose not their own; they are not simply to be gratified, but are to be transformed. Even the Impulse to dodge the passing bullet may be controlled and overcome by the moral virtue of courage. The martyr may not wince at the stake when fire is applied.

Sweep of Impulse. This we may once more bring before ourselves, ere we pass to the next stage of Determined Will. First, the organism (or the organic Ego) yields to the external Determinant, till the latter begins to interfere with the independence of the organism and to assail its inner activity — whereby comes pain. Secondly, the organism begins to rise up and resist

within itself the Determinant, to inhibit such outer influence by its own inner self-determined power. Third, having gained control of itself, the organism sweeps back to the Determinant, and seeks to get possession of the same, that is, seeks to determine the Determinant, making this its own, internal. When, however, the Determinant has become internal and is determined by the Ego, we have passed out of Impulse into Desire.

II. Desire.

We shall at the beginning state the formula for Desire: *The Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined through the Determined.* Let the student compare this with the preceding formula for Impulse, and note wherein they are alike and wherein different. Thus he may see the object of the formula as the connecting and organizing principle in setting forth the total structure of the Will, and as that which, though bare and skeleton-like at the start, is to sweep forward and develop into the full movement of this stage of volition.

The relation of Impulse to Desire may here be touched upon. Desire has in it Impulse, yet Impulse inhibited, and mastered, not executing itself in the act, at least not immediately. I see an apple and am hungry, my Impulse is to seize

it and devour it on the spot; but I reflect that it belongs to another or may not be good for me; so I inhibit the execution of my Impulse, having mastered it and made its process internal, ideal. Thus I may be said to *desire* the apple, having still the Impulse for it, but the Impulse controlled. If I grasped for it immediately on seeing it, that would be Impulse (sensational); but I inhibit such Impulse, so that the visible object no longer starts the actual movement of the organism, but rather a movement of mind which is Desire (here called the Determined), and which is not only Impulse but also the inhibition and the mastery thereof, in fine its total process internalized.

There is, therefore, an element of Impulse in Desire, but it is Impulse mastered, it is that appetency, that going out toward the object on the part of the Ego, which we all feel in Desire. Still we inhibit the execution, for a time at least, till we are ready to fulfill our Desire, which, when fulfilled, is no longer Desire. These two words, Impulse and Desire, often come quite together in popular usage; "I have an Impulse for an apple," and "I have a Desire for an apple," may mean about the same thing. But the two words are sharply distinguished in the present exposition.

When we desire a thing, we have some notion, image or feeling of the thing which we desire.

"I desire to go home;" the going home is before me more or less distinctly as an image, which I am to transform into a deed. This image has been already taken up and ideated by me at some former time; now it is separated from my inner Self and held up before me by my own act; still further, I, in an effort of Will, seek to realize it, converting it into a deed. I cannot desire anything before knowing or feeling somewhat of it.

In the above instance of Desire we may note the three elements of time — past, present, and future. When I desire to go home there is in it a past experience, which I propose to repeat in the future; the image of that past experience belongs to the present, I am now determined by it to the future act. The Ego with its process is the central fact; it takes from the past and projects into the future, its activity being in the present. The Ego, therefore, is the total continuous movement through past, present, and future, reaching backward and forward and connecting both extremes in the Now.

To be sure, I may desire something which I have never experienced directly. I may desire to go to Europe, never having been there. Still, in such a case I have the image, doubtless somewhat vague before me, and that image is a result of former experiences, a result of what I have read, seen and done.

These experiences are chiefly former sensations

and feelings, which have been stored away in my mind through sense-perception and organic stimulation. In the impulsive stage, which has just preceded, the stimulus was present, immediate, more or less directly sensuous, and determined the Ego as Will to action; but now in Desire, the Impulse remains as something experienced in the past, as a feeling or an image, which, however, can be still called up and set to work as an inner stimulation. This again determines the Ego as Will to repeat the deed, possibly in new relations and combinations.

Thus the image or feeling or thought, as an element of Desire, is not presentative, but representative, not presented immediately from the outer world, but mediately from the inner world, from the Ego.

We may here introduce again the formula of Desire, which shows its relation to the sphere of Determined Will, as well as to the entire movement of Will in general. *The Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined*, which, as already set forth, is the expression of Determined Will as a whole. Still further, we ask, Through what is the Ego now determined? Through its own determinateness, say as image; for the image has been both ideated and recalled by an act of the Ego; the determining element is now not something presented immediately from the outside world, but something re-presented from the inside

world, being the work of the Ego itself as Intellect (see *Psychology and the Psychosis*, p. 222).

Thus we reach the formula which covers the whole field of Desire: *The Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined through the Determined.* The significance of each of the three factors must be brought into mind and then the total process realized in a sweep of thought, otherwise the whole thing is hollow. For some it may always seem hollow. Note the three factors: the image as agent or motive power moves the Ego as Will to realize the image, which thus becomes the deed. Or I may say, the ideal determines me to make it real; or, the past experience moves the Ego in the present to repeat it in a future action.

Do all images rouse Desire, as all sensations rouse Impulse? Does the very fact that I possess an image derived from some former experience have a tendency to excite the Will to repeat the experience in a new deed? It is probable, though there must be conflict and inhibition among so many experiences. Still the Image (or ideal) is always soliciting the Ego to make it real, that is to make it complete in the process of the Ego. For the image is but a part of this total process, and so rouses in the Ego the longing for self-completion, which is the foundation of Desire. Why do we desire? Because of incompleteness; we feel a lack, a deficiency in the mind; just as

in hunger, we feel a deficiency in the body, which has not what it needs to make the organic cycle complete; hence, too, physical pain, as we have already seen. So Desire can become painful where we have not something which we long for, and which we imagine more or less distinctly.

Nor must we forget in this general connection to call to mind the negative side of Desire; we may in some cases desire not to realize the past experience quite as strongly as we may desire to realize it in other cases. The image of home may excite the Desire to stay away, wherein memory and experience are again the determining element. Here, then, we may notice an inhibitory power in Desire, corresponding to what we observed in Impulse, where the immediate response to the stimulus is checked by an opposing force.

Through the might of inhibition the Ego as Will controls the immediate energy of Desire, limiting, directing, even canceling the same. The executive power of the monarch — be he king or a private individual — must have its bounds; his wish cannot be altogether law. Desire may by indulgence grow boundless, and become utterly tyrannical; still it has also in itself a tendency to limit itself, and calls for the restraint.

In Desire, therefore, the external Determinant

has become an internal Determinant; the apple of Impulse is transformed into the apple of Desire, in which the Impulse is outwardly inhibited yet ideally exists in the form of appetency or longing. Desire, accordingly, involves the Ego with its process; in order to desire anything, the Self must, as it were, be coiled up in the same; if I desire the apple, that object as desired has within itself the total process of the Ego as before stated.

The Ego working over the external Determinant into an internal one must show its individual character in the Desire, which is the Ego's elaboration of Impulse. One man desires to spend his leisure in reading Shakespeare; another man to play cards; each Ego reflects itself in the Desire. Both may have the same general Impulse as the starting-point, but how different their Desires!

We shall now take a look at the three stages of Desire in advance of a more detailed treatment.

I. The primary stage we call Executive Desire, inasmuch as the Will as Desire carries itself out into the act immediately, in response to the Determinant, which is the Determined (by me), that is, some inner determination of my own. This inner determining world of mine has three general ways of stimulating Desire, corresponding to the Psychosis of the Ego in Intellect.

But the Determinant finds itself able to deter-

mine *not*, that is, to negate Desire, hence the new stage.

II. The second stage is that of Inhibitory Desire, which seeks to prevent, inhibit, negate the immediate Desire coming from the Determinant. This is still a Desire, which, however, seeks to inhibit a Desire; thus Desire, so to speak, divides within itself and turns against itself, hence this is the second or separative stage of Desire. Here, too, is a process the result of which is that Desire can not only inhibit Desire, but can remove the inhibition, and thereby has the ability to control Desire. Next this ability is to pass into reality, which is a return to the executive stage yet with the power of inhibition.

III. The third stage of Desire is the mastery of Desire, the positive mastery, in which Desire goes forth and controls Desire in act. This is not, however, the immediate act of Desire, as seen in the first stage, but is mediated through some form of the inhibitory power. Desire has now within itself the might of self-inhibition; the Determinant (the internally Determined) has roused Desire to a kind of Self-determination.

The mastery of Desire is, accordingly, the mastery over Desire by Desire; Desire is both the master and the mastered, or the self-mastered, the self-determined, as far as is possible in this stage. Herewith, however, we may

notice that we are on the threshold of a new transition, namely, the transition to Choice.

This outline is now to be unfolded into its details, which we shall find to be governed by the movement of the Psychosis.

I. The Desire which executes itself, that is, carries itself out at once into the deed, we may designate as executive. The Ego as Will is immediately determined to the action and is not stopped; the determining activity has its outcome in the deed, without any successful inhibition. This determining activity now becomes the source of different forms of Desire, which we shall find to be threefold — a feeling or sensation, an image, and a thought. As already noticed the Ego as Intellect determines these three forms of knowing as its own, which three forms are now agents or determinants moving the Will to action; what I know, I can realize, must realize, unless inhibited.

1. Desire in its most immediate and unconscious form, as feeling or inner sensation, is usually called instinctive. By force of Instinct the human being or lower animal performs actions which bring about certain ends of which it has no foresight (no distinct image). The bird builds its nest by Instinct, not imagining its young probably, and assuredly not thinking of the preservation of its species. Yet both these ends lie in its acts, yea, are the essence of it,

without which such kind of activity would be meaningless. Man, beholding the work of the bird, is the one who does the imaging and the thinking of such ends, as far as we know. Still the bird has them too, in the form of feeling or forefeeling (presentiment), which drives it to action.

Here we must mark the distinction between Impulse and Instinct. Impulse is an immediate response of the Will to a stimulus, outer or inner, without any intervention of an ideal end; whereas Instinct has such an ideal end, though not in a conscious form, but in the form of feeling. Thus Instinct belongs to the field of Desire. Still Instinct has always in it an element of Impulse; the bird builds its nest by an Impulse, if we consider its act merely as an organic response to an inner stimulus. But when we consider that such a response has in it something more than an organic reaction in the immediate present, that it has an ideal element, the end or design which belongs to the future, then we pass out of the realm of Impulse into that of Instinct. If the building of the nest is purposeless, it is an Impulse; if it has in it ideally the rearing of the young brood and the perpetuation of the species, it is transformed into an Instinct, which, as before said, thus becomes a form of Desire, the unconscious form.

Though all Instincts are Impulses primarily,

not all Impulses are Instincts. Still most Impulses have some meaning or ideal end, and thus rise to Instinct. Perhaps we shall discover, on investigation, that all genuine Impulses are Instincts of some kind. I do not see why the little boy makes so much noise, he certainly has an unceasing Impulse thereto; on looking into the matter I find this Impulse has an ideal end which the boy is seeking to realize with all his might. Child study has, as a part of its function, to catch this ideal end in every outward Impulse and to make it a means of education. It was especially Froebel who saw in the play of children not simply Impulse but likewise Instinct, which could be developed into embodying the highest ideal ends of man, and thereby bringing them into the lives of the little ones.

The field of Instinct is very large, but this is not the place to bring together and to order its multitudinous forms; the subject belongs to Feeling rather than to Will. Still we shall note a few of its leading manifestations, especially in so far as they determine Volition.

There is, first of all, what may be called organic Instinct, the immediate response of the organism through the ideal end. The infant closes its lips for sucking when it feels some object touching them; this is a "motor reaction" undoubtedly, yet something more, else we could not truly call it an Instinct. The appetites,

hunger, thirst, the sexual passion, are properly organic Instincts, in which the ideal end is implicitly contained. The conservation of the individual and of the species is unconsciously at work in many bodily reactions, which thus become Instincts, having their ideal end. Not a few of these Instincts are transitory, belonging only to childhood and needful at the time. Other Instincts come with time, indeed may be generated and established in the organism.

There are what may be called emotional Instincts, such as presentiment, longing, foreboding, the prophetic Instinct. A feeling of the future produces its response in action; such a feeling is not directly organic, though often mediately so; the dark anticipation may depend on the state of the digestive organs. The child especially is full of such dim foreshadowings of his future, and shows them in his play, talk, and even look. They are suggestive hints for the parent and the educator, both of whom ought to have the care and insight to observe them, and to employ them in the training of the child. And the grown man is full of these cloudy foreshowings of things, which, however, are kept usually in a state of suppression. A vast penumbra of Instinct, unconscious or semi-conscious, environs our little sphere of conscious life on all sides — possibilities of ourselves not to be realized in present conditions, faint reflections of

futurity, of the order which is to be. The great man must be great first in presentiment, which he is impelled to fulfill in his deeds.

Aspiration is a very noteworthy form of Instinct, the Instinct to transcend the limit, the infinite Instinct. Especially do we aspire to know, to reach over the bounds of ignorance, and therein assert the supreme selfhood of us. We feel the present limit, we desire to remove it, indeed we cannot rest quietly in it without a kind of self-annihilation. The ideal end is now not merely some particular end, but the universal one, and the Instinct is not alone to live but to know. The world-poem of *Faust* has its fundamental conflict just here: the strongest Aspiration, the infinite Instinct, or the Instinct for the Infinite, on the one side, and the inhibition of that aspiration through skepticism on the other side. Faust aspires, above all things, to know, that is, to know the truth, but just that is the knowledge which knowledge denies, in his case. Thus the theme is not some phase of aspiration struggling with some obstacle, or with some other phase, but the conflict of aspiration itself with its own negative.

Instinct, on account of its character (having the unconscious future end in the present act), has long been the favorite field for teleological speculation. The bird builds its nest, unconsciously providing for its young and the contin-

uance of its kind; who implanted in it this foresight or rather forefeeling? The bird does not know of it, but the creator must have known of it, and intended just that in the primal creative act. Providence, alone conscious of the ideal end, gives to us all, man and the lower animals, these Instincts which we unconsciously carry out. Evolution, on the contrary, deduces them from the working of natural laws, and Instinct becomes a motor reaction of the organism. Premonitions also have been supposed to have in them something of the divine, on account of their suggestion of the future event; and prophecy, the instinctive utterance of the future without the process of reasoning, is a well-known phase of the religious development of all peoples. Instinct is often applied to designate the unreasoned doing of the right thing at the right time, and the unreasoned seeing of the truth. In this last sense the woman is said to be more instinctive than the man.

Instinct is frequently called blind, compelling action without foresight. Rather it is Impulse which is blind and necessitated. The bird building its nest the first time, may proceed from a blind Instinct, not remembering the nest of its mother; but when it builds its nest the second time, the instinct cannot be wholly blind. Each repetition, the bird having memory, would bring out more distinctly the future end; indeed some

image of the little brood can hardly be absent in such a case, though the ideal end as feeling and not as image be still the propelling power.

With the appearance of this image, however, we pass over to a new stage of the present movement of Desire.

2. That form of Desire which is mediated by an Image may be called Ideational Desire. The instance which was above cited, *I desire to go home*, and used as an illustration of Desire in general, belongs to the sphere of Ideational Desire. The image of going home is a previous experience which I now recall and which I propose to repeat. The mediating object is the Image, representing here something which has been and is to be, with the Ego as Will making the connection between the past and the future and forming the complete process.

Through some former sensation or impulse there has been a response of the Will; the act of representing this sensation with its response becomes an image with a motive power; such an image with its motive power stirring the Will to a new deed is Desire as ideational, sometimes called ideo-motor, because the idea or image has this motive power. All sensuous presentations have more or less of a motor reaction; all representations are an ideal copy not only of the stimulating object, but also of the corresponding organic reaction. The image is, therefore, not

complete without its motive power over the Will; Desire has in it the demand for such completeness. To inhibit this completing energy of the image is disagreeable, possibly painful.

The image is a determination of the Ego, which now determines the Will to activity. More distinctly than any form of Instinct is the image or idea an elaboration of the mind, something determined by the Ego. At this point it is well to go back and make the connection with the general formula of Desire: *the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined through the Determined*, that is, through what is determined by the Ego, here the image. Thus the image in Desire is both past and future, both means and end; it is the means with its motive power and the end with its deed to be realized.

By some authors the sphere of the Will has been confined to Desire — to the image or instinct determining the Ego to action. From such a view it follows that the only kind of Will is the Determined Will, since the Will in Desire is determined to the deed by something already determined. Thus the element of freedom is overwhelmed doubly from the outside. There is, however, such a stage of Will as Desire, and a very important stage it is, but it must be transcended.

To make a list of the Desires springing from the image lies outside of the province of the

present undertaking. Everything which we have experienced and which can be recalled may be the source of some Desire. The appetite for food is an impulse primarily, then we see it to be an instinct tending to self-preservation; finally it may become a Desire by the image of some favorite dish enticing us to eat. Some such image perpetually haunts the glutton. In like manner the sexual appetite is first an impulse and an instinct; then through the image it is transformed into lust. The inhibition of the image is the root of moral reformation in most kinds of sensual indulgence; especially is this true of carnality.

But not only the images of Memory can stimulate Desire; we can put together images of our own which have the same power. That is, the Imagination proper is able to generate the imaged stimulus, and becomes particularly active in some kinds of disease. Insanity has a good deal to do with the image forcing the patient to action. Ability to inhibit the image at its creative fountain-head is often the test of sanity.

As the vague instinct clarifies into the image, so the image rises to thought or conception. When I created the image which determined my Will to action, I showed a creative power; this power now produces the energy determining the Will. Here, however, we come to a new stage.

3. That form of Desire which is mediated by

a conception (or thought) may be called, in the present connection, Conceptive Desire. A thought strikes me, as the expression runs, and I proceed to carry it out in a machine, in a book, in a deed. The conception of the machine, the book, the deed, is what determines me to action; to be sure, it is my conception, hence something determined by me. That is, the conception is determined by me, yet this my conception is now what determines me to its execution.

The conception is not the mere image of the book, not the image of its contents, but the creation of them. All true conception is the creative act of the Ego, which ideally generates the object, say the machine, and makes it run and accomplish its purpose. Such an act is not the imaging of it, though that may be involved; I may imagine my machine before it is realized in matter; still such an image is a copy, made by me within, of my creative act which has gone in advance of such image. The conception of yonder house is not the image of it, but the generative principle which made it a house and just such a house. In like manner my conception of Othello is not his outer shape and color, though these do not fail; I have to re-think the poet's creative idea, before I have his conception.

This Conceptive Desire is thought or conception insisting upon being realized, determining the Ego as Will to the deed. The genius, to be

poet, scientist, or inventor, has this creative conception, which compels him to give birth to the new thing in the world. He is driven to production by overmastering Desire, which is a necessity of his nature. The present form of Desire (conceptive) touches his deepest self, the point of origination; it is his determining element, which, however, is created by himself.

Herewith, however, this sphere comes to an end, having attained its highest point, and therein run upon its limit. The Ego, having created its determinant, must be able to inhibit that determinant through the same creative power; if it can originate the conception to do, it can originate the conception not to do; both belong to the power of origination, being its two sides, so to speak, the positive and the negative. That is, if the Ego has the complete power of creating what determines it to action, such power includes the veto of the determinant. In general, the executive stage of Desire implies and passes into the inhibitory.

II. In the stage just considered, the executive, we saw all the determinants of Desire — Feeling or Sensation, Image and Thought — carrying themselves out into the deed immediately. But now the Ego as Will is inhibited, is determined not to be self-determined (to act) by the Determined (some determination of the Ego). On an inspection of this formula, we may find in it that there is still determination, though negative,

negating the act through a determined something. That is, the Ego is led to inhibit some Desire through a determination of its own. I desire to go home, but I inhibit such a desire through another desire which springs from the fact that my friend who has accompanied me and whom I wish to please, prefers to stay. Here my second desire (a determination of my own) is the inhibiting agent, which inhibition is still a determinant.

It is evident that a power of inhibition weaves itself into all the determining elements of Desire. Thus we begin to obtain mastery over Desire, whatever be its form. The immediate response to solicitation must often be set aside; indeed we must always possess the latent capacity to do so, as moral beings.

In the realm of Instinct we find already many kinds of inhibition. Not every Instinct is allowed to carry itself out into action; the animal often shows an inhibition of his Instinct. The rat has an Instinct for food, and will go straight to the piece of cheese in a trap; but if it has had a wrestle with the trap and escaped, it will inhibit its first Instinct and shun the tempting bait, and even impart its experience to others of its kind. In fact, we must suppose that to specialize Instinct requires some slight inhibition. Why does the hen lay her egg in a particular spot of a haymow, while other spots are equally good for her

purpose and quite as accessible? As she has passed some of them and taken the one, she must have felt some inhibitory impulse in specializing the one place by rejecting the rest. Still further, she continues to go to the same spot afterwards to lay her eggs, till the first inhibition hardens into habit.

The inhibition of the image in ideational Desire has been already alluded to. Memory and imagination may be too active in pouring forth their riches; certain things we must forget, not only inhibiting the consequent deed but also the provocative image. If our will is not to avenge an act of wrong, we must blot out the recurring image of it, for that image has a tendency to translate itself into action. Imagination may be well curbed at times, as having the opposite result, namely that of destroying action. If the image does not go over into the deed, there is a gradual sapping of the Will, a resignation to day-dreaming, which never accomplishes what it has imagined. Whole races have apparently surrendered themselves to imagination largely; the Hindoos, of all terrestrial peoples, seem to have the most images and the fewest deeds. Desire with its image unfulfilled is but an empty wish, and wishes are proverbially vain, though entrancing. Hamlet in one phase of his character is such a dreamer, giving himself up to the image without the deed.

The inhibition of thought or conception is also a phenomenon of the Will as desire. We may conceive but not carry out our conception, we may plan but not realize our plan. Here occurs the great separation which we see in some characters, the separation between thought and action. In the executive sphere the conception went over into the deed immediately; but the Ego as Will can inhibit that going over. Undoubtedly thinking without doing has a tendency to disuse the Will from action, producing a kind of paralysis of volitional power. The great poet of character, Shakespeare, has portrayed such a person in his Hamlet, who well knows that "the native hue of resolution" can be "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." He thinks too much and resolves too little: such is his diagnosis of his own case. Students, Professors, the erudite guild in general show often a lack of the practical, an inhibited Will. On the other hand many purely practical men reveal an inhibited thought power and become mere empiricists; so they naturally declaim against theory in favor of practice, whereas the two sides should be united in the complete man.

It is manifest that there are various kinds or stages of inhibition. These we shall summarize.

1. The first inhibition is that of the executive principle, of the completion of the act. Instinct, Image, and Thought carried themselves out into

the deed immediately, such is their primordial tendency, they are determinants of the Ego driving it to performance. But just this is what the Ego as Will first inhibits. Take the image of going home, I may inhibit the act but keep the image, making desire a wish. In like manner, I may cherish my conception of some invention but never realize it in the machine.

2. The second inhibition turns against the determinant itself — Feeling, Image, Thought may be inhibited. In the first stage of inhibition they remained, their execution alone was inhibited. But now not only the action but the determinants to action are stopped by the negative might of the Ego, are apparently wiped out, and there is left — what? A seeming blank, which is, however, the negativity of the Ego, and which thus becomes a determinant again. So we see a new determination of the Ego arising in place of those inhibited, yet the latter may still recur, being likewise determinations of the Ego. Such is the outcome of this second Inhibition, it has inhibited all content of Desire, all determination thereof, but just therein has become a determinant itself, and so must inhibit itself.

3. This is the inhibition of the inhibition, or the inhibition of Desire is now itself inhibited. The result is a return of Desire, but in a new form; the execution is no longer immediate, but depends henceforth on the inhibition; each De-

sire has its own negative over it, it can be carried out only by consent of its own veto power. I am more or less conscious of the ability to inhibit, which lies back of every Desire which I follow. If I cannot inhibit my Desire, I have lost self-control; if I must at once execute every thing I wish, I am indeed in a pitiable condition. And still further, I must be able to inhibit the inhibition, or to stop stopping Desire.

We now see the meaning of the inhibition; the Ego is not to be controlled by its Desire, it has determined not to be determined by this one or that one, just as they spring up, but to subject all to the might of inhibition. Such is the negative control of Desire, which, however, must become positive.

This process of inhibition is most important, and is to be found in all stages of the Will, which, in order to reach the mastery of itself, must be able, first, to inhibit its own immediate fiat, then the content, and finally to inhibit the inhibition. Common experience will show all three stages; it must be in our power to suppress our Desire, for a good reason; this suppression must reach not only the outward act, but the inward feeling, or image, or conception; then we must also have a power over such inhibitory power and stop it in due season; we cannot go on inhibiting forever.

Thus we have not only Desire, but also the Desire to inhibit Desire; yet this Desire to in-

hibit Desire must, by its own inner necessity, be inhibited, since it too is Desire; thus inhibition inherently leads to the inhibition of inhibition, just as negation leads logically to the negation of negation. If we can inhibit all Desire, we must be able to inhibit the Desire to inhibit Desire, or to negate the negative. This is, as above stated, the negative mastery of Desire, its suppression and even the suppression of the suppression. Next we are to see what is its positive mastery.

III. This is the third leading stage of Desire, which we designate as the mastery of Desire. With the inhibition of the inhibition came the restoration of Desire in general, yet with something added; though we removed the veto, we had the consciousness of possessing still the veto power, the power of saying nay to every Desire. But now we must realize our power of saying yes to the Desire, *if we so desire;* we are to execute again Desire, and thus Desire also seeks at last to determine itself. Just as Impulse reaches out toward the mastery of Impulse, so Desire reaches out for the mastery of Desire, which means the mastery over Desire through Desire. That is, the immediate Desire, which carried itself into execution directly, no longer controls, but is controlled, this time by a new Desire, however; this new Desire has been mediated by the inhibition.

In the present stage there is, accordingly, a

return to the first or executive stage, yet through the inhibition; there is the fiat, but likewise the fiat inhibited. Here, too, we may observe the threefold process: first is the immediate mastery, in which one Desire is carried out, while other competing Desires are inhibited; second, the inhibition gets the mastery and carries itself out in the act — Aversion; finally, this mastery is mastered, the negative might of Aversion is put down, which gives a new mastery — the mastery of Aversion.

1. The totality of Desire inclines to one course of conduct in preference to all others, to do just thus and not differently. I must master every Desire through inhibition, then I must follow the one I desire. So I seek the mastery of Desire through Desire. Here, then, we must discriminate between two kinds of Desires; the first (the executive) passes immediately into reality, the second passes into reality after and through the inhibition of other possible Desires.

I desire to go home, I desire also to stay, and still further I desire to go elsewhere. In each case is an image which solicits to be immediately realized in action. Which shall I do? The one for which I have the strongest Desire; that is, I have to make a comparison, and desire anew and execute what I most desire, inhibiting the others. Thus a Desire has a mastery over

other Desires. I am indeed a totality of Desires of which one rules or is executed, the rest are suppressed.

Thus we see that Desire, after inhibition, goes back to the original determinant of Desire, be it instinctive, ideational, or conceptive, and seeks to control that, choosing which it will execute, or desiring anew the special Desire which it will realize. Such is the immediate mastery of Desire through Desire.

From what has preceded we see that this mastery comes through the inhibition of competing Desires so that the strongest is taken, and the others inhibited. Moreover this inhibition is more or less latent, unconscious, implicit. But now the inhibition is to become strongly explicit, and to show itself the determinant of the desire which is carried into execution.

2. This is the field of Aversion, the Desire not to follow, but to turn away to the opposite, or the Desire not to execute the given determinant but the reverse, which is not merely the negative inhibition of the Desire, but the positive contradiction of it realized in an act. The example was: I desire to go home; the image of going home puts down all other competing images. But this image of going home may stir me, through some memory or experience, to move just the other way; not only do I inhibit it as a competing image, not only does it determine me

not to go home, but even to start off in the opposite direction.

Aversion, therefore, leads to a positive act of Will; there is again execution, not simple inhibition; the inhibited Desire becomes itself the determinant, the new Desire which realizes itself in an act. Aversion still has the image as determinant, but this image determines to its opposite. The image of my going home turns me away from home. Thus the Ego as Will is not propelled to, but repelled from, the deed through Desire, does not execute the corresponding act, but the antagonistic one, not proceeding immediately, but mediately through the negative

Undoubtedly Aversion may be more or less impulsive, possibly congenital or hereditary; the percept, image or thought of something may cause a direct revulsion. The sight of a snake for most people is a source of Aversion; the sight of a cat is so for a few. The images called up by Dante's description of Inferno are repulsive to many readers; the thought of eternal damnation makes us shrink from it and dismiss it for less disagreeable things. In a more formal manner we may state the fact: the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined (that is, to an act) by the Determined, which, however, in the present stage (Aversion) moves to get rid of the Determined, be it in the form of percept, image, or thought.

Aversion may thus be mediated through its opposite. Our Aversion to falsehood may be brought about through our love of truth. We have an inclination for temperance, we turn away from drunkenness. The love of moderation must make us averse to excess. Dislike of wrong follows from our liking of justice.

In such cases there may be no special call to master our Aversion. We are inclined to the good, and are averse to the bad naturally, immediately, let us say. The inclination to the good means inclination from the bad, or Aversion. So we let the two tendencies remain; we hate the hateful, and love the lovely, being at bottom one character. But suppose that we are averse to the good, inclined to evil, turned against the law, hating order, the state, authority, all ethical restraint? A new problem rises; we are to conquer Aversion, and therein change our attitude, — wherewith a new stage.

3. This is the mastery of Aversion, which demands a fresh control over the inhibitory power, when the latter turns against the positive element in man, society, institutions. Aversion to the good calls for the mastery of Aversion, such is the psychological as well as moral demand.

Still further, this mastery of Aversion must be made universal and complete, not simply for the sake of moral but also for the sake of psychological completeness. When I am dominated by

Aversion, I am controlled by the inhibitory power of my own Ego, not by its total process, which is its complete self. We are called to master the negative in ourselves, which is here Aversion, and to transform it into the positive which is inclination, love.

A religious illustration may be given, since Aversion easily deepens into Hate. When I hate evil, I am still a hater; when I hate hate, or hate him who hates me or anybody or anything, I am still a hater doubtless. Love your enemies; but suppose your enemy is sin, is the Devil; are you to love notwithstanding? If so, in what sense? When you have subjected him, mastered his principle, which is hate, you need no longer hate him; you can love your enemy though he be Satan. You have only to fear your enemy when you hate him, when you are just like him in hating. Did you ever see a person, deeming himself religious, get to hating sin so strongly that he fell into the sin of hate?

Aversion, then, must at last turn back upon itself and undo itself, wherewith comes spiritual mastery. I must finally get an Aversion to Aversion, avert myself from Aversion — inhibit the inhibition, or negate the negation. My hate of excess may become an excess, an excess of hate. My temperance may be an intemperate temperance. Aversion thus becomes self-destroying, even a virtue based upon Aversion may turn

to the opposite. I must not hate anything so intensely that I become hateful.

Aversion has thus attained to Inclination, having negated itself and become positive. The inhibition is not merely a stoppage or cancellation, but has mediated a new Desire, which has been brought forth through the inhibition of a Desire. Aversion has been carried out directly, then inhibited through itself, through its own negative character, and finds itself at last transformed into a new positive Inclination, or perfect Desire, which is the culmination as well as the end of the present sphere.

We may now cast a glance backwards over the movement of this third stage, called Mastery of Desire. The first phase is the immediate mastery of Desire, which takes place when, of several competing Desires, the strongest makes itself real through the executive act, and implicitly or indirectly inhibits the rest. The second phase is Aversion, which is seen when the inhibition of a Desire is so explicit and emphatic that it turns to the opposite Desire, which is likewise carried into execution. The third phase is Aversion inhibited, the Ego averts itself from Aversion, whereby we attain to the conquest of Aversion. In the present sweep, therefore, we witness not only the mastery of Desire, but the mastery of the negativity of Desire, the latter being quite as

important as the former both on moral and psychological grounds.

What next? The three stages of Desire, executive, inhibitory, and mastery of Desire constitute a process which calls forth and determines a new Desire; thus we have passed into the sphere of the Motive and out of the sphere of Desire proper. That is, we see the total process of Desire motiving a Desire, which is different from one Desire rising simply through the inhibition of another Desire, as when Aversion, being strongly inhibited, is transformed into Inclination, or even Love, which is the final mastery of Desire over Desire.

Moreover, we now choose the Desire which we execute, through the Motive, which, as before said, involves the total process of Desire as ideal. So this new sphere may be named Choice, in so far as the latter is determined by the Motive, or, if you please, by the strongest Motive. But in Desire we have already observed that a selection has taken place, for instance, in the mastery of Desire, when the strongest Desire in its execution inhibits the others, and thus is chosen out of all its competitors. Still more decided is the act of selection in the case of Aversion.

Reverting to the formula, we note that the Ego as Will is no longer determined to be self-determined by the Determined, such as Sensa-

tion, Image, Thought, but by the total process of Desire, which, as we shall see, is a process of the Self-determined.

Summary of Desire. The preceding discussion of Desire may seem prolonged and complex to the student. We shall add a summary which will give him a survey of the details in a compressed yet organic shape, and possibly incite him to fill out to greater completeness such a tabular statement. For the essential fact is that the entire subject be organized in his mind; moreover it must always be remembered that organization does not mean crystallization, but the living process of the Ego itself.

I. *Executive Desire*, the Desire which is carried out immediately, without inhibition; the Ego as Will yields at once to the stimulation, which is here an ideal determinant of some kind; that is, the Ego as Will is immediately determined to be self-determined.

The kinds of this stimulation of Executive Desire through an ideal determinant are three: first, *the instinctive*, in which the ideal end (or determinant) is present, though unconscious; the stimulating image is not separated from feeling and so is not held up before the mind, but is one with the stimulated act; second, *the ideational*, in which an image gives the ideal determinant or end to be realized; third, *the conceptive*, in which a thought or conception

gives the ideal determinant or end to be realized. It is to be noticed that the three leading stages of Intellect — a feeling (sensation), an image (representation), and a conception (thought) furnish the three leading contents of Executive Desire. But thought (and in a less degree the other two spheres of Intellect) being the universal act of mind, must not be controlled by Desire, and hence stops its execution.

II. *Inhibitory Desire;* through the ideal end Desire in its immediate execution is inhibited, yet this inhibition is still a Desire. That is, Desire inhibits Desire, therein reaching over and getting hold of the negative of itself, which negation is also given as the content of this new Desire by the Intellect.

The kinds of such inhibition are three: first, the *inhibition of the execution*, the immediate act is canceled and there remains simply the subjective wish; second, the *inhibition of the content*, in which the ideal determinant in the form feeling, image, or thought is inhibited, or the Desire is inhibited; third, *the inhibition of the inhibition*, in which there is a return and restoration of Desire, yet through its negative. Desire can now desire not only immediately, but also can desire *not* — a very important power.

Thus we behold Desire moving toward the control of itself, by being able to negative its own execution, and then even to negative

this negative. This result now becomes manifest.

III. *Mastery of Desire;* the positive control of Desire, not merely the negative control of it through inhibition, is to be attained next. The Ego as Desire is to get possession of all Desire, constituting a totality of Desire, which will specialize the particular Desire. Here is a return to the executive stage, yet with inhibition.

Three kinds of such Mastery may be designated: first, the strongest among competing Desires, the one favored or selected by the totality, is realized while the rest are unconsciously or implicitly inhibited — *immediate Mastery;* second, the inhibition, in the previous stage implicit, now becomes strongly explicit, and the inhibited Desire is so pronounced that it determines the Ego to the opposite; inhibited inclination passes into *Aversion,* which is a positive Desire though resulting from and containing a negation, whereby it is Desire mastering a Desire. Third is the *mastery of Aversion,* for Aversion must also be inhibited and controlled on its negative side; we are not to hate intemperance so strongly that we become intemperate in our temperance. Thus while we have Aversion, we must also possess an Aversion to Aversion.

Such we behold to be the movement of Desire seeking to control Desire, that is, to be self-

determined. Note then again that there are three constant factors in Desire as a stage of Determined Will, the third constant factor being the Determinant, which is now the internally Determined. Still further this internal Determinant works upon or determines the total Ego which responds to such a Determinant with its threefold process or the Psychosis, which we see manifesting itself in the three stages above given — executive, inhibitory, and mastery of Desire, which is the complete cycle of Desire. Still further, each of these three stages being the Ego roused or determined to action by the Determinant, will also have its threefold movement or Psychosis.

Moralization of Desire. In Morals Desire plays an important part, although the act be primarily psychical. Inasmuch as the determinant of Desire is the work of the Ego, and contains its movement, this Ego begins to reveal its character in Desire, and to know the same by contemplating its Desires. The Self has its process in all Desires worthy of the name, and so can begin to behold its own feature therein as in a mirror.

Desires (as well as Impulses) are to be transformed into the ideal end of the Moral Self, which end is, in general, the Good, and which is often called, from the present point of view, the absolutely desirable, or the thing to be

desired above all others. Over all finite Desires there is the one Desire, which properly includes them all, and which is the ideal end transforming them all into means for its realization.

Still we have to ask, What is this supremely desirable object? What is the content of this Good? Manifestly Desire cannot answer, the Ego as Desire has to rise to a higher stage ere the response can be given; it has to clarify itself out of its present determined condition. The infinitely Desirable or the Good cannot get its full content or meaning till we come to the conception of Free Will.

Desire is still a stage of Determinism, though it have an inner Determinant, and therein rises above Impulse. But our subjective Desires require to be moralized also, they are to be transfigured into the means for realizing the ideal end which is the final determining principle of the moral Self. That is, Desires are not to be immediately realized, but are to be first transformed by the ethical ideal of the soul. Even my Desire for the apple yonder is to undergo such a transformation, and thus become moralized before I may carry it out. Of course the complete unfolding of this thought belongs, not to the psychological but to moral Will.

Sweep of Desire. Let us summon this before the mind ere we pass to the next stage of Determined Will. The Ego as Will yields to the

internal Determinant and executes its behest immediately, till the latter begins to interfere with the total inner movement of the Ego — whereby comes the struggle of Desire with Desire, in which the immediate Determinant is inhibited. Finally, the Ego as Desire having gained control of itself, sweeps back and determines its internal Determinant.

But when the Ego as internal Determinant determines the internal Determinant of itself, and makes this total process of itself a new Determinant, we have evolved the Motive, and have passed out of the sphere of Desire into that of Choice. For the Determinant of Desire, having determined itself is now the Self-determined, which is the Determinant of this new sphere of Determined Will.

III. Choice.

The present stage is usually found to be one of the most difficult portions of the Will. It has unquestionably deep intricacies, and these have been in all sorts of ways entangled by discussions on the subject. A clew out of the labyrinth, which clew has been of much service to us at least, we shall try to put into the hand of the student, not, however, without his making some effort on his part.

It is well to give a warning at the start in regard to the word *Choice*, which has been somewhat narrowed from its ordinary meaning. It is not here used as mere selection according to Desire or the strongest Desire, as when we select this road leading to the theater and not that one leading to the church. Moral Choice is commonly predicated of two courses, one good, one bad; the Ego as Will can take one and inhibit the other. Such an immediate Choice is not meant in the present sphere, but a mediated one, mediated through the *Motive*.

Again, this word *Motive*, in the present discussion, is not employed in its widest significance. Primarily it means that which moves, specially moves the Ego within to an action. In such a sense any Desire or even an Impulse might be called a Motive. What is the exact nature of the Motive, we shall try to unfold later; here in advance we may say, however, that it is not simple Desire, but the total process of Desire, namely, Desire with the inhibition and the mastery, as just set forth. Hence the reader must be at the start on his guard against the ordinary loose meanings of Choice and Motive; their full purport, however, can be understood only after the following discussion, which is nothing more than a psychical evolution of their place in the complete process of the Will.

Perhaps it is also well to express in these intro-

ductory remarks the formula of Choice. *The Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined by the Self-determined.* Again we must premise that this formula, empty as it sounds, has to be filled with a content by the coming development of the subject. But the reader will notice that through its wording it is connected with what has gone before, with Desire and Impulse, for instance; this inner connection is what should be always held fast in the mind — such being, in fact, the main object of the formula.

Choice is, therefore, still a stage of Determined Will, even if two of its factors are characterized as self-determined. The element of Determinism, though much reduced, is not to be wholly eliminated from Choice, which is not yet Free Will. It is often said that we are free to choose this or that; true, and such an expression implies the self-determined element; but there is also a determined element. The alternative is present, but behind the alternative is the Motive to choose one or the other; so the determined creeps in after all in choosing, and *determines* just our freedom of Choice. The completed fortress of Free Will is not, therefore, to be built in the realm of Choice, where nearly all Libertarians and Moralists place it.

We may now take an example and try to set forth our meaning. Employing a former sentence which we used in illustrating Desire, we

can put into it the element which involves Choice. *I desire to go home;* this is simply a Desire (with its stimulating image), which I may execute or inhibit. But when I say, *I desire to go home in order to write*, I have grounded my Desire in the additional clause; or, I have motived it by putting behind my immediate Desire (which is to go home) another Desire (which is to write) more remote, and telling the reason why, the end-in-view, the Motive. Note then the two Desires and their relation to each other in the above sentence.

We may express the same meaning by bringing out the latent term, as follows: *My Motive in going home is to write*, that is, a Desire to write propels me, not to write, but to go home; nay, further, it is the Desire to write which, under the given circumstances, propels me to inhibit writing and do something else. This act both desired and inhibited, is the propelling power, the Motive; thus dawns upon our investigation of the Will the realm of Motives, which, as already said, is the mediating principle of Choice. When I go home, I do not follow my immediate Desire to go home, but back of that is the fact of Choice; I choose to go instead of staying, through a Motive which determines me to act (to be self-determined). Here we may observe again the interplay of Liberty and Necessity (so called) in Choice; before we choose we have the

consciousness of being able to take one or the other alternative; but when we have chosen, we have also the consciousness of being determined to that one way by the Motive. Evidently both Liberty and Necessity constitute the process of Choice; one is not to be separated and held up against the other in argumentation, since thus we are always landed in an unreconciled dualism.

Desire, then, by itself has properly no Motive; the image, instinct, or thought, each of which may form the content of Desire, is carried out in the deed. Desire is not Choice; if I simply desire to go home, I have no true Choice, though there be the external alternative of remaining where I am. Still further, the inhibition of Desire has in itself no Motive, and does not involve Choice, though all choosing involves the inhibition of Desire, as we shall see more fully later on.

But when the image which is the determinant of one Desire with its act, becomes the determinant of a different Desire with *its* act, the first Desire is transformed into the Motive of the second Desire, is what we call the mediating principle thereof. *My motive in going home is to write;* the writing is the Motive which determines my going home, the latter being now reduced to a means of the former. I desire to go home because I desire to write; the first desire with its act is mediated by the second, and there

is quite a difference between the two. The image of writing is before me, still I do not write, but I go home first, which is also an image, and this I immediately execute.

But the writing I do not immediately execute, on the contrary I project it into a future act, hence it is ideal, something to be attained, still an image with its deed imaged. The Motive is, therefore, ideal — not something which is, but which is to be realized. Still that future ideal element is what determines me to present activity, with the design of making it real in the deed. That is, the Motive is a Self-determined as ideal — not merely an image (which would be only a form of the Determined), but the image with its corresponding act, as a total process ideally held up before me. The Motive must have in it not Intellect alone but also Will.

It is most important to note carefully the process of the Motive, which has the following stages: (1) there is the primal Desire with its subjective content of feeling, image, thought; (2) there is the inhibition of this Desire in its executive act, though its subjective content remains; (3) there is the inhibition of the inhibition, and therewith the going-over or the ability to go over, to a new Desire with its content, which is executed, and whose execution is the means of realizing the first Desire. Herein we observe the Psychosis as the inner pulse of life,

the vital throb in the Motive and its Choice; it is not simple immediate Desire but the total movement of Desire, as unfolded in the preceding section. Note again the three stages of this movement: first is the simple immediate Desire; second is the separative stage, here the Desire inhibited; third is the return to Desire, not the first one it is true, but to a new one, which is executed for the purpose of bringing about the fulfillment of the first Desire. As already often indicated, this total process of Desire is the Motive which determines Choice, drives to the act of choosing, and this is, in the present sphere, not mere selection springing from Desire, but something deeper and completer.

At this point the question comes up: Why this inhibition and change? Why desire one thing and do another? Why do I desire to write, yet, instead of doing that, do I at once set out for home? What is the connecting link between the two? This is the Ego itself with its manifold activity; I see that I cannot write in the place where I am, there is lack of materials, there is not a suitable environment, too much noise. So I inhibit the immediate execution of my Desire, and go to a place where I can write, or wait for a time when I can write. The Ego thus perceives, weighs all obstructions, judges and comes to a decision; then it acts. We see herein that the Motive involves the self-deter-

mination of the Ego, since it requires the act based upon the changed Desire. Simple Desire acts directly through the Determined, but Motive (along with Choice) acts through the Self-determined.

Taking a general glance at Choice, we see that it has two ways of doing placed before itself; each appeals to the Ego, solicits to be taken and followed; the Ego as Will must through itself, through its own originative, self-active power, choose one or the other. Still each way has reasons in its favor, and the Ego must choose the reason determining it; or, if it must take the strongest reason, and cannot help itself, this is because it has determined which is the strongest reason and chosen that, to the exclusion of less strong reasons. Somewhere the original fiat of the Ego as Will, the self-determining act comes in, yet it also determines. Here, then, we introduce again the general formula of Choice: *The Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined by the Self-determined.*

Thus the Motive is Desire, yet also the inhibition of the execution of that Desire, and the change to the execution of a new Desire. Just this change involves the Self-determined Ego as a totality; the Motive is the Ego's own act, which still determines the Ego to act. Note again the three factors, one of which asserts Determinism, but the other two assert Self-determination.

Here we may note another fact, which is to be organized and put into its proper place later on: around this central process of the Motive hovers almost an infinity of Motives, less and less distinct till they quite vanish into the unconscious. If writing be my Motive for going home, I can ask, What is my Motive for writing? Say, to earn money; thus I go back to the Motive of my Motive and pass through the same process, since in this last case my writing becomes no longer a Motive, but a Desire, which is also a means. Now the statement is: I desire to write in order to make money. Still further can I go back, and find a Motive for my earning money, which Motive may be that I wish to go abroad. Thus an infinite regressive series of Motives may be projected behind the first.

In like manner, the means which is a Desire, say the wish to go home, may be converted into a Motive. My Motive in taking my hat is that I wish to go home; or still further, my Motive in rising from my chair is that I wish to take my hat. Thus the means we can continually keep projecting forward into an end, forming an infinite progressive series. In the first case, we go on converting end (Motive) into means, and in the second we go on converting means into end (Motive). So the one central circle begets an infinitude of circles, like the pebble cast into the still waters of the lake.

Still in all this multiplicity there is seen the one fundamental process: the image or concept as the content of Desire, the inhibition, the rise of the new image with its corresponding act. The subtle Psychosis of the Ego throws off thousandfold forms of Motives, yet it remains the same process in them all.

If the foregoing discussion be correct, Choice bears in itself the thought that the Self-determined determines the Self-determined. Hence the Self-determined in Choice has to be determined — wherein we see the determinism in Choice, and so we say Choice is determined by the Motive, or the strongest Motive. Still that which determines (the determinant) is the Self-determined; so this motive which is the determinant, is really the Self-determined. Determinism must not be left out of Choice, being one of the three factors, and being interjected, so to speak, between two acts of self-determination. It is, accordingly a bad mistake to deny determinism in Choice, but it is a worse mistake to deny self-determination in Choice. Both are in Choice which must be seen as a process, involving both the Determined and the Self-Determined.

In the preceding introductory remarks we have repeated a number of times the one thought which lies at the basis of Choice and Motive. The formula has been given twice with examples and explanations; we hope that its meaning and

purpose are now clear enough to make a new advance.

We shall next turn to the special consideration of Choice and seek to organize its various activities. It has also its movement, its Psychosis, showing the three stages thereof and revealing a close correspondence with the stages of Impulse and Desire. The following is a brief outline of the development of Choice, to be followed by a fuller synopsis at the end: —

I. Executive Choice is first considered, in which the Motive realizes itself immediately, without inhibition, in the act of Choice.

II. Inhibitory Choice, as its name indicates, is the inhibition of Choice, of course through Choice with its Motive; that is, Choice chooses not to choose, hence this is the second or separative stage of the Psychosis.

III. Mastery of Choice, or the mastery over Choice through Choice, shows Choice choosing its Motive (its own determinant) which then executes itself in the act.

Once more we may turn over the thought that the Motive — say, the Desire to write which motives my going home — is a self-determined something. It would be merely a Desire if the image (my writing) were carried out into the deed immediately, or even if this immediate deed were inhibited. But note the total act (my writing) is not simply inhibited, but is trans-

formed by the Ego into a new determinant, which determines my going home, determines me to a different act. It is thus a Motive — the Ego itself determining itself not simply not to do this (to write) but to do the other (to go home). The image alone, therefore, does not determine the Ego, else it (the Ego) would write, but it determines itself.

Still we must not forget that this self-determined element is also determined, the Motive determines the Ego to be self-determined. That is, the Self-determined does not stand alone, but is in the process of Choice, it is determined to be self-determined through the Self-determined.

We must carefully mark this distinction: we may be led through a Desire to choose, and we may be led through a Motive to choose. As already said often, the Motive is born of the Desire, but is not the simple Desire; it is the total process of Desire, which signifies the mastery of Desire, this being the third stage thereof.

In the present sphere of Determinism an inner world of Motives has arisen and determines the Ego as Will; very different is this from the outer world of nature determining the Ego, such as we saw in Impulse. Yet the two worlds are counterparts and belong to the complete unfolding or the Psychosis of Determined Will.

The subtlest thing in the human heart is the Motive; it can be the hardest matter to discover,

so elusive, deceptive, nebulous it may become. Its own possessor, the very person who is being moved by it, often cannot recognize it, and may honestly deny its presence while ruled by it. Hence, the Motive is the most tortuous thing in all Psychology to pursue through maze and haze, and to catch finally and lay bare. In proof whereof let the student test himself with what follows.

I. Executive Choice is the first or immediate stage in which Choice carries itself into execution, without the conscious act of volition. We choose and then we do; there is no interference from any quarter, no inhibition stopping the executive energy. The stress is now upon the immediate act following straightway after, or indeed being one with Choice.

Still in this sphere of executive or immediate Choice there is a Motive, which impels the Will. This Motive is not simply a Desire, but a complete process of Desire, as already explained. Given the Motive, the deed follows at once; the fiat is not interfered with, but issues forth on the spot.

Still there will be a process of executive Choice which will go through several stages, according to the content of the Motive. As the Motive is determined by Desire, we shall have the following classes of Motives — Instinctive, Ideational

and Conceptive — in correspondence with the division of executive Desire. Nor should we neglect to notice that these three classes correspond with the three main divisions of the psychology of the Intellect, which herein has a bond of connection with the Will. In each of these cases the Ego as Will acts immediately, goes straight to the deed without any inhibition, whatever be the content of the Motive.

1. Instinctively we choose a course of action, implicitly rejecting other ways, selecting the one way, and then sweep forward to the act. An unconscious instinctive Motive we may employ, which has secretly coiled up in it the total process of Desire. I wish to go down town, in due order I step to a certain line of street-cars, unconsciously eschewing all other ways of reaching my destination. Such action pre-supposes that I have previously gained experience in the matter of going down town, and know the various means of transit. Here is, then, the Desire, the inhibition of other lines, and the taking of the one line — Choice, all done in a single unconscious thrust of the Ego. The bird, picking up a straw for its nest, has to reject the rotten leaf lying beside the straw.

I enter an art gallery, I choose a certain picture for my contemplation, omitting the rest. I went to the place perhaps for another purpose, but my unconscious nature has made a new

Choice for me. The picture roused my interest, we say; it touched some natural bent, or possibly some acquired tendency; I became interested in it, and at once was moved to do as I did. My unconscious Ego was the chooser, felt itself to be one with the object and responded immediately. Interest is, therefore, an unconscious Motive for doing many things; in reading a book I am absorbed by it, I am held by its spell which I cannot break except by a strong effort of Will. Thus the unconscious Motive shows in an instinctive form the process of Desire which moves to an immediate act.

Probably every instinct has this process of the Motive more or less pronounced. The bird that builds its nest in a certain place or in a certain manner, must have the desire to build, must inhibit it for a time, and then choose its special locality and method. Undoubtedly the whole process is instinctive, not at all explicit in conscious purpose, still there is the process which makes the Motive. Thus we may trace in the animal a rising line through Impulse, Instinct, even up to Motive which leads to Choice.

But, as we have already seen under the head of Desire, Instinct gradually clarifies out of nebulous feeling or presentiment into the clearness of the Image as end. Or the Ego, in the necessary movement of the Psychosis, must sep-

arate the unconscious impression from itself and hold the same up before itself as distinct — wherewith we have passed into a new stage — the ideational content of the Motive executing itself immediately in Choice.

2. This is the second stage of executive Choice, namely the separative, and corresponds to the stage of Representation in the Psychology of Intellect (see *Psychology and the Psychosis*, p. 222). One form of Desire springs from the Image (namely, the ideational) which through the total process of Desire becomes a Motive (also called ideational). This kind of Motive executing itself directly in Choice, is what we are now considering.

Let us then look at the Image which may become the content of a Motive. It is probably best to take the example already given and connect it with the present sphere. I wish to go home in order to write. Primarily, however, I desire to write; this image (or idea) I hold up before myself, then inhibit it, then inhibit this inhibition of the image by passing to a new image which is the source of a new Desire (namely to go home), and this is what I proceed now to execute. But the first image with its process of Desire has become the Motive, which impels me to fulfill the Desire to go home, of course in order that I may realize the Desire to write. This last Desire is the content of the

Motive, which impels me to choose to execute at once the first Desire.

All this may be intricate, but the question of Motives and Choice is one of the most intricate in Psychology, and is certainly worthy of disentanglement by the student who earnestly seeks clearness. In the present case it is the image, not the instinct or the feeling which forms the content of the Motive. That image I have separated in memory from former experience immediately presented; now it is represented with the stimulus to repeat the act, which repetition cannot take place directly, but mediately through another act. So the image with its ideal act (here my writing) becomes the Motive for the second act which has now to be realized (my going home). For this reason we may designate it as the ideational Motive of executive Choice.

Here we may re-state the formula of Choice in general: *The Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined through the Self-determined*, the latter being in the present instance the Motive with the image as its content. That is, I am determined to act (to be self-determined) through the Motive which is the complete process of Desire as ideational.

But we are able to create an image for our future, as well as recall an image from our past. This creative act now becomes the content of the Motive, not the image by itself; we call it

conception, and the new stage to which it gives rise we may designate as the conceptive Motive of executive Choice. This comes next in order.

3. The third stage, then, of the present sphere, is the conceptive, the nature of which it is well to seize at once. Conception or thought of the object is something altogether different from the image thereof; conception is the genetic act of mind, which generates the object afresh, thinks it anew as its creator thought it. The conception of a book is its creative idea, which the reader must create over for himself, if he would truly possess the same, or would know what the book really means. Thought or conception belongs, as is well known, to the third stage of the Intellect, the second being representation and the first being immediate presentation or sense perception.

It is manifest that conception is often the content of the Motive which insists upon direct execution. The artist has the conception of a new picture, it is not merely the image, but the creation of that image, which drives him to the deed, to the painting of it. In the example already given, it may be the conception which impels me to write, not the mere representation of some past experience, though that too may co-operate. Having it, I proceed immediately, without inhibition, to its realization. No reason do I give for so doing; there is no interruption

on the way, no deliberation perchance. So the conception of Justice moves the Judge to decide justly; the conception of the future in some form moves the seer to his prophecy; he has or may have the conception intuitively, not through the mediation of reflection.

Such are the three stages of the Motive as executive — instinctive, ideational, conceptive. We have noticed the same three stages under Desire, which is also immediate or executive. The Ego in conception has created the Motive, or what moves it to action; my Motive in writing is to realize my conception, that is, creation; my creative power drives me to the deed, is my moving energy. But my creative power, or conception can drive me also not to do, can inhibit the execution of the act, otherwise it is not completely creative. Indeed the Motive is one form of the process of the self-determined Ego, which must have a negative as well as a positive power, else it would not be self-determined. To determine *not*, as well as to determine, belongs to freedom. To unfold this part of Choice is our next step.

II. There is an inhibitory principle in Choice, the very fact of selecting implies a rejecting. The Ego as Will can choose, yet also choose to stop Choice; I must be able to choose to inhibit myself from carrying out what I have chosen. I have the conception of some work, but my Choice may be not to bring the same to realiza-

tion. Thus Choice divides within itself, choosing to inhibit Choice. Such is, in general, its second or separative stage.

The Motive lies back of the inhibition of Choice. My Motive in not taking the journey which I had chosen, is (let us say), to save money; previously I was influenced to the choosing of the journey; now I am influenced to the inhibiting of that Choice. Thus Choice negates Choice, and thereby asserts negative control over itself.

On the contrary, executive Choice, as above unfolded, is uninhibited, and so is followed immediately by the deed. But now the movement is reversed, the fiat of the Will is to refuse execution, the fiat turns against the fiat and begets the conflict which springs out of the Will. We see that the Motive works negatively as well as positively, it leads to execution and also to inhibition.

Choice as inhibitory will have a movement containing three stages which are similar to those already noticed under Impulse and Desire. The negative act of Choice will at the start inhibit the Execution, then the Motive, and finally the inhibition will inhibit itself. These are the three stages which are now to be unfolded and which form a Psychosis. First is the immediate inhibition, which stops the executive act; second is the separative inhibition which separates the Motive or determinant of the act, and

inhibits that; third is the inhibition of the inhibition in which there is a return to the Motive simply, or at least to the ability to form the Motive.

I. The first inhibition, accordingly, is directed against the execution of Choice. The result is a paralysis of the fiat, which is often called Irresolution. You resolve to perform, then you undo your resolution and fall back into your mere wish to perform, or into your Motive which remains purely internal. Irresolute characters instinctively inhibit the fiat, this push of the Will to act; they often become very ingenious in finding excuses for their aversion to the deed. Decision, however, is of two kinds: first, it is immediate, the fiat following directly the Motive; secondly, it may be through some kind of mediation, through reflection in advance of the fiat.

If we take the example already used so often, I may inhibit my going home, though I still have the Motive to write. But if this Motive be present, it must be at work, for its nature is to insist upon being executed. The Motive seeks realization, hence it also must be inhibited, if the inhibition be complete. This brings us to a new stage of the present movement.

2. The inhibition of the Motive goes back to that which determines primarily the Choice. But now Choice inhibits that which determines

Choice, namely that which determines itself, namely the Motive. Not only do I inhibit my going home, but I inhibit my Motive in going home, which springs from the desire to write. That is, I banish the wish to write, which produced my Motive for going home.

Yet this inhibition of the Motive must have a Motive. If I put away the desire to write, it is because I desire to hear some music, which desire, we shall suppose, can be gratified only by my staying where I am. Thus my Motive for staying, which inhibits my motive for going home, is a new and stronger Motive. (This question of the strongest Motive will come up under the head of Mastery of Desire.)

Herein we witness the conflict of Motives. Fresh desires are perpetually rising which form themselves into fresh Motives, and these inhibit antecedent Motives by seeking to realize themselves in the deed. A grand field of struggle it is in which several Motives may co-operate for one end against another Motive or other Motives likewise co-operating for a different end.

3. The inhibitory act of Choice involves the inhibition of the inhibition of the Motive. We have just seen in the preceding paragraph that for the inhibition of the Motive there appeared a Motive, which therein negated its own. But the logic of this negation is the negation of the negation, since the Motive has shown itself as negative

in inhibiting the Motive; thus the Motive, being destructive, must destroy its own destruction in destroying the Motive. That is, the Motive, in inhibiting the Motive, inhibits logically its own inhibition.

Choice can be seen to have the power of inhibiting Choice, and then of removing this inhibition. I, having chosen to go home, can inhibit this Choice and not go home; then I can inhibit this inhibition and go home. The freedom of Choice involves not only the power of inhibition, but also the inhibition of the inhibition.

In Deliberation, which precedes usually the fiat, there is a rapid mental movement between Motive, inhibition, and the inhibition of the inhibition. Shall I go or stay? There is the Motive for going; then comes its inhibition through another Motive, which urges me to stay; finally is the inhibition of this inhibition, which brings me back to the Motive for going. Thus the mind moves from one side to the other, up and down, like a pair of scales, weighing the matter. This weighing furnishes the metaphor which lies in the etymology of the word Deliberation. The grand picture of Deliberation is found in the Iliad when Zeus seizes the golden scales and weighs the fates of Troy and Hellas, these fates being really the Motives which determined the Olympian Will to a choice on that occasion.

In this last stage, in which the inhibition of the Motive was itself inhibited, we have the return to Motive (or the ability to motivate), which is again ready to assert its native energy. This new power of the Motive is not the old one, but has a negative control over itself through its inhibitory principle. But the Motive necessarily pushes towards the execution of itself in the act whereby the process of Choice is completed. Accordingly we must now proceed to the next stage in the movement of Choice, which has in it the executive element restored, and we pass from the negative mastery to the positive mastery of Choice.

III. We have now reached the stage designated in general as the mastery of Choice, since the latter passes out of its negative or inhibitory stage and becomes again positive and executive, though in a new way. The power of inhibition is still present, and gives to Choice its complete movement; unless it could inhibit both the fiat and the Motive, it would not be complete. So Choice has now in itself execution and execution inhibited, as well as Motive and Motive inhibited.

The Motive has been hitherto the determinant of Choice, but in the present sphere Choice chooses its Motive and so asserts its mastery over the Motive. I wish to go home in order to write; but also I wish to go elsewhere in order to see a

friend; thus two Motives solicit me to two different acts; which shall I take? The Choice is mine, and I choose not only which act I shall execute, but also which Motive I shall follow. Choice therein goes back and determines the Motive, thus asserting its mastery over that which was hitherto its determinant. Such mastery of Choice is the mastery over Choice by Choice.

Choice chooses its Motive — it has to reject the one in order to take the other; here is the power of inhibiting the Motive as already discussed. Two Motives are present to me; shall I go or stay? I choose to stay, but I can do so only by inhibiting the Motive to go, and transferring the Choice to the other Motive, which I carry out. Just as Desire had to be inhibited and transferred to a new Desire in order to become Motive, so Motive has to be inhibited and transferred to another Motive in order to become Choice. Such is the act of choosing between two Motives: first I have the one Motive, then I inhibit it, then I pass to the other Motive, which just through this process is the chosen one, and the whole act is that of Choice.

The total movement of Choice in this mastery is still expressed in the formula: the Ego as Will is determined to determine itself through the Self-determined, the latter being now not simply the Motive as such but the chosen Motive.

But this mastery of Choice has its process whose phases we shall unfold in a brief outline.

1. The most direct form of choosing the Motive is seen when the strongest Motive is taken and carried into execution. We can say that the Ego as Will is impelled to action by the strongest Motive, to the exclusion of other Motives. Several courses of conduct lie open to me, each with its own Motive competing for my Choice; I select immediately the strongest, and inhibit the rest, which indeed are more or less latent or in the background; the strongest Motive determines me to act (to be self-determined).

Still I have to choose the strongest Motive; it is strongest only by comparison with other Motives which must be present too, and soliciting my Choice. Such a selection we call immediate since it is quite instinctive, hardly conscious; we seem determined by impulse in following the strongest Motive, yet it has to be chosen.

This immediate mastery of Choice may be, in general, termed Resolution. A man of Resolution possesses a permanent trait of nature, that of choosing his Motive at once and carrying it out with vigor. Persuade me not, I am resolved! This signifies the complete inhibition of all other Motives except the chosen one and its deed. Resolution is not simply decision or

the selection of the Motive; we may decide without doing, but Resolution involves the execution, it is the Will incorporating the chosen Motive in the deed. To resolve is to assert the Ego as Will emphatically against all distractions, all inhibitions, even against deliberation and reflection.

Choice through the strongest Motive has a direct, immediate character, which makes it quite like selection which was noticed under desire. Say, then, that I select my Motive from a number of Motives; but why do I thus select? So a Motive for my selection is called for; that is, my immediate selection demands to be mediated; when I selected my Motive, I must have had a Motive for my selection. Herewith we pass out of the first stage of the Mastery of Choice into the second.

2. So I have chosen my Motive, I take that which is strongest, and have inhibited the other competing Motives, which thus drop down to unfulfilled desires. Note, then, that while my Motive determines my Choice, my Choice also determines my Motive, I choose it. In such fashion opens an interplay between Choice and Motive.

First, I choose to go home; this Choice, however, has its Motive, namely, to write. But this Motive itself has to be chosen against various competing Motives which solicit me to go else-

where or to stay where I am. Still further, this second Choice (of the Motive to write) must in its turn have a Motive (say, to make money, to acquire fame, to propagate an idea, etc.), which has to be chosen from among these various competing Motives. Such is, then, the second Motive, which in its turn, must be chosen, must be determined by Choice, which is the third. This third Choice will demand its Motive, which is the third, which again looks to Choice and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus we see developed a continuous *regressive* series from Choice to Motive.

Let us look at this movement again. I now choose the Motive out of several competing ones; but such Choice too demands a Motive, which in its turn must be chosen. But this new choosing must also be motived, and this new Motive requires still another Choice farther back. Thus every Choice demands a Motive, and such Motive, being chosen, projects another Motive for such Choice behind itself.

But this is not all. The Ego as Choice not only projects a series of Motives back of itself — the regressive series — but also becomes itself Motive and thereby projects a *progressive* series from Choice to Motive in front of itself. To take the old example; I choose to go home — such is my Choice proceeding from the antecedent Motive. But I take my hat in order to go home; the going home is transformed into the Motive

for taking my hat. Still further: I rise from my chair in order to take my hat; here the second Choice of the series has become the second Motive. And again: I place my feet in order to rise from my chair, wherein the previous Choice has been transformed into a still different Motive. All these Motives are very close to their corresponding acts so that they hardly seem separate; still every Motive will show, on examination, not only a Desire, but the complete process of Desire, which is the essential nature of the Motive. For instance, if my Motive in placing my feet in a certain position is to rise from my chair, I must first desire to rise, secondly I must inhibit that Desire till I have adjusted my feet, and I must inhibit the inhibition and execute the Motive.

Thus Choice is seen to send out two sets of Motives, backwards and forwards, so to speak; the separative stage of the Ego it is, in which the division between Motive and Choice runs out into an infinite series. The chase after Motives, as is well known, can be endless; so it is, if confined to the present stage of Choice. But this must, of course, be transcended.

Other terms are often used to express the meanings of Choice and Motive; instead of these, Means and End may be employed. For instance, in the examples adduced, my End is to write, my Means is the going home; or, in the

progressive series, my End is the going home and my Means is the rising from my seat. Less accurately Cause and Effect are sometimes used in the same way.

But in these endless series there is at work the same movement: the Motive, having determined the Choice, the Choice turns round and determines anew the Motive. Though this is not the same Motive as the first, yet there is underneath always the one recurrent process which is that of the Ego itself. It is to be seen returning to itself and so making the active unitary principle in this infinite diversity of play between Choice and Motive. Such is the third and completed stage in the mastery of Desire, which we shall now consider a little more fully.

3. The Ego as Choice has shown that it chooses what determines it, thus it determines its determiner. Moreover this determiner (or determinant) is the Motive, which is, as before said, a form of the Self-determined. So the Ego as Choice is here determined to be Self-determined, through the Self-determined. Choice, though motived, chooses the Motive; Choice therein is seen returning to itself and choosing what determines it, and is in so far self-determined.

Still the Motive as the external determinant is present though it be chosen by the Ego. Thus the old dualism appears; the Motive after all determines the Choice which chooses it, or the

Ego as Choice is determined to determine itself through the Self-determined, and so is yet in the sphere of the Determined Will or Determinism.

The Motive is still given from the outside, and the Ego chooses it; in one sense chooses it freely, in another sense has to choose it (being motived thereto). That is, in form the Ego as Will in Choice is free, but in content is unfree, since the latter is not Choice itself but something given from the outside. The Ego, therefore, is capricious in Choice, chooses what content (or Motive) it pleases, according to whim, fancy, or principle, according to its own subjective determination.

But the Ego as Will must have a free Content, which is just itself. That is, the Ego as Will must not merely choose its Content or Motive from a given quantity of Motives furnished it from the outside, but must choose itself, in its very act of choosing, as its Content or Motive. Thus we attain truly the Free Will which chooses as its inner moving energy the Free Will, or itself. Now Choice really chooses Choice, having the same as its Motive, whereas previously it did so only formally.

Herewith, however, we have manifestly passed out of the stage of the Determined Will, whose essential formula was, *the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined.* On the contrary *the Ego as Will now determines itself to be self-determined.*

The mastery of Choice has thus completed itself, by completing what may be called the cycle of Choice; the Motive determines the Choice, but this determining Motive is itself determined by Choice; or the End becomes the Means, and then the Means turns about and becomes the End. But even this final mastery of Choice (which is the mastery over Choice through Choice) has in it still the Motive or an external determinant; this externality is what is next eliminated or eliminates itself, in order that we arrive at Free Will.

It is manifest that Choice hitherto has been free to choose the Motive, yet behind such choosing of the Motive it has projected a new determinant or Motive, and so it is determined. Thus Choice shows the endless contention between Freedom and Determinism, passing from one side to the other in an infinite series of repetitions. Even when these repetitions are seized in their single fundamental process (as in this last stage of the mastery of Choice) the dualism between the free and the determined element remains.

But the destiny of Choice is to realize its own unconscious principle and to take the same as its end. Choice has been free to choose its Motive as its content; but now Choice is to take just this freedom of choosing as its content. I have come to the place where I have to choose my freedom of Choice, and therein explicitly assert my Free

Will, which has hitherto been implicit. Choice is not now moved by many Motives but by one, the universal one, which is freedom. The Motive if it acts, no longer determines me to be self-determined, but it determines me to determine myself to be self-determined. The full purport of this formula is to be unfolded later.

Before we pass on, however, the student may once more work over in this new connection the old illustration: I desire to go home in order to write. Primarily the Motive (to write) determines me to go home instead of staying, determines me to choose, a self-determined act. But we have found that this Choice exerts itself not only in regard to my going home or staying (the act) but also in regard to my writing or doing something else; that is, the Ego as Choice not only moves forward and chooses the deed, but also moves back and chooses the Motive thereto. So it turns out that the Ego as Choice determines itself to be self-determined, and this is what has been lurking underneath Choice from the start. For Choice means really the freedom of the Ego, and Choice is not itself, is not free, when it is determined by something not itself. Hence it goes back and determines its own Motive, and then, still more deeply, it determines itself to be its own Motive, or it determines itself to be self-determined. This, however, is the conception of Free Will.

Such is, in general, the transition from Determined Will in its last stage of Choice, to Free Will, wherein the Ego is free Choice choosing its own freedom as content, and motive.

Summary. We shall give a condensed survey of the foregoing section on Choice, showing in brief outline its organization and meaning.

I. *Executive Choice.* The execution is immediate in the act; the Motive carries itself out into realization without inhibition. Or the Motive (which is a Self-determined in the form of the total movement of Desire) determines the Ego as Will to be self-determined (to the act).

The kinds of executive Choice are three according to the varied psychical content of the Motive determining the Choice. First is the *Instinctive*, in which the content of the Motive is an Instinct with its total process of Desire executing itself in the act. Second is the *Ideational* in which the content of the Motive is an Image with its total process of Desire executing itself in an act. Third is the *Conceptive*, in which the content of the Motive is a Thought with the total process of Desire executing itself in an act.

II. *Inhibitory Choice;* there is an inhibitory element in the very nature of Choice; it must be able to choose to stop choosing. Inhibition must also have its Motive, as well as execution; if we could not help choosing immediately, we would be completely determined from the outside and

unfree. Choice has at last to control its own negative, choosing to inhibit. Here too are three stages. First is *the inhibition of the execution*, of the fiat, though the Motive still remains. Second is *the inhibition of the Motive*, in which a second Motive comes up, for, in order to inhibit a Motive, I must have a Motive for the inhibition. Here rises the conflict of Motives. Third is *the inhibition of the inhibition*, that is, the inhibition is removed, and there is the return to the Motive or at least to the ability to motivate. This is the negative control of Choice.

III. *Mastery of Choice*, or the positive control of Choice; that is, the mastery over Choice through Choice. The essential fact is that Choice now chooses its Motive; thus it goes back and determines its determinant. Three stages: first, *the strongest Motive* is taken by Choice, which has to choose which is the strongest Motive among several competing ones, the latter being inhibited. Second, this new choice in its turn calls for a new Motive, which has again to be chosen [and so on indefinitely — *the regressive series* in which Choice determines Motive and Motive determines Choice. In like manner there is a *progressive series*. Third, *the one process* underlies both these series, inasmuch as, while the Motive determines the Choice, the Choice goes back and determines the Motive.

Choice is the Ego determined by the Motive

to select and execute a Desire; for instance, the Desire to go home (in the given example) is determined by the Motive, which determination is the act of Choice selecting and possibly executing the Desire. Now, as the Ego in Choice moves forward and chooses the Desire, so it will sweep backward and choose the Motive.

Notes on Motive and Choice. It is evident that Motive and Choice belong together, in the sense of these words just given; they are symmetrical counterparts of one cycle, or better, they are the necessary stages of one process of the Ego. No Motive without Choice and no Choice without Motive; different, yet one in their movement.

1. The Motive, as we have just considered it, is essentially the psychical Motive; the moral Motive, however, in times past has been the grand object of disputation. This kind of Motive we shall have to relegate to the sphere of the Moral Will which comes later in the development of Will. Still we may note here, that, as the psychical Motive has in it the process of self-determination, there comes with it the idea of responsibility. Since the Motive is not an Impulse, nor even a simple Desire, but has in it the total process of the Ego, the Ego holds itself responsible for its Motive. Hence the importance of the Motive in moral conduct, and also in every attempt to construct a Theory of Morals.

2. The Motive has passed by analogy into the sphere of Literature and Art, which seek to express in some form of outward manifestation the inner moving principle. Shakespeare *motives* the death of all his great tragic characters; he does not let them perish by accident, but through some deep violation of the ethical order of the world, which comes home to them at last in the penalty for their deeds. Some of his personages at the first glance seem to be exceptions to this rule, for instance Cordelia and Othello; but the tragic fate of these two characters also will be found to be carefully motived on a searching examination of the dramas in which they occur. Goethe has declared, in a passage contrasting his poetic procedure with that of Schiller, that he naturally motived the main incidents of a poem, while Schiller was inclined to seize and portray them immediately, or with little motivation.

In the other Fine Arts the Motive is applied; specially is this the case in the music of Richard Wagner, whose Leading Motive (*Leit-Motiv*) has become the turning-point of a musical revolution. The Leading Motive is used variously by Wagner himself, sometimes in a superficial, sometimes in a profound manner; this, however, is no objection, since all Motives of the human soul may be in a general way divided into the shallow and the deep. The Leading Motive at its best is a musical utterance out of the heart of

the theme, of which the words of the poem are another and different expression; the two, language and music, reach down to the one substantial element, to which each gives its own way of interpretation. There are many Leading Motives in an opera by Wagner, as there are many Motives in a human soul acting out its life-drama.

3. One of the most difficult things for psychological insight is to discover the Motives of children. These Motives are as yet almost wholly instinctive, undeveloped, unconscious; yet they exist, and are unfolding. Why does a little boy, in a fit of wrath, run and smash his dearest toy? What strange acts are traceable to jealousy in children; and then we have to ask what motives such jealousy? The kindergardner is in possession of this field and must work it wisely and carefully; let her, in her child-study, use the inductive syllogism and tabulate her experiences; but all this will do little good without rational insight, the power of looking immediately into the soul of the child, which is best forwarded by looking into her own soul and catching the subtle play of its Motives.

4. You may just as well study the fact that you, as students, are here, and nowhere else to-day, and consider the Motives which have brought you into this class of mine. First of all, you are here to learn kindergardening; that is the most direct Motive which brings you

together. But why study kindergardening? With this question the second set of Motives show themselves and begin to vary; say, it is for passing the time, for culture, or for getting a vocation. But why do you wish to have a vocation? In order to make a living, to gratify ambition, or to acquire money. Select the last-named Motive; if your object is simply the money, then such a Motive will show in your work here, and in your school. You will not learn that poem, because it is not useful directly for your profession, which is studied simply for the money in it. You will seek to acquire the devices for getting along well enough to draw your salary. More or less distinctly will the mercenary spirit crop out in all that you do You will deny such a Motive, still your deed is the tell-tale of the secret within. But you can have yet another Motive behind the acquiring of money: you may be intending to earn enough in order that you may study music, or painting, or even the stage. Then this new Motive will color your conduct and your work, and will be sure to manifest itself. If you are motived ultimately by music, your kindergarten will get a wrench that way, probably an excessive one, warping it out of relation to other equally important matters. If your object be at last to study painting, your work is likely to show an excess in the matter of drawing — too much of it there will be, and otherwise

not in correlation with the totality of the kindergarden. At the present time color is made the ground of extravagance, the children are led to discriminate the various shades and tints to the last degree of refinement. In like manner the kindergardner with a theatrical Motive can change all her flock into little actors, who will assume a part on the spot and play it, and who will not only naturally imitate, as children must do, but imitate imitation.

Thus we may bring home to ourselves the significance of the Motive, especially the ultimate Motive, for our vocation as well as for our conduct of life. We must correct the Motive if we truly wish to build up a right worthy character; seeing our inadequacy, or failing, or sin, we must proceed at once to transform ourselves, for that is just the truth of spirit — to be able to correct itself and to be always rising out of a lower into a higher, more universal Motive.

5. Your head, or, if you please, your soul is full of Motives, active, wrestling, conflicting often, often co-operating. Some are kept secret, you know them, but you would not tell them for any consideration. You may act from them, yet you assign a different Motive for your action; still the keen eye of the one who knows the human heart can see them, and judges you according to your concealed Motive. For this is what you really are, this is what makes your

character. Then there is within you a vast realm of unconscious Motives, the mainsprings of your deeds, of which you are yourself often not aware, even when they rise to the surface and propel you to act. They seem suddenly to dart into your horizon of activity from that dark, outlying territory of the soul, where Will and Thought lie as yet unborn, and then they vanish again in a sudden luminous, yet blinding streak. Still they are your own, yourself, yea, your deepest Self often, and determine your character. Indeed they form to a certain extent your very body, your gestures and looks. They are the secret sculptors in your soul, chiseling your features; they make your face, at least what your face expresses. For the Motive must come out, though all unknown to yourself; it is not a Motive, unless it manifests itself in action. So the most hidden story of your heart must tell itself in your speech, nay, write itself in your countenance.

Thousands upon thousands do these Motives rise and surge and wriggle through your soul. They remind one of the enormous vat of eels in the great market of Paris; a vast, convoluted, intertwined, wriggling mass, little eels, big eels, each one an individual, slippery, elusive, now sinking out of sight, now rising to the surface and swimming there for a time. Let me catch him; I put my hand into the water and clutch

his sinuous snaky body; with one wrench out he slips, drops down with a splash, and plunges out of sight. What mortal man could identify and land that eel for me now? Here comes the keeper with a kind of scoop-net and does his work of dipping up a sample for a customer. One big fellow rears his black body in curves from the water by a tremendous effort, and opens his mouth; does he want to speak to me, and what will he say? Listen: "I hold now the mirror of your soul, look at yourself" —then he falls back and is lost in that dark living mass, as the spirits of Dante's Inferno drop down again into their ditch after speaking. One thinks too of that electrical eel, the *Gymnotus*, which if you but touch it, gives you a shock. So too with Motives; often when you find them, and find out what they are, you receive an awful shock, which may be the premonition of a great change.

6. Sometimes we hear a fierce outcry against this introspection, this examination of Motives. Undoubtedly it has forms of excess, and may be pushed in certain cases into a mental malady. Too much brooding over ourselves is bad, we all know; still it may be said that self-examination in some way is the condition of all lofty character-building. The man must know his weakness in order to transcend it, and he can know it only by looking into himself. That Ego into which one gazes is indeed the source of all evil as well

as of all good; Motive it can have both mean and noble. To gain the true value of introspection we must be able to exercise a rigid self-criticism and then carry out our own decree. Also we must be able to take the criticism of others at its real worth, and make it our own — a most difficult thing for weak human nature. It is true that criticism is always negative and often unjust, being tainted itself by bad Motives, such as envy in particular. Still you can test its soundness by yourself, and accept or reject accordingly.

7. Let us study the transition from Choice to Free-Will a little further. First, Choice is, in general, the Determined (by the Motive); secondly, Choice is the Determinant (of the Motive), this being the essential fact of the mastery of Choice; thirdly, Choice is both Determined and Determinant in the one process of the Self-determined; thus Choice has determined itself to be self-determined. This, however, is no longer Choice (which is determined by the Motive), but is Free-Will. Moreover the Motive no longer determines the Ego to act in Choice (to be self-determined), but determines it to determine itself to be self-determined. That is, Choice has now not only to choose to do something, but has to choose its own freedom of choosing in what it does. It must take itself as its own content and realize the same in its act.

The Motive is here not the determining principle of Choice, but Choice itself is, which, however, is thus Free Will. Hence we may say that Free Will now wills Free-Will; this is the sphere in which man asserts his freedom, inasmuch as all struggle for liberty is just the Free-Will willing Free-Will. The Motive in this new sphere determines not to Choice, but to Freedom, and the Motive is Freedom, which is indeed the ultimate universal Motive or End.

8. Also there is at this point the still broader transition from Determined Will to Free Will; that is, the second grand division of the Psychological Will passes over into the third, as its aim and outcome. Note, then, that the whole movement of Determined Will through Impulse, Desire, Choice, is to attain Free Will, which has been underneath Determinism all the while, and has often cropped out in the course of the preceding exposition, giving to the same its inner moving principle, which, from its implicit condition, has now become explicit, and is be unfolded through its process.

SECTION THIRD — THE FREE WILL.

The essential fact of Free Will is indicated in the formula: The Ego as Will *determines itself* to be self-determined. This is to be contrasted with the formula of Determined Will, which is: The Ego as Will *is determined* to be self-determined. The first formula indicates the two constant factors, which are found in every process of Free Will.

In the second case just cited (that of Determined Will) the Ego as Will is moved to act by some determinant outside of itself; in the first case (that of Free Will) it determines itself to be self-determined, that is, the Will wills itself to be free, the content of its own free act is its freedom; or, we may say that the motive of Free Will is now the assertion of Free Will.

For instance, if an attempt is made to enslave me or to restrain me wrongfully, I am determined by such an attempt to assert my freedom; my Free Will is thereby moved to will Free

Will, to take itself as its own content, motive, etc. I may be transacting some business of my own, as is my right, when an outside person may interfere and seek to prevent me by violence. At once I drop the business, for a new and far deeper matter has crossed my path; I must, first of all, vindicate my freedom, which is the very condition of my doing any business, and indeed of living worthily. If I tamely submit, I am not a good citizen of a free country, I am not really a free man.

Thus I am led to act (to determine myself), and the one object of my free action is just the freedom of action (the self-determined). Hence we say that the Ego as Will in the present sphere determines itself to be self-determined, wills itself to be Free Will; the free act of man must primordially assert freedom of action, then the Ego is really Free Will.

"Give me liberty or give me death," cries the schoolboy in his favorite declamation. That liberty of his undoubtedly is somewhat vague and capable of being abused; still he means, and ought to mean, that before anything in life, before life itself, he is going to will Free Will. Such is the spirit of the youth who is to unfold into the free citizen of a free country. "Strike for liberty" we hear shouted in the passionate lyric; but here in the present treatise, we must calmly reflect that the free act (*strike*) must

ultimately have as its fulfillment freedom of action (*liberty*).

Hence our strongest emotions are so deeply aroused by Marathon, in which battle a few men against great odds were defending their freedom; for the first time apparently in recorded history, the human Ego reached the point of Free Will asserting Free Will as the principle of the individual and of the nation. With such an assertion history may well begin, since man has now something worthy to tell about himself, since he has staked all — property, life, city — upon Free Will, which has thus dawned on the world as the supreme end of man.

If we designate this last by the term Motive, we find that it differs from the Motive in Determined Will. The end-in-view (Motive) is now the free act itself, which end calls forth the free act. But in Determined Will the Motive calls forth a different act from its own; I go home, but my Motive in going home is to write. To be sure, in going home I am self-determined, and, still further, I may go home in order to assert my freedom against some restraint which I desire to set aside. In this last case, the free act has as its End or Motive the assertion of the free act — or the Ego determines itself therein to be self-determined.

Still, in the example just cited there is the image of going home, something given or deter-

mined, external to the act of Will. Hence we find that the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined through the Determined in the present case. My going home, therefore, can be transformed into an assertion of Free Will, which I have to make the content of my act and not the writing. Hence there is still a determinant of the Will willing itself to be Free Will. (See second stage below.)

This brings us to the division of the present subject. The Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined; through what? The question asks still for a determinant of freedom, and there will be the process of this determinant, which process is the Psychosis. We shall have the three stages, which are seen in the movement of all Will — the Undetermined, the Determined and the Self-determined. The following, then, will be the movement of Free Will:

I. *The Undetermined Free Will* — the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined through the Undetermined, that is through the outer world in which the Ego is placed, but which has not been determined by it; hence this outer world is here named the Undetermined. This undetermined world (of nature, let us say) being external and opposed to me, reaches me through the senses and stimulates me to overcome it and to transform it into the instrument

of my Free Will, which in such transformation is willing Free Will.

II. *The Determined Free Will* — the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined through the Determined, that is, through the inner world which is made up of the determinations of the Ego itself. In Determined Will as such we had as its process the stages called Impulse, Desire, Choice (Motive) but now in Determined Free Will, these become determinants of Free Will, not simply of an act of Will; that is, they determine the Ego as Will to be not merely self-determined but to determine itself to be self-determined.

III. *The Self-Determined Free Will* — the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined through the Self-determined; that is, an outer, objective, self-determined world now determines the Ego as Free Will. Thus there is the return to externalty, but this is not the undetermined world of the first stage; it is a world which the Ego has called forth and objectified, and whose end is to secure the freedom of the Ego. It is usually named the Institutional World, and, as it is the bloom and culmination not only of Free Will, but of the entire movement of Will from the beginning, we may here designate it a little more closely.

The Ego now as Will on the one hand wills (acts or determines itself) to have Free Will (to

be self-determined) through Institutions. Or it wills the Institution (whose function is to will Free Will) as its content, end, motive. Thus the Ego wills as its end that which wills Free Will. The determinant or means is now the self-determined (what wills Will) and the act is self-determined, and the end is self-determined (the Free Will).

When I obey the law of the State, I, as self-determined or free agent, determine myself to be self-determined. The law wills Will, secures it; this law is what I will; I as Free Will, will Free Will. If I say the law determines me, this determination is not only my own, some desire, wish, caprice or choice of mine, but is just self-determination realized, since the law is Will willing my Will.

So I will my Free Will, or assert my freedom through an existing world which wills Free Will, that is, through the Self-determined (not through some determinateness of my own), that is, through the State with its laws.

Glancing back at the movement of Free Will as a whole, we observe that it has the two constant factors, and the third variable one — all of which are in a process with one another. This third variable factor is the determinant, determining the Ego as Will, and hence manifesting in its movement the three fundamental stages of the Will — Undetermined, Determined and Self-

determined. As has been already set forth, these constitute the process of the very conception of the Will, and each is now in turn to be seen as the determinant of Free Will.

I. Undetermined Free Will.

We must first pay attention to the terms of this caption, as they involve three distinct thoughts united in one process. Free Will, as here employed, is not simply Will as the primordial self-active energy, but it is this energy with itself as motive, end, or content; it is the Will which wills Will, or, to return to the formula, the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined.

But even in this case the Free Will has to be stirred to assert itself, has to be stimulated from the outside; in other words, it has to be determined, or to have a determinant. Now this determinant in the present sphere is the Undetermined, that is, something not determined by the Ego or by the Free Will, yet determining the same; hence we may designate it as the Undetermined Free Will.

Already the reader is probably asking for examples. Man as Free Will is plunged by birth into the realm of external Nature, which he has not determined, but which in a thousand ways stimulates, limits, determines him. The whole

material world is, accordingly, for him the realm of the Undetermined, that is, not determined by him, but determining him. Such is the grand contradiction of his existence: a Free Will environed by the determinism of Nature. Now this contradiction the Free Will at once sets about removing, in order that it be actually free; it starts to transforming the material world about itself, making the same into an instrument of freedom.

I build a railroad in order to get the mastery over Space which is an element or phase of the Undetermined determining me; I shall no longer let it rule me absolutely, my deepest aspiration is to remove these limits of Nature and attain freedom. Such is my ideal end in all my works; everything in the way of manufactures springs from my effort to release myself from dependence on Nature; I seize and employ all her forces with the one ultimate purpose, that I become more and more completely self-determined.

Plainly the great battle of my Free Will is to transform that which is undetermined by myself into that which is determined by myself. The world I must make over in order to be free; our age is often called the mechanical age; yet its huge mechanisms, its colossal implements are finally means of freedom, and the Ego as Free Will through them is determined by its own, by itself.

We have already seen the Ego as Will determined by an undetermined element in Impulse and also in Desire or Instinct. But we should mark the difference between these cases and the present one. When I am hungry, I reach forth and eat a piece of bread; I simply gratify my appetite, following an Impulse immediately. But I find that this Impulse has a deeper purpose, it has an ideal end, which is to preserve life. With such a thought we call our hunger not merely an Impulse but an Instinct, an Instinct of self-preservation. The life, however, which I maintain in so many acts, can be subordinated to a still higher, more ideal end, that of freedom. Every true freeman reaches the point at which he prefers death to servitude. "Give me liberty or give me death" is not only fervid declamation, but expresses sound psychological fact.

It is true that modern science has a tendency to analyze all human action into the single end of preserving life. Man, we hear it said, has the one great object, namely to live; the final purpose of the Will is physical and biological. Still the world honors as heroic the person and the nation that sacrifices life rather than live in bondage; and we feel it to be a degradation when a human being purchases existence by surrendering any form of his freedom, personal, moral, political, intellectual. To be sure, the biologist

pure and simple will say and will try to make himself and others believe that such sacrifice of life had really the end of preserving life, and that freedom is only a means of living. But a means is used or used up for the sake of its end; life is for the sake of freedom and not the reverse.

Thus we may note the threefold gradation: we can gratify our appetite simply for the sake of the gratification, or for the sake of living, or for the sake of living freemen. This last is indeed the great end of all activity; the Will has as its ultimate content itself; or, as we have formulated it, the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined.

To such an act, however, the Will must be stimulated, it must have a determinant to rouse it to assert its freedom. This determinant in the present sphere we have designated as the Undetermined, which has three characteristics: first, it is not determined by the Ego or by Free Will; second, it is a determinant of the Free Will which wills the Free Will; third, it has to be made over by the Free Will in order to be a determinant, made over into a means of freedom. This ocean before me is something not determined by me, yet it limits me when I cannot cross it, it determines me, restrains me of my freedom. But this very fact is what stimulates me to remove the limit and to vindicate my Free

Will against its might; I build a ship which floats me over it, and therein I have determined myself to be self-determined. I have not only performed a free act in building the ship, but I have performed a free act whose content and object is to assert my freedom of action. It is true that the ship may carry merchandise across the water, and that I may obtain from alien lands something to gratify my appetite or taste, something conducive to better living; but the chief gratification is that I have revealed myself as a freeman, having not only surmounted the great obstacle, but also transformed it into a means of freedom; my Free Will has therein realized Free Will. The Undetermined has externally determined me to an act, not to any act you please, but to an act whose very object is to overcome this external determination of myself; when I now stand on the sea shore, having the ship, I am not hindered from crossing over. Thus man is continually conquering Nature, not simply through impulse, or desire, or appetite, not even for the sake of life, but for the sake of freedom.

Nature, therefore, the external world, coming in upon me from the outside, is the grand stimulus which rouses my Will not only to react in response to this stimulus, but also to go forth and transform the stimulating object into an implement, which no longer hinders but furthers my freedom. Or, to use the term which links

together the whole process, the Undetermined determines me as Will to determine myself to be self-determined. As to this last sentence, the reader may well test himself whether it is for him a mere rigmarole and empty jingle of like-sounding words, or the expression of a process whose separate terms are fused into unity by the electric spark of thought.

In the present sphere, which we have called the Undetermined Free Will, these are the two constant factors which belong to all Free Will, while the third or variable factor is the determinant, here the Undetermined. That is, the variable factor varies throughout the sphere of Free Will in general, but it becomes permanent in the special stage of Free Will. For instance, the undetermined element will persist through the stage of Undetermined Free Will, as the determinant, but will change to the Determined in the following stage.

Let us, then, bring before us the total process of Undetermined Free Will. It is started by the external determinant (the Undetermined) which is hostile to Free Will, and it proceeds to convert this determinant into a means of freedom. It seeks not merely to get possession of the outer stimulating object (as we saw in the case of Appropriative Impulse) but to transform the same and to use it as an implement of realizing Free Will. So the Ego as Free Will

comes to the mastery of the determinant, making it over, and filling it with a new purpose, that of freedom. Thus the entire world of externality is to be transformed.

The stages of this process of elaborating the external determinant till it responds to the Free Will are three

I. *The Executive;* the Ego as Will willing Free Will responds to the outer determinant (here the Undetermined) in an *immediate* act, without inhibition.

This outer determinant may rouse a Sensation (or more deeply, an Instinct), an Image, or a Thought, in the recipient Ego, which proceeds at once to execute them.

II. *The Inhibitory;* the Ego as Will willing Free Will re-acts against the external determinant in the present sphere, and will not permit itself to be determined from the outside by the undetermined world.

This inhibition will take its three usual forms: inhibition of the fiat, inhibition of the content, and inhibition of the inhibition.

III. *Mastery over the outer determinant or the Undetermined;* the Ego as Will willing Free Will being able now both to execute and to inhibit the determinant, has gotten the mastery over the realm of determinants and can take which one it chooses; or it determines its determinant.

This mastery has its three phases: the immediate mastery through the selection of the strongest determinant, then there may be a new inhibition and a new selection; finally the Ego as Free Will, conscious of its mastery, is to seize and transform the entire undetermined world, making it into a realm of freedom.

Such is the process through which man passes in realizing his Free Will by means of external Nature. He is, as it were, a cave dweller, being penned up in his physical limits on all sides; he is in the vast cave of Polyphemus, the giant, who perpetually threatens to eat him alive. What can he do? He must be a Ulysses, he has to conquer the giant by intelligence, setting him to work and causing him to remove the huge stone which blocks up the entrance to daylight and to freedom. Ulysses, the wise man, turns one huge force of Nature against another force of Nature, and so controls her, making her obedient to his Will. Thus he escapes from the dark cave of Polyphemus, and brings his companions also to liberty and to light. Such is, indeed, the function of the hero, he leads forth his people out of the slavery into which they are born, out of the cave of Nature which environs them on every side, into the realm of freedom. Ulysses is a Free Will willing Free Will, who, being obstructed by an outer undetermined world, converts this into a means of liberation.

The following are the main details of this development of the Undetermined Free Will, in its threefold movement:—

I. In the executive stage of Undetermined Free Will, the act is executed immediately in response to the determinant; there is no inhibition, the Will yields at once to the stimulation and determines itself to be self-determined. The act is what transforms the Undetermined into the Determined, the object or content being always the realization of freedom. I cut down the forest and till the soil in order to live, but I live in order to be free; the forest uncut and the soil unsown are really obstacles to my Free Will which determines me to transform them into implements of my Free Will. In such an act I proceed immediately to the work and execute the same; it is my nature to do the deed.

To this executive act the Ego in its subjective phase has to be stirred through the outer determinant. The Ego, as recipient and intellective, has three stages which give respectively the sensation, the image, and the thought. The outer determinant may stimulate each of these to express itself immediately in a deed, whose content is the realization of Free Will. Here, then, we see that the subjective element is present, but is implicit, not separated from the outer determinant in the executive act.

1. The undetermined world can stir in any

soul through sensation the Instinct to transform that world from an obstacle (which it is by nature) into an instrument of freedom. Probably every sensation rouses in the Ego an act of Will to subject in some way the stimulating object, and still further to make it over into a means for furthering Free Will. Particularly the great vocation of the child is to conquer its freedom from the undetermined outside world; it has really nothing else to do in its infancy. How it works at its task! Many of its naughtinesses spring from its resistance to attempts which hinder its pursuit of realizing its own Free Will. It has the pure Impulse (or Instinct) for freedom; not yet rational, yet on the way to rationality.

Men have also the same Instinct; the very presence of a sphere external to themselves and not determined by themselves, irritates the Will to self-execution. Habit, vocation, character, play into such an Instinct; the farmer will jump out of his wagon and cut down a Canada thistle along the road; the boatman cannot help taking the oars out of unskillful hands, and controlling the unruly craft; the genuine watchmaker will still make a watch now and then by a kind of irresistible Instinct, though he knows he cannot compete with the machinery for that purpose. Such cases show the Ego as Free Will asserting itself against an outer determining world. The

very highest Instinct of man probably is that of calling forth a realm of freedom in which he longs to dwell.

Still the child is the being which manifests most completely the present stage. In fact the whole activity of the child bends toward the continued attainment of its freedom, for which result it is looking all the time. First, it must take possession of limbs and body, and through these take possession of surrounding space and what fills the same. The little boy between three and four years old, seeing the soldiers march, will start to marching in his room; he will repeat the movement forty or fifty times, till he too can march. He has mastered the obstacle, his limit, and he feels joyous in his free activity. But let the nurse try to stop him, at once there is a fight, really a fight for freedom.

2. The undetermined world can rouse an *Image*, derived from a former sensation or experience, which image compels me not merely to execute it (as in Desire) but to transform some environing obstacle, in order to execute it. To take a previous example, *I desire to go home*; the image of going home carried out immediately is the fulfillment of Desire simply. But suppose I am held prisoned in walls, I have to change in some way my environment, I have to determine it anew by boring through those walls or by undermining them. In such an act I am willing

my freedom which is obstructed, I have to determine myself to be self-determined, and I proceed to realize this fact. To be sure, I fulfill my Desire, too, which is to reach home; but first I have to vindicate my freedom. Ulysses standing on the shores of Calypso's Isle longs to get back to sunny Ithaca and prudent Penelope, but he cannot execute the wish of his heart, the ocean stands in his way. Then he begins constructing his raft, every blow struck on its timbers is a blow for freedom. The image of home and wife in his mind drives him to reconstruct some part of surrounding nature in order to master the watery element before him, and to convert it into the service of his Free Will.

3. The undetermined world can rouse a *Thought* which is the creative principle of mind, and this Thought may impel me to a transformation of that undetermined world which has stimulated it. Thought is not the Image but rather the creator of the Image, and it is this creative element upon which stress is now laid. In the preceding example let us suppose that Ulysses had never seen a raft, but had to invent one outright; he might have an antecedent Image of it in his mind, but his Thought or Conception would be the producer of the Image. Such is indeed the supreme activity of human spirit — that which is called originality, invention. Of course Thought may realize itself immediately

through the Will; but in the present case Ulysses making the raft is Free Will willing Free Will, his act transforms the outer undetermined world as the means for realizing his freedom. Each stroke of his hammer not only helps make the raft but helps make him free, this last being his true end. Thus the Undetermined stimulates the Thought through which the Ego determines itself to be self-determined. Often we hear that necessity is the mother of invention; this necessity is the necessity of being free.

II. The Ego as Free Will, being moved to the executive act immediately by the external determinant, begins to resist it as external, as contrary to the very nature of freedom. So the inhibitory principle of the Ego is roused to activity, seeking to stop the might of this outer determination of itself. The Ego willing Free Will turns against the external determinant to willing Free Will. Such is the separative act of the present movement; the Ego as Free Will separates itself from its outer determinant, and begins to refuse to be determined by the same, as inconsistent with its own essence.

Thus in the Sphere of Undetermined Free Will rises the power of inhibition, which turns back upon the previous executive stage and negates both the act and its stimulation. As already seen, the Free Will is roused by the external bound set to itself, the undetermined

world stimulates it to assert its freedom against the outer limit, which it proceeds to remove or to transform or to transcend in some way. But the same Free Will can refuse to be determined thus by the Undetermined to remove or to transform or to transcend the limit, it can submit to the external restraint, it can even deny its own content and object, namely freedom. Such is the mighty contradiction which the Free Will contains within itself: it can determine itself not to be self-determined, it can give itself up to bondage by its own free act.

Still even such an act has lurking within it an implicit Free Will. The inhibition of freedom presupposes freedom; to inhibit his free spirit man must be free. So the inhibitory process will result in bringing forth a deeper freedom, namely, that which is acquired through its own negation, and the return out of that negation. Hence this process will reveal first, the inhibition of the outer fiat; secondly, the inhibition of the inner content; thirdly, the inhibition of the inhibition.

1. There can be, in the first place, an inhibition of the outer executive act. The Free Will may be stimulated by the undetermined world, but is able nevertheless to cut off the fiat. There still remains the stimulus to transcend the limit, yet the execution is repressed by the Free Will. A man interferes with my passage down the

public street, the obstacle stimulates me to an assertion of my freedom; yet I inhibit the act, as it may bring on a street fight, which I prefer to avoid. Thus, on the one hand, there is a determinant which is impelling me to determine myself to be self-determined, still I veto the act and determine myself not to carry out my self-determination in the given case; I resolve not to assert my freedom under the circumstances.

Thus, however, I am getting control of the external determinant, which no longer determines me to an immediate act even in defense of my freedom; a thought, an inner determinant of mine own, has shown a negative power which stays the execution. I have inhibited the doing, but the stimulus to the doing still determines the Ego within, even if the act be cut off. I have still the impulse to assert my freedom, though it be held back from the deed.

2. The inhibition next extends to the content of Free Will, to the very aspiration for freedom; the Ego as Free Will becomes negative to its own end, inhibiting the impulse to, the desire for, and the thought of, freedom. You can not only inhibit the realization of freedom, but the spirit which aspires for such realization. The Free Will determines itself not only to be not self-determined, but to be enslaved. You can sell yourself into servitude by your own Free Will, whose act therein is wholly contradic-

tory of itself. Through such an inhibition the breach in the Free Will is complete.

The undetermined world, rousing a sensation or an image or a thought, can call forth in the Ego the strong resolve to assert freedom, but the present inhibition goes back and undoes the resolve, negates the very power of the spirit to respond within itself to the stimulus, which thereby can no longer stimulate the Ego as Free Will to determine itself to be self-determined. Whole nations often give up their spirit of liberty and droop in slavery; what once determined them to noble deeds determines them no more; we say that their spirit is gone, not merely suppressed or waiting for action; it is no longer stimulated by the act of tyranny to determine itself as self-determined. In like manner individuals give up this eternal struggle of freedom, which is the true content of life.

3. The inhibition of the inhibition is the final inhibitory act of the Undetermined Free Will; having reached the preceding complete contradiction and self-negation, it must proceed to inhibit just this negative content also, as in the previous case it inhibited a positive content, namely, the limit-transcending spirit itself. Or, as we say in abstract speech, the negation negates itself. The inhibition must apply its own logic to itself, and so is in a perpetual conflict with itself, seeking to inhibit itself. The Free Will denying Free

Will cannot even make such a denial without an implicit assertion of Free Will. So all the negative forces of the world, just while positing themselves, are in a process of getting rid of themselves.

Evidently man must be able to cancel his own inhibitory act, else he would remain in a continuous state of inhibition, and therein wholly unfree. The inhibition of the inhibition removes the interdict on the content or Motive, and hence there is the return to the Free Will willing Free Will, or to the ability to do so. Aspiration for freedom comes back or can come back when the negative condition is overcome; the spirit is again ready to realize its supreme end. The Free Will can now execute or inhibit the Free Will when stimulated by the undetermined world; thus it is getting control of itself, which is a very important matter, since we shall find that not every external incident ought to stimulate the Free Will to will itself. The possibility of self-mastery in the present sphere the Free Will has now reached through the process of inhibition.

The outcome of this inhibitory movement is, accordingly, that we have arrived at a new phase of positive freedom, which may be stated as follows: The Ego as Free Will determines itself to be self-determined through the Undetermined still; it is not, however, controlled now

from the outside by chance, but by the Free Will itself, which has reached back and is determining its determinant, selecting and rejecting the same.

III. The Free Will has thus reached the mastery of the executive and inhibitory elements which belong to its complete action, and hence it can employ both. The undetermined world is still the stimulant of Free Will, but is put under its control; this control is not merely negative in the present stage, not merely inhibitory, but is positive; the Free Will still has its determinant in the Undetermined, yet it has gained the mastery over this determinant of itself. The inhibition of the inhibition was the process of negating the negative, yet remained negative or, at least, inactive therein; the present mastery, however, implies the Free Will which has overcome the negative process and commands the same by virtue of its sovereignty.

Thus the Free Will is seizing upon its stimulating world and is using the same for its purpose, which is to realize freedom or to determine itself to be self-determined, not through a world which is outside of Free Will, but which is through Free Will. It is a mastery over the Free Will by Free Will, since the latter goes back and determines its determinant, which is the Undetermined. This mastery will also have its process; the immediate, the separative and

the returning stages will be manifested in what follows.

1. There is, first of all, an immediate Mastery of the determinant through Free Will. The undetermined world is present soliciting the Ego on all sides, and stimulating it to action. One of these stimulants is taken, that which appeals most strongly to the Free Will, which thus performs a work of selection. The other stimulants are inhibited more or less unconsciously through the negative might of the Free Will whose inhibitory power always lies back of such choosing; if one determinant is taken the rest must be rejected. But such rejection is itself a selection, though negative; it must have also a determinant, though this be as yet implicit.

What occupation in life will give me most freedom? Suppose I place my true freedom in culture, in the development of my spirit, not in the making of money. Shall I be a merchant or teacher? The latter offers me the best opportunity to realize my ideal of a free man, so I choose it, though the outlook be not favorable for wealth, or glory, or fame. I inhibit the competing determinants, the trade, the law, though I might employ them for my freedom also.

2. The Ego as Free Will has just selected from the undetermined world the strongest determinant for its freedom, or what it deems such. But that determinant, after being selected, may not

be the best for its purpose; having been chosen for a certain end, it may fail partially or wholly. The Free Will must, therefore, inhibit its own first choice, and open again the whole field, which is the undetermined world; man's freedom cannot be allowed to hang upon one mistaken selection of a means. Thus the Ego as Free Will asserts anew its mastery over its own act, over itself; it inhibits its former selection, returns to the realm of determinants, and then inhibits its inhibition again by making a fresh selection. In such manner it insists upon having not one but many choices, wherein we see that this is the second or divisive stage of the present sphere.

Let us carry out still further the example of choosing a vocation, previously cited, the ultimate object of which is to realize the freedom of the individual in civil society. I find that my calling does not bring out my development, does not stimulate me unto freedom as I expected; on the contrary, it hinders my Free Will willing Free Will. Hence I think of other vocations, I undo my choice (gradually it may be) and seek that occupation which brings out my highest Self. The great problem in Goethe's famous novel, *Wilhelm Meister*, is the choice of a vocation, which will aid and stimulate the human soul to the most perfect freedom by it attainable. The hero in that novel changes from one thing to another, in pursuit of culture, till he passes

through quite a cycle of diversified activity. Really he is seeking freedom in the sphere of vocation; or, to use our formula, he is determining himself to be self-determined through various phases of the undetermined world, which he has to determine for his end.

Thus the Free Will willing the Free Will has not only been able to choose its determinant from the undetermined world, but to change and to choose again another and perchance many determinants, which it makes over into the means of its freedom. But amid all these changes and diversities there is the one process which is now to be set forth.

3. The Free Will is to take and transform the entire undetermined world into a realm of freedom, in which man is to dwell and pass a rational existence. That world, primarily lying outside of him, stimulates him variously, to manifold forms of Impulse, Desire, Choice; but the supreme form of stimulation is to determine him to freedom, that is, to determine him to determine himself to be self-determined. His whole environment he is to transform into a means for this one ultimate end. Thus he builds for himself an objective world of freedom — every object, so to speak, being transmuted into an implement thereof.

Such is the completion of the mastery of the Undetermined Free Will, the Free Will which

makes over its outer environment into an image of itself as well as a means of its own realization. Not a single determinant is chosen now (as was the case in the first stage) but the totality is to be taken and wrought over anew into the bearer of the ideal end of the Ego in the present sphere.

It may be said that the American people, more than any other perhaps, are engaged in developing the resources of nature — which means, at bottom, the transforming of a whole continent into the abode of freedom. The frontiersman cutting down the forest, the plowman turning up the virgin soil for his crops, the manufacturer converting the minerals of the earth into implements of utility, are all ultimately doing one thing: That undetermined world outside they are transmuting into a realm of liberty. They are making it tractable to Free Will, yea to Free Will willing Will; in fact, that is just what they are doing in the very act of work. To be sure, they may all be said to be making money, and they are, but when the test comes, they will give their money and their lives for the higher end. Any how it is better to make money than to take money.

The Anglo-Saxon race is the race which has most fully developed commerce and manufactures, which has adopted as its calling the transformation of Nature into a means for man's improvement. The dollar-loving race it is

sometimes dubbed by its detractors; but note another peculiarity. This dollar-loving race has developed the freest institutions yet attained by humanity. There is an undoubted connection between political freedom, and this transformation of Nature or the money-making tendency. Institutions, specially the State, have as their prime function the securing to man his Free Will, and its results; the Undetermined Free Will, if it is to do its work fully, must be safeguarded by the free Institution.

On the other hand, it is true that the pursuit of the dollar may become enslaving. If it is sought wholly for its own sake, if it becomes the ultimate end and not freedom, not the Free Will willing Free Will, there is a deep perversion which will tell both on the individual and on the national character. Nature must be transformed primarily for the sake of freedom, then the dollar will follow of itself. Deeply corrupting in a free country is the pursuit of the dollar as an end unto itself. Still we may well consider the two facts in their causes and ask ourselves the question: Why among nations are the greatest money-getters also those most ardent for freedom, as well as those possessing the freest institutions?

In this mastery of the undetermined world the Ego has become master, the external determinant is determined by an internal one, namely,

by the Ego itself. Accordingly, the stress of power now passes from the objective to the subjective determinant. Thus we move out of the Undetermined into the Determined, as the stimulating energy which drives the Ego to will Free Will. This is the next sphere which is to be considered and which is distinctively the separative stage of the total process of Free Will. We have already noticed that there has been in Undetermined Free Will an internal element, though it be implicit, and not separated from the outward act. Still it is present and is now to become explicit; that is, the Impulse or Desire for freedom, which lay in the Ego, intermediate, as it were, between rude external Nature and its transformation, is to be made distinct and is to be seen as the determinant taken by itself. Thus the Ego divides itself from its coalescence with the outer determinant, and asserts itself as the inner principle which determines itself to freedom.

II. Determined Free Will.

There is an inner or subjective world of determinants which move the Ego in manifold ways; the ultimate end of them all is to determine the Free Will to will Free Will. Let us again begin at the beginning and take one of the lowest of these lower determinants, anger, which is an

inner determinant of my Ego, and rises usually at some obstruction to or attack upon my freedom. There is undoubtedly an external occasion of anger in most cases, still it may flash up from a recurring image of some past wrong. It is, however, a psychical tendency, a disposition which determines me to some action, unless inhibited; it is one of the most immediate forms of Impulse in which the Ego as Will is determined not merely to be self-determined but to determine itself to be self-determined. Anger may be, and usually is, irrational, nevertheless it is a subjective determinant to freedom.

When the outer fact or event quite loses itself in the internal state of mind or feeling which it excites, we always lay the emphasis upon the subjective determinant, though there be an objective one too. In a distant land I happen to see my country's flag on a ship in the harbor, this accidental view stirs within me an emotion so intense, such a coercive wish for home that I can hold out against it no longer; it drives me to break over any obstacle, or to give up any purpose of further travel and to start at once for my own fireside. Essentially it is a subjective determinant which moves me in the given case; I carry out my desire against all resistance, in meeting which I have to assert my Free Will. The most trivial thing may rouse my inner bent or tendency, which in turn drives me to action.

The flight of a bird may make me feel my limitation to such an extent, if I am very sensitive on the point, that I at once think of a flying-machine, create a plan of the same, and start to produce it, realizing therein not only the mechanism but also my freedom. Here the subjective factor is what moves me to act, and if obstacles be put in my way, it may move me to assert my freedom just by my act. At the same time I am transforming nature and therein creating an outer world of freedom.

In contrast with the previous sphere (the Undetermined Free Will) we name the present sphere the Determined Free Will. In this caption we must first recall and carefully join together the three factors which enter into the process. The two constant factors which make the sphere of Free Will are present: The Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined; that is, the Will not only acts but has its own freedom as the content of its action. But the third or variable factor, that which gives the varieties of the Determined Free Will, is also to be stated in the formula. This factor is, in general, the Determined, that is, something determined by me, by my Ego, and not determined externally by the outer world. So we have the formula: The Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined through the Determined. The Will wills itself

to be Free Will through a stimulation coming from within.

When I leave my position, not merely to do something else, but to assert my freedom, which may be jeoparded by the conduct of my employer, my deed is an instance of this present sphere. I not only act, but the end or content of my act is the liberty of action; my Free Will wills itself to be Free Will, stirred by my subjective determination in the matter. Yet we must always recollect that there is a determinant to such action on my part. I have to feel or to think what my freedom is, and to have a very strong feeling about it; the act of the employer would not determine me unless I had a consciousness of my right and an intense devotion to freedom, and likewise knew the nature of his act toward me.

The subjective world, accordingly, becomes the great determinant to Freedom in the present sphere. To be sure, this world has often to be stimulated from the outside, from the Undetermined, but this outer stimulus has a tendency to be a vanishing quantity in comparison with the inner stimulation. The lighted shaving kindles the conflagration if the material be ready; otherwise, it simply burns itself up and dies away. The throwing a cargo of tea overboard could not have stimulated a revolution unless the spirit

were prepared to take fire. The inner realm of the Ego, with its determinations, thus becomes the main co-efficient of the deed.

Herein we can see the distinction between this and the preceding sphere. The undetermined world stimulated the Free Will to transform it into the instrument of freedom, so that the kingdom of nature is made over into the works of liberty. But the determined world (determined by my Ego) stimulates my Free Will to realize my instinct, my desire or my conception of freedom. It is my own determination which determines me to assert my Free Will. Though the Undetermined moves me through my sensation, my image or my thought, I am moved to get rid of that undetermined element as an obstacle to my freedom and to transmute it into an instrument thereof.

The Free Will, therefore, in the present sphere, is determined directly from within by the activities of the Ego. We may call it the realm of subjective freedom. Another term we shall employ, Caprice, though it is in some respects misleading. Any determination of my own, a whim, a sudden notion or fancy can move me to assert my Free Will; I will my Will through willfulness. Yet the moral Will is also subjective and so has an element of Caprice in it; it is we who choose our moral ideal and carry it out.

We should notice the opposition and conflict involved in the words *Determined* and *Free Will*. Contradictory they are, and the whole movement of this sphere is to overcome the contradiction and to elevate the determination into freedom.

We may now bring before ourselves the total process of Determined Free Will. The beginning is made by a subjective determinant, which, though internal, moves the Ego from the outside to assert Free Will, and hence is in this regard hostile to freedom. This subjective determinant must, therefore, be mastered by the Ego, that is, the Ego must determine its own determinant to willing Free Will, and not be determined by the same, thus it attains the mastery of Caprice by its own Inner Law.

The stages of this process, which is the process of mastering Caprice, are three and show the Psychosis: —

I. *The Executive;* the Ego as Will willing Free Will responds to the inner determinant (the Determined by me) in an immediate act, without inhibition.

This inner determinant takes three forms: Impulse, Desire, Choice (Motive), all of which have been found in Determined Will, where, however, they are carried out directly into any act, not into the act whose content is Free Will.

II. *The Inhibitory;* the Ego as Will willing

Free Will, finding itself determined by a determinant outside of itself, though this determinant is subjective, reacts against the same, and proceeds to inhibit it.

This inhibition will manifest the three forms which it usually passes through in the sphere of the Will: the inhibition of the fiat, the inhibition of the content, and the inhibition of the inhibition. This entire process of inhibition gives what we have called the negative mastery over the determinant.

III. *The Mastery which is positive, or the Mastery of Caprice*, which is the control over the subjective determinant, and the subordination of it to the Inner Law. The Ego as Will willing Free Will, being able now both to execute and to inhibit the determinant, has gotten the mastery over the inner world of determinants, and can take which one it chooses; thus it determines its determinant.

This mastery moves through three phases: the immediate mastery which shows itself in the selection of the strongest determinant and in the inhibition of the others; then comes a new inhibition followed by a new selection from the total field of determinants; finally, the Ego as Free Will is placed over all subjective determinants as their Inner Law, whose content is the Free Will willing the Free Will.

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Free Will, finding itself determined by a determinant outside of itself, though this determinant is subjective, reacts against the same, and proceeds to inhibit it.

This inhibition will manifest the three forms which it usually passes through in the sphere of the Will: the inhibition of the fiat, the inhibition of the content, and the inhibition of the inhibition. This entire process of inhibition gives what we have called the negative mastery over the determinant.

III. *The Mastery which is positive, or the Mastery of Caprice*, which is the control over the subjective determinant, and the subordination of it to the Inner Law. The Ego as Will willing Free Will, being able now both to execute and to inhibit the determinant, has gotten the mastery over the inner world of determinants, and can take which one it chooses; thus it determines its determinant.

This mastery moves through three phases: the immediate mastery which shows itself in the selection of the strongest determinant and in the inhibition of the others; then comes a new inhibition followed by a new selection from the total field of determinants; finally, the Ego as Free Will is placed over all subjective determinants as their Inner Law, whose content is the Free Will willing the Free Will.

Thus the process of Determined Free Will has

completed itself. The subjective determinant started by determining the Ego to its assertion of freedom, and has ended in being subordinated and determined by that same Ego, which has become the Inner Law over all finite determinants. Thus the Inner Law begins to elaborate and transform these determinants into means of freedom. As the outer world was wrought over in the sphere of Undetermined Free Will, and converted into an instrument of man's liberty, so the inner world of subjective determinants must be wrought over in the sphere of Determined Free Will, and must be made to further man's liberty in his inner life. When this ideal end of freedom becomes the controlling principle of the individual and transforms all his conduct according to its behest, we have entered the realm of Morals. At present, however, we are simply considering the psychical fact that in the movement of Will the Ego as Free Will willing Free Will has reached the point at which it controls all subjective determinants, and uses them as means to bring forth the end, which end is itself, namely the Free Will whose content is Free Will.

The Inner Law controlling all finite determinants of the Ego begins to suggest morality, but we cannot yet enter the latter sphere. For the Inner Law is still itself subjective, capricious, though controlling Caprice; it may be rational or not, the final test of rationality it has not

adequately within its purely internal self. So the Law must be objective and universal, not subjective and individual; thus the Ego is to receive a new content, and a new authority is to rise, the authority of institutions. But all this lies much in advance of us.

At present, therefore, we must return and unfold the Determined Free Will, giving in detail its various stages which have been designated above in a general way.

I. The executive act of Determined Free Will follows immediately upon the determination of the Ego, whatever that may be. There is no conscious inhibition of the outgoing energy, no stoppage of the fiat. This determined element, which is the stimulus, is mine, is a determination of my mind, and may be an Impulse, Desire or Choice. These we have already seen as stages of the Determined Will (see last section), but they are also stages of the Determined Free Will, with which we are now dealing. That is, they are in the present case determinants not only of the Self-determined (the act) but also of the content of the act as self-determined; I am herein moved not merely to act freely, but to have freedom as the content of my action. Moreover this action is now immediate, the execution follows implicitly and directly the determinant, which, as before said, is at present subjective.

1. Impulse can be an inner or subjective determinant of Free Will. We have already given as an example of Impulse the whizzing bullet which causes me to dodge; an outside sensation moves me to act, to determine myself. The organism is stimulated immediately to a free movement, yet the very purpose of this free movement of the body is to keep the body free to move; if it were struck by the bullet, it would lose its freedom. Thus the inner Impulse has or can have as end or content the Free Will willing Free Will; that is, it can be a determinant to freedom.

Undoubtedly such a determinant, being merely automatic, is very inadequate, and can act without intelligence. It is started or roused from the outside, and hence is by its very nature quite the opposite of Free Will, even in determining the latter. For the Self-determined must also have the Self-determined as its determinant in order to be completely itself.

In like manner, the appetites, which primarily seek immediate gratification, are for the purpose of preserving life, and still more deeply, for preserving freedom. Yet these, too, as is well known, may run counter to Free Will and even undermine the same. Passion also rises often impulsively in the soul to the end of vindicating freedom; I get angry at the man who obstructs my rightful passage on the street, I

proceed to thrust him out out of the way by violence. My Free Will is willing my Free Will in such a case doubtless, but it is the lowest form of asserting freedom.

Thus there is a sphere of corporeal liberty which is watched over, and, so to speak, willed by Impulse; there is a realm of organic freedom in the body, which impulsively, quite automatically, gives a distant glimpse of the supreme end of Free Will. The lower animals have in them such an immediate impelling power for liberty. The caged bird will usually try to fly away when opportunity offers; the muskrat, if one of his feet be caught in a trap, will gnaw off his own leg for the sake of gaining his liberty. Man, imprisoned, has a perpetual spontaneous movement in his soul which drives him to escape from his captivity, even if all the wants of life are better satisfied in it than in a state of freedom.

Such is the might of this Impulse throughout the whole animated world. Under the head of Determined Will, we saw the primary superficial form of Impulse; but now, under the head of Determined Free Will, we see the deep inner purpose of Impulse to tend toward the realization of freedom.

2. Desire can be an inner or subjective determinant of Free Will. We have already noted that the image of a former experience rises in the present and impels to the future act — all of

which goes to make a Desire, which in its turn may become the stimulant of freedom. To take the example already given, I desire to go home; thus I am simply moved to an act, or am determined to be self-determined. But if there be some interference or obstruction, this image of going home may rouse me not only to act (to go home), but to act for the sake of vindicating my freedom of action.

Such a determinant as Desire, is not rational, not the Self-determined which is at last to determine the Free Will. It is stimulated from within (not from without, like Impulse) by some notion, fancy, idea, by whatever rises to the surface, in the infinite, ever-whirling vortex of the Ego. Into any of these sudden images, these variegated bubbles of the soul always coming up from the depths unknown of subjectivity, man's Free Will can put the whole content of Free Will; upon the fulfillment of some momentary whim I can stake my whole freedom, I can deem myself unfree, in abject servitude, unless such Desire be carried out instantaneously. This is the realm specially of unmeasured Caprice, into which I can put my entire liberty.

Every chance image floating through the brain has a tendency to form itself into a Desire and upon the realization of Desire the human Ego may place its freedom. The child is full of these Caprices, and, if stopped or thwarted in any

way, it at once begins to indicate that its Free Will is asserting Free Will by crying, by assailing the restraint, perchance by a general attack upon everybody and everything in its environment. Of course, here is a loud call for training and direction. Women are generally reported to have Caprices, quite unfathomable, sudden ebullient spirts from the bottom of their oceanic Ego, whose rise and duration no mathematician has yet been able to calculate. Let it, however, be added in all haste that man, born of woman, has in this respect inherited the traits of his mother and often improved on them.

Thus the whole inner world of the soul has a tendency to transform itself into Desire, and still further, this Desire has a tendency to make itself the determinant of Free Will. The Desire for freedom is indeed inherent; the Ego as Free Will has not only the Impulse, but also the Desire to be free; it is always holding up to itself some image, some ideal of its freedom; it cannot wholly dwell in the reality thereof. The Determined Will in the form of Desire thus stimulates and passes into the Determined Free Will, becoming therein its determinant.

3. The Motive can be an inner or subjective determinant of Free Will. We have seen, under the head of Choice, that the Motive, properly speaking, involves the total process of Desire in its three stages, which Motive then passes over

into another Desire and makes Choice. Such is the last and highest phase of Determined Will, whose determinant, the Motive, now moves the Free Will to will the Free Will. I desire to go home in order to write; here my writing is the immediate Motive for my going home; but I may be wrongfully restrained in my action and I may conclude to assert my Free Will just by writing. Still further, my deeper Motive in writing may be to get the material means for my liberty, or to emancipate myself specially; in such a case, the Ego as Free Will wills the Free Will, being urged thereto by the Motive as determinant. This Motive is not a simple Desire for freedom which I try to execute immediately, but the total process of Desire seizing upon the means, let us say the writing. Thus my true Motive in going home to write is to realize my freedom, or by it I am determined to determine myself to be self-determined.

Here again great variety enters, the Motives for freedom may be of every sort, high and low, right and wrong, good and bad. My neighbor's pear tree shades a patch of my garden and thus interferes with my Free Will. Suppose I go and assert the latter by cutting down his tree. In vindicating my own, I have deeply violated his Free Will; what now shall we say to my Motive? At this point morality enters; with

the Motive man becomes responsible, more so, at least, than he is in mere Impulse or Desire. For the Motive contains the total process of Ego, as before shown, and hence must have in it something of deliberation. You cannot have a Desire, then inhibit it and pass to a new Desire through such inhibition without having some consciousness of what you are doing.

The ultimate Motive, whatever be its moral nature, is freedom, as this is also the ultimate Impulse and the ultimate Desire. The whole sphere of what we have above called Determined Will is to determine the Ego as Will to determine itself to be self-determined, or to determine man unto freedom. It may be asked just here again: But if man is determined, how can he be free? The question takes for granted the fatal point that Determinism and Freedom are absolutely separate, whereas they must be seized as elements of one process. Free Will must be seen to be more and more deeply determined to be free, and to pass through a continued unfolding into its actual self (or self-actualization).

At this point undoubtedly the Ego must be able to inhibit the subjective determinant in the form of Impulse, Desire or Motive (Choice). Even the Motive, though a Self-determined, must be put under the might of inhibition, being a subjective determinant in the present sphere.

II. Accordingly, the Ego as Free Will finds

itself determined, unfree, moved by a determinant not its own, though the latter be subjective. Hence it begins to assert itself by inhibiting this determinant as something really outside of itself; it will stop the execution of the Impulse, Desire, Motive; then it will inhibit all of these within, as internal determinants of itself, and finally will inhibit the inhibition. For the Ego as Free Will having found it contradictory to its freedom to be ruled by such a determinant, turns against it and negates it, which, being subjective, has the form of Caprice, and hence must be put under control, whereof the beginning is inhibition.

The inhibition of Caprice, of this subjective determination, is necessary for the completion of freedom. The total Ego is not to be ruled by its own passing notion. We have already seen that any determination of mind, the whole sphere of Determinism, can be the means or the determinant for an assertion of Free Will. Equally necessary is the ability to inhibit such a determinant in order to assert the Free Will.

The child often insists upon the immediate fulfilment of every whim or fancy, and cries if thwarted; it acts as if its whole freedom lay in the gratification of such whim or fancy. Its training must be toward the inhibition of Caprice. The grown person also may show a similar trait; unless the least desire or fortuitous notion is

gratified, he may deem that he has no freedom. Such a person becomes a victim to his own inner states or mental determinations, when he makes them determinants to an assertion of Free Will. Thus even the Free Will in asserting Free Will can be enslaved to Caprice, which must, therefore, be inhibited by Free Will.

Again the inhibitory principle will pass through the three stages of its process, as already indicated. Still we must remember that the content or subject-matter of the inhibitory process is different in the present sphere (Determined Free Will), from that of any preceding sphere.

1. The first inhibition is turned against the executive act, the immediate going forth into the deed. The entire inner world of subjectivity may be let loose upon the Free Will and seek to determine it, that is, to move the Ego to will Free Will; some turn of the fancy, some notion, any internal determination may become such a determinant, which the Ego, if it is to be free, must be able to refuse to carry out. It does so refuse, negates the fiat and cuts off the act.

The young lady may take a sudden notion to become an actress; opposition is made by her relatives, but she feels the strong stimulation to assert her Free Will against such opposition; she declares she is vindicating her freedom, and goes upon the stage. Or she may bring herself to inhibit the carrying out of her fancy, though

she still keeps and plays with it in revery, which, however, must also be inhibited.

2. The inhibition, to be effective, must extend to the inner determinant itself, to the Impulse, Desire, Motive; or to the feeling, image, fancy, notion which has stirred the Free Will to such a state of self-assertion. Then we come to the fountain head of the trouble, we reach down into the subjective home of the Caprice, which is to be inhibited. It is not enough to stop simply the outer execution, and leave intact the inner determination; the Ego is to transform itself, being the source of the Caprice. Or, as has often been said in the previous stages, the content must be inhibited; otherwise there is always the danger that the act may follow. But when the moving principle, the inner determinant, is annulled, the act cannot take place.

In all moral training of my own Ego, I must not only cease from the outer execution of the wrongful deed, but also I must obliterate the notion or thought which tempts to the deed. I must eschew the lustful image as well as the lustful deed; if my heart be purified, my conduct cannot help being pure.

3. But this inhibition of the subjective determinant is itself subjective, or is a determination of the Ego, and thus is itself a Caprice in the sense given. So the inhibition of the subjective determinant, which was shown in the preceding

paragraph, involves the inhibition of this inhibition of the subjective determinant. The negative power of the inhibition has therein come back to itself and has gotten control; Caprice has obtained the negative mastery of Caprice, when it can inhibit itself. For this subjective annulment of Caprice, is still Caprice, which is just this inner determination of the Ego which determines the Free Will to self-assertion.

Such is the result of the inhibitory movement of Caprice; it inhibits itself, which is a negative control over itself. The subjective determinant has now the ability to determine the Ego to will Free Will or not to will the same; that is, the Ego as Free Will begins to determine its determinant, in a negative or inhibitory way. Next we shall see it rising to a positive control or mastery.

III. The mastery of Caprice, to which we have now come, signifies that the subjective determinant to the assertion of Free Will is under control, can be inhibited, though it be carried into execution. We again go back to the executive act, we restore the fiat, yet always with the ability to inhibit. The inner determined world of the Ego is still the stimulant of Free Will, which, however, has gained the mastery over this stimulant of itself, and responds no longer to a mere whim or fancy, but can put it down in favor of the determinant which may be worthy of itself. Herein subjective freedom attains its highest point.

Still we must observe that even this most worthy determinant of Free Will is subjective, and depends on the inner determination of the Ego. It is still a Caprice, though it puts down Caprice. The movement in the mastery of Caprice will be toward getting rid of this contradiction, toward finding a determinant which is not subjective, not still a Caprice.

That which we here call the mastery of Caprice is the mastery of the subjective determinant through the subjective determinant; the Ego as subject in the form of Impulse, Desire, Motive, having determined the process of Free Will, is now in its turn determined by that process. Such is the final attempt of the Ego as Free Will to get rid of its unfreedom, of its determinism, of its own unfree self. Herein again, we shall observe the movement.

1. The first or immediate stage of the mastery of Caprice is seen when a number of subjective determinants are present soliciting or stimulating the Free Will to assert itself; of these the strongest is taken and executed, while the rest are inhibited. The inner world of man is full of competing determinants, in the shape of moods, feelings, images, reflections; they all have their meaning, their ultimate end; this end is the grand end of subjectivity, which is freedom. Every little determination of the Ego, every whim, perchance, asserts its right to

be, and may move the Free Will to assert itself. An infinite sea of subjective determinants thus lies in every soul, and their final object and destination is to stir Free Will to will Free Will. Man cannot rest, has never rested in unfreedom, being everlastingly scourged out of it by his subjective nature.

Of this multitude of determinants the strongest makes itself valid, and gets carried into execution; the others are inhibited. Evidently behind this competing, conflicting mass stands the Ego, and in the present case makes implicitly and quite unconsciously its own selection, accepting and rejecting. Herein we see that the Ego as determinant is asserting the mastery over all its own states and activities which are also seeking to be determinants.

2. But the Ego, having selected the strongest internal determinant, may find it, after such selection, to be not suitable for its purpose. The strongest determinant may not be the wisest; the immediate execution of a mood or feeling or notion, though these be at first very strong, may not be the best way to freedom. Hence comes the need of inhibiting this strongest determinant, and of opening the whole field anew. To be sure, when too often done, such action indicates unsteadiness and fickleness. But the Ego as Free Will must be able to recall its first immediate selection and to

choose again; man's freedom cannot be allowed to depend on a single mistaken effort.

In this case we see that the Ego as Free Will asserts its mastery over its acts, recalling and correcting them; or, more especially, the Ego as the supreme determinant to willing freedom, cancels the one determinant already taken, and selects another. Thus it asserts itself as having not one but many choices; in fact, the whole field of subjective determinants is once more thrown open, and they are again competing with one another — wherein we mark the second or divisive stage of the present sphere. The essential point of the struggle is: Which subjective determinant shall now be taken for the assertion of my freedom, for determining me to determine myself to be self-determined?

3. The answer is, in general, the most worthy determinant must be taken. But what is the test of being the most worthy? Often the reply is given: that determinant which is most rational. But here we may well ask: What is it to be rational in the present instance? Let us see: the Ego as Free Will now determines its own determinant, is the master of its own internal determinations, and can choose the one which most adequately moves it to determine itself to be self-determined. Such a determinant, then, is the most worthy one, is the most rational one, since it is the means most conducive to realize free-

dom, the highest end of man. The Ego which makes such a choice is the truly rational Ego.

Thus the Ego has chosen as its true subjective determinant in the sphere of Determined Free Will just its freedom, or the Free Will which wills Free Will. This is often called the Inner Law, or the Higher Law which commands all other subjective determinants to obey its behest, as supreme over all forms of Impulse, Desire, Motive. Moreover it grounds its authority upon the fact that its whole content is to be the determinant of freedom, its object is the Ego as Free Will asserting Free Will. We have already seen that we may have a Desire, for instance the Desire to go home, which when interfered with, becomes the determinant to asserting freedom; but in the present case, the Ego itself has become the determinant to Free Will willing Free Will. It is thus the Law unto itself or over itself; as before said, it is the Inner Law, in which the Lawgiver makes the Law over himself. Such is the completion of this third stage, or the mastery of the subjective determinant by the subjective determinant, which is the Ego as Free Will willing Free Will, elevated into Law over all its own finite determinations.

Still this highest determinant, this Inner Law, is only subjective, it is as yet merely my authority, I am the ruler and the ruled in the one Ego. My next step must be to make this Law object-

ive. For as subjective it is still Caprice, or at least capricious in form; though it be the master of all subjective determinants, yet it is itself a subjective determinant, and hence exposed to all the caprices of the Ego. The Inner Law is often identified with Conscience; and who does not know that the conscientious person may be supremely irrational? All the might of his conscience, of his Ego willing his freedom, he may lay into the sheerest caprice, which is thus his determinant to evoke the Inner Law. Yet this Law ought to be the supremely rational, having the rational determinant.

Thus arises the necessity for the objective Law as the rational determinant of the Ego. But herewith we pass out of the sphere of the Determined Free Will, whose formula is the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined by the Determined, that is, by my subjective determinations.

Once more we may look at this Inner Law which is the final mastery of Caprice. It is the Ego as Will with its supreme content or end subordinating every other content of its own to that supreme one, which is, in general, freedom. To continue a former illustration, I desire to go home in order to write; but also I desire to stay in order to hear some music; here are two motives competing with each other for the control of me; which shall I choose? Ultimately, the

most rational; and the most rational motive is the one through which I most adequately realize my freedom, which moves me most completely to will Free Will. Such is the test by which I choose the most rational determinant. I as Inner Law, being a Free Will willing Free Will, command myself to take that determinant which is best for realizing myself, who am a Free Will willing Free Will. Every subjective determinant, every Impulse, Desire, Motive, has as end just this internally free Ego, which therein shows itself the supreme authority in this sphere, or the inner determinant determining all inner determinants. Thus it becomes the one Law, though still subjective; it rules the infinite multiplicity of Caprice, by a single stern authority, which is, however, even when rational, a Caprice.

Such is the inner limitation of the present sphere of Free Will (the Determined), which limitation must now be transcended. The loud call is for Law which will control Caprice and not be itself capricious. This final contradiction in Free Will the Ego is to free itself of by making its Law objective, whose authority shall extend not simply over one Ego internally, but over many or all Egos, and shall spring not simply from one dominating Ego but from many or all Egos. The Ego as Free Will cannot, therefore, be satisfied with even the Inner Law as its determinant, inasmuch as therein its freedom is not fully real-

ized. It must in some way rise out of being determined by its own subjective determinant, which at the highest is still capricious, and it must be determined by the Self-determined, which is independent of the individual Ego. The Law must not be subject to me, I must be subject to the Law; I cannot determine the Law and be wholly free, but I must be determined by the Law also, which has to be free too, and not dependent on me. A self-determined world in its own right is to become my true determinant to freedom; or the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined through the Self-determined. This world is known as the institutional world, in which the objective institutions of man (State, Family, Society, Church) determine him to freedom; his Inner Law is complemented and fulfilled by the Outer Law, which is an existent objective entity not sprung from him as an individual. The great end of this Outer Law is to secure freedom, its content is also to will Free Will. Thus an entire outer world is transformed not merely into an instrument of Free Will (as we saw in the sphere of Undetermined Free Will), but also into an actualized Will whose purpose is to secure Free Will.

Herewith we have made the transition to the next stage whose unfolding we are now to witness.

III. Self-determined Free Will.

First of all, these three words must be looked at with some care. They have a common meaning, yet are distinct; they indicate the three factors which go to make the final stage or process of psychological Will.

The Ego as Will now determines itself to be self-determined through the Self-determined — such is the formula, quite abstract and skeleton-like, which the reader must seek to make concrete and alive to himself through thought and examples. There is in the first place the primordial act of Will, the first form of self-activity or the Self-determined in the physical organism — the simple deed. In the second place, this act of Will is Free Will, it has as its content or purpose its own freedom of activity, or the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined. In the third place, this act of Free Will has a determinant or stimulus, which is the Self-determined, not the Undetermined or the Determined, each of which has just been unfolded. Such is the third factor of the present process, being the variable factor thereof, hence manifesting the stages or divisions.

An instance of the Self-determined Free Will may be observed when I obey the law of the State. Am I free in such an act? Undoubtedly I am determined, that is, I have a determinant

which moves me, but this determinant is the Self-determined in the form of the law of the State. For the State with its law is a self-determined Whole, independent of my individual Will, yet its function is just to will my individual Will (along with others), to secure my personal right and liberty. Thus there is a world outside of me, not a subjective determination of mine merely, which world is a Will coming back to me and willing my Will, making the same valid, actual, truly existent. I may be subjectively free in the previous stage of Determined Free Will, but in the present stage of Self-determined Free Will I am objectively free, inasmuch as I live in a world whose very soul is the securing to me of my freedom.

Still further on the same line of comparison, the preceding stage of Determined Free Will manifested the inner law which determines me (sometimes called the higher law), the law of subjective freedom. In such case I make the law over myself, administering and executing the same; the Free Will wills itself to be free, asserts its freedom through some inner determination of the Ego; my conception of what I ought to do is the law for me, which conception may sometimes conflict with the objective law, as we shall see later. But in the present stage of Self-determined Free Will there is the Will actualized in the world and at work willing my

Will; this Will actualized is what I am to will in order to obtain actual or objective freedom, since the Will which secures me and my Will is not my own subjective self, but an objective self, so to speak, whose fundamental purpose is to realize freedom, not alone internally, but externally, in the world.

So, when I obey the law of the State, I am following not simply my own individual Will, but I, this individual Will, have as content the Will which wills Will; or, I will the Will actualized, we may call it the universal Will, since its content is not simply my individual Will, but all Will, including mine. Such is the completion of freedom, when the world is free and exists for the sake of freedom. All institutions, properly speaking, have this end; hence the present sphere is the psychological foundation for what we shall hereafter call institutional Will, which is to be unfolded in the third part of this work.

A world of institutions, then, is the final supreme determinant as well as content of Free Will; its center is the Ego determining itself to be self-determined through the Self-determined; or it is the free activity of the Will asserting its free activity through actualized freedom as a positive working entity. I must will the State, but the State returns and wills my Will in its complete circuit; thus my Will

in itself is objectified, is projected as a total Will into an actual existence. Not till it has thrown itself out in its entire process and become object has it realized its own essence; the fundamental principle of the Will is self-objectification, hence it has not completed itself till it has objectified itself as complete, in its total process. The institutional world is this complete self-objectification of the total process of the Will, hence such a world is a Will which is the completed activity of Will, not only a Will itself but the securing and actualizing of Will.

Note, then, that in the development of Will, I come to will not merely my particular freedom as end, but I must will, and so to speak, recreate through my Will that which wills all freedom, and thus I get my freedom. I have to be universal, altruistic, if you prefer the term; the great boon, Free Will, is obtained only by my willing the Free Will of all and actualizing the same in an objective existence, in an institution. To be sure, this institutional world is already on hand, already created, but I have to create it over again before I can possess it, before I can truly be Free Will.

We may illustrate this final cycle of Free Will by an example. I voluntarily obey the State when it commands me to pay a tax for its support. Let us apply our formula: a self-deter-

mined Will (the State) determines me (is my determinant) to determine myself (moves me to an act) to be self-determined (to will my own Free Will or freedom). My Free Will pays a tax whose object is to maintain a Free Will which in turn maintains my Free Will. Or, the State commands me to do an act, which act has as its content or end my freedom of action guaranteed and safeguarded through the State. So I am still determined to determine myself to be self-determined in Free Will, but the determinant is now the self-determined Will actualized, existent in the world, and willing my Free Will and all Free Will.

The foregoing exposition may seem a mere play of words to puzzle the forbearing student. Still let him recollect that the problem of Free Will is one of the most intricate, riddlesome, subtle problems in Psychology. Indeed a number of eminent psychologists have simply given up the problem, have surrendered the very fortress of their science at discretion. We hold that mind is able to disentangle all the intricacies of mind; if it cannot, then there is no science of mind. Surely it is not wisdom to try to unfold a science of something of which we believe that no science is possible.

It may be here said that Hegel has once used the expression: "the Free Will which wills the Free Will." But in his development of Will he

does not make use of it, nor in his unfolding of institutions, so that it can hardly be called a distinctively Hegelian formula. (Something more will be said on this topic later on.)

Of the present sphere there are three stages constituting the process between the Ego as Free Will and the Self-determined Free Will as Law and Institutions.

I. There is, first, the primal stage of obedience, the unbroken unity of the two sides, the subjective and the objective, or the personal and the institutional. The Ego as Free Will is one with the self-determined Free Will as actualized in the world.

II. The breach between the two sides takes place, the Ego being necessarily separative; this second stage is that of disobedience, the inhibition of the foregoing unity. The Ego as Free Will, in the pursuit of its freedom, falls out with the actualized self-determined Free Will, and divorces itself from the same through many forms, from indifferent aloofness to destructive rebellion and anarchism.

III. Finally comes the return to obedience through the negative process, attaining harmony once more, rising through progress into insight. This stage may be called the mastery of Free Will, which mastery is double: the Ego controls its negative power on the one hand, and, on the other, the actualized Free Will becomes again

master over the individual Ego as Free Will — the mastery over Free Will by Free Will.

In this sphere the Ego has found the highest determinant of freedom, namely freedom, freedom as actualized in the world, thus attaining that of which it has been in search since the beginning, or, having made explicit that which was implicit in the primordial act of Will. The completely free man now begins to come forth from his fetters, outer and inner; he is the Ego which determines itself to be self-determined through the Self-determined. Such is his definition, now realized, but which has to be thought over and created anew before being fully understood and appropriated.

To this end we shall develop in more detail the three heads just given, which in themselves form a Psychosis, and still further sub-divide into many Psychoses, which, however, show at bottom the one process of the Ego running through all the multiplicity of their manifestations.

I. The Ego as Will acts in immediate unity with the objective self-determined Will, which determines it, and which it obeys instinctively. Here again is the direct response to the determinant, which moves the Ego to determine itself as self-determined, to realize its freedom. The fiat, the executive act takes place, at once, without inhibition, in consequence of the determining power, which is here the actualized self-deter-

mined Will, which we have already identified with the institutional world.

In the present stage the person is immediately and instinctively one with Family, State, Church—in general, with his institutional world. He does not question their validity, but obeys unhesitatingly their mandates. These institutional forces work in me unconsciously and determine me to freedom; I may not be aware of their nature, but they are functioning within me and giving character to my life; in fact, they are moving me to being a free man. My patriotism, my religiosity, my domesticity are my inner response to State, Church, Family; through them I am led to actual Free Will, which demands also a free self-determining world.

This instinctive unity of the individual with his institutions has not been neglected by the poets in their portrayal of character. Particularly Margaret in Goethe's Faust is the living embodiment of her Family and her Church in an immediate unreflective form. This is a supremely beautiful trait, showing an unreserved devotion to what is deepest and worthiest in life; but the course of the poem indicates that such a purely instinctive character can be undermined and destroyed. Such is the limitation of the present sphere suggested by the poet's portraiture; the immediate form of the institutional Will must be transcended.

In the present stage, accordingly, there will be a process which will show the Ego unfolding out of this instinctive condition into a deeper consciousness of its freedom.

1. We must first seize the Ego as completely obedient to the law and custom of its institutional world. It has as its absolute determinant the self-determined Will actualized; there is no breach between the two sides, the emotional harmony is unruffled. This is a kind of paradisaical state, which, however, is pretty certain to be disturbed by the intruding serpent. The soul responds immediately to its spiritual environment; the angels are such souls without any inner separation. The child, the man, the nation have each an epoch of such an intimate unity between themselves and their world; it is the epoch of their bloom, of their happiness, after which the breach sets in.

2. The Ego, still innocent, violates the law unknowingly; thus the separation starts. I become fully aware of the law when it smites me for violation; certainly there is now a difference between me and what commands me. I withdraw into myself and project out of me the authority which previously found in me an immediate echo. I now find that I was determined externally by that power.

3. Still, in the present stage, I do not break with the authority above me, I accept its man-

date, and obey. But this obedience is different from that first immediate obedience, I am conscious that I am determined from the outside by the law, I begin to feel that this contradicts my freedom, that I am not a free being under the law. Thus, while I obey, my obedience deepens the chasm ; my subsumption, though not resisted, I deem to be external.

Such is, in general, the process through which the instinctive unity between the Ego and its institutional environment is broken. The Ego as Free Will now declares that it is determined or made unfree by custom and law. It has not yet reached the point at which it sees that social institutions are what secures its freedom; to attain such an insight it has to go through a negative stage, which is verily a discipline leading to the true perception of the institutional idea.

II. We have now reached the second or inhibitory stage of the present sphere, in which there is the inhibition of the immediate unity of the first stage, as just set forth. That is, the Ego as Will proceeds to break completely with that authority which was before instinctively accepted, and which, as it were, compelled it to be free. It separates from its determinant and defies the same, though this be the Self-determined; it now disobeys, though previously it obeyed, even when it felt itself to be externally

subsumed by authority. Such an authority I, in my present state, affirm to be not mine, not through me; so I not only question it, but challenge it and start to inhibit it in one way or other.

Thus we see the youth, in his development of Free Will, begin his challenge of the institutional world which he has hitherto accepted implicitly; he inhibits his instinctive obedience and asks why. He has gotten to the point of seeing that he is determined by an external, objective might, whereas his destiny is to be a free man, internally determined; the contradiction between his inner and outer worlds starts him on the war-path, and he is ready to settle with the authority put over him without his consent. On all sides he meets with prohibitions of his free activity; *thou shalt not* seems written on every stone; what a confined world! He will break over the limit to liberty; the very prohibition of an act, as is well known, has a tendency to provoke its violation for freedom's sake.

All this constitutes a necessary stage of his progress, he is really seeking a deeper unity between himself and his world through his doubt and challenge; he has broken with instinct, but has not yet attained insight. He does not really inhibit institutions as such, but his own instinctive unity with them and subjection to them; such is at least the starting-point of his inhibitory

process, which, however, may deepen to the very bottom of negation.

Undoubtedly the form of external authority or determinism must be transformed for the rational mind; freedom must somehow get rid of being determined or compelled to be free, or this compulsion must be found to be an inner one. Such is an outlook in advance over the total sweep of the process which we have here called the Self-determined Free-Will, though there be people who never can get out of the inhibitory stage, so deeply do they become mired in the negative side of freedom. Very common is the statement among even cultivated men that government is a necessary evil, utterly ignoring the fact that it is what prevents the supreme evil to man and secures to him his freedom. Very common, too, has been the view that the State is sprung of a contract in which the individual gives up one part of his freedom for the sake of keeping the other part.

We may now look at the movement of this second stage.

1. There is, in the first place, the inhibition of the outer act of execution, of the translating the determinant into a deed. This we may name, in general, Disobedience. The Self-determined element may move me internally, but I may refuse the fiat. The law exists, and even finds a response in my spirit, still I am able to inhibit its

projection into an act. Such is disobedience of the external mandate whose right I may recognize, yet refuse submission. The Ego as Will refuses to be determined, though the determinant is in accord with its conviction.

The ability to disobey is a most important factor in human freedom. The mythus of all peoples has celebrated under manifold forms this primal inhibition of the law, even the Law of God. In Hebrew story the primordial act of the rising individual was his disobedience of divine authority; it was indeed the pivotal event of the human race, just that act of disobedience. The budding Free Will of Adam (and of Eve too) dared inhibit the command of the Lord; in that, if in nothing else, they were the ancestors of mankind. The prohibition, though divine, provokes the inhibition, which is human. The breach with authority the highest and most sacred thus begins our terrestrial career which is a grand process of separation from and return to Self-determined Free Will actualized in the institutional world.

2. The Ego in this sphere proceeds to a deeper inhibition, extending not only to the outer act but to the inner conviction; it inhibits in its negative sweep the Self-determined Free Will as actualized in the world. Thus it comes not only to disobey institutional authority, but to deny the validity thereof, and it proceeds to realize its

negation by assailing and undoing the established order.

We must not forget that the Ego in this inhibitory, destructive stage claims to be asserting its freedom, and is perfectly honest in such claim. It feels itself determined, yea enslaved by the institutional order which environs it spiritually on every side; the burden becomes intolerable; and the Ego vindicating its Free Will, seeks to negate in some way that objective power which is really what secures and makes valid Free Will. Such is the profound, terrific contradiction of this sphere, which is at work specially in our present epoch.

The difficulty lies primarily in the fact that the law and all institutional behests are determinants of the Ego, which therein finds itself subjected to an outside power merely, without any adequate compensation for such loss of freedom. It has not yet attained the insight that this determinant is the Self-determined actualized, and, accordingly, the very vindicator of Free Will. Still the mentioned negative stage is a part of the process toward such an insight.

At present, however, we have to consider the breach with the objective determinant — the Ego as Free Will denying the Self-determined Free Will, and breaking with its own mighty upholder. In such a condition it endeavors to undetermine the Determined, to unsettle all things established

and ordered. The sphere of negative freedom is this, since everything is done or rather undone in the name of freedom.

Education may show this tendency; in fact, culture seems often to beget not only a questioning, but also a denying, destructive spirit. In *Faust* we have a character, Mephistopheles, who is the embodiment of such a spirit: *Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint;* thus he defines himself in the poem, and gives the proof of the definition by his deeds. The devil is now a cultivated gentleman, and appears in the best society. Is not the University largely a training-school of negation? At present the education of the child has become the battle-ground of the Mephistophelean powers. The child is to be let alone, his impulses and caprices are the divine thing which is to guide the teacher; he is to be allowed his freedom, he is not to be directed on any pre-established line, as that might limit his Free Will. Thus the training of the child into an institutional life is completely inhibited, and all in the name of freedom.

It is manifest that this inhibition of the Self-determined Free Will, or of the institutional world, for the sake of Free Will, has assumed many forms in the past and played a deep part in history. In fact, the Ego as Will has in a certain stage a tendency to revert to the Undetermined, to negate everything determined in the way of

law, custom, institution, because it is determined and thus not the Ego's own. This negative activity often becomes a gospel of freedom. And we must recollect that the blank, undetermined, merely self-identical Ego is free, or rather is the possibility of freedom, since it is devoid of all real content. A reversion to such a state of pure identity or equality has often been the object of a so-called ideal life.

The Hindoo mind shows a tendency to reach its inner release from finite existence by negating all determinations of its own consciousness and fleeing back into its undetermined Self, the contemplation of which is the grand escape from the pain of living into the only freedom. Renunciation is this, the renunciation of the Will itself as well as of the world.

The Occident has the flight from the secular world by withdrawing into a religious order. Monasticism abandons institutional life, quits Family and State, refusing to be determined in that way. The monastic Ego, in realizing its Free Will, thus breaks, in part at least, with the Self-determined Free Will, having its sole institutional determination in the Church. The ancient Stoics likewise paid little regard to the freedom which comes of institutions; their wise man could be free in chains, being his own law; he was the king, having the sole authority over himself; he needed no Family or State in which to

actualize his Free Will. Such a doctrine, as has been remarked, springs from a corrupt or tyrannical epoch in which the Ego flees back into itself out of its sunken institutional environment, such as was the later Greek and also the later Roman world.

Shakespeare is fond of portraying one phase of this deep breach of the soul. The Ego suffers wrong, injustice, through the ruler and his administration of the law; the result is a flight of the wronged ones from the existent order, from Family and State, into a realm where institutions do not exist. So Orlando and Rosalind flee into the Forest of Arden, in which there is no civil order, that they may gain their freedom and get rid of the injustice of organized society. But the universal poet always brings his characters back to institutions after such a flight; there is the happy return to Family and State, since man cannot be individually free without being institutionally free. Out of this movement with its separation and return Shakespeare has constructed one of his most notable art-forms, basing it upon a profound insight into the nature of both Free Will and institutions. In fact Shakespeare is just the supreme institutional poet, and must so be interpreted in the final judgment of his genius.

Here, too, we must rank another great phenomenon in the history of literature: the con-

struction of ideal commonwealths, of which the Platonic Republic remains the best example. The individual Ego, having fallen out with the existent social and political order, in which it finds no actualized Free Will which seeks to secure Free Will, begins to build its own institutional establishment, and therein takes refuge from the discordant reality. Utopia, Oceana, Atlantis, Icaria are imaginary societies which at least reveal the aspiration of the soul for a free world. They all declare that man cannot be truly free in chains, that he, possessing Free Will, must make it actual in the institution, and thus be an objective existence.

In these cases which have just been given there is hardly more than a simple separation, a mere withdrawal of the Ego from its institutional order; certainly there has been no direct assault upon that order for the purpose of destroying it. But the Ego can become bitterly hostile to the whole social and political fabric, so that it seeks to tear up the same by the roots, of course for the sake of freedom. The most colossal manifestation of such a destructive tendency is seen in the French Revolution, which sought or moved toward blank equality, and so negated everything having authority as antagonistic to liberty. The whole institutional world of France sank for a time in that vast cataclysm, in which the Ego endeavored to reduce all dis-

tinction to its own dead level of identity. Here, in this Ego, everybody is equal and free. Thus negative freedom showed its most terrific manifestation, showed what it means when carried out to its consequences.

A still deeper and intenser phase of this kind of freedom has developed itself in recent days. We have become familiar with the name and meaning of Anarchism; in it the Ego sets up as its conscious principle the unsettling of everything settled, the undetermining of the determined; specially is this negative power turned against the sphere of institutions. Freedom now defines itself as the destruction of the actualized Will in every form, the established must be disestablished and thereby we attain the enfranchisement of blank nothingness. The anarchist usually claims that he would establish a new order, but this lies outside of his direct purpose. He would at present make the undoing of the established order universal, but such an universal negation turns back and negates itself. That is, the anarchist seeks to establish the destruction of the established; so he must and does in the end undo his own principle.

3. This leads us to the third phase of the inhibitory process, namely the inhibition of the inhibition. The Ego as Free Will, even in the pursuit of its enfranchisement from all determination, finds that it must stop the annulment of

actualized Free Will, or become itself null. We have just seen, in the case of Anarchism, that the negative Free Will cannot help actualizing itself, establishing itself, and so becoming institutional, as it were, and a determinant of Free Will. Herein it contradicts and in fact overthrows its own principle, for it started out to get rid of the determinant, and now it makes itself a determinant. Thus Anarchism becomes a law enforced by the supreme anarch, is a kind of government which, intending to destroy government, has to establish it, has to inhibit its own inhibition. Revolution cannot well keep on forever revolutionizing, it must revolutionize itself, and when it does so, it stops, it inhibits itself. The French Revolution in its inner process showed a series of attempts to revolutionize revolution, which at last succeeded, and brought to an end the revolutionary movement.

Thus the inhibition inhibits itself, has to do so to be true to its principle. As usual, such inhibition has here a double character, being itself on the one hand, yet on the other making the inner turn to its opposite. It is still inhibitory, being an inhibition; yet it must also do away with inhibition. Thus we pass out of the negative or inhibitory stage into the positive. The Free Will, seeking to realize its freedom, has gone through the inhibitory discipline and begins to accept as its true determinant the self-deter-

mined Free Will, or the authority of law and institutions, as the genuine reality of its freedom. And not only this acceptance of the established world is here the fact, but also there is a new creation of law and institutions through the negative process just recounted. Such positive fruition thereof we are next to look at.

III. We have, accordingly, reached the final stage in the process of the Self-determined Free Will, having passed through its negative, destructive phase, and come out into the mastery of that phase, which, however, belongs to the complete movement of freedom. Hence we observe here a restoration, a return to the unity of the first stage, yet with all the experience of the second or inhibitory stage.

We shall thus witness a new mastery of Free Will, the truly positive one; that is, the mastery over Free Will through Free Will. This will give the complete and final reconciliation of the Ego as Free Will with the institutional world as Free Will. The former wills the latter and the latter in turn wills the former; both sides, previously in opposition, have thus become harmonious and enforce each other. The Ego as Free Will reaches the mastery of itself as negative and inhibitory, no longer assailing the institutional world for being its determinant, but recognizing the same as its vindicator. Still the Ego has the negative power of freedom within

itself, but it controls the same, transforming it into a means of progress. For all progress has in it a resistance and the overcoming of this resistance, or an inhibition and the inhibition of the inhibition.

The present stage brings about the change into rational conduct coupled with insight, out of instinctive obedience and inhibitory doubt and estrangement. This is, accordingly, the return to unity with the institutional world after alienation; the individual sees it to be the completion of his freedom, its only actualization. He finds that his simplest act of Will necessarily demands as its complement and fulfillment self-objectification, and therein calls for the existent object, namely the institution, which secures it by willing it in return.

But also this mastery of the negative Free Will has its process which falls into three stages, showing specially the movement from act to insight.

1. There is, in the first place, the positive act, which results directly from inhibiting the negative attitude of the individual Free Will against the self-determined Free Will. The restoration to harmony between the two sides is primarily a deed; the return is first to the executive act, which is not now instinctive, but mediated through the negative experience of the Ego. By means of such experience do we learn the mean-

ing of institutions and at once respond with action. After an estrangement of this sort we hear the voice: Go thy way and sin no more. Through the undoing of our negative deed we pass to the restorative deed, which is once more in harmony with that institutional order from which we have separated ourselves. Thus man is restored to Church, State, Family, the Social Organism, to the whole realm of the Self-determined Free Will.

Such a return to the institutional deed after a deep negative experience is a beloved theme of Shakespeare. His deeper comedies have their happy outcome just in this inner restoration after a profound spiritual scission. Homer has the same thought; the Odyssey over and over again calls itself a return, which is not only the body's but the soul's coming home.

2. But in this stage which we have named the Mastery of Free Will, its negative power is not lost. It still must be able and may be compelled to inhibit its institutional relation. Authority may become so external that it becomes tyranny; institutions may grow to be so fixed, so crystallized, that they cramp the spirit of man, which is essentially limit-transcending, and must be transformed. Transformed, let it be noted, not destroyed. For the institutional world is also in the grand process of development: it has to reflect, indeed secure the Ego

as Free Will, and in order to do so, there must rise new special forms of willing Will.

Thus the Ego as Free Will, seeking its highest freedom which is its supreme end, has to adjust its objective reality in order that this may correspond to its process. The present form of the State, for instance, may be inadequate, we may feel that it no longer carries out our Free Will in its administration of affairs. In some way or other the new conception of Free Will must be actualized in the institution, which is, as already set forth, Free Will actualized. For the "Will of the People" must always be flowing in upon and transforming the State and other institutions, so that these reflect, and (what is far more) actualize that Will. Of this principle the Constitution of the United States is doubtless the most perfect embodiment as yet, though it too is in the process. The legislative branch of government rests upon the perpetual renewal of the law, which must be both inhibited and re-enacted, though in one sense it does not or ought not to change; it must be a true actualization of Free Will, so that its outer authority is inner freedom.

But suppose that authority compels the individual, as it does and must, and thus stands in opposition to his Free Will. The State, which is actualized Free Will, does not indeed will the personal wish (or Will, if you please), it must

will universal Free Will, which, however, the individual may resist and seek to nullify. Then the State determines him, forces him to determine himself to be a Free Will even in opposition to himself. The criminal, even when punished unwillingly for his wrongful act, is nevertheless taken by the law as a Free Will and held thereto in spite of himself.

Still the Ego as Free Will must retain its prerogative of inhibition, which may rise at times to the point of revolution. The Right of Revolution comes in here; the Ego may be compelled to actualize itself in a new institutional world when the old one becomes utterly subversive of its end. Equally certain is it that there is a wrong of Revolution, and this wrong may be paramount. Shakespeare, who is the great poet of Anglo-Saxon institutions, has portrayed these two opposite cases in two of his greatest historical dramas. In *Richard the Second* he champions the Right of Revolution against the established royal succession; in *Henry the Fourth* he sets forth the Wrong of Revolution in its attempt to overthrow the new order. Herein, of course, the poet reflects the deepest spirit of his people as revealed in the events of history.

All progress, accordingly, demands the presence of this negative power in Free Will. The existent actuality in the form of Church, State,

the Social Organism has to be improved, in order to be harmonious with the aspiration of the Ego, which is always moving beyond its own limit. So the Self-determined Free Will must be able to transform its determinant, which is the institutional world; only thus is it truly self-determined. In this Mastery of Free Will, the latter has finally to make or at least to make over the master which masters it; it must indeed will the institution, and the institution must will it; the limit-transcending character of the Ego must also be existent, objective, actualized, a working entity in the world; thus it is able to inhibit, and likewise to posit the new order.

3. When the Ego sees its own complete process of Free Will, it has attained the insight into freedom. It beholds the immediate union of the individual Free Will with the actualized or institutional Free Will; then it beholds the separation of these two sides, which reveals its negative, inhibitory element; finally it sees the return out of the negative sphere, which is not merely the going back to the immediate stage of unity with its institutional world but also involves the conscious knowing of the process. This return, therefore, is both action and insight in their loftiest harmony; action is not only harmonious with institutions, but also has insight into that harmony. The Ego as Free Will is not only the Psychosis, but in its willing is also the knowing

of the Psychosis; its self-activity is aware of itself as self-activity. Will and Intellect are united in the free, self-conscious act.

We have seen that the institutional world gets its progressive character through the Ego possessing an inhibitory as well as a positing power, which are elements of its process. This process of itself the Ego as Will has now objectified, made actual in an existent object which is some kind of institution; still further, in such self-objectification, it has become conscious of itself and thinks itself — which activity we have called insight. Such insight is Thought in highest potence, Thought creative, which generates anew the object, which is here the total process of the Ego as self-determined Free Will. Thus the Will now requires Thought for its completion, is indeed one with the same; Thought also requires Will and becomes one with Will in the act of originating genetically the object, which is here the total process of the self-determined Free Will, as just stated. Thought, in thinking Will, generates it, and so becomes Will just in thinking it; such, indeed, is the very conception of the Will, its starting-point, as was set forth at the beginning. But now we have come to the end, having unfolded the entire process of the Will, which has not only actualized itself, but knows itself in its actualization.

Here, then, the psychological Will has attained

its conclusion, having started with the first inner implicit Conception of the Will and unfolded into this last stage, which has projected the Will with its process into the world of objective existent fact, and has recognized the same as the Psychosis. The spontaneous Psychosis of the Will has thus become conscious and knows itself as the Psychosis.

Observations.

The preceding sphere of the Will we have called psychological (or psychical), though we are well aware that all Will is psychological (or psychical), inasmuch as it belongs to the domain of psychology. The term is, therefore, not the best possible, since it may cause ambiguity; still, with a little care the student can avoid all serious trouble from this source. In a general sense, moral Will and institutional Will are also psychological, but this word, as here applied, relates to the inner process of the Ego taken by itself.

Historical. The modern discussion of the Will hovers about the name of Kant. He may be called the philosopher of the Will *par excellence;* that is, his philosophy is positive on the side of Will, while on the side of Intellect it is negative. The fact may be illustrated in a brief discussion.

This philosopher (Kant) starts out with an investigation of the faculty of knowing in his *Critique of Pure Reason;* before we know, we must discover what are our means of knowing. Now it is manifest that such an investigation is itself an act of knowing; that is, we have to

know before we know. This Critique of Kant's shows, accordingly, an inner contradiction in its very purpose; the author seems not to be fully aware that the thing investigated is just the thing investigating. A poet-philosopher once called this work of Kant's a Critique of the Sun by the Moon; the Moon, looking at the Sun by the Sun's own light, criticises and denies sunlight. Or it is the borrowed light of the Understanding questioning the source of its own power of questioning, which is previously given by Reason. The outcome of this Critique is negative to knowledge; that is, to the knowledge of truth — man cannot know truth. At this point it joins hands with the great poem of Kant's time, Goethe's Faust. Still underneath this denial, namely, that man cannot know truth, rests an affirmation, namely, he must know the truth of the statement that man cannot know the truth.

Kant, accordingly, assails the Intellect in its essence, the ability to know what is true, but from this assault he falls back with all the more violence upon Will. From the third stage of the self-knowing Ego he withdraws to the second stage in which he becomes positive, just as he was previously negative (in Intellect). Such is the point of view he takes in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the second of his great Critiques, which pertains specially to Will and Freedom.

According to Kant, the Will is what determines itself within itself, and this is the conception of Freedom. He grasps the primordial act of the Ego as this self-separation which we have identified as the second stage of the Psychosis. Moreover, this pure subjective self-determination is the *automony* of the Will, the field in which it is absolutely free. On the other hand there is the *heteronomy* of the Will, in which the Will is determined from the outside, by desire, passion, finite ends, in contrast with its being determined from the inside, by itself.

Kant's idea of Freedom remains subjective, it is supremely a moral internal Freedom, and this constitutes its value on the one hand, yet reveals its limitation on the other. It puts stress upon the moral Ego which is to be a law unto itself, with its imperative; but it does not rise to a clear conception of objective or institutional Freedom. It has itself as its own subjective content, and thus is formal and empty, or may become so.

The Kantian philosophy, perhaps more truly than any other, has been the philosophy of the century, both in its positive and negative aspects. His denial of intellect is the expression of the skepticism of the age; he has voiced the doubts of his time in regard to the knowledge of truth as something objectively valid. Hegel repeatedly connects the negative side of Kant's

philosophy with the French Revolution, the latter being its practical realization. The recent agnosticism, falling out with all true knowledge, and cultivating simply the ethical Ego, traces itself back to Kant. One cannot help thinking that the latest development of the German state culminating in one imperial Ego, is a political realization of the categorical imperative of Kant. In accord with the same we hear a modern philosophic cry in Germany which shouts "Backwards to Kant," evidently to his absolute Ego as the supreme authority. The Will even as brute force has found its defenders among the most highly civilized peoples of the century.

Among the successors of Kant, Fichte found in every act of consciousness the Will; the Ego cannot be conscious of itself without willing at the same time (see p. 33 of this book). Fichte also carried out the ethical idea of Kant, which is derived from the subjective Ego. Schelling, for the most part, occupies the same ground, though he uses different terms. He defines the Ego "as the *act* by which thought becomes object to itself," which act is the primal act of Will, really the second or separative stage of the Psychosis. Schelling defines his grand shibboleth, intellectual intuition, in terms of Will: "This (intellectual tuition) is at the same time a producing of the object," and hence is an act

of volition as well as of knowledge. The primordial creative energy must be Will.

These philosophers, however, lead up to Hegel, who has developed and organized the forms of both Intellect and Will with a completeness which makes his work the culminating point of modern philosophy.

Hegel. The deepest source of Hegel's philosophizing is undoubtedly to be found in Kant, though he shows traces of having developed through Fichte and Schelling, especially the latter. But Hegel's main objective point may be called a critique of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — a negating of Kant's negation. He turns Kant's denial of knowing upon Kant himself with undoubted effect and often with decided relish. Out of this movement springs Hegel's Logic in the main, whose soul is the famous Hegelian dialectic. It is, therefore, the great positive work of Hegel to have rescued knowledge (that is the knowing of Truth) from Kant's destructive attack, making in manifold ways Kant's negation negate itself — which is the essential movement of the dialectic.

So much for Hegel's treatment of Intellect. But when he comes to Will he is more in accord with Kant, who, as already stated, is positive in his Practical Reason, making it go back and save that Truth which Pure Reason could not reach. Still, in the matter of the Will, specially the In-

stitutional Will, Hegel has, as we shall see, made a great advance upon Kant.

Hegel, notwithstanding, has nowhere given anything like a complete account of the Psychological Will, and in one passage apologizes for not having done so — he could not get the time. He introduces the subject in several places (see his *Philosophy of Spirit* under the head of *Will*, and also in the Introduction to his *Philosophy of History*). The fullest and the best of these various accounts of Will is found in his *Philosophy of Right* (*Rechts*), though it is there thrown into an Introduction, and is not embodied in the movement of the work itself — which fact we have to regard as a blemish in that very remarkable book, from which we confess that we have learned more about the Will than from any other piece of writing.

We must next consider Hegel's method of treating the Will in the place alluded to, for in philosophy much depends on the method. He takes from his Logic the three forms or categories of Conception (*Begriff*) — Universality, Particularity, and Individuality — and applies them to the determination of the Will (see *Philosophie des Rechts*, *s. 36*, et seq.). But this way of treating of the Will has the difficulty of the Hegelian system; the three categories seem to be externally applied, being taken from an outside source and clapped on the free movement

of the Will. Now the Will, as the essence of all freedom, resents such treatment, which appears to place its process under control of some external domination, instead of permitting it to unfold freely out of itself, and thus to be truly self-determined. Herein, strange to say, Hegel coincides in spirit with the method of Herbert Spencer, who also applies his categories (derived from Natural Science in his case) to the free movement of mind and thus tries to make the cart draw the horse. Personally we have no doubt that Hegel had in his thought the free internal movement of the Ego, still his treatment, in form at least, is external and thus alien to the essence of its content, here the Will. We may be permitted to say in this connection that the preceding exposition *tries* at least to develop the Will internally, out of its own inherent nature. When the Will is externally determined, it is called so by name, it is Determined Will and not Free Will.

Still, that same book of Hegel's, we are glad to acknowledge, contains the germ of the present work. The following passage indicates the relation; it is for us the most important passage in all of Hegel's writings (*Philosophie des Rechts, s. 60, Einleitung*). We shall cite the original and then give a translation; Der abstracte Begriff der Idee des Willens ist überhaupt *der freie Wille, der den freien Willen*

will. "The abstract conception of the idea of the Will is, in general, *the free Will which wills the free Will.*" The emphasis on the words in italics is also Hegel's.

The reader of the preceding exposition need not be told how often we have employed the formula just cited, and what use we make of it. But the strange fact is that Hegel employs it only in this one passage; it does not enter at all into his methodical treatment of the Will; it is an added observation thrown off apparently at random, an external explanation rather than an inherent part of his exposition. Now, for our procedure this statement contains the psychological germ of the entire development of Will.

In other words, Hegel's treatment of the Psychological Will is abstract, formal, and, we must think, external, whereas it ought to be made, if possible, concrete, internal, self-developing. Undoubtedly we have to use abstract terms in expressing the Will, but these ought to be derived from and connected directly with the inner activity of the Will and not imported into it from the outside. The Ego as Will must always be seen and shown as making its own abstractions when it needs them; thus they are not separated from it and hence dead, but one with its activity, and therefore living and energizing. That is, the abstraction must always contain the abstractor, the energy which made it

and keeps making it, and gives to it life and activity. In fact, it may be said, in a general way, that the great philosophical movement of the future is to make the abstract (logical) method pass over into the concrete (psychological) method, which is to make the abstraction go back and take up into itself its maker, this, of course, being the self-conscious Ego.

Still, the most important of all Hegel's services to philosophy lies in the sphere of the Will, specially in what we have called Institutional Will. In fact, this is the greatest product of his, and, probably, of modern philosophy. This portion of his work is chiefly contained in the book already cited (*Philosophie des Rechts*, third part called by Hegel *Sittlichkeit*). Throwing Hegel's activity into three main divisions and taking a forecast of each, we should say that his specially logical and dialectical works will never again make the stir they once did; his historical books are exerting at present great influence, which reaches far beyond purely Hegelian circles; but his philosophy of Institutions is the most solid and enduring part of his labor and belongs to the future for its full appreciation and development. It is a noteworthy fact that Anglo-Saxon peoples are beginning to study, elaborate, and interpret Hegel's views on Institutions (at Oxford for instance, also in Scotland, and formerly at St. Louis).

Spencer. It is interesting to contrast with the preceding German philosophers the most famous Anglo-Saxon philosopher of the present time, Mr. Herbert Spencer, who has devoted a short chapter of his long Psychology (Vol. II., p. 495, Am. ed.) to the Will. With him the notion of Free Will originates in "an illusion," and any lengthy discussion of this subject "would be alike useless and out of place." His is, therefore, a Psychology without a Will, indeed without an Ego, which is but an aggregate of feelings and ideas which happen at the time to be present in consciousness, and which of course come from the outside somewhere, ultimately "from the Unknowable Power" called energy.

The special activity of the Will is conceived by Mr. Spencer as follows: "We have a conflict between two sets of ideal motor changes which severally tend to become real, and one of which eventually does become real;" this approaches the Herbartian point of view that the mind or Ego (*we*) is simply the field of battle between contending impressions. "This passing of an ideal motor change into a real one, we distinguish as Will." The reader of the preceding pages will be able to locate this "ideal motor change" under Determined Will in the sphere of Desire, whose content is an image which is immediately executive. Mr. Spencer continues:

oluntary act of the simplest kind we can
hing beyond a mental representation of
followed by a performance of it." Mr.
ɔr can see in the Will hardly more than
, and that too, in its immediate, executive
as he certainly does not bring out the in-
ɔry power of Desire or the still deeper mas-
of Desire (see the preceding exposition
ɔr the head of Desire). How utterly narrow
ı a view of the Will is, may be seen from the
; that it does not even include the whole of
termined Will. The word *motive* is casually
roduced once (p. 503), but it means apparently
esire, or any external determinant, which
ıoves to action. Thus Mr. Spencer covers, in
is own proper sphere, that of Determinism, but
ı very small area.

The freedom of the Will, therefore, does not exist, is an illusion; the only show of freedom being that one "is at liberty to do what he desires to do," if there be "no external hindrances." The idea of a Free Will which has freedom as its end or content lies wholly outside of Mr. Spencer's range of mind, which seems able to grasp only some form of Determinism. Equally out of his range is the conception of the Will as the second stage of the process of the Ego. Indeed for Mr. Spencer the Ego is not a self-active process at all, but a kind of passive holder of sensations, images, and thoughts, and helpless spectator of

their struggles, in which the strongest wins the prize, that is, passes over into the act.

Still Mr. Spencer at the end of this chapter acknowledges an Ego "which continuously survives as the subject of these changing states"—an admission which, if carried out to its consequences, would overthrow all that he has previously said. This persistent Ego is "a portion of the Unknowable Power" which Mr. Spencer then proceeds to define after his fashion (p. 504), showing that he at least knows a good deal about his Unknowable.

The utter inadequacy, we may say weakness, of such a view of the Will is remarkable in a thinker so full of Will and strong self-assertion as Mr. Spencer. He has plenty of Will, but apparently does not see it. Does not the fact indicate his complete inability of turning within, his absolute want of introspective power? For introspection is still the fundamental requisite of the psychologist in spite of laboratories, experiments, and methods of physical science. Indeed the trouble seems to lie in Mr. Spencer's so-called scientific procedure, which always turns him outward, when the thing is inward. Still he claps on his external method derived from Natural Science, and of course finds no free Will but only "an illusion." Very like does the philosopher seem to the rustic who, having never learned his alphabet, puts on a pair of

spectacles and expects to read in that way, but soon finds out that he cannot and starts the cry of fraud or "illusion" on all those who do read, or have ever read.

Will and Intellect. These two divisions of the soul (psyche), or rather, these two fundamental stages of the psychosis of the Ego are always coming up in the mind of the student, and demanding to be re-thought and re-stated. Such a demand is to be heeded, since it springs from the inner desire and necessity for the unification of the diversified mental states.

As Will the Ego has to realize itself, to make itself into a world existent; it builds the spiritual house for the Ego to dwell in.

As Intellect the Ego has to idealize or make internal the world outside, and thus to know it, to identify it with the Ego. Every Ego born into the world is to know what the Will has done in the world.

Such is the contrast between Will and Intellect, yet each is always present in the other's process. Implicitly the Will is realizing itself in the act of knowing, the Ego is taking up into itself the object, is therein Will too, it wills to know, to realize itself as knowledge. No intellection, therefore, without volition.

On the other hand, there is no volition without intellection. When the Will realizes itself, there is implicit Intellect in the act; you know

the thing which you have made, or imitated, you have internalized it fully then. Children especially learn by doing, that is, through the activity of the Will; they must imitate in order to know adequately. Thus the imitation of children is a kind of thinking.

In fact every sensation (which belongs to Intellect), has a corresponding outer act of the body (which is Will).

Which should come first in a psychological treatment? As already set forth in the preceding exposition, the fundamental fact of the Will is the uttering, outering, externalizing of the Ego. This is the separative stage of the Psychosis, which is the second, while the Intellect is the third.

The Will is, therefore, a center of origination, and every living individual in the universe is such a center. He is in some way through Will counteracting the naked forces of Nature, subjecting them, transforming them, putting his Will into them. The turning of one force of Nature against another force is the conquering of Nature by Will, and this is origination.

The Will, accordingly, sets a new force going in the world, whose function is in some way to counteract, subdue, negate the existing force of Nature. Herein we may note the negative character of the Will; really it is a negation of a negation, it negates an external energy of Nature,

which is itself negative, in the sense that it is assailing something. This negative power of Nature is what man is to grapple with and make over through his own power of Will. Thus he gets control of that power and redirects it in accord with his own inner end. The world is a Will (or force) negative to mine, which it is my destiny to re-will, and thereby create a new world, which, in its supreme manifestation, is the world of freedom.

Here we may remark that the teacher stands on the highest principle of his vocation, when he fully masters the meaning of the Free Will willing the Free Will, and brings his school to that point of excellence, at which it is the embodiment and realization of the aforesaid conception of freedom. The supreme end of the school may be said to be the training of the pupil to be a self-determined Free Will.

Paternalism in the old sense of the term no more belongs to pedagogics than to politics. Particularly American instruction must take its cue from the prevailing institutional spirit, which is that of rational freedom. An educational system whose great object is militarism cannot be adapted to produce a citizenship which has just the opposite purpose.

Relation to Moral Will. The Ego as Psychological Will having completed its course in the self-determined Free Will, or the Ideal End,

proceeds to realize this Ideal End in conduct. This is the sphere of the Moral Will, which is to make freedom valid in individual action. The Ego, therefore, as Moral Will projects out of itself the Ideal End already designated, making the same existent in moral conduct. Hence, the present sphere belongs to the second or separation stage in the total process of Will.

Every act of life is to be transformed into a means and a manifestation of this Ideal End, which is ever present in the actions of men. Such is the new motive, which we now call moral, the complete realization of a life which is itself a will power always calling forth the Free Will. This is the grand duty of the Ego as Will; moreover, such an end is the Highest Good (summum bonum), is the source of all moral Obligation; that is, you are bound by this end or motive universally; it is the Moral Law, which you must be conscious of, and thus have a conscience. Yet it is your own freedom which thus binds you, your own Law.

Each act of mine, then, must be made over into a duty, or into a moral act, through my Ideal End; thus it is a realization of Free Will in an individual. I go to my dinner, obeying appetite; if that is all, then in such action, I am not a moral being, I am an animal. But in going to my dinner and partaking of food I can have, more or less consciously, an Ideal End,

nay, the grand motive of life which is to bring forth a complete realization of freedom. For thus I get physical sustenance to do my work; I keep my health, perchance, and do not exhaust my reserve strength without a fresh supply. Indeed, the hour of dining, the quantity of food, its quality also, the speed of eating, my dining in all its details can be governed and ought to be governed by the supreme end of existence. Thus it becomes a moral act, with its commands and its prohibitions; it prohibits me from dining too late or irregularly; that grand Ideal End transfigures all my action, my total conduct, into a means for its realization.

My life is made up of particular acts. I have to do every day a thousand things, but each smallest particular act, each microscopic deed of mine, born in the beginning of a second and dying at the end of that same second, is touched, transmitted, gets its character from that universal End, which is the moral one. My pleasures, my recreations, my joys and sorrows, receive tone and significance therefrom; they must all be transformed into duties.

This we call the moralization of life, every action is to be moralized by being filled with the Ideal End. It is well to distinguish between this kind of moralizing which is of deeds and the other frequent kind of moralizing which is of words. The latter is in ill repute both with

children and with grown people. The moralizer (in words) is, therefore, quite distinct from the one who moralizes his life; everybody should be an active moralizer, moralizing every deed, filling it with the Ideal End. If you are a teacher, your school, your kindergarden, should be moralized, yet with as little moralizing as possible.

Such is, in general, the sphere of the Moral Will and its world, which world lies in the realm of individual conduct. Not so with the Psychical Will, which we have just passed through; this is as yet purely internal, subjective, unrealized. It is true that the Ego as Psychical Will attains its complete internal process of freedom, but this Psychical Will is still ideal, and it is next to be realized in Moral Will.

PART SECOND.

The Moral Will.

This Part takes up the second of the three main divisions of the present work, and belongs, as already indicated, to the second stage of the Psychosis in the complete process of the Will. This is now to be seen producing its world which is the moral one, and in which the Ideal End takes on many forms of human conduct.

The procedure hitherto has been the unfolding of the Psychological Will into the Moral Will. The former showed the pure movement of the Will as psychical activity, showed its inner conception fully developed, which was in its final stage the self-determined Free Will. This is what the Moral Will is now to take as its con-

tent or Ideal End, which it is always seeking to realize in the action, conduct, and character of the individual.

The insight into the movement of the Ego as self-determined Free Will was the last point attained by the Psychological Will. The Ego as Will has, therefore, unfolded into its own complete process of freedom internally; but now this process of freedom must be made real, the internal must be transformed into the external. The individual is to realize the self-determined Free Will in himself, in his own Will, which thus wills the Ideal End. The Ego in moral action always contains this Ideal End implicitly or explicitly seeking realization.

The Ego as moral Will ultimately wills Free Will through the Self-determined, through Law and the Institutional World, and not through the Determined, which is its own subjective determinant in some form, such as Impulse, Desire, or inner Law. That is, the moral Ego has as its supreme content and end, not the Determined Free Will (as is often supposed) but the Self-determined Free Will.

We speak of a person who has this process of freedom as the principle of life and who makes it irradiate all his actions, as the complete ethical character; he has the Ideal End, he is always realizing his best self; of such an one, therefore, we predicate self-realization, since he is making

real through Will the whole cycle of the psychological Self. Accordingly in him the self-determined Free Will, which in Psychological Will is the inner conception, is made manifest in Moral Will, and reveals itself in the outward conduct. The Moral Will has always within itself, consciously or unconsciously, the entire process of freedom.

The completely good man follows not simply his own inner Law as absolute determinant, nor, on the other hand, the outer Law as absolute determinant; he endeavors, in every possible way, to unite these two sides, which so often fall into contradiction. His inner Law (often called Conscience) is and must remain his subjective determinant, bidding him to will Free Will; yet not through himself immediately, but through the outer Law of the Institutional World, which in its turn also secures Free Will. Thus the individual in morality is ever performing the process of freedom; he as inner Law (Determined Free Will) wills the outer Law (Self-determined Free Will), which is for all and over all.

The inner Law is merely subjective or individualistic in its willing of Free Will; hence, it must will the outer or objective Law (whose end is also the willing of Free Will), whereby it makes itself universal. Thus the individual Ego can unite with all Egos under one Law.

The self-determined Free Will as psychological has shown us an objective world of Institutions, which returns to the subjective Ego and becomes its determinant to freedom. But in Morals this subjective Ego takes the whole cycle of self-determined Free Will and realizes it as a total process within itself, thus having as Ideal End this self-realization. Such is the Moral Ego as Will; it seeks to embody in conduct its highest psychical self.

The person is called good who habitually has the above mentioned content to his Will. The child is to be trained into being such a Will. Even in the kindergarden the little child starts to getting its freedom through law and institution; it begins to realize in its behavior the self-determined Free Will. It has to will the order above itself, which, however, returns and secures its Free Will. Thus the teacher's grand aim is to moralize his pupils.

This expression (the self-determined Free Will) has three factors, indicated by the words of which it is composed. We may look at them separately.

1. The free act, or self-active principle, which is involved in the term Will.

2. The content of this free act being freedom of action constitutes Free Will.

3. The determinant to this Free Will being the Self-determined (in the form of law and in-

stitutions) constitutes the self-determined Free Will. Such is what we may in general call the process of freedom. Or, man, willing his freedom, wills the institutional world which wills his freedom. Now the Ego must have this process of freedom unconsciously or consciously in itself in order to be moral, or must seek to realize the same in conduct and life. Such realization of the process of freedom becomes its great object, is the Good. This process of freedom is the Ideal End, which is the driving wheel of all morality, and which moral science seeks to make explicit and to formulate.

So, back of the three factors which we have already noted as constituting the process of the self-determined Free Will, lies the Ego of the individual willing this process, consciously or unconsciously, as its Ideal End, and realizing the same in conduct. Thus it is that the Moral Ego is always *seeking* to attain and to bring forth actualized Free Will, or law and institutions; it is always *seeking* to make freedom an objective existence in the world. But the Moral Will remains subjective in its process of freedom; it has this process, but as internal, in the individual and not in the institution. The Moral Will is its own inner institutional world; we may, therefore, say that it realizes, but does not actualize, the self-determined Free Will. It wills and internally objectifies that Will which

wills Will in the form of Duty, Conscience, the Good, inner Law; it thus has a world of its own, the moral world, in contrast to the institutional world.

Yet, we must not forget that the Moral Will is always seeking to reach the latter, to attain actuality. Indeed, the Will by its very nature endeavors not only to put something into the world, but to put itself as a total process into the world and thereby become truly objectified, namely, an existent object which is itself Will willing Will. So the Moral Will is forever seeking, yet never fully attaining; it secretly, unconsciously longs to get out of itself and become an institution — which it will finally do, as we shall see; but then it will be no longer itself. Morality is a perennial aspiration for an ideal; this it labors to realize, but when this is realized, it is still dissatisfied, since the object is no longer ideal but real, and hence a discord and a disappointment. The purely moral nature seeks happiness in vain, hence it comes that happiness is so often held up as the grand Ideal End; the truth is, were it once attained, it would no longer be ideal. The moral man, striving to reform the political institution, is sure to be disappointed even when reform succeeds; after all, the ideal is not the real.

Such is the worth of the Moral Will on the one side, such is its limitation on the other.

Without the quickening power of its ideal striving, the whole institutional world would be in danger of sinking into the quagmire of corrupt reality. But the Moral Will is not the self-rounded, complete Will, though an absolutely necessary stage in the process of the latter. The individual Ego must first realize in the subjective Self the process of self-determined Free Will, then it can proceed to make the same actual; the man must be free himself before he can make the world free — he can only make the world as free as he is.

It is manifest, therefore, that the Moral Will has in it a breach, which it is always seeking to overcome, yet cannot, till it gets out of itself and reaches the institutional world. Thus it is the realm of separation, of difference, of self-opposition and struggle; hence it belongs to the second stage in the complete psychosis of Will. The Moral Ego has the primal division into subject and object, which doubleness has often the effect of making the Ego seem to have two selves; there is the individual self on the one side, and on the other the universal self, frequently called the higher or better self, which is the law over the first self.

In the expression *I ought* is seen the dualism of the moral consciousness; it implies two Egos, a present real one, and a future ideal one; the two are not in unity till the real Ego carries out the behest of the ideal Ego in the deed. So

there is a commander and a commanded, both being the same Ego; still each is distinct from the other and in a process with the other. What is it that commands? The Ego as Ideal End, and that end is ultimately freedom. I do my duty when I obey the command and realize what the Ideal End prescribes. Duty is the Ego as Free Will commanding the Ego to be free in act. Duty is not some abstraction, it is Ego; my Duty is myself giving the mandate to myself, and the content of such mandate is, in general, that I determine myself to be self-determined, that I assert my freedom in my act. It is my Duty to educate my child; who commands and who obeys? I as Free Will command, and I as Free Will obey; my obedience is the act of my Will which wills my own Free Will as authority; thus in following Duty do I vindicate my freedom. If I was determined by my desire, caprice, indolence, to decline Duty, I am negating my own Free Will. It is true that in Duty there is an imperial power issuing its imperative; but through that power I determine myself to be self-determined; Duty, which is myself, determines me, or compels me, to will Free Will. Any other determination would make me or leave me unfree. My moral life depends ultimately upon my habit of willing Free Will in myself and in others, which is the Ideal End realizing itself in conduct. Such is the ought of all

oughts — the process of freedom, self-realization, the Ideal End.

This Ideal End is also called the motive, which plays a very important part in moral science. Already we have treated of the motive under the head of Choice, which is determined by the motive; that is, the self-determined is the determinant. The true moral motive is an end, but ultimate and not finite, not a means for some other end which may again be a means; it is rather the end which has before itself the complete realization of the Free Will in the person, the moralization of his action and conduct. Or the matter may be put in this form: Your highest moral motive is to realize your best self all the time.

The diversified relation of ends may be seen in your present occupation, whatever it is. How many ends or so-called motives can you trace in yourself? My reader is likely to be a young lady who is studying the kindergarden; for what end? It may be to make a living, to satisfy some curiosity, or simply to play with the children for the fun of the thing. These are all finite ends, not immoral but non-moral; their outlook is not upon the Ideal End in the supreme sense. But if you study kindergardening with that end which makes moral every act of yours in the process of the work, you will seek in such a vocation to realize your loftiest conception of

your own selfhood; then you will long to impart to the children under your care all your highest attainments, and to make them like you, that is, like the noblest part of yourself. You have the true moral motive in your vocation when your end is to make real your best self and to reproduce it in others. Not your faults, your shortcomings, do you perpetuate; you endeavor to train yourself into the highest possible worth that you may impart that; so is your motive good. In the meantime, you interweave other ends — you are making some money out of your work, you are gaining some distinction, and, doubtless, having a good deal of pleasure. But your choice of this vocation, rather than that of a milliner, stenographer, or clerk, comes from your moral nature, which aspires to realize in life all that is best within you. To embody in conduct the self-determined Free Will is the ultimate moral End, and it is this End which brings about the moralization of all activity of the individual.

The child begins early to develop the Ideal End. When you ask the little one, "Have you been good to-day?" you imply the existence and a certain degree of knowledge of such an End. The child has already an ideal of living, and, likewise, the consciousness of the opposite. Has it determined itself according to its Ideal End, or the reverse? Suppose it has been disobedi-

ent to its mother; it has, then, not willed her Will, which is for it the good; it has been determined by some other content, some caprice, desire, impulse; it has not followed its moral imperative, and is well aware of the fact. But the man can also disobey the word of his mother in the universal sense, he can defy that authority which bids him will Free Will and therein be truly free. The mother or the kindergardner perchance, begins that moral training which is finally to unite and to reconcile the individual Will with the whole institutional world. Thus the man is not simply the citizen of the State (which is one institution), but he is the universal citizen, participating in all institutions, and his supreme virtue becomes the institutional virtue.

Looking back at the Psychological Will once more, we observe that its outcome is the simple process of freedom, of which the Ego becomes aware; but in Moral Will the Ego proceeds to realize in conduct this process of freedom. Such is the difference between the two spheres; a man can know freedom and still not be free; he can be conscious of the principle of moralization, and still not moralize his life. The expression of the Ideal End in moral action is the function of the Moral Will.

There is a movement in the Moral Will, which starting from its immediate stage, unfolds into complete realization, wherein the Ego recog-

nizes the willing of Free Will as the Ideal End in all moral conduct. At first this Ideal End is implicit in the Deed, then it is separated from the Deed and sought for as particular end, finally it is attained as universal end, when it comes back to itself, and knows itself as the ultimate principle in morals.

These three stages of the Moral Will and its World we shall designate briefly in advance of the full exposition.

I. *The Moral Will and its Deed.* The Moral Will as willing the Deed immediately is the first stage; thus the Ideal End is implicit in the Deed as to both its factors (End and Ideal).

Such is the first realization of the Moral Will, the immediate, in which the Ideal End is wholly potential or implicit in the moral act. The process of the Ego in the Deed is that it finds itself responsible for the same; thereby it becomes aware that it not only has, but must have an Ideal or Universal End in all its conduct and be held accountable through having such an End.

The Ego thus finds itself conscious of a separation of its End from the immediate embodiment of the same in the Deed, and begins to regard and to formulate this End.

II. *The Moral Will and its End.* The Moral Will as willing the End, separating it from the Deed and making it explicit, constitutes the second stage of this sphere, the separative.

Still there is one element, the ideal, which remains implicit even when the End has become explicit. That is, the Ego as Moral Will now determines the universal End to be some particular End of its own.

Such is the second realization of the Moral Will, in which the individual begins to get conscious of his End. That is, the Ego in the moral process must know not only that there is such an Ideal (or Universal) End in the Deed, but must also know what it is, must give to it content, must determine this End consciously. If I am to be held responsible for my End or Motive, I must seek to discover what it is and to formulate the same. Here, however, is again a process. The Ego, knowing this Universal End to be its own, proceeds to make it some particular form of itself, such as Pleasure, Happiness, Benevolence, which move in a gradation toward the Universal End, but never quite attain it, since such ends are particular, and of the Ego's special determination. Such is the separation and contradiction in the present sphere of the moral Ego as Free Will, which, however, will now return to itself and take itself as content.

III. *The Moral Will and its Ideal or Universal End.* The Moral Will as willing the Ideal End, making both factors explicit, is the third stage. The Ideal End which was wholly implicit in the

Deed (first stage), is now wholly explicit, unfolded, declared.

Such is the third realization of the Moral Will, its completed self-realization, which now has a conscious content. Yet this stage also has its process, it has to show itself becoming fully explicit, conscious, realized, through a threefold movement whose phases we shall name Good, Evil, Virtue, which will be developed and coordinated in their proper place.

The Moral Will has, in general to realize the Ideal End in human action. Such is its total sweep, which, however, is a continuous unfolding from its unconscious and immediate to its fully mediated and self-knowing state. The Moral Ego as Free Will is to take Free Will in itself and in others as its Ideal End, which it seeks to realize in action. This End is often called the Good, or the Highest Good — the End toward which the Universe is moving. "The Good has been well defined as that which all things aim at" (Aristotle, *Ethica Nic.* Bk. I., c. 1.). "The good is realized freedom, the absolute end and aim of the world — *der absolute Endzweck der Welt*" (Hegel, *Phil. des Rechts*, s. 167).

In this third stage the Free Will is willing Free Will, is willing itself, and so the Ego herein has become Self-End. That is, the Ego as Free Will is realizing the self-determined Free Will, which

is the complete process of freedom, though this is still subjective, in the individual and not yet actualized in the institution. Such is the supreme attainment of this sphere, verily the Highest Good of the Moral Will, in which the man makes himself personally and internally free, in which freedom is always seeking to realize freedom for self and for the brother.

SECTION FIRST—THE MORAL WILL AND ITS DEED.

The fundamental utterance of the Moral Will is in the Deed. The whole sphere of human action is to be transformed by the Ideal End of man and thereby made moral; the isolated, particular acts of an individual are thus endowed with unity, and human life in all its diversity becomes a totality of conduct governed by an ultimate principle. Now, this Ideal End, which is the ruling fact of Moral Science, is to be unfolded; it is not so much a dead result, which can be expressed in a crystallized category, as a living process which is its own self-revelation.

The unity of human life as conduct springs from what may be called the moralization of the Deed, which takes place through the ever-active transforming power of the Ideal End. This principle we can express in our formula: the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined by the Self-determined and embodies the same in conduct. Suppose that I am endowed

with a love of money; it leads me to act, to sell merchandise, to manufacture some article, possibly to write a book. But this immediate act of mine is transformed by my Ideal End; this limits, this determines, changes the nature of what I do, and often interposes its veto; it forbids me to sell rotten eggs, or to manufacture wooden nutmegs, or to write corrupt or even pessimistic books; this Ideal End will go so far as to regulate my eating and drinking, my work and my pastime, according to its behest. It makes over my whole existence, the entire life series of my actions, into a means for its realization. Thus the Deed is *moralized*, undergoing a kind of transfiguration through the Ideal End; this it is which makes moral each minute act of life and the sum total of life's activity.

Such is, then, the imperial behest, the Imperative, the moral obligation, which is laid upon every rational human soul by itself — the making over of life according to the Ideal End, which End thereby becomes the supreme motive of conduct, and which life thereby becomes a true work of art, illuminated in every little nook of its activity by a central spiritual sun. Life has often been called a Fine Art; so it is and more, being the source and prototype of all the other Fine Arts so-called.

In the present sphere, the Moral Will and its

Deed, there are two elements always present, the Moral Will (the internal, subjective) and the Deed (the external, objective). The movement is from simple or implicit Intention, through Knowledge, to the unfolding of the total internal process in the Motive. Still this movement of the Moral Will in its various stages remains in immediate or implicit unity with the Deed. The following are the three main stages of the present sphere: —

I. *The Deed and Intention.* The implicit (unconscious) Intention determines implicitly the Deed as moral. Here both sides are implicit, though the Intention is unfolding toward Knowledge.

II. *The Deed and Knowledge.* The explicit (known or conscious) Intention determines implicitly the Deed as moral. Here the separation involved in consciousness has taken place, and has entered the Intention. The Ego, knowing the consequences of the Deed which it at first did not know must intend them in doing the Deed afterwards.

III. *The Deed and Motive.* The Motive (or the complete process of Intention) determines implicitly the Deed as moral. In this stage Intention deepens to its foundation, which in some form is seen to be the Ego as Will willing Free Will.

In all these stages the inner element, though

it unfolds within itself, remains in implicit unity with the Deed. Such is, in general, the sphere of the Moral Will and its Deed, as here conceived and set forth.

It is manifest that the characteristic of the moral Deed is that it has implicit within it, throughout all the phases of its process, the Ideal End, or the self-determined Free Will. When this implicit state of the Ideal End starts to becoming explicit, and the Ego separates it from the Deed and makes it a conscious object of itself (the Ego), then we have passed out of the present sphere.

It now remains to give a fuller exposition of the three preceding stages, whereby their meaning and scope may be more adequately unfolded.

I. The Deed and Intention.

Any Deed, in order to be moral, must have in it the element of Intention, which is primarily the Ego as Will. For the Ego as Will is the originative principle in man, who through it alone is responsible.

The first thing in Morals is to consider the simple Deed, or the Deed in its primal simplicity, as it is in itself, taken in its own inherent nature. This simple Deed shows the Ego willing immediately, not knowing and willing, which is a later stage. It has its process, through which it unfolds into an inner and outer element, and then

returns into itself, thus revealing the movement of the Psychosis. Through this movement the Ego comes to know itself as Intention and to assert itself as such, and therewith to develop into the idea of responsibility. Accordingly, the present sphere will pass through, firstly, its immediate stage, which is the Deed conceived; secondly, its separative stage, which is the Deed determined doubly, from within and from without; thirdly, its returning stage, which shows the Deed as a self-determined product, and hence brings with itself responsibility. These thoughts we may illustrate a little in advance.

We shall first consider the Deed as it appears immediately in the world. It is the utterance of an Ego which has therein projected itself out of itself and become real; it is the manifestation of a Will. It is an original thing, sent forth now for the first time, and the Ego as Will is this power of origination. Still the world existed already, and the Deed being thrown into it, produces an alteration therein, sets a new current going, which may involve many other external things. Every Deed is a kind of new created world impinging upon and colliding with an old created world, bringing forth change, revolution, and then re-adjustment.

I, having done the Deed, it is mine; it lay in my Ego, and I have projected myself with it into externality. Thus it is attributable to me; I am

responsible. It is my Ego which has separated itself within itself and uttered itself in an act of Will which has changed the world. With such a change my responsibility begins; the Deed is imputable to me, containing my Ego, or, as we say, my Intention. Also I am sometimes said to realize my Motive in the Deed.

The Deed, then, is projected into a realm of externality, which already exists in its own right, and with which the Deed is connected by many a subtle influence. A continuous chain of causation interlinks my Deed with this external world quite to infinity, and carries it far beyond any intention or conception of my Ego, which started the movement by flinging its act into the stream of Time. Again the question of responsibility comes up. Am I accountable for these results of my Deed in the world of externality? Are they imputable to my Ego? Note again this voice, the voice of imputation, a kind of judge proclaiming my responsibility, my guilt or innocence, after calling my Ego before his tribunal. Who is it?

That is an important matter to find out, and we may say here that the judge alluded to, along with his law, is intimately related to the Ideal End, of which mention has already been made. At the present time, however, we must show forth the process which is involved in the Deed as immediate; again, we shall find in it that movement of the Ego called Psychosis.

We may now look at the general process of the Deed and Intention. The separation indicated by these two words is at first implicit; the whole movement is to unfold this separation, and make it conscious to the Ego, as we see in the following statement.

I. The Conception of the Deed; the purely internal side of the Deed is set forth as conceived.

II. The Deed and its Consequences; the Deed as uttered from within by the Ego and determined from without by the world calls up this division.

III. The Deed and its Responsibility, which springs from Intention. Now the Ego returns to itself and becomes aware of itself in the Deed, holding itself responsible for the same.

Thus we observe the threefold movement of the Deed in this sphere, showing the Psychosis: the Deed as simply conceived, the Deed as determined, and the Deed as intended consciously — the act of consciousness bringing with it responsibility. On these lines we may develop in greater fullness this part of our subject, beginning with the very conception of it.

I. The Deed as conceived by the Ego or the Conception of the Deed is the simple conceiving of the primal act of separation by the Ego and its self-projection into externality, upon which it impinges and in which it produces some change.

Thus the existent world is made different

through my Deed, it is not what it was before I acted. This difference between what was and what is must be referred to the Ego as Will, is its work and manifestation. Every moment, therefore, I as Will am changing the Universe. I take some wood and make a house, I put a new object into the world, transforming the old object or objects; this change or transformation of material is mine and contains my Ego. I intended to produce it after some plan or image in my mind, therefore it has my Intention (which is my Ego both as image and volition) in itself and reveals the same.

Thus the Conception of the Deed involves the immediate unity of myself and externality as conceived. The whole movement here is as yet subjective; still the Ego as subjective throws out the object in its internal process. We recollect that the Conception of the Will (in Psychological Will) was stated to be this: the Ego, conceiving itself as Will, was Will in that very act. The same thing is involved in the Conception of the Deed, but the latter demands in addition that the act of Will be conceived as impinging upon and uniting with an external world.

The Conception of the Deed has its process, which may be briefly given as follows: —

1. We must in the primal Conception of the Deed, conceive of it in its undeveloped, potential condition, before the separation within,

before realization. Still the germ must be there, else the Deed could never result; this germ or possibility is now to unfold and make itself real. The present stage is the undetermined, which, however, is to determine itself, it is the acorn which is to burst its shell and become the oak.

2. The Conception of the Deed demands separation, utterance in the object; this is the stage in which the Ego as Will manifests itself as the determined; the Deed is conceived as externality, it cannot remain undetermined and be Deed. Thus the Ego ideally projects itself into the world, and becomes a part or phase of that; though internal it has to conceive itself external also.

3. The Deed is conceived as the unity of the internal and external, of subject and object. The Ego as Will is not lost in its utterance, but is still itself just therein and returns to itself. Such is the nature of the Deed in its conception, it is the Ego externalized, thrown out into the world, yet containing the process thereof. That is, every Deed has in it the process of the Ego as Will, hence is ascribable to the same; the Deed is imputable to the Ego and from this comes the latter's responsibilty.

Such are the three stages of the Conception of the Deed — immediate, separative and unitary. The main result to be retained is that the Deed as conceived bears within itself the inner process

of the Ego, and hence is the latter's own; thus the Deed is moral and the Ego is accountable.

But, though the Deed be the Ego's own, belonging to internality, it is also the world's own and belongs to externality. If, on the one hand, it be determined from the inside, it is likewise determined from the outside, externally determined. This brings us to a new and deeper separative stage of the Deed, based on its two determinants, the Ego and the world, or the inner and outer.

II. The Deed as determined by the external world is distinguished from the pure Conception of the Deed which contains within itself the process of the Ego. We may consider this stage as the Determined Deed, and it corresponds to the stage of Determined Will in the preceding Psychological Will.

Thus the two sides of the Deed (or its two determinants) inner or outer, begin to separate, become opposed and antagonistic, yet both belong to the Deed. Let us note the fact more closely. The Deed through its utterance is linked into a chain of externality, which whirls it beyond the scope of my Ego. The Deed has consequences which I did not foresee or know; I separate myself from these consequences, and say that they did not lie in my Ego as Will, they are not *mine*, they contain not my Intention.

I go forth into the woods on a hunt; I shoot

at a squirrel, it was my Intention to do so, the act is mine. But the squirrel is external and is connected on many sides with externality; it may be somebody's property, or the bullet may glance and hit an unseen person. Indeed, that which I take to be a squirrel in the distance may be the fur cap of a man whose body happens to be concealed by foliage. The man is killed by my action, yet I say the Deed is not mine, I really did not do it, I had no such Intention, my Ego went out only into the killing of the squirrel. I acquit myself of murder, the inner judge proclaims that I was not responsible, and the outer judge on due proof lets me go free, for this outer judge upon his bench is but the counterpart of the inner one.

It is manifest that a separation has taken place, in fact, a double separation. We have to separate the Deed as such from its consequences; it touches on every side a rim of externality, from which it must be severed in thought; beyond this rim the Ego does not extend itself, though the Deed propagates itself onward through it indefinitely. Then there is the second separation: the Ego as Intention separates itself from the Deed as utterance, and becomes thereby conscious of itself.

Thus the Ego has been made aware of itself in the Deed and the Consequences, which Consequences are for it the intended and the unin-

tended. It has come to know itself as Intention; what I intend, is mine when realized; what I do not intend, though it occurs in connection with my act, is not mine. Such is the penalty of all action: I may become involved in Consequences unknown, remote, wholly unintended. The result is often doubt, pain, possibly self-reproach. At first we may hesitate and interrogate our Ego sharply about its share in the ill result; but we soon rally and vindicate our freedom.

Thus the Ego divides its Deed, and this division we shall see passing through the stages of the Psychosis, which is again threefold.

1. The first or immediate separation made by the Ego in this sphere is into the Deed and its Consequences, or the part of the Deed belonging to itself (the Ego) and the part not so belonging. Acting in a world which is closely connected together, my Will breaks into the line of connection and causation, and sets a new cause to work in co-operation with that of nature. The result is an effect which reaches out beyond my immediate act. To light the spear of straw in a straw-stack is my Deed, immediately taken, or that part of my Deed connected directly with my organism, but the burning of the stack is the Consequence of the Deed. Now did I have the presentation of such a Consequence when I applied the match?

2. Thus my Ego begins to look at the Conse-

quences and soon divides them into two kinds, the intended and the unintended — those which were present to it and those which were not, or perchance the necessary and the accidental Consequences. In such fashion the Ego, seeking for what belongs to it and what does not, carries its division over into externality; having already separated the Deed into the inner and outer sides, it now separates the outer side into the two portions, the intended and the unintended, which expresses the relation of these two portions to itself. Did I, the doer, have more or less distinctly the image of these Consequences before me when I did the Deed? And was I stimulated to act through such image?

3. Out of this dualism and division the Ego returns to itself and asserts itself as the determinant of the one set of Consequences, of which the image or thought was present to it and stimulated the action. Such was its Intention, being determined therein by itself, versus the other set of Consequences, which it did not intend. I fired the gun, and intended to kill the squirrel. I did not intend to kill the man. Thus the Ego has become conscious of Intention through separating itself from the unintended and falling back upon itself as the stimulating cause, or as the originating power of the Self. That is, Intention is based upon the Self-determined, the conception of a self-active Ego.

But with this assertion of Intention rises another assertion, that of responsibility. If I, out of myself, can originate the Deed, or a part of it, then it is mine, is referable to me, and I am responsible. At this point, however, we enter upon a new phase of the subject, in which I not only return to myself as Intention, but to myself as Ideal End, according to which I am to deliver judgment over myself. I being self-determined, or self-cause of the Deed, so to speak, must hold myself accountable.

III. Thus we have reached not only the Right of Intention, but also its counterpart, the requirement of responsibility. The moral Ego is now the judge with his law, by which law he is going to judge my Deed with its Intention, and declare in how far it fulfills the Ideal End, which is the highest. We are to see that this third stage is a return of the Ego to its deepest self, out of its previous stage of dualism and separation. This is manifest in the statement: I hold myself responsible for what I have done. Responsible to whom? To myself in my supreme form, to my Ideal End, which is freedom.

Let us unfold the matter a little further. After the previous state of inner scission, the Ego returns to itself, asserting first the Right of Intention. I withdraw myself from the Consequences, though I still lament them and suffer from them in feeling though not

in reason; I cut off, as it were, the unintended part of the Deed as not mine, because I did not pass into its results with my own selfhood, not willing them, and perchance not knowing them as even possible. The man whom the bullet from my gun hit, is indeed dead, but I did not slay him. The law of the land, Public Opinion, the judge will confirm my own Ego in its declaration of innocence. Such is the right of my Ego in all its majesty, being the final lawgiver and justiciary in the present case.

Thus it is my Ego as supreme arbiter that sets free my Ego as supposed culprit. We shall take notice of this arbiter who will often appear as the judge, the law, the accuser, and the liberator. The grounds of his judgment are indeed fundamental in the moral sphere; we shall find his decision springing from and resting upon the Ideal End, which will be seen unfolding more and more as we proceed.

We have, accordingly, at this point a process which may be called the process of Responsibility. The Deed being done and bearing in itself Intention, or the self-determined principle of the doer, is judged by his Ego according to this Intention, which is finally to be subsumed under the supreme moral law or Ideal End. This is involved in the question: Was my Intention in performing a given act good? Thus the Deed, the Intention, and the Ideal End must

pass in review before the Ego in the case of moral judgment.

1. The Deed being done and the Consequences being present, I hold myself responsible for the *intended* Consequences, those which lay within the purview of my Ego, and which, therefore, belong to me. When I act, I utter myself in externality, in the Deed, which is the union of the internal and external, and which goes back to me as the original creative power that called it into being. Thus I separate myself from what I did not intend, from that part which the world with its energy or causation added to and intermingled with mine. Hence the second stage of my judgment.

2. I do not hold myself responsible for the *unintended* Consequences, those which lay outside of the purview of my Ego. Here in the most emphatic manner I assert the Right of my Intention, which is really the Right of myself, of my subjectivity. I cast away that which is external to me in my Deed, I judge myself and affirm my innocence. Thus I withdraw into myself as my own moral home.

3. This is, however, a return of the Ego out of separation, and in every such return it carries along with itself knowledge, consciousness. The Ego now knows that there is an external world in which it acts, that it, acting therein, is carried forth to consequences which it never intended;

it knows the two kinds of Consequences, the intended and unintended. So we have reached a unity of the previous separation of intended and unintended Consequences, the unity in knowledge; both are known and taken up into the Ego.

The result is, that the Consequence, at first unintended, becomes known and so is a constituent of the Ego, hence it is no longer unintended, or at least I am responsible for it, responsible for a Consequence which is known to me, since it lies in my Ego. At this point responsibility widens its circle and embraces the unintended Consequences of the Deed, which become known through my experience; knowledge is now the test and not simply the immediate Intention.

It is manifest that herein lies a return out of the unintended Consequence to the intended, through experience or knowledge. When I have experienced that touching a lighted match to powder produces an explosion, I cannot a second time plead the unintended Consequence. The latter becoming known, becomes the intended Consequence ever afterwards.

The rise of this Right of Intention has a history; it belongs to the modern world whose governing principle is to give validity to the Ego, to the subjective nature of man. Antiquity recognized the principle, but not fully and consciously. The ancient man had to take the Deed and its Consequences, he could not flee

into his Intention, into his own subjectivity, and there find protection. The Hebrews had cities of refuge for the person who had unwittingly slain his neighbor; he could not rightly be punished with death, nor could he be wholly absolved and still live in his community among people who had no such act hanging over them. Thus we see a kind of compromise between the Intention and the Deed, or the right of the subject and the right of the object; the separation above designated had not yet completely taken place, yet was at work. In Greek legend Oedipus slew his father and married his mother, both acts were great violations of the ethical consciousness of his people, yet he did not know that either person was his parent at the time of his Deed. When he comes to the knowledge of what he has done, he accepts the Deed and its penalty regardless of his Intention; he does not appeal to his subjective right, which had not yet risen in the Greek world, but heroically suffers for the guilt which Fate, in his opinion, has laid upon him. In like manner we read in the First Book of Herodotus the affecting tale of Adrastus, "the Doomed," who had fled to the court of Croesus from his native country, Phrygia, for having undesignedly caused his brother's death. Croesus purified him, and restored him, so to speak, to innocence; but Fate still pursues him, and again he causes a death undesignedly, this

time the death of Croesus' own son and heir to the throne. Adrastus, in his despair of escaping the relentless pursuit of Fate, takes his Deed with its Guilt upon himself, and ends his life through his own act. We would now say that Adrastus was innocent, we would further say that he ought to proclaim to himself, "I am guiltless, having had no bad Intention;" thus he would escape Fate by taking refuge, not in some foreign city or country, but in his own inner city, in his own subjectivity with its right. Even the lifeless object such as a stone, which had caused a death, was in Greece and other countries, tried publicly, condemned, and with great ceremony cast out of the territorial limits into the sea.

We have now witnessed the process of the immediate Deed, and have seen it unfold and differentiate itself into its elements. The Deed, as done by a human subject, has shown three main constituents: the Intention, the external Occurrence, the Judgment. The latter is often called conscience (etymologically as well as psychologically connected with consciousness and self-knowledge), and starts into special energy, when the Deed is out of harmony with the Ideal End, when I do something knowingly which violates my true nature, my selfhood. The internal judge with his law pronounces judgment according to the Intention. Conscience knows

the Guilt and punishes within, seeking to scourge the discordant, rebellious Ego back into harmony with its own highest Self, which is the ultimate good.

Thus the Intention asserts itself in the Deed, I must have my Intention in it, else it is not mine; if there is any portion of it not containing my Intention, I am free of responsibility. Thus saith the judge. But I, having done the Deed and seen the Consequences, now know them, I can no longer plead ignorance before the judge, who begins to compel me to answer for the known Consequences of the Deed. Herewith begins a new stage of the development of the Moral Will.

Summary of Deed and Intention. In accordance with our plan, we shall now seek to mark more definitely as well as state more briefly the distinctions which have been laid down in the preceding account, and which have been allowed somewhat freely to flow into one another.

In the Deed immediately considered we regard the Ego as Will separating itself within itself, and projecting itself into the world. The Deed thus has the process of the Ego, and, in fact, of the Ideal End, though this be as yet in an implicit form. Thus, however, the Deed is moral, and the Ego, taking upon itself its own, is responsible. Three stages, in each of which is a secondary division.

I. The Deed as conceived; now we regard the simple conception of the Deed in its inner process, which, however, is to become externalized; the subjective side of the Will which must become objective.

1. The immediate, potential phase, before any separation within; the undeveloped state.

2. The separated, determined phase of the Ego in the Deed, conceived still within, yet as objective.

3. The self-determined phase of the Deed as conceived. This is the inner process of the Deed completed, the full Conception of the Deed.

II. The Deed as determined; it is determined, we may say, doubly — from within by the Ego, and from without by the world. Here, then, the Deed shows its division, having an inner and an outer element; or, better, this division manifests itself as the Deed and its Consequences. These latter again divide themselves into the intended and unintended, with which distinction rises into view conscious Intention.

The moral Ego, having its Ideal End coiled up within itself, acts in an external world, which, undetermined by it, nevertheless determines it, and interlinks with the Ego's act, forming a chain of causation and bringing forth results not intended by me, that is, not present in the stimulating image or feeling or thougnt which impelled me to act. Three stages: —

1. The first separation is into the Deed and its Consequences. To light the spear of straw is my Deed, immediately taken, but the burning of the whole stack is the Consequence.

2. The second separation follows, the separation of the Consequences into the intended and unintended. This separation goes back to the Ego as determinant of the act; did it have the image of these Consequences as its stimulant or not?

3. The Ego returns into itself out of the Deed and its Consequences and asserts itself as the determinant inasmuch as it is the self-determined. As such determinant it is called Intention.

I did intend to set fire to the single straw and to burn the stack, but I did not intend to burn the barn lying not far off. I withdraw myself from the unintended Consequence, and therein assert the right of Intention; I the self-determined, must be the determinant of the moral nature of my Deed.

III. The Deed as intended, consciously intended, for which, therefore, the Ego as self-knowing is responsible. That is, the Ego now knows the Deed as its own, and refers it to itself as cause. Thus there is in this third stage a return of the Ego to itself with its Deed, through self-consciousness. Here we have reached what may be called the right of Inten-

tion — it claims the Deed as its own and must answer for the same.

We may unfold this process a little. The moral Ego as judge, having its Ideal End as law or standard, adjudicates the Deed; it holds itself accountable to its supreme end in the particular act and its Intention. Did I intend to will the highest, or was I moved by some lower end of my own? Still, in the present stage, this Ideal End is not yet developed, is not in full consciousness, though present and at work. The moral judge is as yet more or less intuitive.

In this present process of responsibility we note the three phases: —

1. I hold myself responsible for the intended Consequences, those that lay in the purview of my Ego.

2. I separate myself from the unintended Consequences, and refuse to hold myself responsible for them.

3. I return out of this separation, though knowing it, I unite the intended and the unintended Consequences in an act of thought, both being known to me in relation. Thus I become aware of acting in an external world which determines or may determine my Deed differently from me; I begin to find two determinants co-operating in my Deed, the known and the unknown.

The movement of the immediate Deed, de-

veloping through the intended and unintended Consequences, has reached the responsibility of the Will in Intention. But when the unintended Consequence becomes known as a Consequence of the Deed, a new responsibility enters through Knowledge. This gives a new stage of the moral Ego, which is unfolded in the Deed and Knowledge.

So at this point the process of the simple or immediate Deed is brought to a conclusion, and we pass into a new sphere, which embraces knowing as well as willing. I am asked for charity on the street, I give some money to the asker, with the Intention of helping him, but I find that he spends the money for drink, to his own injury. The next time I am asked for charity, my knowledge of the previous case enters as a determining element of my action: I am not to give the money unless I see that it is well spent. I cannot plead before the judge my good Intention a second time, after having had that experience, though I could so plead the first time and be justified.

Thus the Intention which was immediate, more or less impulsive in the simple Deed, must now be mediated by knowledge. Or, as it is often stated, we must think before we act; if we do not, we as thinking beings are held responsible. We must now wed our Intellect to our Will, our reflective to our volitional nature.

Still even here a new separation takes place. I having united the intended and the unintended in the known Consequences still have to project beyond the known the unknown Consequences, with which dualism the Ego has next to grapple.

II. The Deed and Knowledge.

In the previous sphere of the Moral Deed we considered the Deed and Intention; in the present sphere we are to unfold the Deed and Knowledge, this Knowledge belonging to the Ego knowing as well as willing the Deed. Or to make the expression fuller, we are to look at the Deed and its Periphery of Consequences known and unknown, wherein the inner movement turns upon the knowing of the Consequences.

The Ego in Intention drew back into itself, separating from Consequences external to itself, but just therein it posited a world outside of its Intention, which world became known to it through that act. With such a separation the present sphere begins: the Ego with its inner world of Intention on one side and the outer world of Consequences on the other, which latter are gradually to be taken up into Knowledge, and thus become a part of the Ego with its responsibility.

Thus we shall seek to conceive the Deed in its new aspect, incarnating itself in a body of Consequences, known and unknown, in every direc-

tion quite to infinity. Not only each Ego, but each Deed of the Ego is a center from which flow results great and small through Space, Time, and Spirit, everywhither and forevermore. The act of Will is a creative point which changes the universe. Thus it has a Periphery surrounding itself on all sides, in which the Ego draws limits of its own; at present it draws the limit of Knowledge, for the purpose of finding its moral responsibility. Thus the present sphere embraces the Deed with its Periphery of Consequences known and unknown, forming a totality of which the Ego is the central point.

We may consider the matter in some further detail. The Ego has arrived at a consciousness of the Deed and its Consequences; it knows that it acts in a world of externality, and must henceforth take account of that knowledge. All experience carries with it moral responsibility; I know something which I did not know before, and am no longer guiltless; I have eaten of the tree of knowledge and have lost my paradisaical innocence. My Intention is able to plead ignorance no more, and is thereby vastly widened, my accountability begins to affirm itself commensurate with my intelligence.

In the Deed as immediate I asserted simply my Intention and cut off the unintended result, for which I refused to give a reckoning, inasmuch as I did not know of such a result. But

when I know it, then I take it up into my Deed, and it is imputable to me; it lies in my Ego and calls for my responsibility. I cannot deny that I know the Deed which I have experienced and which is knowable to man. Here then blame enters, guilt; here the court opens with the Ego as judge, judging by its own supreme standard of right, subsuming its own particular case under its own universal law.

The movement of the simple or immediate Deed, as hitherto set forth, has thus ended in the complete dualism of Intention as regards the Deed and its Consequences, which are, accordingly, named the intended and the unintended elements, and hence are deemed the responsible and the irresponsible portions of the Deed. With such a separation the present movement starts, which is to overcome the dualism between the Deed and its Consequences; the Deed begins to incorporate the Consequences into itself, when the latter are known by the Ego. Thus a new united Deed arises which reaches back and unifies the Intention, taking away the separation between the intended and unintended elements. The Deed now asserts its right, as previously Intention asserted *its* right. The Deed affirms itself to have been done by a rational self-conscious Ego, which knows itself acting in a world of externality, and hence proclaims a corresponding Intention. We may say

that previously the Intention got hold of the Deed and threw away the Consequences, but now the Deed with its Consequences is returning and is getting hold of Intention. The result will be a process which will take the form of a Psychosis with its three stages.

In this second sphere we may still say and think that the Deed has Intention, but the latter is conscious or explicit Intention; the Ego, having experienced the unintended Consequence, now knows it, so that after such experience it must be an intended Consequence. That is, the Ego now separates this knowledge and makes it explicit in the Deed, whereas in the previous sphere (of Deed and Intention) such knowledge, though present, was implicit. For instance, if my simple Intention was to burn the straw-stack, I knew already that the lighting of the single straw would produce the conflagration. Yet such knowledge hardly rose into my consciousness. Thus we see that Knowledge lies back of Intention and really constitutes its essence. At present, however, we wish to unfold conscious Intention or the known element thereof, which shows the following stages: —

I. There will be a primal separation, in which the known will be seen unfolding into the known and unknown — the dualism of the present sphere.

II. There will follow a second separation, in

which the unknown, being taken up by the Ego, will show a new dualism into the known and unknown.

III. The Ego therein returns to itself with the unknown — it comes to know the unknown as unknown. I have to know also that I do not know; thus I subsume under knowledge something known and something unknown.

But with such knowledge comes responsibility. So we shall see in the following development that I have to answer for Consequences to the extent that I know them to be unknown.

These three stages will be better seen in a more detailed development.

I. We start with the dualism which we have inherited from the preceeding movement. The Ego as Intention withdraws itself into itself, accepting the Deed, but refusing to answer for the Consequences. But the Ego by the very fact of having made this separation and having drawn the limit against the Consequences, knows of them, knows that they exist, and thus takes them up into itself as Knowledge. Thus their exclusion is really their inclusion; the Ego, by its very nature, is limit-transcending; when it knows the limit, this is no longer a limit to its knowing.

When I do the Deed for the first time, I may not know the Consequences, and so they do not lie in my Intention, and I am not responsible;

but when I do the same or a similar Deed the second time, I know the Consequences, and so they lie in my Intention which proceeds from my total Ego, and I am responsible. Every increase of knowledge, therefore, is an increase of responsibility, I cannot acquire the most common experience without its affecting my moral nature. With advancing life I act more and more knowingly, and hence more and more worthily or more and more guiltily. As I increase in knowledge, the ideal end of existence becomes more and more explicit, and with it grows the imperative to moralize my whole activity more and more completely.

Accordingly, I must know myself as acting in an external world which is connected in manifold ways, in Space, in Time, in Causation. My Deed is not merely this single Deed in isolation, but has an environment of many relations; the little sphere of my Deed is surrounded by a vast periphery of externality, which I, as a rational, limit-transcending being, must be continually getting conscious of, and thus I must realize my destiny. If I set fire to a single straw, I must be aware that it will involve the entire straw-stack with which it is connected; the conflagration will certainly reach the adjacent barn and probably sweep to the house not far away. Though my little immediate Deed may be confined to this small object, to this one straw, my

Ego, as knowing and rational, embraces the Consequences and holds itself accountable for the same.

Here one begins to ask — accountable for all the Consequences? Some Consequences I did not know, could not know; does my responsibility extend to them? In the burning barn a man may be sleeping; if he perishes in the flames, have I to answer for his death? At this point, then, rises a fresh distinction and separation. The fact that I know calls up a new boundary, namely that I do not know; as previously my knowledge swept away the limit, so now it posits the limit. That is, through knowledge I transcended the limit of the Deed and took in its Consequences; but now I set down the limit again, through Knowledge I divide the Consequences into the known and the unknown.

I must accept the responsibility, in the given case, for the extent of the conflagration; but I draw the line at the death of man. Again Intention comes forward and claims its right; it includes some Consequences and refuses others. As we before had the division into the Deed and its Consequences, so now we have projected it into the Consequences by themselves — wherewith we pass to the next stage of this movement.

The Ego, as it has often done already, begins again to differentiate the Consequences of the Deed, in order to discover its responsibility. It

cannot answer for all the results of acting in a world of externality, in which other forces are at work besides its Will, yet the imperative insists that it answer for some of them; so the supreme judge with his inner law again begins to hold court in order to sift and discriminate the Consequences.

Often the distinction is drawn between necessary and accidental Consequences. In general, the former are those which follow from the very nature of the Deed, and which every rational Ego is capable of perceiving to be in intimate connection with the Deed. I, therefore, must know, or am held to know, the necessary Consequences of my action; I cannot plead ignorance of them without abjuring my rationality. If I set fire to one end of a single straw in a stack, I must know and be accountable for the necessary Consequences; I cannot limit myself to the mere act of placing the match at one small point. But the accidental Consequences are those which lie outside of my purview of the circumstances; not imaged in my Ego, they are not mine.

Still the Ego can never securely rest in its own bounds, not even in those which it has imposed upon itself. The unknown Consequences it begins to tamper with, and finds some that ought to have been known, some that could have been foreseen with care; hence comes the charge of carelessness. We often hear an act branded

as thoughtless, implying that the subject must think beforehand what are the probable, nay, the possible Consequences. In such fashion the Ego begins to reach over and to embrace not merely the known, but the calculable, making the same an element of the Deed for which reckoning is to be rendered before the judge.

Thus the divisive principle in the present sphere goes on to an indefinite length, revealing the attempt of the Ego always to get beyond its limit. We observe the double movement; the Ego as Will is forever positing a limit in the external world, beyond which limit it as Intention refuses to take any responsibility, saying, "I did not intend that;" on the other hand the Ego as Intellect is forever transcending the posited limit, making known what lies beyond it and including the same in the sphere of responsibility, saying, "I knew that." Even the accidental Consequences, when known as accidental, have to be taken into the account; I must know myself as acting in the sphere of hazard, and I am responsible for the risk I take.

It is manifest that the self-conscious Ego has quite overcome the difference with which the present movement started. That difference lay primarily between the necessary and the accidental Consequences of the Deed, or the calculable and the incalculable element of an action. I must know the calculable and proceed accord-

ingly; but just thereby I come to know also the incalculable as such, that is, to know it as incalculable, and thus I take it up into the sphere of responsibility. Hence comes the immorality of hazard, when it is immoral.

A wonderful fascination the human mind has always felt for this incalculable element in its action. We grapple with the unknown, must do so, if we be limit-transcending beings. Gambling, financial speculation, even business, enter the world of hazard and endeavor to make it give up its secret. Often indeed we must take the grand risk and dare. We venture into the unknown sea, though nature hold us responsible for our temerity.

Undoubtedly a great difference in responsibility exists between different individuals according to their difference in experience and knowledge. The child does not know the results and the connections of his act; he may innocently set fire to the piece of straw and produce the conflagration. The savage does not know what is known to the civilized man; yet the Indian comes to find out the nature of whisky, and feels responsibility in drinking it. The servant who kindled the fire with Carlyle's manuscript of the "French Revolution," was answerable only for carelessness, possibly not even for that.

Living is truly a thing of responsibility, yet we must not brood over the fact, and be forever

dwelling upon it with a microscopic introspection. The Ideal End insists that we moralize every act and experience, but does not insist that we cut ourselves to pieces in making moral distinctions. We are responsible for being too responsible; let there be no moral excess, not even the excess of morality.

But before we go on, we may look a moment at what we have reached in the present (or first) stage of the Deed and its Periphery. The Ego takes up into itself the known Consequences, as distinct from the unknown, that is, the element of Knowledge is added to that of Intention. I may not intend to hit an innocent person when I shoot at a burglar who runs toward a crowd of people; but I know that such a result is probable, and I must be held responsible not for my Intention simply, but for my Knowledge. Herein again appears a process which we may designate as follows: —

1. The Ego is posited as knowing the Consequences intended and unintended, of its Deed. It is taken as capable of thinking, or at least of imaging, up to a certain limit, what lies in the circumference of a given act. It does not intend a certain result and yet it knows that such a result is a direct Consequence of its conduct, or that it lies in the Periphery of its Deed.

2. The thought of the known Consequences brings up the unknown, as the boundary of the

known. This is the separation which must take place in the present sphere; the Periphery, so to speak, divides into two portions, one of which lies inside the Ego's world, the other outside.

3. The Ego returns out of the separations just unfolded, to itself with the known Periphery as against the unknown. Yet this distinction it brings along too; it has become conscious not only of the known Periphery of Consequences, but also of the unknown. Thus its consciousness embraces the limit, the Ego has taken up into itself the difference between the known and the unknown, and this difference is what it has next to elaborate.

What have we gained in this first stage of the process of the Deed and its Periphery? We have made the division of the Periphery into the inner and outer sides, or the known and the unknown, and we have become conscious of this division, with which we pass to the following stage.

II. The Ego's knowledge of the Deed and its Periphery is now twofold, divided; this dualism it is to work over into unity. The unknown is different from the known, yet this unknown element must somehow be brought under the known, and thus included in responsibility. The soul reaches out for the beyond, is by its very nature limit-transcending; it must know or be responsible for not knowing. This matter we may turn over somewhat more fully.

As already set forth, the present is the second or separative stage of the Deed and its Periphery, the separation into known and unknown Consequences having become a conscious fact of the Ego. The movement is to bring these unknown Consequences into the sphere of the known; the Ego is seen transcending the limit to its knowledge, and in the same degree it will widen its responsibility. But first let us note the process of the Ego overcoming the dualism between known and unknown.

1. The beginning is made with the previous result, namely the separation of the Deed and its Periphery into the known and unknown Consequences. Still further, the Ego, having become conscious of this fact, knows both the known and the unknown Consequences, knows that both exist in the Deed.

2. The Ego as knowing now takes up the unknown Consequences and begins to look at them; it seeks to know them as they are, that is, to know them as unknown. Thereby this unknown becomes twofold, being both known and unknown. For to know a thing as unknown is a kind of knowledge, yet also a kind of ignorance. Still the Ego in its process passes out of this duality through its knowledge.

3. This is the return to itself, yet bearing with itself the unknown Consequences, which are now

known as unknown. The great fact here is that the Ego has united the two worlds, the known and the unknown; it has taken up both into itself and knows both, to be sure, in different ways, which give rise to different degrees of responsibility, as we shall see in the next stage.

It is manifest, however, that the dualism with which we started in the present stage (the Deed and its Periphery) has been wrought over into unity — the known and the unknown have been subsumed under the one rubric of knowledge. This does not mean that the difference is totally destroyed; though subsumed, it still has its power just through that subsumption; there is still the difference between the known and the unknown even in knowledge.

But now we are to see the great moral purpose of this subtle movement: as knowledge increases, responsibility is compelled to follow. Thus we note the interplay between Will and Intellect; the Ego as Will, or especially as Intention, is always positing the limit and refusing to be further responsible, while the Ego as Intellect or Knowledge is always transcending the limit and forcing responsibility to keep pace with its advance. This fact we are now to set forth.

III. In the movement of the present sphere (the Deed and Knowledge), the Ego, having united the known and the unknown Consequence in its knowing, asserts its responsibility according

to its Knowledge. As in the previous sphere (the Deed and Intention) the Right of Intention made the Ego responsible, so now the Right of Knowledge makes it responsible; in the former case I withdraw myself from the unintended Consequences, in the latter case I withdraw myself from the unknown Consequences, which, however, become known through the Deed. Moreover, I, being able to transcend the limit of my ignorance, have a new kind of responsibility — I must answer for that ignorance of mine which I have the power of overcoming.

Let us once more take a rapid sweep over this field. I have become aware that every limit to my Ego which I posit I can transcend. This is a new kind of knowledge and with it rises a new responsibility. The Ego has attained to the consciousness of its ideal, transcendent character; whatever bound it finds in externality, it can remove or surmount. Acting in an external world, the Ego does the Deed, which, however, has a new quality, that of being done by a person conscious of his limit-transcending nature.

Such is the outcome of the movement which has just preceded. When I know the unknown as unknown, and act in a world of unknown externality, knowing the same as unknown, my knowledge has compassed the two worlds, known and unknown, has overcome the division between them, has made the two one, has subsumed both

under a single predicate. It is true that the unknown is still unknown, yet it is known as unknown; when I act in that external unknown realm, I act in it as knowing it, and just this knowledge makes me answerable. If I engage to make a hat for a man, knowing my ignorance of hat-making, I am responsible for the failure, and it is my knowing the unknown which brings condemnation upon me. If I promise to guide a party through a country unknown to me and get lost, I am to blame because of my knowledge of my own lack of knowledge. To know the unknown, namely, that it is unknown, is a responsible knowledge.

All this has, doubtless, some appearance of being profitless subtlety or a mere play on words. Still we hope that the reader may be led to see through the appearance and to behold the meaning, which is that the Ego has in this sphere overcome separation, limitation, finitude, and has shown itself universal, taking up the total realm of externality, the known and the unknown, into its movement, and thereby making itself responsible for the complete circuit of its Deed.

Thus into Intention is introduced a totality of environment, of which I am conscious. My immediate purpose may be to chop down this tree, but I have to know whether it will fall on yonder house within its range, and I have to

prefigure what will be the Consequences to those dwelling in the house. To be sure, these Consequences are unknown; still I have to image them and all that lies in the periphery of the action; what is unknown I have to know that it is unknown and hence pregnant with possibilities, for which I shall be held accountable. What is called criminal carelessness means that I did not duly regard the unknown which I knew to be unknown, and so my Intention is chargeable with unintended results, since sins of omission bear the penalty as well as sins of commission. Into my Intention (also named Motive sometimes) the universal element of knowing enters and brings with it a responsibility in proportion.

The Ego, having now become aware of itself, of its own universal, limit-transcending nature, must hold itself responsible for this new knowledge, responsible for its own universality. When it acts, it must act according to its highest self, it must follow its supreme insight; if it does not thus act, then comes the penalty. For the judge is beginning to make explicit his law, and to apply it to the Deed, which now asserts the Intention to be commensurate with itself. Thus, however, we have passed to a new sphere of the Deed.

This responsibility for knowledge assumes the form of a process. Here again is the judge

adjudicating the Deed, taking up the total Periphery of Consequences, known and unknown, and then applying the law, which is the Ideal End. The Ego tests the Deed by its own highest Self: Did I realize my own true being in that act? Let us distinguish the stages of the movement.

1. First, the Ego, having made the distinction into known and unknown Consequences, holds itself responsible for the known.

2. This separation involves the deeper separation of the unknown Consequences from the Ego, which does not hold itself responsible for them. I cast them away from me, they are not mine. Yet just this separation and rejection make me aware of them, I know the unknown as unknown, and with such knowledge responsibility begins.

3. Now I have returned to myself with the unknown, which I have embraced in my knowledge, which fact makes me answerable for the Deed and its Periphery of Consequences known and unknown. That is, I have to know my unknown world; no unimportant part of my knowledge is the knowledge of my ignorance. I have to know that I am ignorant of military tactics, so let me not get myself appointed generalissimo of an army, or even captain of a company. I have to know what I do not know in every activity of life. Socrates said that others did not know, or, more fully, did not know that they did not know, whereas he knew

that he did not know; this he deemed a great step in the philosophy of knowing, and also of doing. So the knowledge of ignorance is a great advance beyond mere ignorance; indeed, to be ignorant of your ignorance is often one of the chief fatalities of life. You must know that you do not know how to manage this ship upon which we are embarked; if you undertake the job and cause a loss of property and life, you are responsible, not by virtue of your ignorance, but by virtue of your knowledge of your ignorance. Herewith the Ego has taken up into itself and appropriated to its knowledge the Deed and its Periphery of Consequences both known and unknown, and has made itself responsible in proportion to such knowledge.

If we look back at the movement of the Deed and its Consequences, we observe that the Ego has passed through three stages, which involve acting, knowing the act, and the being responsible through knowing the act. First the Ego as Intention separates itself from the Consequences of the Deed, yet by such separation comes to know them as Consequences, and therewith acknowledges responsibility. Second, the Ego as Intention begins to divide and discriminate the Consequences in various ways, particularly as known and unknown. But thereby the unknown Consequences become known as unknown, with which new knowledge rises

a new responsibility. Third, the Ego having canceled all the limits to its knowledge of externality, and taking up the Deed in its total Periphery, has become conscious of itself as this power of cancelling the limit, conscious of itself as being universal, and holds itself responsible for its universality, making the Intention quite co-terminous with the Deed.

The Ego, therefore, knowing itself as universal, must know and affirm the universality of the Deed. That is, the Ego must know its complete process in the Deed, must know the return of the Deed to the doer, or its total circuit

We may take the illustration already given and carry it forward into the present sphere. The immediate Deed is my setting fire to a single straw. But I am to know the Consequences; my act through such knowledge includes the burning of the stack, and I am responsible accordingly. But my Intention (or Motive) may be to destroy the property of another Ego; my Will is to destroy his Will in so far as the latter is realized in such a piece of property. Here enters the sphere of the universal Deed; I do not only the act, to which are joined its external Consequences, but also there is the return of the Deed to me, as I have assailed and in so far as I have assailed the Ego of another by my destructive work. As I destroy Will, so my Will is destroyed. Thus the Deed as universal comes back

to me when I will the Will of my neighbor or when I assail that Will. Such is the circuit of the Deed implied by universality, which circuit I am to know and so am responsible. The judge simply pronounces judgment in accord with this return of the Deed, which is what I have done to another Ego.

Summary of the Deed and Knowledge. The Deed is now regarded as having a Periphery of Consequences known and unknown, not simply intended and unintended. The intended Consequence is, of course, known; then the unintended Consequence gets known as a Consequence of a given Deed through experience. The unintended but known Consequence of shooting a pistol at a man in a crowd is the likelihood of hitting an innocent person. Responsibility begins to assert itself not simply for Intention but for Knowledge, it arises not only through the Will but also through the Intellect.

This is to show itself in the process of the Deed and its Periphery of Consequences, known and unknown. The said process will go through three leading stages, each of which has subordinate subdivisions as follows: —

I. The first separation or the unfolding of the known into the unknown. The Periphery of the Deed starting with the known Consequences, then passing to the unknown, returns and takes up both.

1. The Ego simply knows the Consequences of the Deed, intended and it may be, unintended.

2. This known element brings up the unknown element as the limit to the known.

3. The Ego returns to itself, now knowing this limit, and therein takes up the unknown into consciousness.

II. The second separation or the unfolding of the unknown. The Ego as knowing brings back the unknown into the known.

Such is the process, starting with the dualism which lies in the Ego's knowledge of the Deed and its Periphery — this knowledge being both of the known and the unknown. The movement is out of this dualism; the unknown is somehow to be brought under the known, and thus included in responsibility. The Periphery of the Deed is to advance beyond the known and to take up the unknown into itself. I have to learn that the igniting of a match at a certain point includes in its Periphery the igniting of the can of oil, and this the igniting of the house. Then after such experiences I have to know generally that there is beyond the known, an unknown Periphery of Consequences, which, nevertheless, I must know as unknown and act according to such knowledge. Let us note the process here, too.

1. The start is made with the separation into the known and the unknown; the Periphery of

the Deed has an inside which is known and an outside which is unknown, by the Ego.

2. But thereby the Ego takes up this unknown element, and finds that it (the unknown) has also two elements, a known and an unknown.

3. So the Ego returns to itself with the unknown and subsumes it under the known. Thus it has united the two worlds, known and unknown, embracing both in its knowledge, though in a different way. Still, from each kind of knowledge will follow a proportionate responsibility.

III. As previously the Right of Intention made the Ego responsible, so now the Right of Knowledge makes the Ego responsible. That is, in proportion as I intend the Deed and its Consequences, I have to answer; and in proportion as I know the Deed and its Periphery, I have to answer. Manifestly I am accountable for the known, and not for the unknown; but when I know the unknown as unknown, I have a knowledge which insures responsibility. The judge, holding me up to the Ideal End, investigates the extent of my knowledge of the Deed and its Periphery of Consequences, and gives his decree accordingly.

1. I hold myself responsible for the known Consequences.

2. I do not hold myself responsible for the unknown Consequences.

3. I return to responsibility and bring along with myself a knowledge of the unknown, namely that it is unknown, for which knowledge I am again answerable.

Thus the Deed and its Periphery of Consequences, known and unknown, form an outer totality of which the Ego is the center, acting and knowing. The universe is divided for every Ego into known and unknown; when it knows both, it knows itself as universal, or as knowing the universal; it reaches over the limit of the known and knows the unknown, and holds itself responsible for such knowledge, as we have already noted.

But the Ego with its total Periphery of Deed and Consequences comes upon another Ego with *its* total Periphery of Deed and Consequence; the result is that a new moral relation becomes explicit, the relation of Ego to Ego. Or, one Will having an environment of action necessarily meets another Will having also an environment of action, nay, meets many such Wills; they brush against one another, they probably clash at first; what is to be the final attitude of each toward each? Thus we penetrate to the fundamental question of morals, really the relation of man to man.

The Ego, as already set forth, knows itself as universal; now it must make itself universal, in accord with its true, limit-transcending nature.

Or, knowing the universal, it must proceed to *do* the universal. But the Deed with its Periphery finds its limit in the Deed of another Ego; the Wills collide unless they be reconciled in a common principle. This appears when the Will wills Will; each Will is to will Will, then all Wills are one and harmonious in an universal Will.

I know the other Ego to be what mine is, I recognize it to be such as I am. Now I am to realize this knowledge, to act it; I am to do as I know, and as I know the other Ego to be what I am, I am to recognize his Will to be of the same validity as mine. I must not only respect it as I do mine own, but also I must vindicate it as I do mine own, in case of necessity. My neighbor is assailed wrongfully (which means that his Will is in some way jeoparded); I have to rally to his defense (which means that I am to exert my Will to secure his Will); only thus do I secure mine own. Such is the universal Deed which I have now to do, in which I return to my Will and make it valid through willing the Will of others.

III. The Deed and Motive.

So now, when the Deed is done, the ultimate question comes up, do I will the Will of the other, or do I violate the same in doing the Deed? We may carry the example already given

through the three main stages of the Moral Will and its Deed.

First, I am responsible for destroying the straw-stack, as I intended such a consequence in setting fire to it.

Second, I am responsible for destroying the adjacent house, as I knew such to be the probable consequence of my Deed, though I may not have intended it directly. At least, my Intention in this second case is mediated through Knowledge.

Third, I am responsible for destroying Will, which has realized itself in a piece of property (here the straw-stack), as my Will has violated another Will, having assailed the latter in its product. Herein my Ego as Will has come back to itself as object in the world, and knows itself as destroying or negating the same, and thus is logically self-negative in its act.

Intention is manifold, embracing many finite ends; but Motive is substantially one, embracing the Ideal End or the willing of Free Will. The Motive, however, can be considered in a twofold relation, positive and negative, according as it seeks to affirm or to negative Free Will.

Hence we apply to the Motive the two moral predicates, good and bad, according to its positive or negative quality. The discussion of Good and Evil, however, does not belong in this sphere, but in a later one, when the Ego is becoming

conscious of its self-end and is seeking to formulate the same.

The Motive, which is the completed process of the Ego as Intention, is now the determinant of the Deed as moral. The Motive, though explicit in itself, as subjective, is still in implicit unity with the Deed, Or, the Ideal End is as yet implicit in the Deed, and so we still remain in the first sphere of the Moral Will, in spite of the fact that Intention has unfolded into Motive.

I know myself to be Free Will and I know the other Ego to be what I am, namely Free Will; this is the new knowledge which brings along with it responsibility. Knowing the external, the Ego finally comes to know the external as itself; so it knows the other as Ego. Consequences are moral only in so far as they reach another Ego. If the straw-stack belonged to nobody, and served no Will, there would be no violation in burning it. The Ego as Will, acting in the world, acts to the other as to itself, when its action is moral. Or, as already said, its Deed is universal; it, in going forth to the object, comes back to itself.

In this last point we get the conception of Motive, which, at least in the sense here used, pertains to the Will willing Free Will. The Motive in setting fire to the straw-stack, we may say, is malice, that is, I intend to assail the owner's Will. But my immediate Intention is to

burn up the stack. This immediate Intention, however, gets its moral significance from the Motive. Ultimately, therefore, I answer for my Motive, and not for my Intention; responsibility even for immediate Intention has in it the Motive, though implicitly and unconsciously.

Observations. The foregoing introductory statements will, in general, be deemed sufficient to give the underlying thought in this sphere of the Deed and Motive. Still, some readers may find it to their profit to look at the matter in new turns of speech and in fresh illustrations. Hence we append the following remarks which extend to the outline.

We may first notice a possible difficulty. We have said that, in the sense here used, there can be but one Motive. People speak, however, of many Motives. A man commits murder, what is his Motive? Ambition, money, love may be assigned as different Motives of the Deed. These, taken by themselves, are merely states or determinations of the Ego, which can be manifold. But to transform any one of these mental states into a Motive, it must move the Will to assail Will. When I am moved to destroy the Will of the neighbor, that transforms any determination of mine into a Motive, which is thus the one essential thing amid all the Ego's states as special determinants to the act.

The Ego as Free Will knows Free Will in an-

other, and knows that it is to will Free Will in another, and still further knows that if it assails or destroys Free Will in another, it is responsible. Such is the cycle of the Deed, or, as we now call it, the Deed as universal, for which I as Motive hold myself responsible.

Manifestly this knowledge is the knowledge of a process, of the Ego's process of Free Will. First, there is the act of the Ego, the act of Will which separates and objectifies; second, there is the object or the Deed as such, done to the other Ego; third, there is the return of the Deed to the Ego which has done it, this return completing the process.

Why should there be this return? Thus the Ego is itself, having gone through the process which makes it Ego; if the Ego as Will simply separated itself and made itself object, without return, it would not be conscious of its deed, and there would be no responsibility. I must first take up the Deed into my knowing, before the judge can follow me and declare it to be mine. I may will to secure the other Will, or will to negate it; in either case there is the return, and I know my Deed as a process, or as universal.

All Deeds tend to become universal, though they may not be so directly. The two preceding stages (designated as *The Deed and Intention* and *The Deed and Knowledge*) look forward to and rest upon the universal Deed with its

process of the Ego. Ultimately every act of mine bears upon the Free Will of the other, which I am, remotely or directly, to affirm and to secure. When my Will is fully moralized, the simple gesture, apparently accidental, but really springing from within, will make for willing the Free Will of the other and of myself.

At this point we may note the distinction between Intention and Motive, the latter pertaining to the sphere of the universal Deed. I intended to burn the straw-stack, but what was my Motive? Did I mean to destroy the property, therein assailing the owner's Will? If such was my Motive lying back of my Intention, then the Deed is to be returned to me in its negative form. I determine myself to destroy Free Will, such is the process of my Free Will or my Motive; really I determine myself to be punished.

In the case of correcting a child, my immediate Intention is to inflict the penalty, yea, pain, but this is not my Motive, which is the child's good. I wish through the penalty of its deed to train it into freedom, such is my Motive. Herein the Ego goes through the following process: My first or immediate Intention is pain, but I inhibit this Intention (unless I am angry in the act of punishment, which is thus bad and incomplete); then I inhibit this inhibition and pass into the new Intention which is really the Motive. My ulti-

mate Motive (or End) is to make that child a self-determined Free Will.

It may be remembered that we traced a similar process in the psychical Motive. (See the discussion of it under the head of Choice.) There it was shown that the total process of Desire enters into the Motive properly so called. I desire to sell my house in order to pay my debt, really, however, I do not wish to part with my house which is my home; I primarily desire to keep it, but I inhibit such Desire, then inhibit this inhibition and pass over to a new Desire, which thus becomes Motive. I prefer being a morally free man to keeping my home, where I would feel myself unfree, with debts unpaid.

In like manner the Intention of the previous sphere must through its own inner process pass over and become Motive in the present sphere. It is to be understood, however, that the moral Motive as here used is more than the psychical Motive, though involving the latter. For the moral Motive must contain implicitly the Ideal End, or the self-determined Free Will, which, in the ethical sphere, the individual is to realize in his conduct.

We have thus reached the point at which the Deed may be said to proclaim itself to be universal, that is, it proclaims itself to be done by an Ego, which knowing its own universality, knows the Deed to be universal. The value of

the act henceforth is to be taken into account, some acts having little or no value, and some having an infinite value.

If I shoot a pistol at a rat or at a man, I must know the difference in the value of the two acts, which is determined by the difference in value between the two objects. If I destroy a moral being or a non-moral being, in the one case my act is absolutely contradictory and indeed self-destructive, in the other case it is quite indifferent, unless I hold some peculiar ideas about animal life. Externally both acts are the same — the shooting off a pistol. But if my act ends in the killing of the man, I commit murder, and I am held responsible for the universal value of my Deed. The judge is to serve up to me the law; as I have treated my fellow-man, so I am to be treated in turn. The universal result of my destructive action is, all would be destroyed.

The immediate Deed is, therefore, to be tested at last by its universal worth or value. My Ego, uttering itself in the Deed, has undone an Ego which is also the utterance, or the ability to utter itself, in the Deed. I, knowing myself as limit-transcending, have in my Deed destroyed the limit-transcending; what is the decree of the judge on such a Deed? Surely if the Ego as universal slays the possibility of universality, it slays itself. Thus the negative Ego forces into light the universal character of its own Deed.

On the contrary, if the Ego is positive and wills what is universal instead of destroying it, the Deed is not only preservative but self-preservative.

Herein we come back to the fact that the Ego knowing itself as universal or limit-transcending, must know the other Ego as itself, that is, as universal or limit-transcending. The Ego thus reaches the principle of recognition, which is the foundation of men's living together in a social order. Yet there will be conflict between the Egos in manifold ways; recognition, at least in its highest realized forms, matures only after much struggle.

At this point we may notice Kant's famous Categorical Imperative which has had a great place in the history of Ethics. It runs thus: "Act only on that maxim which thou canst will at the same time to become a universal Law." Universalize your action and see whether it be self-annihilating; universalize theft and it destroys property, universalize murder and it destroys man, universalize negation and it negates itself.

It may be said, however, that man must know himself as universal, as the limit-positing and the limit-transcending movement of Self, before he can make his Deed universal, that is, make it harmonious with his own selfhood. Moreover, the other Ego has to be introduced, which is also

an Ego knowing itself as universal and must be recognized as such. Your Will has to realize itself in a world of other Wills, which, while external to yourself, are just your Self, that is, yourself as universal. So the Imperative runs: Will that your Will be and will what others can be and will without self-negation. The Ego as Will thus recognizes and wills the other Ego as Will; I recognize and will my neighbor's Will to make an honest living, and he mine, though each of us makes it in a different way.

We have frequently noticed the Ideal End, which transforms the Deed into a means for the realization of itself, this End being the Self as universal. You are to realize in your conduct that the other person is what you are; you in every act are to recognize him, to recognize his Ego as also universal, such as you are; so your particular action as well as your whole conduct is filled with the Ideal End of human existence. Such is the transfiguration of life, having been made universal, not merely externally so, but internally as well. Where the Ideal End completely possesses your Deed, transforming and illuminating the same, you are *moralized*, all your actions being made universal and thereby harmonious not only with yourself, but with selfhood. The judge, whose law is the Ideal End, is not merely occupied with scourging the negative Deed, but also with approving the positive one.

The universal Deed will have its process, which is essentially a movement between the two sides, the Motive (inner, universal) and the Deed (outer, real). This process will reveal itself in three stages: —

I. The moral Will manifests an immediate unconscious unity of the Motive and the Deed. This is, in general, the state of prescriptive morality.

II. The second stage will show a complete separation and conflict between Motive and Deed; the Deed at first determines the Motive, then the Motive and the Deed are in opposition and conflict; finally the Motive determines wholly the Deed.

III. There will take place a restoration of both principles, the Motive and the Deed, each finding its true function in the process, which brings forth the three harmonies of the third stage. First is the harmony of the disrupted Motive, in the unity of its particular and universal elements; second is the harmony of the Motive and Deed as such; third is the harmony of the totality of each with each, which gives the harmony of conduct and character.

Thus the universal Deed in its process with the Motive, or subjective side of itself, goes through the three stages of the Psychosis — immediate unity, separation, return to unity. Such is the movement of the Ego in its experience

with its Deed as universal, which it has now accomplished. The details of this movement are to be set forth in the following account.

Ere we begin, however, let us once more summon before ourselves the true significance of the Deed as universal. The question asked of it is, Does my Ego as Ideal End will the Ego as Ideal End, in doing this Deed? I, as judge, thus hold up my Deed to its law and decide the case. Or, to use the formula, has my Ego as self-determined Free Will taken itself as its own content, and willed itself in the other or all other Egos? If it has, then its Deed is universal, can be willed and done by all without conflict, has the end of all Will, namely, freedom, its own realization. Universal — it is all Will, and yet itself too. Such is now the Motive, the ultimate one, there being only one Motive properly in Morals, though we speak of many according to the different relations of the one. Ultimately, then, there is the one moral Motive, through which I am moved to will the process of freedom in my Deed.

But the lofty Motive, the content, is in a perpetual struggle with the form, the Deed. The one is the inner, the other is the outer; yet both belong together and each is through the other. The Motive may be called infinite, sharing in the limit-transcending Ego, the Deed is finite sharing in the external world. The present sphere will

show this struggle between Motive and the Deed, the former seeking to make the latter adequate to itself.

I. We may first look at the universal Deed in its immediate form. There is the natural unconscious unity between the two sides, the Deed and the Motive; the individual as Free Will wills the Free Will of the other Ego without going through the negative process. Such an individual is deemed naturally good, he needs not to go the way of denial and of alienation; he does his duty to his fellow man by a kind of instinct and turns away from all temptation to the contrary. Yet even in him we have to note the process, since he is an Ego, and must move from his potential condition into reality.

1. The most immediate stage of such an Ego we behold in the sphere of prescriptive morality, in which the harmony with the moral behest is unquestioned and without reflection.

2. Still, such an Ego as Free Will has to act in a world of externality, and it must experience that the external act does not always correspond to the internal Ego in its willing, the Deed does not always turn out in accord with the Motive. Here enters a breach, a separation, which, however, does not at present drive the Ego into an extreme attitude against the Deed, but rather leads it to shun such a struggle.

3. The Ego simply returns into itself from

such a breach and asserts its own Motive, which is to do the good, or to will the Ideal End. Still even in such an experience it has become conscious of the new situation, which shows the Ego with its Motive on one side and the Deed on the other.

II. It is manifest, however, that such a withdrawal of the Ego as Will away from the Deed cannot last, since the Will in order to be Will, must act and bring forth the Deed. But the Ego cannot return to the immediate unity of the preceding stage, its paradisaical harmony is lost, it has become aware of the separation between the Motive and the Deed. The Ego has willed the good of the other, but the act has not turned out in accord with such a purpose. I, willing the Free Will of my neighbor, have produced no result in correspondence with my inner self. Still I am held accountable for the externality; the Deed, asserting its universal nature, asserts the same of the doer; that is, it asserts that the Ego, as universal, as the complete process, has willed it, and that it belongs to such an Ego. The latter, however, asserts that it has willed no such Deed, and refuses responsibility, falling back upon its own conscious internality, or its Motive.

So the struggle opens, which, in general, may be named the struggle between the Motive and the Deed. The Ego with its inner, self-con-

scious process is on one side, the effect set a-going by its action is on the other. The result will be a process between these two sides, which will unfold fully the character of the universal Deed.

1. The Deed we take first, it is posited in the world by an Ego, whose offspring it is naturally conceived to be. At the first look, what I do is regarded as mine. So the Deed implies primarily that if it be worthy, the Motive is worthy; there must be this harmony between the inner and outer worlds. In like manner, if the Deed be bad the Motive cannot be good. Thus externality insists at the start upon adjusting internality to its own behest.

Such, then, is the first phase of the struggle, the Motive is judged by the Deed, is approved or condemned according to the latter. The inner process of the Ego is determined by the external act and its consequences. The Right of the Deed is here the matter strongly affirmed, ruling over, possibly tyrannizing over, the Ego.

Most people judge by the Deed; in fact, what other criterion have they? The world, therefore, asserts this Right of the Deed at first, even though it afterward change its mind. In early ages the Ego's right, when clear, could not be fully entertained by positive law; hence arose (as already explained elsewhere in this section) the cities of refuge in case of accidental homicide.

2. The Ego, however, is the self-determining

principle, and is not to be determined from the outside; so it rises up against the Right of the Deed, asserting its own Right, the Right of the Motive; thus the Self-determined, the Motive, claims to be the true determinant of the Deed. This is the other side of the contest; the Ego as Motive affirms that if it wills the Free Will of the other, it cannot be held responsible for consequences which lie outside of its self-conscious volition. In the modern world it makes good its claim; to us of the present this subjective right of the Ego seems valid; so we are inclined to hold that the Motive determines wholly the moral character of an action.

Accordingly we soon reach a complete separation and opposition in moral terms between the Motive and the Deed. First, the Motive may be good and the Deed in its outcome may be bad, a holy purpose may bring forth a curse. I may give alms with a good Motive, but it may encourage idleness and beggary in the recipient and so have a bad effect. Second, is the reverse case: the Motive may be bad but the Deed may be good, a wicked purpose may bring forth a blessing. Christendom pronounces the Motive of Judas to have been bad, inexpressibly bad, but, as the story runs, Christendom would not have been except for that bad act of Judas.

It is manifest that in both these cases the Ego

as Motive asserts its supreme prerogative of determining the moral character of the act. If the Motive be right, but the outcome amiss, it is still a moral action; then if the Motive be wrong yet the outcome beneficial, it is none the less an immoral action. Thus the Ego in its subjective majesty claims the right of determining the moral character of the man, be his Deed what it may. Herein the Deed is reduced morally to something wholly external and accidental by the Motive.

Such is the separation so far: The good Deed may have a bad Motive, and the good Motive may have a bad Deed. But now comes the third case: the Deed may have a double Motive, good and bad, or may have a universal and a particular end, or an unselfish and a selfish purpose. A man may give a large sum of money to an educational institution, both to further a great cause in which he honestly believes and at the same time to feather his own nest by a fat job gotten through his charity. Men can be very patriotic, will go to war and expose their lives in battle, yet also have the design of fleecing the government through contracts let to favored persons. Very seldom indeed is the Motive single, it is not only double, but shows often contradictory elements, having an outlook upon the public good and at the same time an inlook upon personal advantage, to the detriment of the public good.

Thus the splitting-up of Motive and Deed may be carried out indefinitely. The good Deed may have both a good and a bad Motive, and the bad Deed likewise; on the other hand the good Motive may result in both a good and bad Deed, and the bad Motive likewise. At least we call Deeds and Motives good and bad in such cases, and the moral problem is real.

It will now be manifest that the Ego as Motive has divided within itself: it has its particular end or its personal element while willing what is universal. The man may give a park to the city and thus subserve public interest, and at the same time find his private interest in such an act. Is this particular element necessarily wrong or immoral? If there be allowed no personal satisfaction in the Deed, then we are always "to do with disgust what duty demands," as the poet Schiller has put the case in a famous epigram. The least pleasure in doing the universal Deed tarnishes it with a base admixture of a particular element. Such was an outcome of the Kantian view of Morals, though possibly an extreme. Thus the Motive splits into a universal and particular side; not only are the Motive and the Deed separated and antagonized, but the Motive divides within itself against itself, and begins to put down with its tyrannical imperative all its own particularity in the form of feeling, delight, interest. Herein the Ego as

Motive reaches its deepest point of self-opposition and indeed of self-negation. For, after all, the Ego is this particular Ego, and, in its universal end, it wills the freedom of other particular Egos; in assailing the particular element of Free Will, it is assailing itself.

Thus the Motive in its dualism with the Deed, has begotten a deeper dualism, a dualism within itself; its outer conflict has become inner, a war between two sides of itself. Such is its complete diremption within itself in this separative stage, out of which it is to come back to unity with itself and with the Deed. But before we reach this result we must consider the third phase of this second or separative stage of the struggle between Motive and Deed.

We have just seen in the present sphere, the following separations: (1) good Deed, bad Motive; (2) bad Deed, good Motive; (3) good and bad Motive for the Deed. Thus there is not only a double scission between Deed and Motive, but the scission enters into the Motive, the Ego itself. But let us pass to the next sphere.

3. The Ego as Motive having, so to speak, declared its independence of the Deed, will now proceed a step further, it will seek to determine the Deed. That is, the Motive will reverse the situation as given in the first stage above; there, we recollect the Deed determines the Motive,

but now the Motive determines the Deed. Thus the Ego as Motive returns into itself out of its scission and struggle with the external Deed and asserts its absolute mastery. And certainly this realm in its proper limits has its justification as a genuine phase of the moral process: the Motive does determine the character of the Deed.

Still, the result will be that, as the Deed once tyrannized over the Ego and had to have the limit drawn against it, so the Ego (as Motive) will seek to tyrannize over the Deed and will require some limitation of its power. The moral Ego, claiming an absolute authority in such cases, will begin to justify a bad act by ascribing to it a good Motive. The Deed is a mere appearance behind which I, this absolute self-determining agent, can put what purpose I please. Here is a young fellow who has committed a serious breach of school order and is called to account for his Deed, but his mother tells me that his Motives were right and she cannot be persuaded out of her notion. Here is a preacher of the gospel, and hence the teacher, the upholder, and to a degree the guardian of the morals of his community; well, he has done some morally questionable act; at once the attempt is made, sometimes by himself, sometimes by members of his flock or by both, to show that his Motives were high and pure, and are now the sole thing to be considered; as to the Deed it was acci-

dental, some outward shape of illusion gotten up by the fiends to trouble the saints. So the immoral Deed is made to pass into nothingness if not appear as postively moral, by the Motive.

And still further, the moral Ego with its autocratic power will not only claim to make the bad Deed good, but also the good Deed bad. Outwardly a certain action seems and, in fact, is beneficial, it does good to the fellow-man. Still the Ego (of the outsider of course) can affirm that the Motive was bad, or self-seeking, and can thus besmirch the noblest act. This man gave to the public a fine park, which was certainly to the public's benefit; still his Motive was selfish and bad, since he enhanced, by his gift, the value of the property surrounding the park, which property was his also. So the petty Motive-monger prides himself in belittling and degrading every generous public Deed. Particularly in the warfare between political parties as conducted by newspapers does this ascribing unworthy Motives to worthy Deeds constitute a chief weapon against the opponent. The statesman has carried through a great reform in the civil service; the politician will always see in such conduct a Motive purely personal and selfish. One will not easily forget Hegel's scornful characterization (see his *Intro. to Phil. Hist.*) of the historian who belittles and disparages the great heroic Deed of History,

done by a Cæsar, Cromwell, Napoleon, by picking flaws in the Motives of the hero, usually those of ambition, revenge, fame. Such a view is antagonistic to good Morals and to good History.

It is manifest that in these cases the Motive has substantially undone itself. For it has no meaning unless it realizes itself in a Deed corresponding to itself; if it can turn the Deed inside out and outside in, totally perverting the same, making the bad good and the good bad, it has destroyed the very nature of Morals. The Ego feeling deeply its own inner scission and contradiction, will cast about for unity and reconciliation; it must, if it be Ego, return out of this separative stage to that of restoration.

Accordingly, the Judge will now appear with his law, testing and adjudicating the two sides, he will command that an end be made to the two tyrannies, the tyranny of the Deed over the Motive, and the tyranny of the Motive over the Deed. He will review the entire process of this second stage in its three phases, which are first the Deed determining the Motive, secondly the separation and conflict between Deed and Motive, third the Motive determining the Deed. The result will appear in a restored harmony between the contestants and a new assertion of the moral order.

III. In general the logical principle becomes

manifest that if one wills what is universal, the particular cannot be excluded; otherwise what he has willed is not universal. If I will the good of all and except my own good, I do not will the good of all as I too belong to the totality. You seek to make happy many particular people, but your particular self has some right to the gift even though you are the giver.

The moral Ego is, therefore, to move out of its second or separative stage into harmony, in which the preceding conflict of the Motive with the Deed and with itself finds its solution.

1. The individual doing the universal Deed, which brings happiness, advantage, freedom to others, has a right to his personal happiness, advantage, freedom, along with these others. His benevolence, while broad enough to include many or all in its sphere, must not be so narrow as to exclude himself. In doing the heroic act, let the hero have his personal end; if you perform a public service, take your private satisfaction without scruple. Fame, "the last infirmity of noble minds," is not an infirmity if coupled with noble actions. You still have a right to your own, though you give to your neighbor; even though you give him all, you still have a right to the pleasure of giving.

The Motive in the present sphere has three stages which form its process and indicate its gradations. The Ego, grounding the Motive, may

will in the act simply its own self and selfish aim, disregarding the other — Egoism; then it may will in the act the other self wholly, disregarding its own self — Altruism; finally it may unite the two sides into one complete process of itself. In this last stage the particular and the universal elements previously disunited and in conflict are united in the harmony of a complete movement of the Ego, which is the Psychosis. That is, the Motive, determining the Deed as universal, must be in itself the total process of the Ego, for the universal Deed (as already set forth) must contain in itself this process, which was called the complete cycle of the Deed.

Such is, then, harmony of the Motive after its disruption, in general the restored unity of the universal and the particular, not, however, as a dead result, but as the living process of the Ego. But this inner harmony can be disturbed by a new discord or separation, that between the Motive and the Deed, wherein a new movement out of separation towards unity takes place.

2. We have seen the Motive not only asserting its right against the Deed in case of a conflict between them, but even making the bad Deed good and the good Deed bad. Thus, however, it has undermined the Deed as a moral manifestation of the Ego, and just therein also undermined itself, for the very meaning of Motive is what moves to action, its function is to

translate itself into the Deed. Unless the Motive can clothe itself in reality, it is really nothing. Its essence is eliminated when it is reduced to a mere subjective state of the Ego, since its essence is to move, to determine something in accord with itself. The Will, in being purely a Motive and making the Deed an accident or mere appearance, has undone itself. The result is we come back to a new assertion of the validity of the Deed; the Motive must utter itself in the Deed, and the Deed must manifest itself in the Motive. Their separation and antagonism must cease and the hostile camps must unite in a common principle; the Deed must tell the Motive, and the Motive the Deed; the right of each must be respected and harmonized.

The man who does the good Deed will, in the natural order of things, be allowed to have a good Motive. To make a good Deed bad by impugning the Motive without adequate evidence, becomes itself an immoral act, which undermines the very basis of morality. Similar is the case of making the bad Deed good. Thus we limit the absolute power of the moral Ego, which runs the danger of all absolute power, the danger of getting tyrannical. But, on the other side, having restored its sphere of authority to the Deed, we must not let it break over its just limit and become tyrannical in its turn. We have to recognize that a malevolent Motive may bring

forth a beneficent Deed, which, however, does not change the Motive, nor the moral character of the doer. All willful wickedness is doubtless overruled finally in the providential order. The Devil himself is the embodiment of malice, yet he is a part of the divine plan. Mephistopheles (in Goethe's poem) who knew himself very well, defines himself as "willing the bad yet working the good," of course in the long, long run of centuries or of myriads of æons.

We cannot, therefore, grant to the Deed the absolute power of determining the moral worth of the Motive, just as little as we can grant to the Motive the absolute power of determining the moral worth of the Deed. Yet we do grant a limited power in each case. Both sides, however, are stages of one process which is their harmony. Still the particular case is not always determinable, be it Motive or Deed, so a new process with a new harmony comes in and brings about a final unity; this is the process of the totality.

3. Not the single Deed alone, but the totality of single Deeds called life we must now consider; not the single Motive alone, but the totality of Motives called character we must likewise consider. If a man's life is made up of worthy actions, we must hold the man to be worthy; if his life is the reverse of worthy, our judgment corresponds. The totality of external perform-

ance must show what is internal. A man always doing good Deeds with bad Motives is an impossible man, for man as Will has to realize his inner Self in the totality of life; certainly there is no real difference between him and a good man.

Thus the total circuit of Deeds determines the man, and we also say that the total circuit of Motives determines the man; the two sides will be harmonious, the exceptions in particular cases will be smoothed out in the universal rule. A person with a good Motive may call forth a bad result once, but next time or the next dozen times the Deed will correspond to the Motive. The good Will becomes habitual, and the result must be the good life.

In this third stage, accordingly, we have reached the three harmonies of the Motive with the Deed as universal, after their deep scission and conflict. First is the harmony of the Motive within itself, the unifying process of its particular and its universal elements; second is the harmony of the Motive and the Deed after much diversified strife; third is the harmony of the totality of Deeds called life and of the totality of Motives, which, becoming habit, form what is usually called character.

The moral Ego, passing through many phases on its way, has finally reached the universal Deed. The individual is to transform all the

actions of his life into means for attaining the Ideal End, which is thus the grand Motive underlying the totality of his conduct. But to reach this End, to do the universal Deed, the Ego has discovered that it must know wherein this consists, it must have some insight into the nature of the object pursued. What is the Ego to will as its universal principle which is going to moralize the entire life? Such is the question which calls forth the next section.

Still it is the Ego which is to know, to will and to choose this universal End; thus the latter is mine and hence particular also. That is, this sphere has in it the dualism indicated by the foregoing terms; I who am a particular Ego with particular ends, am to know and to state what is the universal End. How am I to find out which End is the particular and which the universal? The moral Ego is now seeking to recognize and to formulate its fundamental principle as the End to be attained.

Summary of the Deed and Motive. The universal Deed can be done by the Ego only through willing the Will of the other Ego or Egos. I knowing myself, know the neighbor to be what I am, and must act in accord with this knowledge. I am not merely *to know* the universal, but *to do* the universal and realize the same in my conduct. The judge must finally ask: Hast thou, in this act, willed Free Will?

Or, what has been thy Motive? Has it always had the Universal or Ideal End?

The result will be a process between the Motive (the inner, the Universal as such) and the Deed (the outer, the side of reality). The two elements of the Universal Deed, namely, the Universal and the Deed, thus show a process with each other.

I. There is first the immediate unity of the two elements, the Motive and the Deed — of the Ego within and its outer act. The person moves here in the realm of prescriptive morality — he wills the Free Will of others without breach, without question or doubt. Yet here is a process too — the processs of prescription.

1. The unreflective doing of the Universal Deed shows the primordial paradisaical harmony with the law — Motive and Deed are unconsciously one.

2. But by acting in a world of externality, the Ego finds that the Deed does not always correspond to the Motive. Thus the separation takes place of which the Ego has the experience and becomes conscious, through the discipline of failure.

3. So the Ego is aware of its Motive as distinct from and in fact opposite to its Deed. It returns into itself on the one side and on the other side it holds off the Deed.

II. Therewith begins the conflict between the

sides, each asserting itself as the determining principle of the moral action. Which is the true ethical determinant, the Motive or the Deed? Here again is the process.

1. The Deed insists at first upon being such a determinant; if my Deed is good, my Motive is good and vice versa; the outer must correspond to the inner and show the same. The world judges me by my Deed, and has nothing else by which to judge. The Right of the Deed is this, which, however, may become the Tyranny of the Deed, crushing or ignoring the Motive.

2. But the Motive now rises on its side and asserts itself as having also a Right. It is the Ego, the self-determined principle within, and is not to be suppressed. So there rises between the Motive and Deed a struggle for supremacy. Such is the present stage of scission and contradiction which may be seen in the following three forms of separation between Motive and Deed.

(1) Deed may be good, but Motive bad.

(2) Deed may be bad, but Motive good.

(3) Motive may be both good and bad (universal and particular).

Thus the disruption is complete, even the Motive (the Ego) dividing itself into two opposing camps.

3. Still the Ego is one, and returns to itself out of its own self-separation and asserts itself. So the Motive (the Ego's side) gets the upper

hand and declares itself to be the absolute determinant of the moral action. Such is now the Right of the Motive, which in its turn becomes the Tyranny of the Motive.

(1) It makes the bad Deed good.

(2) It makes the good Deed bad.

(3) It has therein undone itself as the moral determinant since it has upset morality.

The result is that the Ego must return to the Deed and rescue it from the destroying activity of the Motive, bringing the two Tyrannies (of Deed and of Motive) as well as their conflict, to an end in reconciliation.

III. The Deed and the Motive are to be harmonized as two phases of the complete moral process; the one is not to suppress or tyrannize over the other. In the universal Deed both sides must be present. But of this harmonization we may note three stages.

1. The harmony of the Motive with itself, after its separation into the universal and particular elements of itself — both these elements being allowed in the moral Deed by the judge.

2. The harmony between the Deed and the Motive; in general, the Deed is to express the Motive; still there are exceptions to this rule, and so a note of discord is heard again. But this disappears in what follows.

3. The harmony of the totality of Deeds (conduct) with the totality of Motives (character).

Thus each side has become universal or a totality, and both harmonize therein; the total man as Deed (the circuit of his Deeds) is one with the total man as Motive (the circuit of his Motives). The Ego always willing Free Will as its universal Motive, must have as its result the universal Deed.

We have now brought to a conclusion the present section, which we have called the *Moral Will and its Deed.* The stress is placed upon the Deed, in which the Ideal End is implicit. Still this Ideal End has often been mentioned in the preceding discussion, for the purpose of explanation. The moral nature of the Deed cannot be understood without taking into account this its ultimate End, which is what constitutes its morality. The Deed is not the Word, but may be supposed to contain implicitly the Word, which must become explicit when the Deed gives an account of itself.

Still, the content of the Ideal End has been already set forth in the Psychological Will, whose highest result was the self-determined Free Will. This is what the Moral Will is to realize in conduct.

The Ego (in the foregoing account) has found that there is a Universal or Ideal End in the Deed, or that the latter has at bottom but one total Motive. What is this one Motive or Ideal End? Such is the problem now before the Moral Ego.

SECOND SECTION — THE MORAL WILL AND ITS END.

We might designate this caption as *The Moral Will and its Ends*, making the latter plural, since now the stress is upon particularity, separation, multiplicity. We shall find the Ends to be many, though each claims to be the one ultimate End, and the true basis for morality. This multiplicity of Ends is characteristic of the second stage of the Psychosis, which, however, is to work itself over into unity. Under all these particular, finite Ends is the one universal or absolute End secretly laboring to bring itself forth into utterance and thereby to become explicit.

In the previous section our attention was turned to the Deed in which the End was implicit, unseparated, unexpressed by itself, or its expression was in the form of action. Now we are going to try to separate this End from its wrappage in the Deed, to look at it and to utter it in language. Thus it becomes explicit, conscious, being the second stage of the Ego. Hitherto there has been the immediate presence of

the Deed, in which we have found the Ego lurking as Intention and as Motive. But in the universal Deed the Ego found itself to be that which gave universality to the Deed; it came to know itself as universal, as its own process, in the realm of action. It grew aware of having the universal or ideal End within itself; so it knew itself as responsible in thinking and willing the Deed. The Ego, therefore, holds itself to accountability for the universal nature of its action; if I steal from my neighbor, I must know and stand for the complete circuit of my act. Still further, my life is composed of a series of such actions, for which I, as universal or as the total process of the Ego, am responsible; I become aware that all my Deeds must be universal, or I am to blame.

Thus the Ego has gotten conscious that it must have an universal End in moral conduct. Its next question is, What is that End? In what terms can it be stated? Can I formulate the idea which is to moralize all my actions? In the universal Deed the Ego may act instinctively and be moral without reflection; still the time comes when it asks for the principle which underlies this instinctive morality. Language is the expression of what is universal to the spirit, so when a universal principle dawns in the mind, it seeks to be expressed in language, and not simply in action, whose form is particular. Thus

we have now to pass from the Deed to the Word; from the latter again we return to the Deed, laden with the idea or the universal principle of moral action.

I, therefore, this particular person, with my own personal or particular ends, know myself as having an universal End, which I am to realize in my conduct. All my personal ends are to become filled with the great universal End, which thus moralizes my entire life. Moreover, this universal End I am to endow with a voice and to utter the same, which is to endow it with a form which is universal, that of language. Hence rises a new struggle of many gradations of success, the struggle for the adequate expression of such an End.

This principle, becoming explicit and utterable, is often called the Good, the great ultimate End "at which all things aim." It is regarded as that which is supremely desirable, the excellent above every terrestrial object, and as that which makes excellent, being the transforming power of all finite, particular activity in the daily life of men, so that this life in its petty details becomes filled with the one grand content, with this universal End, which is thus always in the process of realization. The Good, however, has a number of significations, there are several grades of it, one of which, called the *summum bonum*, will be spoken of later on.

Still we must see the limitation of the present sphere. The Ego is a particular person, with his own particular ends, motives, desires, ambitions — in fine an Ego containing whole universe of particularity, any phase of which may rise and assert itself against the universal End. But the Ego knows already that this is the End which is to be willed and which is to transform all particular, finite ends; this knowledge, too, is what makes the Ego responsible. And yet it is this particular Ego which is to know, will and choose the universal End, which End is thus a determination of its own; the Ego subjectively determines and formulates what such an End shall be. Hence, the Ego, knowing itself as the determinant of the universal End in the present sphere, will determine it to be some particular form of itself. Here, then, lies the difficulty and the dualism which we shall now encounter. The Ego, in seeking to find and to state the universal End, makes the latter particular, usually some determination of itself. When I say the universal End to be Happiness, for instance, that is a particular phase of my Ego, which I through myself make universal. But another person may take a determination of his Ego different from mine, and designate that as the universal End — let it be Benevolence.

In the present sphere, therefore, we shall have a complete working over of the moral Ego in its

attempt to formulate what constitutes morality. Many kinds of particular ends will be taken and set up as the universal End; but they will all have a common difficulty. The object is to obtain a Theory of Morals which is founded on a single general principle; yet this principle is the Ego's own determination, or the Ego as particular asserts itself to be universal. Of course the great inner movement in the history of moral speculation is the overcoming of this dualism, which, however, does not take place in the present sphere of the Moral Will and its End. Still the search is kept up, and the result will be a process which will reveal the Psychosis. Its stages we shall designate briefly.

In the present sphere, therefore, the pivotal thought is that the End as real and particular has become explicit, but as ideal and universal it remains implicit. Ideally I am pursuing a universal End, really I am pursuing a particular End which I consciously express, though unconsciously lurks in this expression the implicit Ideal End.

When a man states the supreme object in life to be Pleasure, he means his particular Pleasure as distinct from that of other men, who can also follow their particular Pleasure. Still in the statement is implied the universal End, Pleasure, common to all men, which, however, is really each man's particular determination. My End

is stated to be your End, yet my Pleasure is certainly not your Pleasure. So each man may formally utter the universal End, yet he puts into it his own particular content, which is really his own, namely, Pleasure.

So we say of this sphere (The Moral Will and its End) that the particular End is explicit and real, while the universal End, though present, is implicit and ideal. This particular End or determinateness of the Ego (embracing implicitly the universal End) will be the central fact of the present sphere, and will show a movement which is the Psychosis.

The Ego determines the Ideal End to be one with its own particular End in three ways, forming a triple process:

I. The Ego determines the Ideal End to be one with its own particular End as determined from without, or as given to itself more or less externally — *Hedonism*.

In Hedonism the outer stimulant is always present, stimulating the organism through the senses, which stimulation, when desired to be lasting, is Pleasure, and is taken as one with the universal End.

II. The Ego determines the Ideal End to be one with its own particular End as determined from within, or as given internally — *Intuitionism*.

The determinant is now inner, indeed the Ego

itself, which takes its own particular determinateness from within as the universal End, and thus becomes the moral Imperative.

III. The Ego determines the Ideal End to be one with its own particular End as determining other Egos —*Benevolence* (which wills the good of others, and determines what is their good).

In Benevolence the determinant is still inner (as in Intuitionism), and is imperative, yet to this imperative Ego now comes an outer determinant, namely, another Ego, which moves the first Ego to its Benevolence, which is thus a process between two Egos, benevolent and recipient, and which unites the outer and inner determinants of the two preceding spheres, Hedonism and Intuitionism.

But the benevolent Ego finds just through the process of Benevolence that it cannot be the moral Imperative over another Ego, which, being also self-determined, must itself be a moral Imperative. Thus the Ego comes to see that it must recognize and will the other Ego as self-determined, or more fully as self-determined Free Will, taking the same as its End.

At this point, however, the Ego has made the universal End explicit; the latter is no longer implicit, contained in some form of the Ego's particularity. Hence the present sphere comes to its termination, having passed through its three stages, Hedonism, Intuitionism and Benev-

olence, whose processes are to be more fully set forth in the following exposition.

I. Hedonism..

The word is taken from the Greek, and its meaning suggests Pleasure as the principle; herein the suggestion is doubtless correct. Still the total sphere embraces a good deal that lies beyond immediate gratification, such as Happiness, or the Greatest Good of the Greatest Number. This total sphere, in accord with prevailing usage, we shall term Hedonism.

We have already found under Impulse and Desire that the Ego is induced to perform an act through an outside influence; or, the Ego is determined to be self-determined, which is a statement of the general principle of Determinism. But now in the moral sphere the Ego makes this Determinism of itself to be the universal End, which it is consciously to pursue and realize in conduct. Such is, in general, the standpoint of Hedonism, which is thus in its very origin strongly deterministic, wherein we see the reason its supporters are, on the whole, ardent determinists. Some form of my particular determinateness I am not only to will, but to think and express as the universal End, which is to moralize my whole life.

Still I must have, in the moral sphere, this universal End, which is, as already indicated,

the process of the Ego, or is the Self-determined. The very fact that I set up such an End implies my freedom. But this End in Hedonism has, as content, not itself, not its own free action, but some outside determination, and is thereby unfree. Say, I have as my universal End some pleasure of mine, let it be gain; gain, the making of money, transforms every act of my life, whereas the universal End ought to transform the making of money into a means which helps realize such universal End.

Here, then, lies the difficulty, the grand breach in Hedonism, which becomes manifest in the statement that the Ego takes the particular as determined from without, and subjects to the same what is universal. The special finite determinations of the Ego are not now transformed into the bringing forth the Ideal End, but the Ideal End is transformed into a means for bringing them forth. So is the cart put before the horse.

The universal rule of action is my particular pleasure, whatever I determine that to be. Of course there is no true universality in such a rule, it is my caprice. I follow my own determinateness, impulse, wish, pleasure, which, however, I assert as a universal principle.

Manifestly the form here is in deep contradiction with the content. There is the universal End, the Self-determined in form, but when I give to that End what it is to realize, or its con-

tent, I make it realize something directly opposite to it, I subordinate it to my particular End, and still further utter this subordination of the universal End as my principle of action.

But just this dualism of the Hedonistic view is what will tear it to pieces at last, and compel it to a higher position. Inasmuch as it sets up the Determined to be the Self-determined or the universal End, it implicitly contains and is even pursuing the latter. Explicitly it declares Pleasure to be the universal End, but such a declaration implies the underlying effort or search for the universal End. Thus the process of overcoming the dualism begins; the Ego finds out that what it has gotten is not what it was seeking for, that the thing attained does not correspond to the end pursued. In other words, the content, when stated and thought out, will always be found inadequate to the form, which it seeks to fill. Hence will follow a new and possibly better statement, which, however, will be vitiated by the same trouble in this sphere.

Hedonism will, accordingly, show a number of statements or formulations of its principle, which will reveal the process of the Ego in trying to get rid of the contradiction inherent in this sphere. Recollect that the Hedonistic Ego demands universality of End, must do so in order to be moral, but into such an End it puts its own particularity in some shape, and that too

as determined from without. Whatever from the outside can move the particular Will to take its own particular determination as the ideal or universal End, calls forth the principle of Hedonism. Something stimulates my organism which I wish to last forever — that is Pleasure. An external stimulant moves me to make such stimulation my supreme End, my highest Good — then I am Hedonistic.

Throughout the whole sphere of Hedonism will remain this element of Pleasure, though it will become more and more refined as it approaches nearer and nearer the Ideal End. But when the Ego completely conquers its own external determinant or its outer stimulation, then it has mastered Pleasure and is no longer Hedonistic.

The Ego, being by its very nature self-determined, will strive continuously to overcome this external determination of itself, which is involved in every form of Pleasure, lowest as well as highest. That is, the Ego, though it often takes and must take Pleasure as its finite End, will go on refusing to take it as its ultimate or Ideal End through all Hedonism.

The process of Hedonism will have the movement of the Ego, which is first determined by the stimulant immediately; then it separates from its stimulation, turns back and determines the same as different from itself; finally it de-

termines the stimulant (being an Ego) as one with itself. These are the three stages of the Psychosis of Hedonism which we may designate distinctively as follows:—

I. Pleasure in its immediate form, or organic Pleasure; the outer stimulant comes through the senses to the Ego, which yields to it and takes such stimulation as its universal End. The process of the organism, roused from the outside and intensified, perchance, determines the Ego externally, and the latter makes this determination of itself its universal End. Still this organic Pleasure will have its process with its negative, called Pain, and the Ego will be invoked to control the latter. This leads to the next stage.

II. Happiness, which is no longer Immediate Pleasure, but Reflective Pleasure, mediated by the Ego. That is, the outer stimulant still stimulates the Ego, but stimulates it to turn back and control its own outer stimulant. This control of the Ego over its stimulant will pass through three stages, expressing the quantity, quality, and duration of the stimulant.

In Happiness, therefore, the Ego keeps asserting more and more strongly its freedom, reacting against its determination from without, and seeking its determination from within, and affirming the latter as the universal End.

The Ego in the sphere of Happiness having determined its determinant as something sepa-

rated from and opposite to itself, comes to know itself (or Ego) as the determinant (or stimulant). Consequently when the other Ego appears, I do not determine it as something different from myself, but recognize it to be the same as myself, to be Ego. This brings us to the third stage.

III. Utilitarianism; the greatest Happiness of the greatest Number is taken as the universal End. Herein lies the return to unity: the other Ego (or Egos) is now the external determinant, still my Ego does not determine it (as in Happiness), but regards it as one with itself. The latter seeks a kind of universal Pleasure, granting its boon to all or to the greatest number of Egos. Still there is the outer stimulant of Pleasure: It is my Pleasure to will the greatest Happiness of the greatest Number.

Utilitarianism, though it starts with unity and harmony, will also have its process, passing from agreement among "the greatest number of Egos" to difference and then back to a final unity, which, however, means the complete elimination of Pleasure as the universal End. Therewith we reach the conclusion of Hedonism.

The Ego, having completely triumphed over the external determination given to it in every form of Pleasure, will next take its own inner determination through itself as the universal End. Thus we make the transition out of

Hedonism into Intuitionism. Still it must not be forgotten that in Intuitionism also the particular determination of the Ego is taken by the latter as the universal End, which is, therefore, not yet explicit in consciousness.

At present we shall proceed to unfold the various stages of Hedonism, which doctrine has played such an important part in the History of Ethics both in ancient and modern times, and may be called the primary movement of the moral Ego.

I. When my Pleasure, or that which gives me Pleasure, is declared to be my great object in life, there is usually meant the affection of my organism which goes by the name of pleasant. My body is a vital process, and when this process takes place unimpeded and quickened, the result is physical Pleasure, which becomes a determinant of my psychical condition, of my Ego. Then the Ego, being pleasurably determined by nature as it were, sets up this determination of itself from the outside as its supreme content of Will.

Doubtless the origin of such a view comes from the fact that most men must be chiefly employed in satisfying their wants, in making a living. We all have to eat, drink, be clothed and sheltered; such is the demand of physical existence merely, while physical comfort demands still more. So there is a sphere in which

man has as his end the gratification of his appetites, desires, impulses. To a certain extent he has to be egoistic in order to be at all.

But Pleasure, just this organic Pleasure, will have its process and will seek to transcend itself as immediate. It will run upon Pain, its opposite, even in the hot pursuit of itself, and will therein finds its limit.

1. The natural gratification of nature's demands gives Pleasure, as the healthy unfettered movement of the organism. But this Pleasure now becomes the End which the Ego pursues, yea the universal End; so the requirement must be the greatest amount of Pleasure of the moment. Though each moment be different, having a different determinant, still I am to follow this determinant, be it impulse, wish, or caprice. The appetite now uppermost is to be indulged as the pleasure-giving element; eat, drink, and be merry now, and let to-morrow take care of itself. The passion is not in the present case a mere passing desire, but it is the End, universal, it is passion elevated into a doctrine, which I think and utter as my grand object in living.

My reason, or my universal principle, is herein subjected to appetite, to the animal element of my nature, and is transformed into a means of realizing my animality instead of being the End itself to be realized. This is the extreme Hedo-

nistic standpoint of Hume, who says (in his treatise on Human Nature) that "Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions," administering to their supremacy and not seeking to subordinate them to itself or to transform them according to its purpose and pattern. The world-poets have all treated this theme, each in his own peculiar manner. Goethe portrays such a world, in which Reason is the slave of the passions, in his *Witches' Kitchen* (see first part of *Faust*). Dante has shown the same in his monsters of the Inferno, which are commingled animal shapes, yet endowed with human intelligence which they have used in the service of their passions. Homer brings before us a Calypso and a Circe and also a Polyphemus in a similar vein. All these poets, however, shadow forth such a world as the absolutely perverted one, and its inhabitants as monstrosities from the human point of view.

2. But Pleasure when gratified ceases, its fulfillment is its undoing. No sooner is the want satisfied and the Pleasure reached than the limit is also reached; the Ego is by its very nature (as limit-transcending) dissatisfied with the limit or will be shortly. Thus the very attainment of satisfaction is the beginning and source of dissatisfaction. So we become displeased with Pleasure, which, as an End, refuses to be universal, or to persist for any length of time.

It has often been remarked that the way to catch Pleasure is not to pursue it. We are to pursue some other End, best of all the Ideal End, and Pleasure will fall in by the way.

The greatest pleasure-loving city on the planet is probably Paris; the world goes to Paris for Pleasure. Still, the expression most commonly heard on its streets from pleasure-seekers is *Je m'ennuie;* one hears it when nothing else can be heard, at theaters, at cafés, at balls. The gratification of the outer want only sends us to the deeper inner want which is still left unsatisfied.

But our principle at present is Pleasure, and we must have the greatest amount of it, as it is the grand object, the Good. The result of having such an end is that we push gratification beyonds its limit, and it lands us into the opposite of Pleasure, namely Pain. To eat may be pleasant, but the surfeit is painful. The organism itself protests through Pain against Pleasure as the universal End, calling up in its process the negative element to Pleasure.

Thus a new principle enters, we are to curtail Pleasure at the point where Pain starts. The greatest amount of Pleasure of the moment has its limit in the avoidance of Pain. So it happens that our immediate Pleasure pursued as the universal End, calls up within itself its own opposite just in the organism which is its chosen arena.

3. Out of Pain, then, we return to Pleasure with a new experience which gives what may be called the process of Pleasure. This does not remain in its immediate form of seeking the greatest sum of gratification for the moment, but takes into account the avoidance of the sequent Pain which comes from excess, from breaking over the particular limit inherent in Pleasure. Thus the End has become not mere Pleasure or immediate gratification, but Pleasure in a process with its own opposite or negative — Pleasure limited by shunning Pain.

It is manifest that the Ego when it now pursues Pleasure, puts a limit upon the same, and therein determines Pleasure. Plainly the Ego is beginning to assert itself as End, it refuses to be determined wholly from without and to yield to that external stimulus which is simply pleasant. It declines to suffer the consequences of the greatest amount of Pleasure of the moment and so turns to regard the total process of Pleasure, which also involves the avoidance of Pain. But therewith the Ego has started to determine Pleasure, so we enter a new field of Hedonism, passing beyond the sphere of Pleasure proper which has hitherto held sway over the Ego.

II. The second stage of Hedonism is what may be, in general, termed Happiness or Endæmonism. Pleasure still remains the substrate, the thing given; but the Ego directs, determines,

limits it in many ways. In fact, Happiness will be found to be a process, else the Ego would not be happy in Happiness, nay, this process contains a struggle of the Ego to master Pleasure as such, as an outward determining principle which insists upon controlling the Ego.

Happiness is, therefore, the universal End at present; this End demands most distinctively that I include Time. Not the greatest Pleasure, but the greatest persistent Pleasure is the requirement; already in the preceding stage of Hedonism we have seen that the Pleasure of one moment is not to be followed by the Pain of another moment, especially if the Pain is greater and more prolonged than the Pleasure. So the Ego, looking out in advance upon sequent effects, calculates and determines the quantity, quality, and duration of the Pleasure, so that it may become Happiness.

Happiness is, accordingly, Reflective Pleasure, calculated by the Ego. Here enters the strong mathematical element, so marked in Hedonism; the determinant being external and impinging on its object, has a mechanical character and is hence measurable, to a degree. So the quantity of Pleasure is first considered by the Ego.

1. Happiness has to calculate the greatest amount of Pleasure which is lasting, without the counterstroke of Pain. The largest quantity of Happiness continuous through all moments is

my primal object in the present sphere. To be sure, I may have to diminish the amount at one moment to avoid Pain at another. Thus I seek a permanent quantitative Pleasure, and I adjust the volume and the intensity of it according to the totality. It is to be observed here that the Ego is the one who makes the adjustment and does the measuring; the Ego manifestly is determining according to its own End the given Pleasure, diminishing or increasing the quantity by a standard of its own.

Hedonists have often sought to make a kind of calculus of Pleasures; the latter can be compared in amount, and this comparison is capable of a numerical statement; two or more Pleasures can be added together and their size made equal to one big Pleasure. The ground of such mathematical relations is that an external force is producing an effect which is proportionate to the force, and this effect is held to be Pleasure, and so suggests measurement.

Such is the first control of the Ego over unmeasured Pleasure — the quantitative, measured control, important yet by no means final. Note that some Pleasures are more intense than others, and so of a different kind. Even the quantity I must make of a certain quality; I have already put a limit upon Pleasure and made it equable; moreover I find the quantity of some Pleasures, being greater or less, changes their nature, their quality.

2. Thus quantity always projects its counterpart, quality. The keenest delight, by a quantitative excess, goes over into a qualitative disgust. Quantity of Pleasure easily becomes its own enemy. So we have also the quality of Pleasure insisting upon consideration; we demand not only the greatest amount but also the highest kind of Pleasure. Thus a new criterion enters: What constitutes the highest kind? Often two classes are mentioned in contrast, Pleasures of body and Pleasures of mind.

One of the most famous of British Hedonists, J. S. Mill, in an oft-cited passage (*Utilitarianism*, C. 2) puts the following stress upon the quality of Pleasure: "It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them satisfied. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." Here the distinction implied is that between Pleasures of body and of mind. Any quantity of the former is no equivalent for the quality of the latter.

But this mental quality of Pleasure is that of the Ego itself, evidently its own pleasurable activity. Thus the Ego has not only limited the quantity of Pleasure, but has determined the kind thereof, and furthermore has determined the highest kind to be its own Pleasure. So there comes into view, not the greatest amount, but

the most perfect kind, of Pleasure, as the universal End. The Ego, therefore, determines the quality of Pleasure, and grades it as high or low, according to its approach toward the self-determined process of mind. But even the highest quality must have some amount to be at all; so we return to the quantitative.

3. This return, however, is the complete process of the present sphere, which we have called Happiness or Pleasure determined by the Ego from within. For the Ego has determined both quantity and the quality, and now it determines these in the process which is its own, and which has become the universal End. This process is involved in the statement: the greatest amount of the most perfect Pleasure at all moments for my Ego. It is manifest that the Ego has herein determined for itself the three elements of Pleasure — quantity, quality, and duration; furthermore it has united them in its own process, and made the same its universal End.

The outcome of the pursuit of Happiness is supremely Egoistic, more so than the pursuit of Pleasure, since Happiness involves the Ego determining all for its own end. Pleasure is the immediate determination of the organism through nature; Happiness is the determination of Pleasure itself through the Ego for its own sake. Such is the culmination of the Ego in the present sphere; through being the universal End of its

particular self, it has become aware of its inner dualism, which we may call its state of supreme selfishness.

Accordingly, the Ego will proceed to overcome this dualism by including other Egos, or by the attempt to make itself as Ego universal. We have already found that in the stage of Pleasure it universalized time and sought to make Pleasure not momentary but enduring; while in Happiness it took charge of all the elements of Pleasure and determined them through itself, putting them into its process. But now it returns to itself previously left out and universalizes itself as Ego and puts itself into the process of Pleasure, not simply as this particular Ego but as all other Egos or the greatest number of them. This is a new stage of Hedonism, undoubtedly the highest.

Looking back at Happiness we observe that the Ego has strongly asserted itself as the determiner of its own external stimulant of Pleasure, determining it outwardly in quantity, determining it inwardly in quality by referring it to itself (the Ego), determining it universally in time by making it enduring. The Ego thus controls Pleasure, still to the end of Pleasure, not letting the latter undo itself. At the same time the Ego emphatically asserts itself, so that Happiness is more Egoistic, more selfish than simple organic Pleasure.

Self then controls the determinant, but what if that determinant be another Ego? Logically if Self assert itself absolutely as the controller of Pleasure, then this other Self must be recognized as the controller of its Pleasure. Consequently when this other Ego appears as pleasure-controller, I cannot subject it or determine it as something different from myself (which is my principle in Happiness), but I must give it validity as having the same essence as myself. Thus through the other Ego I come to recognize and to affirm my end as Pleasure to be universal, the end of all Egos.

Now, the happy Ego must advance out of its own selfishness, and in principle must not disturb but must forward the happiness of other Egos — the greatest happiness of the greatest number of them. So we reach Utilitarianism.

III. Utilitarianism is the name usually applied to the present form of the moral consciousness, though the propriety of the name has been questioned. Its leading principle has become almost proverbial in the maxim: The greatest happiness (or good) of the greatest number. We read that recent Utilitarianism is getting shy of this maxim, which can only mean that it is getting shy of itself. Certainly it is rapidly developing out of itself, for it too is in the process and is itself a process.

But the pivotal point is reached in the fact

that the Ego has now included in its universal End other Egos, "the greatest number" of them, if not quite all. Thus it has made the attempt to universalize itself, not, however, with absolute success. The End is still Happiness, the greatest too, which evidently means the greatest quantity of the highest quality of Pleasure through the longest time, not now for my Ego alone, but for the greatest number of Egos.

Very important is this step, as the conception of society or even of humanity begins to work in the particular Ego, which now wills that other Egos be free to do what it does; they can have Happiness as their End and can follow their own determinations in the form of desire, ambition, caprice. Utilitarianism thus asserts the freedom of the individual as universal, as the law, and as that which is to be embodied in the law. The legislative activity of Bentham and other Utilitarians sprang from their doctrine applied to existing jurisprudence.

The outcome, however, of Utilitarianism is the so-called *laissez-faire* in morals, economics, and politics. Let the individual alone, suffer him to follow his inclination as long as he does not conflict with others in the same pursuit. I must not determine him to any conduct even for his Happiness, I must permit him to do as he pleases as long as he permits others to do likewise. This form of individual freedom has its

right; in asserting and legislating for this right the services of Utilitarianism have been great. Political economy has also been benefited by the movement of Utilitarians, most of whom have shown an economical bent in their theorizing. Still its fundamental thought has been ethical, furnishing the groundwork for its practical endeavor.

Utilitarianism has been a movement, it has gone through its stages, which have been at bottom the stages of the Ego itself in its process. This we may now look at.

1. The first and most immediate form of Utilitarianism may be called the Egoistic, as the Ego finds its own greatest Happiness in willing the greatest Happiness of other Egos. There is as yet no scission between pursuing its own particular End and the universal End, as Happiness. This is naive Utilitarianism, unconscious of the coming breach; it is not Egoistic Hedonism (as designated by Sidgwick), in which the Ego has Pleasure for its End, without regard to other Egos, but Egoistic Utilitarianism.

The separation, however, which is inherent in the present stage, soon makes itself manifest. I will the greatest happiness of other Egos, and I determine in what that Happiness consists. But the others do the same thing; each wills the greatest Happiness of other Egos, including me,

and determines in what that Happiness consists. Now if all these Egos agree not only in willing the general object, which is the greatest Happiness of the greatest number, but also agree in the particular thing which realizes that Happiness at a given time, then certainly the greatest Happiness principle is a reality. But suppose they disagree not in the universal End but in its special application? At once a new phase comes to view.

2. This is the sphere of division, separation, conflict, and the greatest Happiness of many particular Egos is all broken up into a mass of struggling individuals. Still each may will the greatest Happiness of the greatest number, but may differ from every other individual about the manner of realizing that Happiness. After all, each Ego insists upon the determination of the matter, and thus falls into a conflict with another or with others, who also may insist with the same right upon their determination of the matter. So it comes that, though each particular Ego wills the greatest Happiness of the greatest number, his particular End seems to get the advantage of the universal End and to use it as a means. If a name is needed for this manifestation of the present sphere, we may call it particularistic Utilitarianism.

But this is not the end of the split; the maxim itself seems to go to pieces. The great Happi-

ness of a few people can be summed, and the small Happiness of many people can also be summed; in case the two sums are equal, which side is to have the preference? Is the quantity of Happiness to be the test or the quantity of Egos? In the case of trouble, are we to choose the greatest Happiness of the lesser number or the lesser Happiness of the greater number? Six men of a community want a public road made by the public through their landed possessions for their own advantage; their sum of Happiness at having such a road will be greater than the sum of Happiness in the community at not having the road made. Generally, the community is indifferent, but the particular Ego is alert and buoyant, overflowing with Happiness too often at others' expense.

Our principle, then, the greatest Happiness of the greatest number, has become disrupted within and is in a conflict with itself. If we say that Happiness is the universal End, then the greatest Happiness is to be realized, though it be confined to a few or even to one man; all society, all humanity is to will the one man's Happiness if it be greater than the sum total of others' Happiness. But what has now become of the Happiness of the other Egos which the Utilitarian in his definition included in his principle? Clearly it has denied itself, and so we must go back and take as End the

quantity of Egos, even if their sum of Happiness be less. Thus, however, the greatest Happiness as quantitative or even as qualitative is no longer the universal End, and the maxim no longer holds.

Thus Utilitarianism as universal End goes over into particularism in its attempt to subsume the Ego. The Ego at last uses the universal End for its own particular purpose, though it may claim and believe that it is seeking all the while the greatest Happiness of the greatest number. Happiness is indeed something very personal and particular; as universal End it is a soulless abstraction, which the Ego is strongly inclined to make soulful and concrete by putting its own particular self with its interests and ends into such an abstraction.

Still the Ego knows what it has done, knows that its particular selfish End is not the universal altruistic End. Utilitarianism will make one more effort to recover its principle, it will return to the first stage and demand the unity between the particular Ego and the universal End. This is still Happiness, yet not of the greatest number but of all human beings, yea of all sentient creatures. Such is Happiness universalized, to which the particular Ego is now to subordinate itself through thought and will.

3. This has been called universalistic Hedonism by Sidgwick who is its chief supporter.

The former maxim of Utilitarianism, the greatest Happiness of the greatest number, has vanished into the background, and instead of it the declaration is heard that each man is to seek the Happiness (or the Pleasure) of all men. The universal End is to dominate the individual in his special interests, ends, desires. This is the "universalistic" side of the present doctrine, and it looks at the first glance as if the individual was to give up his special Happiness for the general Happiness.

But no such thing is meant; if it were, Hedonism would have reached its conclusion. On the contrary, Pleasure is still considered the great object, the only thing which is in itself desirable, and we are to choose the greatest attainable Pleasure. Of course, each particular Ego is to determine this Pleasure for itself, which is its own special End. Thus the old dualism makes its appearance.

Still the universalistic Hedonist says that the Happiness of others is to be taken into account, is to be regarded as of equal validity with our own. We are to recognize the other in his Pleasures, nevertheless we are to pursue our own. Thus two Ends are acknowledged, the universal and the particular one, and are acknowledged to be of equal right, even in their mutual opposition. Herein the dualism inherent in all Hedonism has become explicit, has

worked itself out to consciousness and recognition. The words put together in the term "universalistic Hedonism," suggest just this inner twofoldness and contradiction.

The latest and most important representative of this stage of Utilitarianism, Professor Sidgwick, seems to acknowledge this dualism in his principle, deeming that the science of morality winds up in "an ultimate and fundamental contradiction," and that we shall have "to abandon the idea of rationalizing it completely." It is true that the Professor speaks with the greatest caution, guarding his words with so much care that his meaning, to us, at least, gets obscure (see last few pages of his work *The Methods of Ethics*, Fifth ed.). Still such an opinion is consistent with what he says elsewhere in the same work (p. 222) that "there are several ultimate ends of action." This sounds to most thinkers like the statement that there are several universes, several absolutes, several Gods, each being as ultimate as the other. But what now has become of our principle, Universal Happiness, supposed to be ultimate, and, as it says, universal?

Thus Utilitarianism, in fact all Hedonism, has brought to light its inherent dualism, has acknowledged the same, and has at the same time questioned the possibility of there being any science of Morals. With such a result it has

apparently brought itself to a conclusion, having unconsciously ripped itself in twain by a kind of hari kari.

We have had little to say of the so-called evolutionary Ethics, since its expounders seem to range through the various stages of Hedonism, as above set forth. In regard to their method, it is derived confessedly from Physical Science, and externally applied to the moral movement of the Ego. The result is a continuous discord between their procedure and the matter to be ordered, or between form and content. The evolution is, accordingly, a forced one, in which the tyranny of the ready-made system flings the free activity of the moral spirit into a prison-house of alien categories. Right, Conscience, Obligation, terms which the human race has elaborated to utter its moral nature, are tortured and whipped into line with a remorselessness which often makes the reader intercede for mercy.

Yet we believe in evolution. It must be, however, spiritual evolution, that of Ego itself unfolding into its moral heritage. Every page of this book is a witness for evolution — not the best witness possibly, still a witness. The old metaphysical morality, with its cut-and-dried distinctions and definitions brought in anywhere without inner connection, must be supplanted by the living, soulful, genetic process of the moral

Ego. Evolutionary Ethics have done good by demanding evolution in the moral sphere, but this evolution must be an inner, not an outer, must be an evolution not of physical organisms applied to the spirit but of the spirit itself.

That the evolutionist is likely to be Hedonistic may be noted in Mr. Spencer's celebrated formula of Justice: "Every man to be free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man." This statement is based upon the utilitarian doctrine *laissez-faire*. It is, accordingly, merely a negative definition of Justice. The truly just man, however, must be positive in his Justice, he must not merely refrain from infringing "the equal freedom of any other man," but he must will positively "the equal freedom of any other man," especially when it is assailed — he must will Free Will.

Looking back at the preceding movement, we see that Hedonism has run its course, and really has undone itself. It starts with Pleasure in which the outer stimulation coming to the yielding Ego is asserted to be the universal End. But the Ego, being inherently self-determined, seeks to put its own limits upon this external control of itself, which it must do for its Happiness. Finally it must seek not only its own Happiness, but also that of other Egos, indeed of all sentient beings; what this universal Hap-

piness is, the Ego must see and settle within its own mind, must internally determine for itself. The Ego is no longer determined from without, but determines from within.

That is, the external stimulant (or determinant) which we found dominating the Ego in Pleasure, has quite vanished into an internal determinant, which is some form of the Ego itself. From looking outward, the Ego has turned to looking within for its moral determinant. Not an outer organic sense, but an internal sense is declared to be the means for realizing the universal End in conduct. The universal element in "Universalistic Hedonism," is the controlling one, and is Intuitional more than Hedonistic.

This is, accordingly, the transitional stage to the next, which is explicitly Intuitionism, the nature of which is now to be briefly unfolded.

II. Intuitionism.

The moral Ego as intuitional takes some determination of itself (the Ego) from within as one with the universal End. As Hedonism springs from an outer sense, so Intuitionism springs from an inner sense, which is often called the Moral Sense or the Moral Sentiment.

Throughout Intuitionism the Ego has a particular determination of itself as the universal End,

which is also its own. That is, the Ideal End is implicitly one with the special determination of the Ego, now coming from within and not from without as in Hedonism. Accordingly in Intuitionism the Ego is the determined, yet also the determinant, both in one, both subjective. At first these two sides will be in immediate unity, but the process of Intuitionism will separate them and finally the Ego will assert this inner determinant of itself as the Moral Imperative.

Though Intuitionism gets rid of the dualism which we saw in Hedonism, by making the determination of the Ego wholly internal, still it will develop a dualism of its own, even deeper than that of Hedonism, lying within the Ego. The determined as the existent present state of the Ego and the determinant as its Ideal End, as that which it ought to be but is not, will reveal a chasm within, a separation which characterizes the present sphere. The struggle between my real self, determined as it is just now, and my ideal determinant, shows the twofoldness of the moral consciousness such as belongs here.

Hence the conception of Ought enters decidedly in Intuitionism, but in Hedonism it is mostly implicit, or is imported into that sphere from the outside. For the Ego being essentially determined by the external stimulant, and taking such stimulation as the universal End, has already its

pleasure, its satisfaction, and very naturally does not seek much after an Ought. Bentham, the most influential of modern Hedonists, was right from his point of view when he said that *Ought* ought to be abolished. Still there is a school called Ethical Hedonists who declare that Pleasure or Happiness ought to be pursued as the universal End. Such a statement, however, is a contradiction in terms.

The initial fact of Intuitionism lies in the view that the Ego knows the nature of an act, its rightness or wrongness, by intuition, by immediate insight. We are simply to look at the deed, square in the face, as it were, and its moral nature will appear to our vision. Man has this power or faculty of seeing or intuiting the moral element, which the deed on its side reveals.

It is manifest that such a view in the beginning at least, dispenses with the universal End. Every moral act is right or wrong according to its own inherent nature and not through any End outside of itself, not as it tends to produce Happiness, or Perfection, or Freedom. Still we shall find that it contains such an End implicitly and will develop the same into a form of statement. Intuitionism, in its most immediate phase, needs no doctrine of moral action, needs no reasoning or thinking about the deed, whose character it sees by direct insight. Plainly with such a view there can be no science of Morals which is the

attempt to express in some formulation the Ideal End which is to moralize man's life.

Intuitionism, however, is a formulation of the ultimate moral principle, and so is, at the very start, in a deep contradiction with itself. I am to act directly in view of the deed, according to my moral perception, without regarding the consequences, without any formulation of an universal End. Still just this statement is an universal End formulated. When I say I have no principle of guidance, I have expressed my principle. When Mirabeau said: "I have swallowed all formulas," that was his formula, and he made it the universal rule of his conduct. The intuitionist has expressed, unconsciously, the End which he is always seeking to realize, when he declares that he acts immediately from his moral sense, and still further when he declares that all moral action is of that kind. Thus in his denial he is affirming the universal End in spite of himself.

Here, then, in the second stage of the process of the moral Ego and its End we place Intuitionism, inasmuch as it is manifestly a reaction against Hedonism, which is the first stage. Hedonism affirmed the universal End to be Pleasure in some form; Intuitionism begins not only with denying Pleasure as the universal End, but with denying the universal End as such. Thus Intuitionism as a doctrine springs from a separation, being primarily negative to the

Hedonistic view. Though it asserts immediacy in moral action, such an assertion is a rebound, an opposition to the preceding stage, and so belongs to the second or separative stage of the present Psychosis.

Undoubtedly men often act from an intuitive perception of right and wrong. In fact prescription and habit tend to make the Ego immediate and intuitive, not needing reflection and doctrine. Already in the Deed we have seen the Ego acting in this way, without thinking or uttering the universal End as a conscious principle; finally in the universal Deed it was aware of such an End, yet did not assert it as a doctrine, still less did it proceed to deny it as a doctrine. Every moral act has an immediate element, an intuitive step; even Hedonism must at last be seen immediately by its follower.

Intuitionism is, therefore, not intuition, but is a statement, doctrine, utterance, that all moral conduct rests upon intuition as against the universal End; the Ego is to transform the particular action and build up the grand structure of moral life intuitively, whose architecture is instinctive like that of the little bee constructing its honeycomb. Thus however we are intuitive consciously and with design, not directly intuitive.

In Hedonism there is always an element of Pleasure, which signifies an external stimulus or

determinant of the Ego. But in Intuitionism such an external determinant is expressly denied; the Ego out of itself, without any external stimulus, sees and even determines for itself what is right and good in conduct, the deed is done not for the sake of the Pleasure or Happiness following it, but because the Ego determines it as the right thing to be done. Hence in Intuitionism the element of self-determination has the emphasis, and the intuitionists are mostly libertarians; on the other hand, in Hedonism the Ego is more or less determined from the outside, and so the Hedonist is naturally a determinist. The attitude toward Free Will is the fundamental test of every school of moralists.

Relying upon my immediate insight into the morality of an action, I proceed to moralize my life intuitively. First of all, I abjure Pleasure as my End; this negative attitude toward Hedonism is the starting-point of Intuitionism (though not of intuition). Furthermore I abjure the universal End as such, since that compels me to reflect, to think what it is, inasmuch as thought is itself the universal principle which grasps what is universal. And yet one has to think in the present sphere also in spite of himself, for to deny the universal End one has to think what it means. Such is the inherent dualism in the doctrine of Intuitionism.

If we look into the history of Moral Science we observe, in illustration of the foregoing statement, that Intuitionism usually appears with or soon after Hedonism, as its counterpart and antidote. In ancient Greece Hedonism was the principle of the Cyrenaic school whose leader was Aristippus; this early Hedonism was also of most immediate kind, taking Pleasure as the good, and that too the Pleasure of the moment. Alongside of this Hedonism rose the Cynic school of moralists headed by Antisthenes, who assailed Pleasure violently, intimating that it was worse than madness. The Cynic sage, in his positive doctrine, was essentially intuitive; his own wisdom was to dictate the law which he was to obey, hence he was to follow insight in his conduct. In the later Epicurianism and Stoicism we observe the same two principles as opposite tendencies taking possession of the Greco-Roman world. Coming down to modern times in England we find the Hedonism (strongly Egoistic) of Hobbs stirring up a movement of Intuitionism in the seventeenth century; and in our own century, the Utilitarianism of the Benthamites has called forth its emphatic counterpart in a new school (or schools) of Intuitionism.

From the preceding it becomes manifest that Hedonism and Intuitionism, while in one sense opposites, yet are in a process with each other,

and both together form a process which is their active unity. The refutation of Hedonism by Intuitionism, or of Intuitionism by Hedonism, and the holding fast to one side against the other, can never quite bring us to the truth of either. The form of argumentation in these matters must be changed; both the mentioned doctrines must be seen and justified not by themselves but as stages of one movement of the Ego, of a Psychosis involving both.

Yet each stage, separately, is a movement of the Ego, and so reveals in itself the stages of the Psychosis. Such has been the case with Hedonism, as we have just seen; now we are to witness the same thing in the case of Intuitionism, which will also have its movement within its own lines. For it too is a product of spirit and must bear the impress of spirit, which impress is best seen in its fundamental fact, namely, its self-active process. This, accordingly, cannot help revealing the three stages of the Psychosis, which are to be unfolded in the field of Intuitionism, and are to organize all its various manifestations.

The process of Intuitionism involves three factors: (1) a real, present, determined Ego; (2) an universal or ideal End implicit yet at work in the Ego; (3) this ideal End of the Ego is the determinant of the immediate present reality of the Ego. The essential movement of Intuitionism, therefore, is that I as this ideal or

universal End (in the form of Right, Duty, the moral Law) am the determinant of my conduct, of my real self, all of which will show the process of the Ego as the ideal determinant of itself.

I. Immediate Intuitionism; I intuit the universal End immediately as my determinant of conduct, or as the right thing to be done; my direct intuition of the right determines me to make it real. This is the primal state of unity between the two sides of the moral Ego.

II. Regulative Intuitionism; I intuit the universal End mediately, through a rule of right which I realize in conduct. The moral rule (regula) now determines me, externally, as it were authoritatively to moral action. This is the separative stage of Intuitionism, inasmuch as the universal or ideal End as determinant is separated (abstracted) from the Ego and set up in the form of an abstract rule or maxim over the Ego. However, the particular Ego will require a multiplicity of rules for the particular cases, inasmuch as the unity of the universal End has been lost through abstraction. But this very multiplicity of rules compels a pursuit of their common principle, and so we have the next.

III. Imperative Intuitionism; I intuit the universal End as the one moral Law which unites all rules and maxims. Now the one rule of Right

determines all particular rules of Right which determine my Ego. Thus we have returned to unity, but not to that of the first or immediate stage; the universal End is the determinant of the Ego not directly but through the universal moral Imperative or Law.

Still this Law is intuitive, is seen as the determinant of the Ego in its particular conduct. The height of Intuitionism is, therefore, when the Ideal End is taken as the Moral Imperative determining the Ego to moral action. The next step is to pass from the Law to the Law-giver, to the Ego as determining the Law — but therewith we have moved out of the realm of Intuitionism. First, however, some details on these three heads.

I. We have already observed that Intuitionism as a doctrine has in itself primarily the denial of Hedonism, and also the denial of the universal End, on account of which negation there is a falling back upon intuition as the means of moralizing conduct. But just in this stage Intuitionism will go through a process which brings to the surface its inner difficulty, revealing to itself its inherent contradiction.

1. There is, in the first place, the immediate act of intuition which sees the moral nature of conduct. The Ego through its own indwelling power moralizes every particular deed; it may behold the universal element in the act, yet not

as distinct, not as consciously separated from that act. Every moral agent is gifted with such an intuitive power of beholding the right, and he acts in the special case only, as it rises before him with its demand.

2. But next the moral agent becomes doctrinal, and affirms that there is no universal End, in fact, no general rule of guidance. For Intuition rests upon such a denial; it refuses to take Pleasure or any other principle and affirms that there is no formulation of such principle.

3. Yet just this is a formulation, as stated above. The intuitionist declares that he acts without regard to the universal End, which statement thus becomes his formula of action. In saying he has no rule of guidance, he has certainly laid down one rule of guidance, and a very general rule, out of which will grow necessarily other rules. The man who says he has no Ideal End, cannot help himself; he still has an Ideal End, which he seeks to realize by having no Ideal End.

Such is the movement of the Ego in the first stage of Intuitionism, which finds that in its very denial of the universal as End is lurking the affirmation thereof. Such an experience leads the intuitionist to take a new position, which we are now to observe.

II. Intuitionism next declares that we can behold the validity of certain rules of conduct

intuitively. Not only the particular case of theft can we intuit as wrong, but also we can intuit the moral essence of the general rule or law which declares "Thou shalt not steal." Thus the immediate act of intuition as confined to the particular case is widened. There is still a more or less explicit denial of the universal End, which subsumes all rules, whose multiplicity and separation Intuitionism in the present sphere asserts.

1. The intuitionist uttering rules for particular cases, has begun to generalize and to think. Still he asserts that the rule is known by intuition, even though he picks it up as a maxim of current morality. It may be given him by the popular consciousness or from the storehouse of the sages or from the sacred books of the race; nevertheless his Ego must intuit the same, adopt it, and apply it to the particular case. He is, however, clearly mediating, by means of the general rule, his previous immediate intuition, which saw the right and the wrong without the rule.

2. But at this point difference must enter; the Ego is not the same at every moment of action and will apply the rule diversely. But there is a multiplicity of rules, and they do not always agree, having no universal End explicit in themselves. The result will be a conflict of intuitions in the same Ego, of perplexity of conscience as to which rule to apply, or if this be settled, as

to how to apply it. So questions of casuistry will come up even in the realm of Intuitionism, which in the beginning, at least, proposed to banish them through its immediate insight.

3. Out this conflict the intuitional Ego will seek to bring order by some arrangement of manifold elements in proper relation and subordination. This, however, involves a new rule which is superior to other rules, a kind of rule of rules, which is, of course, intuited both in its own nature and in its application. Thus we have tabular statements of motives, virtues, maxims, externally ordered according to some principle of precedence or relationship.

Herewith, however, we have implicitly reached the idea of the universal rule which is to control all rules, and finally all particular actions. Thus Intuitionism itself has abstracted its determinant from its immediate phase and made the same into a rule of right which is now its determinant; but this rule becomes necessarily many rules, which are finally unified into a system of rules by some external rule, which is more or less arbitrarily taken, and according to which the other rules are arranged.

But such a rule must not be arbitrary and uncertain, but universal and ultimate; hence the new search.

III. The intuitionist at this point will begin to seek for a statement of the internal, underly-

ing principle which has sytematized the rules and maxims of conduct, and united them into the order just mentioned. He asks, what is the ordering law which is thus to reach back through the rules and to moralize conduct? Such a law will be universal and supreme, the Imperative which gives the moral command to the subject.

Still such an Imperative must be an intuition, it is to be seen immediately by the Ego, and recognized in its authority. This final stage of intuitionism will also have its process.

1. The first form in which this intuitive act appears is often called the Moral Sense. This might mean simple intuition of the particular act which has already been unfolded in the first stage of Intuitionism. But here it means the immediate beholding of the universal principle inherent in all the diverse moral maxims; this is seen by the Moral Sense, a special phase or activity of the Ego. In a more mediate form it is called the Moral Judgment or even the Moral Reason, the universal of the Ego grasping the universal as law.

2. But as it is still the particular Ego, which has this intuition of what is universal, difference will again enter, now the difference of Egos in intuiting the Moral Law. Not only different men, but different nations and different ages show a difference in Moral Sense or Moral Judgment; their ultimate standard of morality is by no

means the same. Thus into our unity of Moral Law a new separation comes, and now we seek to find the Law of all difference in this sphere, the authority which is absolute.

3. At this point we come upon the Categorical Imperative, thus called by the philosopher Kant who gave it a well known formulation, which runs as follows: "Act only on that maxim or rule which thou canst at the same time will to become a universal law." Herein three elements are introduced in a kind of ascending order: the particular act, the maxim or rule pertaining to that act, and the universal law applying to the maxim. For instance, the Ego may think of stealing this hat, then it calls up the maxim or rule against theft, as Thou shall not steal; finally it grounds this rule by thinking it as universal, by supposing that all men should steal, and thus really destroy theft by destroying property. Kant's formula is in its essence a test of the negativity of the deed; make your deed universal and see whether it negates itself; if it does it is negative in some way. It can tell us often what not to do; but as to telling us what to do its utterance is by no means so distinct. Shall I go as a missionary to Asia? Make the maxim universal: "Go ye into all the world;" who would be left at home, where there are also duties? Shall I devote my life to the slum, to helping those who cannot help themselves?

Make it universal; shall we all betake ourselves to the slums? Who then will do the work of the world, which is assuredly something different?

Intuitionism has thus manifested in Kant its culmination and end; it sets up a universal law which the Ego intuits as universal, and applies it as a test both to moral maxim and to moral act. The intuitive Ego no longer affirms that it sees immediately the moral nature of the deed, it on the contrary affirms that it sees the moral nature of the deed through the Imperative of a universal law.

Herein we have come back to the open statement of the universal End in the form of the moral Imperative. The particular act must be able to realize itself as such an End, which all can will. The end of all conduct is to embody the Imperative. Shall we not say that in such a statement Intuitionism has brought itself to its conclusion? The immediate intuition of the rightness of the deed seems now to require mediation, in fact a double mediation.

Such is, in very brief outline, the movement of a vast body of ethical doctrine, which may be classed as Intuitionism. Throughout its entire field it is dominated by a commanding power within, by a pervading sense of higher authority, which authority is of the Ego over the Ego. Such is the inner dualism working in the present sphere, and terminating in an absolute moral

Imperative, which has the note of severity if not of tyranny. For I can become a tyrant over myself.

Still there is validity in Intuitionism up to a certain point, and it has always been attractive to the idealistic moralist, who is apt to maintain it in some of its many forms. Right, Duty, Obligation, Conscience, are some of the ideal terms with which it conjures. Still it does not make explicit the Ideal End inherent in all its moral action; not even the moral Imperative states such an End, which is freedom, or more fully the self-determined Free Will. Accordingly the moral Imperative has not yet made explicit the idea of moral freedom, though it is an important stage on the way thereto, and represents a necessary phase in the total development of the moral Ego — that of inner authority.

It is a noteworthy and curious fact that Sidgwick, in his criticism of Intuitionism, divides it in the threefold manner, calling its divisions perceptional (or ultra-intuitional), dogmatic, and philosophic Intuitionism. These divisions correspond in essence to the process of the Ego, or the Psychosis, which Sidgwick in general does not recognize; in fact he seems not to be aware of it as the inner ordering principle of all ethical phenomena, since he does not organize his great work, "The Methods of Ethics," by any such

inner genetic movement, as far as we can see; on the contrary his procedure seems to rest mostly upon external grounds of convenience or of rhetorical arrangement.

The outcome of Intuitionism is that the Ego asserts itself as the Imperative over the Ego, that is, over itself. Now the next step is to be taken; the Ego asserts the moral Imperative not merely over itself, but over the other Ego in its particular determinations, and determines these according to its own Imperative. Thus the Ego rises from being the Law over itself into being the Lawgiver over others; it wills their good but determines what their good is; it becomes benevolent. Herewith we enter the third stage of the present sphere.

III. Benevolence.

Benevolence implies that there is another person (or persons) toward whom and for whom I bring my moral Will into exercise. This other Ego has now become the determinant or stimulant of my activity; it is what moves me to realize my Ideal End in a new way, or in a fresh sphere of moral conduct.

The distinguishing fact at present is that the determinant is a self-determined entity (an Ego), not, as heretofore, merely external or internal, but both to a degree; it is Ego which moves my Ego to Benevolence. Or, the self-determined

determinant (the external Ego) determines me (the internal Ego) to return to it and to be its determinant, according to my Ideal End, or according to my conception of duty. Thus I am its Imperative, which determination of mine it, however, has stimulated, determined.

Thus we see the general process of Benevolence: it has first the self-determined determinant (other Ego); secondly, my particular determination, in which my Ego specially manifests itself; thirdly, the Universal or Ideal End, or my moral Imperative, which now commands me to determine the other Ego according to its principle. I moralize myself by determining the other Ego according to my Imperative.

I am benevolent, willing the good (*bene, volens*) but I determine what that good is for other Wills; I am the imperative Ego (*imperator*) not only over myself but over other Egos.

In Benevolence I embrace the other Ego or Egos in my act of Will; I may have their Happiness as my End, but I determine for them what that Happiness is. So we may call this by the name of welfare or well-being, inasmuch as it is different from Hedonism. That is, the Ego wills not the Happiness of the individual, but the welfare as determined by the Ego of the agent who wills. In Happiness, I will the Happiness of the subject, according to his own determination, not mine; I will what he deems to be

his Happiness. But I see that what he does is against his own Happiness; I also see wherein lies his true Happiness; so I will that and determine it for him. I am herein the superior, the Imperative, so to speak, to his Ego, while he is the inferior. The equality or the *laissez faire* of Utilitarianism is set aside; I assert myself as the determiner of his welfare, and possibly become the tyrant thereof. In Utilitarianism I let him have what he deemed his Happiness, I also willed the same; but in Benevolence I command his welfare even against his Happiness. So the benevolent principle, as here used, has in it the side of authority.

So much for the relation of Benevolence to Hedonism. Next we ask, what is its relation to Intuitionism which has just preceded? The Ego is the central authority and determines out of itself the nature of an act by simple intuition, at the start; finally, however, it develops the Categorical Imperative or the universal law of moral conduct. This Imperative is the Ego, first as law-giver, then as judge applying the law; the Ego is the imperial tribunal of Morals, before which every maxim and every deed are to be cited and tested by the law, which is the Ego asserting its own universal principle by making the maxim and the deed universal. But the law is chiefly administered against violators, law-breakers, hence it works negatively, negating

the negative act. The positive result, however, is that I am to will what all Egos can will without injuring one another; and I am to abstain from doing what injures others. My End, therefore, should be their welfare, which I as universal law and judge must determine. Still in Intuitionism the Ego applies the universal law intuitively, as something given, not knowing the same as its own and indeed as itself.

But through the process of Intuitionism, culminating in the Categorial Imperative, the Ego becomes aware that it makes the universal law, is the lawgiver, as well as the law's adjudicator, that it determines the Imperative and so determines the End, which is the fulfillment of the law. Thus the Ego prescribes the End, knowing itself to be the law, judge, and executor — wherewith we have passed out of the sphere of Intuitionism into that of Benevolence, whose End is the welfare of humanity, as dictated by the benevolent Ego. In Intuitionism I determine the act to be right or wrong immediately out of my own subjective insight; but finally I make this subjective Imperative of mine, which is implicit in my first intuition, explicit in the objective law for all Egos, and thus reach the Categorical Imperative, still given intuitively. When now I recognize and assert myself as the Imperative determining the End or the Law for other Egos, I have passed into the sphere of Benevolence. The

benevolent Will in individual or society or church, is and always has been imperial, autocratic, domineering, in spite of its sympathetic feeling; it presupposes in the other Ego some defect or inability which it supplies, else such Ego would not need Benevolence.

The general character of Benevolence may be grasped thus: 'another Ego moves me (or my Ego) to be benevolent to it, that is to will its good, which good is ultimately its freedom (or self-determined Free Will). Thus in Benevolence there is a continuous inter-relation between two Egos, the Giver and the Receiver of the good, starting with an immediate unity between the two, passing into their scission and opposition, and returning to their union and reconciliation. The three stages of this Psychosis are as follows: —

I. Individual Benevolence of the Giver, who at the start is immediately determined by the Receiver to his Benevolence; then he internally re-acts against this external determination of himself; finally he returns to the Receiver, and determines him, thus passing from being ruled to ruling, and therein making himself the Imperative over the recipient Ego.

II. The separation and conflict between the two Egos, the Receiver struggling for his freedom against the Imperative of the Giver. The former will pass from being determined by the

latter, through a stage of opposition inner and outer, to an external unity or compromise which takes place between the two (Giver and Receiver), each retaining a part of his claim, the one a part of his Imperative, the other a part of his freedom. From this state of separation they pass to the mediating principle for both Egos — the Institution.

III. Institutional Benevolence, in which the Giver is the benevolent Institution with its Law standing between both Egos and reconciling them. Especially it seeks to secure freedom to the Receiver, and even to supply him with Will when this is wanting. But the benevolent Institution will also have its process, being at first determined by the individual Giver, then determining the individual Giver, and finally making all citizens of the State Givers, thus universalizing Benevolence and removing it quite out of the sphere of individual determination.

It is manifest that now the benevolent Ego has reached its destination, having actualized itself in an Institution. It has no longer to will the good of the recipient Ego, but to will the Institution whose function is to look after that good. Nor is the benevolent Ego determined any longer by the need or suffering of the fellow-man, who must put himself under law and thus get his relief. It is not said that this condition has yet been attained, but such is the goal to-

ward which the benevolent spirit of the ages is working.

So the moral Ego in the present sphere finds a peculiarly rich experience and discipline, having to transform its subjective Imperative of Benevolence into the objective Institution of Freedom, and therein passing from its inner individual Law to the outer universal Law.

This process, already suggested in outline, we shall now follow out in more detail.

I. The first stage is Benevolence in its simplest form, that of the Giver who is stimulated by his feelings to a benevolent act through a suffering Ego. The sight of pain moves the man to alleviate it; he has sympathy with his fellow-man in affliction and his response is at first immediate. That is, he is determined directly by the determinant (here an Ego) to the deed of Benevolence.

But he soon finds that this immediate, impulsive way of doing is of questionable benefit either to the recipient or to society. He has to think before he acts, if he is to do any good permanently; moreover he must assert his own freedom in being benevolent; he must not let himself be determined from without, but must determine himself from within. He must not wholly give himself up to the determinant, though this be a suffering Ego, else he becomes enslaved to his own emotion. Just as the free man is not to yield immediately to Pleasure, so he is not to yield immediately to

Benevolence, both being determinations of him from without. Still both Pleasure and benevolent Emotion have their place in his soul.

The movement, therefore, of this first stage of Benevolence (the immediate) will be from the Ego of the Giver determined by that of the Receiver to just the opposite, namely to the Ego of the Receiver determined by that of the Giver; or from the external determination of the benevolent man to his internal determination, while the recipient moves the reverse way.

There will be three stages in the above process: the purely emotional and unitary, the separative and conflicting, the return to unity through the subordination of emotion. A word upon each of these stages.

1, Emotional Benevolence is best seen in almsgiving on the street. The man of suffering (real or simulated) appears; there is the response in the sympathetic spectator. Pain in the one excites Pain in the other, and then follows the determination of the spectator to get rid of his own Pain by getting rid of the Pain of the one whom he beholds. This Hedonistic element is in Benevolence, yet it is by no means all of Benevolence.

It is soon discovered that Emotional Benevolence may not be very benevolent. It is at bottom selfish and then it makes the man unfree. He soon finds out that in many cases he is

victimized, and he comes to the conclusion that his Benevolence often does more harm than good. The Benevolence which responds to every appeal and determines at once the Ego to the act of giving, soon shows itself to be a very inadequate principle of moral conduct. Thus a reaction sets in, bringing forth a conflict in the Giver.

2. This conflict lies between Emotion and Reflection, or the Ego of the Giver struggles between being determined from without and being determined from within. The benevolent man now says to himself: I shall first investigate whether this applicant for my charity deserves it. Thus the giving Ego refuses to be determined immediately by Emotion any longer, but stops the response in order to reflect. I may injure by giving him money which he will spend on drink, I may be doing a wrong to society by encouraging idleness and beggary.

The outcome of such reaction may be extreme, ending in hard-heartedness. Nobody perhaps deserves Benevolence who needs it; the person who calls for charity has been careless or foolish, or at least has shown some finite side in his character, which has landed him in his present distress. So we turn away saying: he deserves just what he has gotten. Thus, however, we have lost our Benevolence; every human being has something inadequate or finite in his nature, some weakness which it is just the function of

Benevolence to help out. So we react against our reaction, and seek to harmonize the two conflicting elements.

3. The unity is brought about by the Ego determining its determinant. I seek to prevent the ill effects which I have seen following my yielding implicitly to Emotion, to the external determinant, which is an Ego soliciting my help; at the same time I seek to give help, to keep alive my human sympathy, to retain my Benevolence. Accordingly, I resolve not to give till I find out what is the need, and determining through myself its degree and even its reality. Thus I return to my determinant, the soliciting Ego, and determine its claim to determine me to give.

Thus the Ego of the Giver has made itself the Imperative over the Ego of the Receiver. It is still determined by the soliciting Ego, but it turns back and determines its determinant ere it be moved to the act of Benevolence. Thus it has asserted its freedom or self-determination.

But how about the other Ego, the recipient? It has manifestly lost its self-determination, and the result must be a new struggle for its freedom. Thus the Ego of the Giver, after having harmonized its own inner conflict, is whelmed into a new conflict with the Ego of the Receiver.

II. This brings us to the deeply separative stage of Benevolence, the conflict between the

two Egos, the Giver and the Receiver. The first is benevolent, but therewith is imperative, determining the free activity of the other, who is the recipient of Benevolence, but who becomes therein enslaved or subjected in his Will. Yet both are self-determined Egos and possibly living in a free land, whose essence is to guarantee freedom. What will be the outcome? Each Ego will go through a process within itself and with each other, the purpose of which is to get rid of the conflict and to come to harmony.

The process now lies chiefly in the recipient Ego, which seeks to vindicate its self-determined nature against the Imperative of the benevolent Ego. For the Receiver, too, has his fight for freedom in his way. He will pass through a state of external determination imposed upon him by the benevolent Ego, through a state of separation and resistance, to a unity in which each side is given validity, in which there is some mutual recognition of each other. This triple process we shall carry out a little more fully.

1. The recipient Ego, with which we begin, is determined from without in its own domain of inner freedom. Such is the result of the Imperative of the benevolent Ego, as reached in the preceding stage. Charity can make and has often made the beggar, the man who has renounced his self-determined activity, and begs merely to be determined by Benevolence. Something of

the kind occurred in the old Church, especially in Italy.

But the Ego, even that of the alms-seeker, is by its very nature self-determined, limit-transcending, freedom-asserting; so it will rise against this external determination of itself and seek to counteract the same.

2. The recipient Ego, therefore, resists the Imperative of the benevolent Ego, though accepting the Benevolence. There is the inner resistance: the Receiver yields outwardly to the command of the Giver, but thwarts it through deceit. The tyranny of the Imperative begets hypocrisy in the subject. Thus Benevolence can make the man not merely a beggar, a solicitor of alms outwardly, but inwardly a liar, a hypocrite, a totally perverted soul, which perversion, strange to say, results from the Receiver seeking to keep his freedom. He will secretly foil the Imperative from the outside, and determine himself from within. Thus the man gets corrupt and corrupting morally and socially.

Sometimes the resistance of the recipient Ego becomes open, undisguised. The ancient populace of Rome demanded both food and amusement, "bread and the circus," they were not going to be determined by the Giver; though recipients of the gift, they were masters not only of themselves but of the Givers. Similar notes have been heard at times in modern societies.

Such is the extreme negative result of Benevolence, out of which both sides seek some retreat. The recipient Ego must find that its triumph is its destruction, having destroyed in essence the very means of Benevolence. If the beggar can determine my giving, I have no longer anything to give, I cannot be benevolent through an act of my own.

3. So the benevolent Ego and the recipient Ego, the one in order to give and the other in order to receive, have to come together in a new unity. The Giver now gives and the Receiver now receives, not the release from work but work itself. The Receiver can thus earn his gift, and so be free, partially at least, of the external determination of the Giver, who simply helps him to help himself, determines him to be self-determined. Such is one solution which benevolent men have tried in order to avoid the evils of unconditioned Benevolence.

But the contradiction inherent in the two sides soon makes itself felt, and tears the compromise asunder.

In the first place the Receiver begins to demand work as his right, as his property for which a market must be found; he insists that, if he be made to work, work must be made for him. But in the second place he soon shows even in his work discontent, since he is still not free; the Imperative of the Giver still determines

him working. His Ego, the self-determined ideally, is really dominated by another Ego, which limits him, subjects him, enslaves him to its own behest. Accordingly he rises to the demand for a new kind of Benevolence, which will not only give work, but also secure freedom.

III. This is institutional Benevolence, in which the Giver is not an individual but an institution. Thus the Receiver is free from the caprice and uncertainty of the particular Ego that gives; the institution is based upon some kind of law which is universal, though it too be imperative. The Giver, on the other hand, is relieved of the conflicts springing from his Benevolence; an organized, objective Will has taken his place, and is doing his benevolent work.

The institution is itself a Will, whose object is to secure Will, here the Will of the recipient Ego, which is in danger of being suppressed by the Will of the benevolent Ego. Moreover the Will of the recipient Ego, by the very fact of its requiring assistance, is likely to be weak, inadequate, perverted, and needs to be helped out by an institutional Will.

Thus between the two individual Wills, giving and receiving, is placed a third Will different from both yet mediating and reconciling them in their continuous struggle. Hereby the unity is restored not by a compromise between the two sides but by an institution whose object is ulti-

mately to preserve each Will, giving or receiving, in its integrity. That is, the end is now to secure the freedom of both individuals from an undue domination of one over the other, such as we have seen manifesting itself in the two preceding stages.

Still this institutional (or objective) Benevolence has its process; the benevolent institution as this mediating power will show a development which reveals the Psychosis, being itself a Will.

1. The Private Benevolent Institution comes first, as it springs directly from and is supported by individual effort. The single Ego finds that it cannot by itself cope with the problem of Benevolence and so organizes a society whose end is solely benevolent. That is, the individual Will feeling its insufficiency calls forth an institution, which is an instrument for securing greater freedom to both the giving and the receiving persons.

Thus the benevolent Ego, in order to be effective, seeks naturally to institutionalize itself. As most people have some share of Benevolence in these days, we observe the phenomenon of a vast increase of Private Benevolent Institutions, some wholly and very many partially benevolent.

Such an institution, however, soon reveals its inadequate side. The individual still determines or may determine it; thus it is not free from that subjective side which we find in the benev-

olent Ego. So the private Institution is apt to be determined by private influence, and all the old conflicts of the Giver and the Receiver may again arise, though an institution stands between them. Each side seeks now to use the organization as its weapon of defense and offense, and the institution is lost in the contention of opposite parties.

The Private Institution must, therefore, separate itself from this immediate connection with the individual Ego and its dominating influence, and must form an alliance with an organization whose ruling spirit is the objective Law. Thus dirempted from its immediate subjective factor, the Benevolent Institution falls into the hands of the State.

2. Thus we have the Public Benevolent Institution organized and supported by town, city, county, State, Nation. The great fact about all these benevolent institutions is that they spring from and belong to the great Institution, the State, whose object is to secure freedom, to will Will through Law. The Giver of Benevolence is now the State, giving according to Law, which means that it gives to maintain Free Will. The recipient Ego whose Will is defective from any cause is supplied with Will by the State, whose ultimate end is to secure Will. The blind, the deaf-mute, who are deprived of senses which are the implements of Will, the helpless poor and

aged are endowed, so to speak, with a new Will by the State, whose inmost soul goes back to the sacredness of Will and hence its preservation, even when defective.

Thus the State through the Public Benevolent Institution has brought freedom to the recipient Ego, not capricious freedom but freedom through the Law, which has no private end of its own, but the one great objective end of making valid the Ego as Will.

3. The State now must be seen coming back to the other Ego, the Giver, and not letting one man be benevolent but compelling all men (who are its citizens) to be benevolent through taxation for the Public Institutions of Benevolence. If left to the individual, the levy is unfair, and the contribution uncertain; some will give, some not. Thus the State compels all to support Will when defenseless, when nature, time, or accident has deprived the Ego of its Will, or of the power of giving validity to its Will.

But what has now become of the benevolent Ego, with which we started? In the first place, it can hardly be called benevolent when forced to be benevolent. But in the second place, it has now no need to be benevolent, it has called forth an Institution to do its work better than it can; instead of the subjective Ego with its capricious and perchance tyranical Imperative, we have the

objective Law whose end is the security of freedom to the recipient Ego.

Thus the process of the benevolent Ego has run its course and reached its fulfillment in the Institution. What next? The benevolent Ego must now rise out of Benevolence; it is no longer to dominate the Will of the recipient Ego with its own Imperative, but is to will the Institution whose object is to secure the Free Will of the recipient Ego. The Giver thus passes from being forced to be benevolent to willing freedom through the Institution. So there is a return to the Ego which now has a new purpose: the Ego as Will hears the call to will freedom through an institutional world, and obeys.

Herewith we have come to that stage of the Moral Will in which it receives a fresh content, namely the self-determined Free Will. That is, the Moral Will has reached its third realization, seeking to embody in conduct the complete process of freedom, or to realize the Ideal End. Moreover this Ideal End has become fully explicit, and we pass from *the Moral Will and its End* to the next stage, which is *the Moral Will and its Ideal End.*

If we look back at the general sweep of the section through which we have just passed, we see that the grand labor of the Moral Ego is to get rid of its particularity of End and to reach a

true universality thereof, which is in the Free Will taking itself as its own content or object. This endeavor of the moral person to grasp and to formulate his End is what has called forth the various Theories of Morals in past ages, the successive record of which constitutes the History of Ethics.

SECTION THIRD — THE MORAL WILL AND ITS IDEAL END.

The Ego as Moral Will has not only the End but the Ideal End explicit in this third stage. In the simple Deed both factors (Ideal and End) were implicit, then the End became explicit in the form of particularity; but now the Ideal End which is universal, is to unfold itself directly in its own process.

This Ideal End has often been spoken of in the preceding phases of the Moral Will, since it is the one great End which makes morality and brings the moral world into an harmonious order. But previously it has been simply the inner potential force, which is at present to be realized and shown in its own express movement. The lurking principle in all conduct is to come forth into daylight and manifest its own self-revelation. It has been the secret law to which the inner judge has appealed in all the foregoing cases of responsibility. That law and that judge must now move out of their background and show themselves unfolding themselves according to their own inherent character.

This Ideal End may be also designated as self-end, since the Ego as Moral Will is to make real in action and conduct its own universal selfhood, coming back always to itself as universal. In the present sphere our freedom is constructing freedom, giving to it reality; our Free-Will is to will Free-Will and is to make this spirit over into our moral possession. Thus we become the good Samaritan in the best sense, who acts not merely from sympathy with human suffering (which undoubtedly has its claim), but whose motive is to will the freedom of the fellow-man.

If I see my neighbor struggling in a wreck or in a tangle, from which he cannot extricate himself, it is a good deed on my part, other things not being involved in the case, to help him release himself. He wills to be free, and I am to will his Will to be free; my own free activity of Will I am to impart to him. It is true that he seeks his own happiness or well-being just in his freedom; the latter is really the content of his Will, and also the content of my Will in helping him; at some expense possibly, of time, of convenience, or of happiness, I must will his Will to be a free man. Thus I as a moral agent realize my own selfhood in an action; my own Free Will wills itself in the other, in the neighbor; in securing his freedom, I produce or make active my own; for Free-Will must be active to be itself, and its highest activity is self-realization.

In such an act we begin to catch a glimpse of the Good in its complete meaning.

It must be said, however, that this term, the Good, applies to all the preceding ends of moral action, such as Pleasure, Happiness, Well-Being, to Egoism as well as to Altruism; they all have their validity in their sphere, and each may be called a Good. Yet each is relative, finite, and, if willed absolutely as End, becomes self-contradictory, suicidal. Hence rises the demand for the Highest Good (*Summum Bonum*), the Good which overarches and includes all others in a universal moral harmony.

Such is the ultimate Good, or the End of the Will when it seeks to realize Free-Will. The limit to it is seen when the Will of the neighbor is not universal, is not itself Will realized, but is still particular or capricious. A person who wills the Good in the true sense cannot simply will the gratification or the indulgence of the neighbor's Will, which may not even be its well-being, but decidedly its ill-being. Hence the first Ego, as Will, must exercise Intellect also, must have insight and reflection as to what is best for the second Will. It makes itself judge over the content of this second Will, and must at least see that such content is truly well-being and not an injury. Still, when it has done all this, it has not attained the highest End, not the supreme Good which is freedom. When I will the well-being of others,

this well-being is the content, motive, End of my Will; but when I will truly the Good of others in its supreme potence, I must will their Will in its realization, just as that is my own Good at its best. Thus I can make their Will the content of my Will, my freedom I will to be their freedom. To be sure, this implies that the neighbor's Will has attained the freedom here indicated, that he has realized the rational Self in his act of willing. Such, of course, may not be, and often is not, the case.

If I will the Good of my neighbor and settle within myself what that Good is, it is evident that his Will is determined by mine, he is not self-determined to his own End, he is not truly free, though he assents and probably has to assent to my determination of himself. Such a Good is not the highest Good, though it may be relatively the best for him. His own Will may be so unfree, may be so completely dominated by passion, appetite, love of drink, that he cannot control himself and hence requires external control from another Will which has self-control. So the drunkard, being unfree, has to be controlled from without, the only question being, Shall he be ruled by his appetite or by another Ego who inhibits appetite? In such a case I, this Ego, simply carry out his own true Will, which he by himself is unable to realize, and I substitute my own Will for his. Thus he may obtain well-being

externally, but separated from his own freedom, we might say, from his highest selfhood. This, as already set forth, is specially the field for Benevolence.

The form of paternal government with its fatherly kindness assumes that all men are in this unfree condition, another Will than their own must look after them and prevent them from hurting themselves. Such is specially the view of the Orient, and holds good for many in the Occident. In every society there is a class, children and incompetents, who are unfree and come under the law of being determined through an outside Will.

Accordingly in such a condition neither Will, neither mine nor my neighbor's, can be truly free, neither has a Content of the Will which is adequate to the Will itself, or to its Form. But when I can will the ultimate Good, this Content is just the Form or the free, self-determined activity of the Will; it is Free-Will willing Free-Will. I must not only will my own Free-Will, but that of my neighbor, I must recognize him as a self-determined being, and I must vindicate his freedom, if assailed, as strongly as I do my own, for it is my own in essence. Or, to use the above nomenclature, my Form of Will must take his as its Content, then it has a Content adequate, co-terminous, in full equivalency with itself. Therein we see that the Will has

itself as end, or is self-end, which it now realizes, for this realization can take place only by having such Content, namely freedom. Such is the process of the Good, for it must be seized as a process finally — Free-Will perpetually realizing itself on earth.

To be sure, such a consummation of the Good implies that the neighbor also has a truly free Will and is not determined from the outside by passion, impulse, Egoism, even by Happiness or Benevolence, all of which furnish a finite or inadequate Content to the Will. If the neighbor has not Free Will, I cannot will it, since it does not exist. For instance, if he insists upon being governed by Envy, I cannot will that, without destroying my own Self, as it were; I can, however, let him see or experience that Envy is a denial of his own true Selfhood, that the envious man, in shutting his eyes to what he sees to be excellent, really blinds himself, quenching the very vision of his own intellect. So Dante represents the envious, in their purgatorial penance, as having their eyelids sewed up with an iron thread.

Still even here, I must let such a person have his act and its consequences; I cannot alter the nature of Envy for his sake, nay, I must will it to be, as it is a product of his Will. Nor can I rescue him from the penalty, for just that is what may make him free of Envy, if he takes

the discipline. Punishment is indeed the grand liberator, if rightly accepted and employed; it is an inherent part of the process into freedom, its very object being to call out of servitude the Free-Will, which I in turn must will in its complete movement and fulfillment.

Am I my brother's keeper? is an old question. In one sense I am and always shall be; in case he needs a keeper, and the call comes to me personally, the behest of Benevolence must be obeyed. But it is better that he should keep himself, and that I should support him therein; the ultimate Good as End is to will him to be his own keeper.

In like manner I am to will Free-Will in myself, and not be determined from without by passion, pleasure, or any content inadequate to my own Free-Will. Suppose I am controlled by revenge, the control comes not of my Self, but of what is outside of selfhood. "You have done that mean thing to me, therefore I shall requite you, I shall pay you back in the same coin." That is, I revenging, am controlled by your action and not by my Self; nay, I am controlled by your mean action, and that, too, by an action which I myself know and characterize to be mean. Thus do I give up my own freedom in revenge, my very selfhood, since I am not self-determined, but am determined from without to an act which I condemn as bad.

Hence Dante in his Inferno plunges the wrathful (who are also the revengeful) into the Stygian bog of fetid water and mud, which impedes all activity and likewise perfect vision, suggesting the soul's mire. On the other hand Kent in Shakespeare's drama of *King Lear* refuses to be controlled by revenge, and so maintains his freedom under the most trying circumstances; his royal master banishes him guiltless, yet he will not stoop to revenge, not even to indifference, but will return and serve in disguise that master, as duty and loyalty demand. Thus Kent is determined from within, from his own Self, and is the ideal of a morally free man.

But the Moral Will is still subjective, though willing the Free-Will; herein again it finds its limitation. When I will my freedom in another immediately, it is still my act, a subjective willing of mine, hence it is a particular, capricious willing of the Good or of Freedom. Now the great object of reason is to relieve the Good of this personal element, which is at least in the form of caprice. Can I not find or call forth a new kind of Will, which is not only subjectively universal but is objectively so — which wills both me willing freedom and my neighbor willing freedom? In each case my neighbor is not dependent upon me directly nor I upon him, for the securing of our freedom. Thus while we both have the content of Free-Will, each has

independence of the other, so that each is free in a new sense, each individual Will being established and willed by an actualized objective Will. Such is what we shall call the Institutional Will, and it is the sphere beyond the Moral Will, yet is its necessary complement and fulfillment. In the moral sphere it is still I who do the willing — I will the Good, for instance, that my neighbor be truly a free man, determining himself to be the self-determined; but in the institutional sphere there is an actualized Will, an institution, whose function is to will both my Free-Will and that of my neighbor.

What is, then, the situation at present? When I will the supreme content, the Highest Good, the act is still individual, capricious, not truly universal in form and cannot be. But when I will the actualized Will, the Institution, whose function is to secure and make actual in law and authority just this Free-Will of mine and of my neighbor and of the whole community or perchance of the whole commonwealth, I still have the Highest Good, Freedom, as content, but not in the subjective form of individual willing; it is an objective reality not dependent upon my particular action or even my particular existence. So far at least has freedom now become truly free, being released from its subjection to the finitude of the individual Will.

It is well to state this matter in a somewhat

different way. In the moral sphere I will the Good immediately, in the institutional sphere I will the Good mediately, that is, through the mediation of an actualized Will existing in the world. My neighbor's freedom in the one case is the immediate End of my volition, in the other case it is the mediate end — I will it through willing the Institution, which returns, as it were, and establishes both his and my freedom.

Still, in the moral sphere, I, this individual, willing the Good, have realized in my own particular Ego the Ideal; I have, so to speak, embodied the same personally and subjectively. But I must rise to the institutional sphere also, and as individual participate in the objective, universal Will. Nevertheless, I must therein remain a moral being, realizing in my personal conduct the Ideal End, the Supreme Good. I being in my highest manifestation Free-Will, am to will Free Will; I thus make the supreme Form of myself my supreme Content; my highest freedom is to have freedom as End, as the Good, which I am to realize. Thus I as a moral being have become Self-end, not in the sense of selfishness, but of rational altruism; I will not only my own Free Will, but also that of my neighbor; I recognize him as a self-determined being and vindicate his freedom as much as I do my own. Self-end, therefore, pertains not simply to my particular self, but is

universal; my Free Will is to will and to make real the Free Will of every self, as far as possible.

The condition of living together in a social order is that each member positively wills the freedom of the other members and holds himself always ready to act on their behalf with this end in view. The basis of good citizenship is not Benevolence, but the willing Free Will, in relation to other citizens. The free man does not ask your Benevolence, he can help himself if he only has freedom; this is what he requests you to assist him in securing when it is assailed. And I must aid him fully as much for my own sake as for his sake, since I too am a Free Will, whose freedom has to be secured in the same way. Benevolence (as already unfolded) implies more or less of external determination, and hence is at bottom antagonistic to the full development of Free Will in the social order. The free citizen cannot be an alms-taker, and he ought, just as little as possible, to be an alms-giver. Slavery, if it be not a good thing for the slave, is not a good thing for the master.

The Moral Will as the Ideal End will have its movement in realizing this End, which, in its full formulation, has been called the self-determined Free Will, the three terms of which indicate the triple process of freedom. This process is what the individual is seeking to embody and to

realize in his life throughout the entire sphere of Morals. The stages of the movement we shall designate briefly in advance of the main exposition.

I. *Good* — the unity between the individual Free Will and its universal Content which is the triple process of freedom before mentioned — this unity being as yet unbroken. I am good when my Free Will wills directly and immediately the realization of Free Will, or when my Ego's freedom acts to bring forth the universal freedom of action, through Instinct, Duty, and Conscience.

II. *Evil* — the preceding unity is broken and assailed by the Ego which turns against Good. That is, the individual in his freedom wills the negation of self-determined Free Will realizing itself in conduct. The bad man uses his freedom of action to crush freedom of action in others; he realizes himself by destroying self-realization in some form. Evil is the contradiction which develops in the Will seeking to realize itself, and is inherent in freedom, without which the Ego could not be bad.

III. *Virtue* — which has in it a return to Good after a possible or actual separation therefrom through Evil. Virtue implies habit, and habit results from repetition of the evil-mastering act till it becomes instinct, a part of the moral nature. Free Will now wills naturally and

habitually, not once and with effort, the process of freedom. Virtue is thus the final moralization of the individual in character.

Such are the three stages of the moral Ego willing the Ideal End explicitly — Good, Evil, Virtue — constituting the Psychosis of this sphere. We now name the Deed good, implying that it embodies the Ideal End by that term. Or we may name the Deed evil, implying that the Will negates the Ideal End, which is really its own. Finally we call the Deed virtuous when the moral Will has overcome its negative condition and has returned to Good, which, however, is not the immediate paradisaical Good, but that which has been mediated through the process of Evil.

I. Good.

It is not easy to put the term *Good* into prescribed limits, for its meaning ranges over a wide and often indefinite field. Already it has been used and variously applied, in preceding portions of the present work, according to popular usage. At present, however, we shall employ the term to designate the Will before its lapse and passage through the negative state of itself called Evil. There is a primordial conception of good Will, as, when God made the world, it is declared that he saw his work was good.

When my individual Will wills the universal

principle of itself, or the process of its freedom, without passing through the stage of alienation, it is good immediately; it is positive without having to overcome the negative; what it wills is also good. I have experienced as yet no deep inner scission between myself and the Ideal End which is the content of my Will; I am still innocent of the Bad which in this sphere is not willed. The good man as such has the good purpose in simplicity; he lives and acts in unity with himself, not yet rent in twain by Evil, though unquestionably in the process toward the same, through the very movement of Free Will.

This process of Good, or of the good Will, into Evil, is what we are now to consider. In the present stage the individual Will keeps itself in harmony with its own essential nature, which, as before said, is self-determination, though in an immediate form, without the lapse. The phases of this process of Good will be as follows: —

I. *Natural Goodness;* the Will which may be called good by nature, being in an instinctive unity with its Ideal End. Here is likewise a process — Pleasure, Suffering, Mastery of Fate.

II. *Duty;* the separation of the Ego takes place within itself, showing its Ideal End as commanding on the one hand, its particular shapes as being commanded on the other. This is the sphere of the Ought specially.

III. *Conscience;* the Ego as moral Will comes

back to itself and asserts itself as the determinant of Duty, of the Ideal End.

Such are the three stages in the process of Good, in which the Ego as moral Will unites with the Ideal End immediately, that is, without going through the act of negating the Ideal End. This negative act, however, is what comes next.

Is the child by nature good or bad? Is the infant an angel or an animal? Or is it both? Or perchance neither? Such questions have played and are still playing an important part in the educational world. It is Rousseau who has brought up the discussion by maintaining the original goodness of man, who has been corrupted by the social order. The same doctrine had its influence upon Pestalozzi and Froebel and other educators. It is the counterpart to the doctrine of total depravity, which has also had its strong hold upon mankind. We may say here that both sides belong to the total process of the moral order, as we hope to make plain further on.

At present, however, we shall direct our attention to the triple process of Good, as above outlined, it being the immediate stage of the Moral Will willing the Ideal End.

I. Natural Goodness is an activity of the Will in which it determines itself immediately as one with the universal End. Thus we say that man is good by nature; he remains in harmony with the true or higher self naturally, quite instinct-

ively; he does not consciously will the self-determined Free Will, still this is the native content of his volition. His Ego, in doing the special act, does not follow some particular bent or end of its own, but obeys the injunction of the Ego implicitly.

This condition of the Ego has been presented in the Hebrew Mythus of Eden. Man was primordially placed in Paradise, where he dwelt before his fall, before his act of disobedience, which was the grand separation of the individual from the universal Ego, and the self-assertion of the former against the latter. Hereby evil arose, previously not known. The child has to start over again in this Paradise, but, true to his ancestry, soon is driven out of it, of course through himself. The angels, the unfallen good ones, are supposed to be in the same condition essentially, which is that of the first innocence, or the Natural Goodness of the unestranged Will. Heaven is also portrayed as such a state, to which, however, man can be restored after his erring terrestrial pilgrimage. The true Mythus of all peoples seeks to account for this great change in the human being which is essentially the rise of the individual Will into a consciousness of its separation from the universal Will; the latter is regarded in some form as the Will of the Gods. Greek legend has set forth the same idea in many mythical turns, specially in the

Prometheus story coupled with that of Pandora, the Greek Eve; it has also portrayed a time of Natural Goodness in the Golden Age and in the Saturnian Kingdom. The imagination in our modern epoch is still at work on the same line; we have books describing paradisaical societies, Utopia, Oceana, Icaria, in which man is brought back to his primitive condition of Natural Goodness, the period of his innocence, which he cannot know while he is in it, being quite unconscious of Good or Evil, till he makes the separation above noted.

Notwithstanding, the Ego is at work, must be at work, for its essence is to be always engaged in its own process. The Ego as Will, therefore, even in the paradisaical state of Natural Goodness, has its movement; otherwise it would not be Ego. There is not yet the complete separation or the lapse to Evil, still there is and must be the second or separative stage, such as is found in every Psychosis.

1. We conceive of an immediate Good of Nature which may be called enjoyment or pleasure. This as an object of the moral Will has been already discussed under Hedonism, which seeks to make it the universal End in a theory of Morals. In the present case, however, we start with it as that harmony of the physical man which indicates the unobstructed activity of the human organism. There is an external stimula-

tion, there are appetite and desire; there is also the sufficient response to such stimulation, there is the due gratification of desire and appetite. Now such a gratification, which keeps the organism in harmony with itself, is a Good, as far as it goes, a Good of Nature. It is primarily the simplest state of enjoyment, it is Eden with its fruits furnishing the means for satisfying the first wants; it is the most immediate form of happiness, the organic in equilibrium between need and its satisfaction, without excess on either side. Such is indeed the primal natural Good, we may call it health, still a grand condition of man's happiness and achievement in the most highly organized society. We must look after it, else it will slip away; it should always be an end, of which, however, we do not become aware till it is lost, till its absence makes itself felt in an opposite condition.

2. This is, in general, Pain, which has its profound part to play in the process of Nature's Good. Now the organic process, which gave enjoyment, is interrupted; there arises the negative element to pleasure, the element of difference, which, however, is still organic at the start. Pain is the demon who avenges the violation of the physical organism, which also has its law, and hence its prohibitions and penalties.

Pain is, accordingly, a kind of punishment, which is inflicted by the law of the organism,

when the latter does not act in conformity with its own true being. What causes this violation? Sometimes the Will, sometimes not; the organism may be born disordered, and it is always exposed to external accident, to the Fate of Nature, for which it is not directly responsible.

The general function of Pain is manifest, it is the organic totality seeking to right itself, to negate its negative; destructive it is, yet destroying therein the deeper destruction; it is the vital process fighting against obstruction and death. The sentient organism suffers that it perish not; the Ego suffers also, because it has sinned and must recover from sin.

There are many forms of suffering as it moves from without to within. Bodily suffering, mental suffering; we suffer through ourselves, we suffer through others. Thus, our immediate Good, which is, in general, our pleasure, runs upon an inhibition, which is some form of suffering. The Good of Nature is met by the Fate of Nature, its negative counterpart in this stage.

3. The Ego as moral Will must now assert its limit-transcending power, and triumph over suffering. This is the mastery of the Fate of Nature, in which the soul of Natural Goodness reveals its highest potency. Can you digest Fate swooping down upon you from the outside, without any known fault of yours? Can you work over and transfigure misfortune, making it

the discipline unto perfection? We must still, in suffering and through suffering, will the Ideal End, and thus rise above suffering.

Our destiny is that we be Fate-compellers; we are not to be determined morally by what is external, but we must be self-determined, and will the Self-determined. This is not mere endurance, not mere Stoicism. It is true that we must bear; then we must forbear and forgive, not resenting nor revenging; but the final act is to reconstruct that which wrongs us and makes us suffer, causing the same to do right and to be right. Thus we reach over the fateful bound and re-make, after the Ideal End, which is freedom, that which assails it and us. Such is the way to become truly the master of Fate, determining that which determines us.

The great fact of Christianity is that its disciples crossed over the limit of the old heathen world and converted the Barbarians to the doctrine of peace and good-will, and thereby saved civilization. The ancients believed in Fate, since it was a reality to them, eternally threatening them from beyond the barbarous border which environed them on every side of the horizon. Christianity moved across this border and gave to the savage the Good which it had, and Fate began to vanish. Every man in Christendom must re-enact the same epoch in his life, in order to be a Fate-compeller; he must

travel through the same experience of his race, and transcend the limit of Barbarism in his own heart.

Through suffering which has its cause in the Fate of Nature, and through the mastery thereof within, the individual has become aware of himself as master or ruler in his own inner world; he gives the command to himself who is to obey even against the presence of external Fate, which is not to determine him but is to be subordinated. That is, Fate has become internal, is itself an act of the Ego controlling, determining, commanding the Ego. Thus arises the phenomenon which is called Duty, an inner Fate, which, however, is really no Fate; an authority which seems to be distinct from myself, yet is myself as imperial, ruling all determinations inner and outer. This is the next stage of Good, the second, which is now to be considered.

II. Duty makes the dualism explicit which in Natural Goodness was implicit. It rests upon the twofoldness of the Ego, which, in mastering external Fate, has become conscious of itself as master or law over itself. I, this particular Ego, have been made aware of a universal principle within me, to which I must subordinate my own particularity. I am commanded by myself to subject pleasure, desire, even benevolence to a higher end.

This is also expressed in the phrase *I ought.*

Here is an imperative, an inner voice which bids me act thus and thus. It is not an external law, at least not in this form, yet it is authoritative; indeed it may come into conflict with external law. Evidently the command is what is first heard in Ought. From whom and to whom goes forth this command? From myself to myself. Thus my Self is dualized in the Ought; two selves appear, the one commanding, the other commanded; the one is Will as lord, the other is Will as servant, carrying out the behest of the lord. Moral sovereignty and moral obedience are here twain, yet united in one Ego: the command of the moral sovereign is executed by the moral servant; the outcome is the moral act, or duty done, which has in it the two sides — sovereign and servant — in one process. I am the lord and the servant, both are in my Deed, distinct, yet united and reconciled, when that Deed is complete.

Duty puts stress upon the Imperative, the separate behest, hence it belongs to the second stage of the Psychosis. Still it will have its own movement as the Ego's formal authority over Self.

1. There is, first, the Imperative as immediate, as the command, yet without telling what is commanded. Do your Duty for Duty's sake, obey the authority because it is authority. Thus Duty may seem almost external to you, the separation is so strongly marked. This is the

emphatic thing in the famous lines of Emerson: —

> So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
> So near to God is man,
> When Duty whispers low, *Thou must*,
> The youth replies, *I can*.

Duty is here apparently an outside commander whom the youth obeys. Still such a separation is only in appearance; the two sides are in reality one Ego and its process. For every time you say *ought*, or speak of Duty, you have more or less implicitly the process of the Self-determined Free Will. First is the Ego as potential, it is able to do the act; the youth says *I can* primarily. Second is the law commanding the Ego, here its own law, objective yet internal. Third is the fact that this law is to realize Free Will; you are not free unless you obey the law and do your Duty.

So the process is as follows: The Ego as youth must first say *I can*, which is to declare that he is potential Free Will, has the ability to do; then comes the command of Duty *Thou shalt;* finally is the reply of assent and unity, *I will.* The whole is the Ego's process of Free-Will.

Still the Imperative puts the stress on Duty. But Duty as such is a form without content. When I am told to do my Duty, I am supposed to know what are my Duties. If not, I call for information; I ask, What are my Duties?

Therein I seek for specialized forms of the general form; I have to demand the particular. This, however, brings us to the second stage of the Imperative, which we may now look at.

2. The one grand Imperative, accordingly, splits up into many, Duty differentiates into Duties, each of which is a command. These have been known in the moral history of mankind as Commandments, of which the most important and influential summary was the Jewish, designated as the decalogue. Their form in the Old Testament is external, they are the mandates of the nation's lawgiver, and their fountain head is Jehovah. Still they must also be regarded as expressing the consciousness and moral aspiration of the Jewish people.

Their number is ten, of which we may briefly notice three in the present connection. *Thou shalt not kill;* the condition of all activity is life; if thou slayest man, thou slayest the possibility of Free Will, and thus destroyest in its bud the soul's self-realization. *Thou shalt not steal;* the condition of all society is property, at least of society now actual or even conceivable; theft is the primary negative act destroying institutional order. *Thou shalt not lie;* thou art to say and do what thou really art; thy utterance in word and deed is to correspond to thy inner selfhood, which thus unfolds into its highest worth; the relation of man to man rests upon his

being truthful and true, which is verily the truth of his being; the lie makes action abortive, it nullifies Free Will.

But now follows the limitation of the special Commandment, which brings forth the conflict of Duties. The State, for example, puts me into the rank of its defenders, and bids me slay its enemy; which Commandment shall I obey? My life is suddenly assailed; there is a new behest which enjoins me to destroy life, if there be no alternative. Again: I am bidden to take the loaf of bread belonging to another in order to save a person dying of hunger. There rises, in regard to the last Commandment above given, the old-new question: Is a lie ever justifiable? Did Penelope do her Duty in deceiving the wicked suitors and thereby preserving home and country for her absent husband? It would seem that every particular Commandment runs upon its limit through being particular and the Duty is not obedience but violation.

In such fashion these moral Commandments fall into opposition with one another, and we behold the disturbed realm which is often named the Conflict of Duties. My Duty to my country commands me as a soldier to employ a ruse against its enemy, which command is in violation of the injunction against lying. The great poets are fond of portraying these ethical collisions; in fact, the latter usually are the axis of the poetic action.

The *Odyssey* is full of them; the *Antigone* of Sophocles is eternal through the intense yet clear-cut collision which it unfolds between Duty to Family and Duty to State. The final ground of Shakespeare's genius is reached only when we see the conflicts of the Ethical World as the deep-laid foundation of his dramatic procedure.

Moral Science in its development has acknowledged the existence of this Conflict of Duties, by trying to formulate a new set of Duties for the violation of Duties, a kind of a new decalogue for breaking the decalogue. Thus the Commandment turns against the Commandment, and the contradiction begins to throw the whole moral world into confusion. That department of Moral Science known as Casuistry attempts to give a moral rule for setting aside the rule of morality, which work was specially taken up and elaborated by the Jesuits, who received no small portion of obloquy on this account. Still the conflict which they sought to harmonize was and is now a real one; the difficulty is that the particular rule having shown its limitation through its particularity the first time, will show the same limitation the second time. Thus the exception to the rule will call forth the exception to the exception, and, as far as solving the problem is concerned, we come out the door where we went in.

It is manifest that the specialized Duties must

in some way be generalized; the particular has undone itself and is calling for the universal, which is its essence and its complete process. Already we may have noticed that the Commandment against murder means that I must not destroy Free Will in my act; also the exception to this Commandment has essentially the same meaning: I must not destroy Free Will myself, and I must not allow it to be destroyed.

3. Herewith we have returned to the Imperative, which, however, is not exactly the old one: Be a Free Will thyself and regard thy neighbor as a Free Will. All the Commandments and all the exceptions to the Commandments have the one great end: the realization of freedom. The Free Will thus has itself as its own object and content. My supreme Duty is that I determine myself to be self-determined through the Self-determined. My act (or Free Will) is to will the Free Will of my neighbor through the Imperative, whose End is Free Will. Duty bids me to will myself a free man through willing the freedom of another Ego. There is no complete liberty for me while my brother is a slave.

Such is the process of the Imperative of Duty which in this last stage commands the Ego to realize itself as Free Will. But this Commandment is still in form external to the Ego, which begins to question the authority giving the mandate. Who prescribes to me my Duty? What

has the right to lay upon my Ego its Imperative? Such is the challenge now heard, and the Ego seeking for the source of the authority of Duty, finds it at last to be in itself.

III. This third stage of Good, in which the Ego returns to itself out of the external Imperative and asserts itself as the law, is called Conscience. When the Ego knows itself as the determiner of Duty it is Conscience. I now settle within myself what I ought to do; the Commandment has to pass my scrutiny and be accepted in the given case. Moreover I know myself as that which determines the act and hence am responsible.

Conscience is, accordingly, consciousness, but in a peculiar form. The Ego is not merely conscious of itself as Ego, but as Free Will giving the Commandment to itself. That is, the Ego in Conscience out of itself, out of its own depths, asserts itself as the Imperative over Self, and claims the same to be final for the individual. It is the inner infallibility of the Ego within its own sphere, and its command is absolute. "An erring Conscience is a chimera," says Kant; the Ego cannot grant that it is mistaken in following the behest of Conscience; what other behest is there for the moral man to follow? Says Hegel: "Conscience expresses the absolute justification of the subjective self-consciousness (Ego) to know in itself and out of

itself what right and duty are, and to recognize nothing as Good except what it sees to be so." (*Phil. des Rechts* s. 176). On account of this absoluteness of Conscience, it has been often claimed as the direct communication of the Will of God, which the individual must obey or be punished by Conscience for violation of the divine injunction. Says the Quaker moralist, Jonathan Dymond: "In most men, perhaps in all, this sense of obligation refers, with greater or less distinctness, to the will of a superior being. The impression, however obscure, is fundamentally this: I must do so or so, because God requires it" (*Essays*, p. 56, Harper's Ed.). The authority of Conscience is ultimate, because it is God's authority. Intuitionists specially have dwelt much upon the immediate dictates of Conscience, and usually such absolute dictates are referred to the absolute ruler of the Universe, who alone would have the right and the power to exert such an unlimited sway, especially in a constitutional monarchy like England, or in a republic, like America. "Conscience is felt to act as a delegate of an invisible Ruler" (Blair's *Sermons*). Heathen moralists had the same idea: "He who is well-disposed will do everything *dictated by the God*," who "has given to every man a particle of Himself for guidance" (Marcus Aurelius). Similarly Epictetus and the Stoics, as well as touches in Plato and Aristotle;

even the demon of Socrates has been identified with Conscience. Hegel, however, declares, that Conscience belongs to "the standpoint of the modern world, which was first to reach this consciousness, this going down and disappearance into itself (*Untergang in sich*)."

It is manifest that Conscience, being Ego and subjective, must have the process of the Ego in its full intensity, and manifest therein the different stages of the Psychosis.

1. Conscience in its immediate form has no breach with the Commandment, which it knows and wills as its own. It knows what Duty is, knows it as binding, and proceeds to do it. I see a man in difficulty, I hear the command within to go to his assistance. I know myself as giving the command and ordering such assistance. Yet this command is also the law and universal, which I as judge must duly execute. In one sense the law as Imperative is given, but I am to recognize it, choose it, apply it to the special case. An official position is offered me, and I say: I cannot accept it, my Conscience will not permit me, as I cannot fulfill its duties. Herein the Conscience is the judge who knows the law and makes the application of it to the given instance. It is an internal judiciary, of which the external one is the copy actualized and at work in the world.

It is true that the judge may differ from an-

other judge in the interpretation of the same law, and may differ from himself at different times and under different circumstances. Thus the Ego will inject all its particularity and difference into Conscience, which is, indeed, just the Ego asserting itself in its absoluteness, in its complete process.

2. Conscience will, therefore, manifest the separative stage of the Ego in all its variety, being just the realm of individual self-assertion. Millions and millions of infallible Egos, each within its own little world (microcosm) determining what is Right and Duty — certainly there will be conflict enough. The history of religions (perhaps not of Religion) is largely made up of these conflicts of Conscience. The Patriot and the Quaker may both accept the Commandment, *Thou shalt not kill*. But is yonder enemy of the State to be slain? The Conscience of one says says Yes, the Conscience of the other says No, and thus a new struggle opens. In fact, the Conscience of the one may bid him suppress or inhibit in some way the Conscience of the other, possibly by law, whereby it begins to get self-destructive, seeking to root out its own Self. So the Quaker and many others had to suffer for Conscience' sake just through Conscience.

But the dualism of Conscience, or the separation between its form and content, becomes most striking in Conscientiousness, which is Conscience

carried out rigidly into action and conduct. The conscientious man is absolute in his self-assertion, yet may be in the wrong, and even persistently wrong-headed. What is to be done with him in an organization or a society? There is no doubt about his perfect honesty, and yet that honesty sets strongly against the order about him. Shakespeare has portrayed such a character in Brutus, who, on account of his conscientiousness, "was the noblest Roman of them all," lofty in motive yet foolish in act. Paul, the persecutor, was as conscientious, according to his own statement, as Paul the apostle; still there was a mighty difference in the respective deeds; the formal Ego was the same in both cases, the difference was in their content. On the whole, the mule with its obstinacy may be pronounced the most conscientious of all animate existence, high and low; it will allow itself to be prodded with iron spikes, to be dragged over rough cobblestones, to have its neck pulled out of joint by cable and windlass, rather than walk over a wide plank to a boat, when such an act is for it not the right one, being contrary to the mulish Conscience. The martyr at the stake could not suffer more.

Still, every human being (and probably the animal, too), should be conscientious; without such a quality, we all agree that high moral worth is impossible. What, then, is the matter?

We must look into the content of Conscience, and not merely regard the form, which is by itself merely the self-assertion of the Ego.

The man who with so much fervor appeals to his Conscience gives no proof of having done the right thing, though many make such an appeal with the belief that it is a complete vindication of their conduct. Not altogether so; we must likewise ask, what was the man so conscientious about? Some universal, or some particular end? Conscientiousness may become selfish; it is, in fact, exposed specially to a danger of that kind, since it is so strongly self-assertive.

So, the question becomes loud, With what shall we fill this activity of Conscience, which, taken by itself, is quite empty? Only through some adequate content can we save Conscience from itself.

3. Conscience must, therefore, return out of its mere subjectivity to objective law and institutions for its content. The institutional world is to put a filling into the empty form of Conscience; what that institutional world is in its completeness is unfolded in the third part of the present work on the Will. Here, however, we may say that it is Will actualized, existent, objective, whose function is to secure Will, and, hence, among other things, to secure Conscience to its individual possessor in its rightful sphere. The State is not to suppress Conscience but rather to

safeguard it; on the other hand, Conscience is not to suppress State and Constitution, as it has sometimes sought to do.

Still even here the process begins to manifest itself. The institutional world may become perverted, disordered, inadequate; it may no longer fulfill its end, which is to actualize Will, one of whose shapes is just this Conscience. What then is to be done? Undoubtedly in such a crisis there is begotten the deepest conflict of the soul as well as of history. The supreme man of Time is thrown up to the surface of events, he is the one who sees the new order needed and coming, sees it subjectively, and in him it takes the form of Conscience. Thus a fresh collision arises between Conscience and the Law, or between the new Law being born and the old Law becoming insufficient. The result is a tragedy, indeed a double tragedy; the individual bearer of Conscience perishes in the shock of the conflict, but his Conscience lives on and embodies itself in the new Law, while the old Law, having slain the individual, dies itself through his idea. Socrates, Buddha, Christ, are the great exemplars of this collision in former ages, and are justly regarded as the spiritual heroes of the race.

Thus Conscience is also to transform the institutional world, while taking the same as its content. The Law must be settled, but not crystallized; it must also be capable of taking up the

Ego's process, of re-incarnating the new spirit, which is also a higher freedom. The Ego as moral Conscience must be forever seeking to transform institutions into a more complete expression of Free Will; it now sees its supreme end to be the actualizing of the Self-determined Free Will. It still knows itself as the determiner of the Imperative of Duty; but this Imperative is to will freedom. That is, the Ego as moral Conscience is aware of itself as Free Will (subject) willing Free Will (objective in law and institutions) which is to return and secure Free Will. Such is the culminating process of the present sphere.

But the Ego in its freedom can also inhibit such a content, and can also be aware of such inhibition. The Ego as Free Will is free to negate just this content of Free Will; as absolute self-assertion, the Ego can deny its own principle; if it is free, is must be free to turn against its own freedom. Thus, however, we have passed out of the realm of Good into that of Evil, which has likewise its source in Free Will, nay it has the same root as Conscience in the absoluteness of the Ego, just as Cain and Abel sprang brothers from the same womb.

All Good comes of the Free Will of the individual willing the universal principle of itself, which is the process of its freedom. We have just seen that Conscience may develop a negative

element within itself and become hostile to its objective content, which is, in general, the institutional world. Still therein it does not need to lapse into Evil, since it may continue to will Free Will, and yet oppose the existing Law in the attempt to realize a better Law.

Manifestly, there can be two opposite kinds of legal violation. Christ and the two thieves on the cross furnish the eternal example of the two sorts of violators of Law, for all of them had violated Law. The one, however, had willed the Good through his Free Will, the others had willed the Bad through their Free Will. The one sought to preserve and to improve the old Law by the new Law; the others sought to destroy all Law. So the one had no need of repentance, while the others had, showing the pangs of Conscience.

This sort of pain may be attributed to the Conscience, though by no means its total function, as some writers have thought. The Ego as Conscience may take the part of the inner judge inflicting the penalty upon that same Ego for violating or for not doing what it knew was required by the Ideal End. It thus falls into a deep scission and conflict with itself, having disobeyed its own supreme law. Remorse is the moral Ego scourging itself out of its own negative attitude toward the Ideal End. But it may remain in that negative attitude; being Free

Will it may will the opposite of Free Will. Thus it becomes truly the destroyer, yea the self-destroyer, destroying Self in the very germ of its being. Through this gate, truly that of Inferno, the Ego enters the realm of Evil.

II. Evil.

It is often declared that Evil is the great mystery of the Universe. In a sense we can see how this is so; Evil is connected with the original act of Will, which is the primordial diremption of the Ego, and has no ground but itself, its own self-energy. Hence, it may be deemed unfathomable, since this term implies or calls for an external ground, which absolute origination must exclude by its own nature.

Evil, unquestionably, is to be referred back to the Ego as Will, which is the primal breach, the first separation in consciousness. The necessity of the act is primordially the necessity of Evil. It is true that Good springs from the same root, even that developed form of Good which we have unfolded as Conscience, wherein the Ego is thrown back upon itself as the determiner of conduct. The Will, being such determiner, may choose not to follow the command of Duty, but to obey its own caprice or appetite, which moves it against the Law; thus, it wills not Good, but Evil; or, the particular Self, determined from without in the form of impulse, desire, appetite,

caprice, subordinates the universal Self determined from within in the form of Duty, Law, Right.

Good and Evil, therefore, have their common source in the Will, which must act in order to be itself, and whose separation must take place. Man is good only in so far as he can be bad; he is both the positive and the negative and their process; he cannot be one without being the other, as well as the movement of both in himself. God is good, yet has in Himself the process with his opposite; the Divine Will must act, yet contains in itself the negative potentiality of all Will.

It is, on the whole, a characteristic of Oriental mind that it is in a deep struggle against this separative stage of the Ego, which is fundamentally manifested in the Will, and which is the great original sin of the birth of the Ego. Particularly the Hindoo seeks to destroy consciousness, which involves such a separation, and with it to get rid of the Will which is the source of Evil. The Persian allows the dualism to exist in a perpetual fight between Good and Evil, till finally the latter will be overwhelmed. The Hebrew Sin-Mythus goes back to the knowledge, on the part of the new-born man (or Ego), of Good and Evil. The separation between Orient and Occident lies emphatically in the assertion of the Will on the part of the latter against the former, seen most brill-

iantly in the ancient Greco-Persian war, which may well be called the opening of History. For History is the conscious record of the great deeds of men, of the mightiest manifestations of Will, but Will means Evil to the Oriental mind. Hence the Orient has no History in any high sense of the term, having really no Ego for it, or deeming such an Ego sinful. To the Occident, therefore, belongs History, while, on the other hand, to the Orient belongs Religion, whose great function is "the broken and contrite heart," the subjection of the Will and the expiation of the Deed. The Occident with its Will has had, accordingly, to receive its religious discipline and, in fact, its Religion from the Orient. This damnation of the Will as the source of all suffering, wrong, evil, has brought certain Occidental writers, otherwise not religiously inclined, into a peculiar sympathy with the Oriental, especially the Hindoo mind, whereof a notable instance is seen in Schopenhauer and his philosophy.

At present, however, we are looking at that which may be called Moral Evil, which springs from the Ego as Will breaking with Good. That is, man, being free, is able to will the opposite of his own freedom, to will the negation of the Self-determined Free Will, which is his Ideal End. The bad man realizes his Self, but by destroying selfhood; such is the Self-destroying contradiction in his conduct.

Evil will show itself in the process as this self-negation, which will have, as usual, three main stages manifesting the Psychosis.

I. The principle of Evil, which reveals itself in what may be called the universal sin; the Ego uses its freedom to destroy freedom; the Free Will turns against its own essence, the Ideal End, and therein seeks to realize the negation of the self-determined Free Will. The sphere of the immoral thus has its place in the science of morality.

II. The system of Evil, in which the preceding principle or universal element of Evil differentiates itself, showing the varied forms of negative Free Will in human conduct. Thus, there will be a system of Sins or Vices in contrast with a system of Virtues. The ordered Inferno.

III. The completed process of Evil, which is its own self-undoing. This is the third stage of the negative process of Free Will, in which it is seen returning upon itself and overcoming itself, getting rid of its evil or sinful character through Punishment, Repentance, Mastery of the Negative.

The purgatorial process, or the Ego's self-imposed ordeal of purification, is this third stage, in which the Ego gives testimony of its transcendent, infinite nature.

Very few writers on Morals explicitly make Evil a part of the process of Good. It is some-

how kept outside of the ethical movement, yet it has to be taken into account, and so is permitted to slip in unheeded, till the reader is of a sudden surprised by its presence. The poets are in this respect far completer in their treatment of the subject than the professional moralists, and hence are far more instructive. To mention the four of first rank — Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe — they all include Evil or the negative element in the grand development of their themes. Indeed their chief problem is to show a human soul overcoming and transcending its own negative condition, which is an inherent part of the poetic movement, inner and outer. Accordingly illustrations taken from the poets are in general more telling and more profound than any other kind.

The three above-mentioned stages in the total sweep of Evil, we shall now unfold in more detail, and thus indicate its significant place in any complete view of Moral Science.

I. The first stage of Evil is the Ego as Will willing in some form the negative of Free Will. It is the stage of separation in which the Ego as particular self separates from and antagonizes its universal self. The free man employs his freedom to will the opposite of freedom; he refuses to realize in his conduct the Ideal End. We shall look at his separative act in three phases.

1. Man is bad by nature, it is said, and this

is the counterpart to the statement that man is good by nature. He breaks with natural goodness, that immediate unity with rightness he shivers, he turns away from innocence and disobeys. Thus he is driven out of his paradisaical state through a primordial disobedience, really through his nascent act of Will which begins to assert its freedom even in Paradise. The potential Ego, which is innocently good, passes into the deed and gets bad.

Moreover this primal natural Will is determined from without by the stimulation of nature, and so follows appetite and passion; it yields to determinism instead of asserting its freedom. The natural man is innocent as a potential man; but when he starts to realizing himself, the breach takes place and he falls, that is, he separates himself from the commandment. For the first moral commandment is directed against the determinism of nature, and orders the control of impulse and appetite. This brings us to the next.

2. Man is bad by prescription, inasmuch as he disregards the moral injunction laid upon him, which moral injunction has for its content the command to freedom. Thus he becomes a violator of law and a criminal. For crime presupposes the law, into whose world the child is born, and whose authority he absorbs instinctively till he revolts, that is, till he separates himself from

his prescriptive realm, and through Free Will becomes disobedient.

The commandment, being external, provokes the act of volition which is bad; still, such an act is the assertion of Free Will in the individual. Yet the commandment has just the object of realizing Free Will, though its form be unfree, imposed from without. So the Free Will gets wicked, undermining, defying, violating just that which is seeking to preserve and safeguard Free Will universally. It is Free Will negating the realization of Free Will in itself and in another, in the individual and in society.

3. The acme of this negative condition is reached when the Ego as Free Will denies the moral order of the world and seeks its overthrow. Therein is the separation complete and the negative spirit has become universal. The religious as well as the poetic imagination has always sought to embody such a spirit in a character and to hold it up before the eyes of mankind. The mythical soul of the race has given to it many forms, most imposing of which is that of the Semitic Satan. Back of the fall of man is projected the fall of the angels, whose chief stood next to God himself. Still in this highest realm the separation had to take place, and it carried with itself the separation of man from the Highest. In like manner Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust* is the universal negative: "I am

the spirit that denies," while as Will he is "always willing the Bad," seeking to destroy the morally ordered Universe in thought and deed.

In this last case we have reached that complete estrangement of the soul which in religious language is called sin, Dante's "dark wood where the straight way was lost." The ethical expression of it, however, must be found in the Free Will which wills to destroy the Self-determined Free Will in every form of its realization. Such is the final principle of Evil in its fullness, being the absolute process of negation and destruction.

Thus we have seen the three phases of the present stage of Evil. First is Evil as a sort of natural badness, the counterstroke of the Free Will to natural goodness; second is Evil as crime, the act of disobedience to law, which the Free Will is led to violate in asserting itself; third is Evil as sin, the virulent, noxious process of the Free Will as destroyer of the moral order of the Universe. Such a Free Will necessarily makes a Hell and puts itself into the same by its own free act.

In this last case we have reached down to the fundamental unitary act of Evil and have endeavored to formulate the same. It is the one great sin, the active, creative one, source of all other sins. It is that world-destroying Malice which

Dante unfolds in the lower circles of his Inferno, and which culminates in his arch-fiend, Satan, eternally fixed at the center. Milton's conception of the Destroyer shows the same trait when the latter says: "Evil, be thou my Good."

But the one great sin, this deepest separation of the spirit within itself against itself, is generative of many sins, calling forth many kinds of separation in the particular acts of Will. Herein we move forward to a new stage.

II. The universal sin specializes itself into manifold forms of itself, which are ordered after the process of the Ego and thus reveal what may be called the System of Sins. Such a System is not made externally by putting together classes, but is truly produced by the inner movement of the Ego, who is the final orderer of every division of the spiritual cosmos. All these Sins have the same general character: the Free Will has become destructive of its own self-realization in the individual, in institutions, and in the World-Order; it is consumed with a burning hate of itself, and suffers an eternal malady of dying without death.

Many have been the attempts to bring something like order into the vast chaotic multiplicity of man's sinful nature. For even in sinning the Ego is the sinner and makes the Psychosis of sin. The Free Will is always some kind of an architect, though it be "the architect of ruin;"

it brings an order into the destruction of order; to the Pantheon, divinely constructed, stands on the opposite shore of the Universe the Pandemonium, diabolically constructed. The architectonic spirit of Satan is one of the first matters indicated in *Paradise Lost*, which is itself a most wonderful temple of negation with the Destroyer as its central constructive idea. Note when he with his devilish cohorts rises from the burning lake and starts to building their infernal edifice. But the greatest of all these architects of Hell is unquestionably Dante with his Inferno, which is mathematically put together according to measurements taken from the Earth's diameter. Still Dante has also his ethical Inferno built in marvelous harmony with his physical Inferno, which thus becomes the most cunningly constructed symbolic Temple of Evil which the ages have yet seen.

We can here indicate only the outlines of this System of Sins, its fundamental process, which must be seen to be a movement of the Will. Evil springs from the Will and must always be grasped springing from the Will in its very conception. Now the conception of the Will has the three stages, which have been already set forth in Psychological Will, as the Undetermined, the Determined, and the Self-determined. How often these designations have been hitherto applied in this work, to ground the inner divis-

ions of the Will, we need not tell the attentive reader. At present we may name the stages as the Sins of Indeterminism, of Determinism, and of Self-determinism, in the order of the Psychosis.

1. The sin of Indeterminism is, in general, when the Will does not act, though it ought. There is the command but no response, nay a refusal to respond. The Will persists in remaining potential, inactive, not asserting its own nature, out of fear or selfishness. The great crisis is on hand, the great principle is at stake, but the undetermined Will wills not to determine itself.

A class of indeterminates, the neutrals, is put by Dante into his Inferno, just inside, in the Vestibule of the subterranean temple of Evil. They were "those who lived without praise or blame," quite will-less, undetermined; in the grand conflict "they were neither rebels nor faithful to God, but were for themselves." A high dignitary is here, probably a Pope, "who made the great refusal," refusing evidently to do the important deed laid upon him by his time.

More decisive is the condemnation which Shakespeare in his dramatic way places on those who "make the great refusal." Hamlet is such an indeterminate; a duty he deems is laid upon him, the avenging his father's murder; but he delays, shirks, excuses himself from its perform-

ance, till he pays the penalty of the sin of Indeterminism by his death. In like manner, Banquo "makes the great refusal;" he is called, and knows he is called, to right a great wrong in the land; but he does not act, he remains undetermined; the result is that guilt sweeps him into its net and he perishes by a tragic fate. The sin of omission may be as deep as that of commission, the not-doing may assail the Free Will as strongly as the doing, or the Will not to do can be as destructive and as self-destructive as the Will to do.

We have already noted that the Orientals have a tendency to get rid of the sins of the deed by getting rid of the Will itself, which is primarily the second stage of consciousness. They long to return out of the Determined to the Undetermined, which to them is the movement from a sinful to a holy life. It may be doubted if Hamlet and Banquo can be justifiably tragic characters to the Oriental mind. The Pope who made "the great refusal" of his office and retired to a monastery would be hardly a sinner to the Hindoo, but rather a saint. The Occident, however, celebrates the Will and its Deed, and religion must somehow reconcile itself with the Will. The great poets of the Occident take action as their theme; their hero is the man who acts, however varied their poetic forms in the epos and the drama.

2. Second in the present sphere is the sin of Determinism, in which the Free Will allows itself to be determined by something outside itself against itself. Thus the self-controller, the Free Will, is controlled to the destruction of self-control. Whatever be the determinant — Impulse, Desire, Motive — we are not to be determined by it, when the supreme End calls us to assert that which constitutes its essence.

Not all Determinism is sinful, but all is which runs counter to the realizing of Free Will. Even the high motive may become unworthy when it sets aside a higher or the highest. The young man is going to College to get an education, having a lofty purpose to develop his manhood in a certain direction; but the call resounds through the land for defenders of freedom, which has been assailed. He must quit his studies, he must march forth to battle. What has produced this wonderful change? His Free Will is attacked in its very soul and protecting power, namely, in the State; not till that is secured can he study in security; so he drops everything else, he eschews every content of his Will, and through his deed wills Free Will. Thus the studious youth of 1861 responded to a call ever memorable.

During peace also there is the loud demand upon the citizen to vindicate Free Will. A modern brigand may descend upon him and

demand pay of him for the privilege of attending to his business. The cheapest way might be and usually is, to buy off the brigand; but the good citizen, at great outlay of time, expense and trouble, resolves to catch the offender and punish him, thereby vindicating Free Will. Thus the good citizen is determined to an action which declares him to be a free being willing his freedom.

The sins of Determinism are multifarious, running through the stages of that sphere which we called Determined Will. (See under Psychological Will.) Appetite may become a sin, though up to a certain point one has the right to gratify his Appetite. What is that point? Man is not to be determined by his Appetite to violate Free Will in himself or in others. Intemperance, excess in eating and drinking, is such a violation; likewise carnality. All Desires are permissible till they come into conflict with the realization of freedom, which should be the supreme Desire. Not the total extirpation of Appetite and Desire can be the true moral End, but their due subordination to the Free Will whose content is Free Will. Still further, the Motive, even the so-called selfish Motive, which looks to personal advantage, has its right so long as it does not stand in the way of the supreme Motive, which we have so often designated as Self-determined Free Will.

Nor can we here omit to mention what may be called the intellectual sin of Determinism. In sensuous indulgence the Will yields to the external determinant in the form of passion or appetite; it allows itself to be determined by its lower nature and thus is guilty of moral violation. But this very indulgence may become a doctrine, a principle of life; a man may say: "There is no truth in the world except what these senses give; therefore enjoy, enjoy." The tendency of such a doctrine can only be toward the perversion of our moral nature. It is the intellectual sin of Determinism, which debauches the spirit and then the body. Thus all systems of philosophical sensism, from Epicurus down to Spencer, not only fail to account theoretically for morality, but tend practically to lower the standard of moral life among men.

3. The sin of Self-determinism is the supreme form of Sin in the present stage. I deliberately assail the Free Will of my neighbor in some way; I take his property, injure his body, even destroy his life with intention. That is, I "make up my mind to do so," I determine myself to an act which is destructive of his self-determination. Such an act is usually said to be done with "malice aforethought;" the Free Will wills to destroy Free Will positively, maliciously.

In the previous stage the sin of Determinism

arose more through the passivity of the Free Will which permitted itself to be determined from the outside; in the present stage, however, which is the third, the Ego as Will returns to itself and resolves out of its own free power to destroy Free Will. Hence the sin of Malice is more deeply tainted than any sin of mere Determinism, being the internal active work of the Ego. The point is now reached at which the Self-determined determines itself to annihilate the Self-determined, and may rise up not only against the individual but also against Law and Institution, indeed against the whole sphere of actualized Free-Will.

This deeply negative condition of mind, especially where directed into a channel hostile to state and society, finds an illustration in Nihilism, which also has become a doctrine. The negative Ego sets up its own negativity as the true belief, and as the supreme matter to be realized in the world.

Aristotle has in a general way, distinguished between the sins of Determinism (Incontinence) and of Malice. Dante takes up this distinction, and upon it organizes his whole Inferno (See Canto XI). The deepest sins of Hell are those of Malice, which, however, have many gradations, till they reach down to the bottom and find their last embodiment in Satan himself, the malicious enemy of God and the Divine

Order. Aristotle did not have, could not have, any Hell; though he condemned, he could not damn the immoral, in that Greek world of his; he showed that Incontinence and Malice were hurtful to the person guilty of them, and to society also, that is, they were personal and social vices, not sins which violate "the Will of Heaven." In Christendom the Free Will of the sinner can commit a far deeper violation than in the Greek world; so he, the sinner, must create a Hell, in due response and counterpart to his own Free-Will. Such is the tremendous conception of Dante's Inferno, which is not to be abolished, but is to grow deeper with the deepening of man's freedom.

In fact, Dante's whole poem, the *Divine Comedy*, has, in its six centuries of existence, asserted itself most emphatically as the greatest ethical product of Christendom. It is deserving of study not merely for its wondrous literary beauty, but for that deeper excellence, the moral, which makes it, when truly taken up into the soul of the reader, a sacred catharsis, a holy pilgrimage of purification through the realm of the spirit. In a far profounder sense than any abstract treatise on Morals is it an ethical book, recording the soul's journey through all the stages of its fall, rise, and restoration, till it reach the presence of God Himself, which is the final goal of its freedom.

Accordingly, the next stage which we have to consider is this purgatorial process, the purificatory ordeal, through which the Ego has to pass in order to free itself of its deeply negative, immoral condition and to become reconciled with the positive, moral order of the world.

III. The third stage in the movement of Evil is its return, which means that it comes back to itself and serves itself up to itself. Thus, Evil is now overcome, undone, indeed self-undone; such is verily its ultimate outcome: it undoes itself, it is evil to itself. The Ego, being this total process within its own activity, has thereby the power of getting rid of its own evil nature.

We may employ a more formal, philosophical expression to designate the same thing: negation must in the end negate itself. Evil is, in its essence, negative; hence, when taken in its totality or made universal, it is seen to return to itself and therein to be self-negative. In like manner, if destruction be absolute, it destroys itself. When the cycle of Evil is complete, it has to come back to itself, and so it is evil not merely to something else, but specially to itself.

Looking at this movement once more we may use a still different nomenclature, one which has been employed in connection with the Will as unfolded in the preceding exposition. Evil, in general, may be called the inhibitory stage of Will, it inhibits the self-determined Free Will,

it is Free Will negating Free Will, and therein logically negating itself. So we have this third phase in the process of Evil, which is essentially the inhibition of the inhibition, or the removal of the inhibitory element of Evil.

It is manifest that the Ego, which as Will had become negative, inhibitory, destructive, is now to be treated to its own character, and therein is to find out what it really is, in its inherent nature. If I use my freedom to assail or destroy the freedom of others, I am to be served with my own deed, and thus I begin to discover what I am. I may refuse to accept the penalty, but then such refusal becomes a new violation, for just through my suffering I come to know what I have done.

This inhibition of the inhibition is the movement of the Will toward self-mastery, which fact we have often observed already in the development of the Psychological Will. Such is the chief meaning of Evil in the spiritual cosmos; it is a training out of limitation, inadequate conduct, sin; the Ego must always be transcending its bounds of weakness and wickedness and rising toward the perfect, which is freedom.

We shall notice this inhibitory movement, which is the undoing of Evil, in its three phases.

1. The evil deed as such or in its externality is inhibited or negated. Through his Will man puts his act into an external world, this act is

what he is to get back. This is the underlying idea of Justice. As you do, so you receive; if your deed be negative, it is brought back to you negatively. Such is the Law, in fact the archetypal Law of the World's Order.

There is a special institution whose function is to return to the doer his negative deed, when it has been made external and a reality. But beyond the State there is existent in the world a tendency which makes for the punishment of the wicked deed, though unwitnessed, or done by the supreme authority. It is often remarked that "the higher powers" interfere and bring home to the guilty person the consequences of his act, when other agencies fail or are inadequate. This consciousness is often expressed in an abstract form by such terms as Retribution, Nemesis, Vengeance, which receive a kind of deification, being regarded as a species of divinities ruling this lower world. Very deep is the conviction that the moral universe must give back to the man his deed in some fashion.

Punishment is unquestionably a most important element of the ethical order of things. Thus only does the individual get the actual experience of what he has done; he is made to know his own Evil, his own negative element as it is in its true nature. Sending forth his deed into the wide world, he would never find out what it really was unless it came back to him,

in its own native character, and made itself felt in its full negative intensity. Punishment bears in itself the seed of all progress, it is the gift of God, not of the Devil, unless you choose to change its true purpose and make it diabolic. Divine Justice is the foundation of the Divine Government of mankind.

The poets never tire of showing forth this Divine Justice, how it realizes itself in spite of apparently insuparable obstacles. Institutions may fail, still Justice must bring back to the doer his wicked deed. Shakespeare in many a play reveals what he calls "God's Justice," how it smites the guilty king who, by being head of the State, deems himself to be above all responsiblity, and out of the reach of all punishment. In the drama of Hamlet, Claudio, king of Denmark, though no one has witnessed the murder done by him, and though he be monarch and the source of Justice, is nevertheless overtaken by Justice. In like manner, Macbeth, though successful at the start, gets his own at the end.

We have already alluded to Dante's Inferno as giving a very striking account of Evil organizing itself in a System of Sins. The Will which is negative to Free Will, "which Heaven wills not," is thus seen in a very complete order. But the great object of Dante's Inferno is to set forth "God's Justice" which is the return of

the deed in punishment. It is the negative act of the Will which creates Hell and all its varied penalties corresponding to the character of the deed.

But now the Ego is to take up this external punishment of the deed and is to make it internal, a part of its own process. The result is a scission of the soul, which is often called remorse, or the spirit's punishment of itself. Here the Ego is manifestly twofold, divided within itself; it turns back upon itself and figuratively bites itself (remorse) for having done the deed. Thus the penalty becomes internal, self-inflicted, and the Ego performs before its own tribunal the complete process of Justice. Thereby that which was outer, coming from the State or from the Divine Order, is adopted, acknowledged, and made its own by the Ego. Justice as a virtue belonging to the individual Ego, we may here note by the way, will be considered later under a different head.

2. Such is what is commonly called Repentance, the process of the Ego in getting rid of its finite, inadequate, sinful action — the purification of the Will through the penalty. The Ego feels what it has done through the return of the deed, it becomes aware of its shortcoming, and with a renewed Will transcends its limitation. Thus does it assert its infinite nature, its freedom.

The penitent man is, therefore, the free man,

or on the road to freedom; he takes within himself the punishment which Justice hands him for his faulty conduct, accepts the same as his moral discipline unto freedom, and therein rises above the weakness and sin which have caused the lapse and its punishment. In the process of moral purification Repentance cannot be left out, and in any system, code, or science of Morals, Repentance occupies a most important place. It is certainly a profoundly moral act, though the Church has especially laid stress upon Repentance, establishing its rite and insisting upon its necessity.

Still every moral being, church member or not, must repent after having been involved in Evil. He must go through the inner process of undoing the spirit which led him to his negative act, he must get rid of his perverted Will, or he must negate his own negation.

That is, the Ego as Free Will in Repentance must not only inhibit the outward act, but must inhibit the motive, the content or the spiritual condition which led to the act, and which lies back of the same. The Ego must say to itself not merely, "I shall not do so again," but also, "I shall not wish or be tempted to do so again." If you are punished for a sinful deed, you must repent of the sin of which the deed is only an external manifestation. If you are punished for lying, you ought to be determined by your

punishment to get rid of the disposition to lie, for just that is the significance of punishment in the moral order. In like manner not simply the lustful deed is to be repented of, but the lustful thought is to be extirpated from the heart, ere Repentance has reached its true fruition.

The function of Justice with its penalty is, therefore, to bring forth Repentance in the punished soul. Then in the Moral Order appears Mercy or Forgiveness, which accepts the repentant one, and the whole process may be called that of Divine Love, which has established Justice, Repentance, Forgiveness, as the discipline of man unto perfection.

Every sort of penalty can have this discipline. You may have to undergo the spirit's suffering; the one in whom you had confided most implicitly and trusted with all the secrets of your love may turn out faithless and betray you in the deepest intimacy of your soul. In some way, stronger or milder, that is always happening; what can you make out of your sorrow? You may on close examination find in it some punishment for a concealed transgression of your own; you may discover it to be a penalty possibly for your own infidelity. It would be strange if you in your anguish did not find that you had been faithless in some relation, and if your tribulation did not show itself to be a penalty for some action or habit recalled by suffering. If you accept hon-

estly and fully the meaning of your penitential ordeal, you will at once start with a new resolution and a new life, rising above the old limits and the old transgression. But if you take your penalty as undeserved and unjust, if you refuse to see your own shortcoming in the light shed by affliction, you may come to curse your punishment, and blame the Moral Order in which it takes place and of which it is a part. That is the infernal disposition, is what puts men into the Inferno and subjects them to hellish torments; it is the awful condition of those whom punishment for their sins only makes more diabolic.

Opposite to this infernal is the purgatorial disposition, which draws out of all the trials of life the purification of the Will from its negative condition. Thus it wills purely freedom. For when you can give up that open or disguised passion which has made you unfaithful for years to your ideal, you have attained a new freedom, you are not determined from something outside the Free Will, but your end is the highest Good — the self-determined Free Will.

But this self-opposition and self-punishment in which the Ego finds itself in Repentance must finally vanish having performed their function. In such an inner conflict and separation the Ego is in its second stage, out of which it must pass into the third stage, that of return and reconciliation. Repentance is not to go on forever, else

the mind lapses into brooding and unnecessary self-trituration, and the soul, in getting free of one wound, inflicts upon itself another and possibly a deeper. There must be the judgment and the punishment, there must also be the pain and the contrition, yet there must finally be the restoration, as the object of Repentance is to save the person by destroying the sin.

3. We are now to have the return out of the dualism involved in Repentance. This is the release when the inner disposition to Evil is repented of, is undone, and the rent soul is brought back to harmony with itself and with the Moral Order.

The Ego, therefore, inhibits Repentance or Remorse when the latter has accomplished its work of getting rid of the inadequate or wicked act, and of the disposition which lies behind the same. That is, the inhibition must now be inhibited, the repentant process must be stopped, otherwise the Ego will remain in its own negative, self-destroying state. Through the aforesaid process the mastery over appetite, passion, evil, etc., has been attained, the negative energy of the Will has done its work in overcoming its own lower or inadequate determinations. The pang of remorse, having undone the sinful cause of itself, can be soothed; it is not good, not healthy spiritually to go on repenting forever, though everybody has to

repent in this world. Like every other kind of inhibition or prohibition, it must come back to itself; the prohibition too must at last be prohibited, else temperance itself may become intemperate.

Thus we have reached not only the inhibition of Evil through Repentance, but the inhibition of this inhibitory process, whereby the mind attains a new freedom. It is the mastery of Evil; the Ego has now the ability or inner capacity to meet temptation, sin, indeed all the negative elements of life, which it knows itself able to negate. Undoubtedly the man can drop back out of Repentance into transgression again, but the true and complete movement of his Ego is to advance to the mastery above mentioned, in which he can negate not only Evil, but negate this negation, and thus be getting free of the negative.

Such is the moral reserve of energy, the stored-up power which the soul is to acquire and lay away within itself by passing through the total process just described. A mastery of the Ego over all its negative elements we have named it, the ability to inhibit the ill disposition when it threatens to rise and to assert its supremacy. "I crown and mitre thee as master," having gone through the foregoing purgatorial process, the purification of the negative in the form of appetite, envy, pride, passion, and

finally the purification from this negation itself. Or, as it has been repeatedly stated, we must have the inhibition of Evil, and then the inhibition of this inhibition, as the Ego cannot remain fixed forever in its own inhibitory act, since that would be unfreedom.

Still we are to see that even this last mastery is a negative mastery, it is simply a negative power over all forms of the negative, even its own; in inhibiting the inhibition the Ego is still inhibitory. The latter may cancel every kind of vice, and then cancel even its own cancellation, but all that does not make it positively virtuous. So we are to pass out of this negative mastery into the positive mastery, out of the conquest of Evil into the triumph of Virtue. It is true, that Virtue, the positive, must have this total mastery of Evil within itself, but it has to be something more and much more. Such is our next theme, truly the culmination of the Moral Will in its willing the Self-determined Free Will.

The literature of the world is largely based upon the purificatory process, truly the inner process of the soul's ascent. The great poems of our European race turn upon the experience of the hero, who has in some form to go through this fiery ordeal of own negative nature, out of which he is to come forth a new man. This is, in a general way, the movement of Achilles

in the *Iliad*, through a double Wrath to a double Reconciliation; and the *Odyssey* has a movement of the same sort in the soul of its hero Ulysses. Such is the earliest European poetry, and the latest, in the case of *Faust*, its greatest example, takes explicitly the negative soul, "the spirit that denies," as its leading character. But the best poet of the purificatory process as shown in Repentance is Dante in his *Purgatorio*. He is himself the soul of his own song and its hero, who passes through the various grades of the Purgatorial Mountain (the second general stage of the process) till he reaches the Terrestrial Paradise (third general stage called in the above exposition the negative mastery), where he is washed in the fountains of Lethe and Eunoe, and is made ready for the ascent to Heaven (the abode of Virtue or Blessedness). Herewith, however, we have come to the final stage in the present exposition of the Moral Will unfolding towards its Ideal End.

(The author may be permitted, in this connection, to refer to his Commentary on Dante's *Inferno* and *Purgatorio* for a much fuller treatment of the preceding subjects than is here possible.)

III. Virtue.

Virtue we may call the positive mastery of evil, as the previous process of repentance ends in the negative mastery thereof, which gives the ability to be virtuous, the potentiality but not the reality. Virtue implies Evil, the negative of Good, yet also the inhibition of Evil, the power over it through the Will.

We may give the same thought a somewhat different turn. Virtue is Free Will, yet Free Will overcoming the negative of Free Will which wills Free Will. Such is the process implicitly or explicitly taken up into Virtue, which presupposes the possibility of a Free Will hostile to Free Will — which hostility is what must be canceled by virtuous conduct.

Virtue has in it, therefore, the *return to Good*, to the first stage of the present movement of the moral Will, namely, the implicit, immediate willing of Free Will, though this is not now the case; Virtue is not the simple, untutored Good, but is Good with the process of Evil in it indirectly or directly, it is the positive through the overcoming of the negative in an unconscious or conscious way.

Moreover Virtue is not merely the return to Good, but the *unceasing* return to Good, and therefore implies *habit*. Not the one effort, but the continued activity of the Ego in turning

from Evil to Good constitutes Virtue. Such a habit has been attained through the oft-willed repetition of the process unto Good; it is, nevertheless, a free habit, the only possible free habit, since it has Free Will willing Free Will as its content and end. Such a habit, therefore, does not enslave, but really liberates, making the man truly a free man for the first time, since his Free Will is now absolutely subject to nothing but itself.

It is an interesting fact that one of the oldest poems of the world, the Odyssey, calls itself a Return, and in its deepest depth images this process of virtue. Ulysses is essentially what may be called a Returner, seeking in his long wanderings to get back "to sunny Ithaca and prudent Penelope," to country and family, to his institutional life, from which he had been externally separated and internally alienated by the Trojan War. The poet casts into mythical shapes the many experiences of that Return, which indeed has made the poem one of the great educational books of the race, educating every reader who takes it to heart, into Virtue, specially that form of Virtue which we shall call institutional.

To take another analogy from one of the Literary Bibles of our Occident, the Divine Comedy — Virtue attained is the Paradiso, in contrast with the Purgatorio or the Inferno, through

which in some form the man has to pass with sorrow in order to reach the great fulfillment. "There was no other way," says Dante in the poem alluded to; the road to Paradise lay through the negative or infernal and the purificatory or purgatorial realms. Such is, indeed, the complete movement in the universal man, whatever exceptions there may be in the case of individuals. But mark! this is not the original Paradise of Adam and Eve at the beginning and in innocence; it is the Paradise attained at the end, by going through all the fires of negation and through all the pangs of repentance. Dante has transformed the Mythus of Paradise by making it, not the starting-point but the conclusion "of the journey of our life," in striking contrast with Milton's handling of the same story. Thus the Italian poet has constructed a world-poem, following even in his poetical architecture the process of the spirit in its deepest movement toward virtue and perfection.

Still we must consider this process as an attainment here and now, and not relegate it into the future, as Dante does or seems to do. Virtue is a present disposition which is always returning out of Evil, out of the negative elements of life, unto the Good. Virtue is activity, the activity of the Ego in the process just alluded to; not only Virtue as universal, but also every particular Virtue has this process in itself; it is in some

special form a return to Good, it is Free Will mastering the negative to Free Will willing Free Will, and asserting the latter positively. When I will my neighbor's freedom as my own, it is a virtuous act, but this is to be not once, but continuously, it is to be my habit, my unconscious soul-movement; I cannot do anything else without a reversal of my nature. Such is the habit of Virtue, which habit, however, is freedom itself, being Free Will which is willing Free Will.

This is, in general, the outcome of the moral Will as Ideal End with its threefold process of Good, Evil, Virtue, of which the last has in itself the return out of Evil to Good, and thus is the total process.

Many have been the attempts to define Virtue by the different writers on Morals. Such definitions undoubtedly have their value, as they tend to bring into relief some phase or side of this much-embracing and elusive term. Also the relation of Virtue to Good has exercised the ingenuity of subtle definers. But we do not believe that mere definition is the method of bringing clearness into this subject; the living process of the thought must be seized and unfolded; the movement of the Ego in the act of Virtue must somehow be set forth, so that Virtue is seen in its own self-development. In other words, the Psychosis is the pulse-beat of Virtue

as well as of Good; Virtue and Good are to be grasped in their own inner process as well as in their process with one another. A dead, processless definition cannot reproduce the self-active energizing thought to the thinking subject, who is himself just the self-active Ego.

Virtue is the Ideal End perpetually realizing itself; or we may call it self-realization in the highest sense, the supreme end of life is to realize your best self in conduct. This means not merely the individual self; you are to unfold all the society around you which has produced you. For you never made yourself intellectually or morally; your institutional environment nourished you, gave you the sustenance, which has made you an intellectual and moral being. What would you have been without the institutional order encompassing you with protection and support, the school, the family, the state, the church, which open to you their fountains of spiritual life? Now, they having fostered you, you are in turn to foster them; you must produce them, as they produced you; your will is to will this institutional Will, and make it a reality in the world. Thus it is also a reality in you, and you have Virtue; you are the Free Will which wills Free Will, now embodied in an institutional order, whose function is to return and secure the Free Will of the individual which fosters it.

You can realize your best self only through the social organism around you, which has made you possible, and so you must make it possible. You will develop in Virtue according as you take up and develop the institutional spirit. If you rise to a new insight, you must transform not merely yourself, but your institutions according to your new knowledge.

Virtue, then, is a practical matter, having its life in the eternal Now; it is not some future Golden Age, or far-away realization; it is made real by the virtuous deed willing freedom daily, hourly, momentarily. The doing, not the done, has the stress, though the done must not be omitted. Virtue or Good is not stowed away in something which is to be, but lives in its own activity. Nay, it is to descend into the lower realm of our nature and transfigure that; it is to become impulse, desire, motive, and therein make over our whole psychical life, even to the dim borderland of our least developed instincts.

Virtue being supremely the inner development of the Ego, will have the psychical process of the Ego, and will pass through the following main phases.

I. Conception of Virtue — which is Virtue conceived in its essence, revealing itself therein as the habitual overcoming of Evil or of the negation of Free Will. Thus it is the positive willing of the Good or of the self-determined

Free Will, showing itself in three stages, as Instinct, Knowledge, and Character.

II. System of Virtues — which unfolds this Conception of Virtue differentiating itself into manifold forms throughout the ages and according to the diverse relations of life. There will be the Ancient, Medieval, and Modern Systems, or the Heathen, Christian, and Renascent Systems, each of which will have its own organization of Virtue.

III. The Institutional Virtue — all the Virtues go back to the one universal Virtue, generating the same in its fullness, yet generated out of the same. This source as well as end of Virtue is the Institutional World; we shall, therefore, call the Virtue corresponding by the corresponding name — the Institutional Virtue.

To overcome the might of the negative Will, the individual cannot be left to himself, but must be trained by his community to such mastery. So he must will that Will of his community and be harmonious therewith in feeling and in deed; thus he attains Institutional Virtue, which supports and creates Institutions, while these in turn foster and secure all virtuous conduct, or at least make the same possible in the world.

I. THE CONCEPTION OF VIRTUE. We shall start with the Ego conceiving its own inner movement as Virtue. This, as before said, is Free Will overcoming perpetually in conduct the neg-

ative to Free Will; it is the Ego having its own free-acting energy as content of the deed, from the lowest impulse up to the highest rationality. The Conception of Virtue is the soul's primordial creation of Virtue, the generative act of the Ego which calls forth Virtue, and is the original spiritual germ out of which all virtuous conduct grows. This Conception is the creative source, the original virtuous act of the soul, the truly universal Virtue, mother of all the special Virtues. (Note the usage of the word *conception* here, not the modern English one, but that of Shakespeare and the Bible.) It may be said once more that this original germ is laid in the Ego by the institutional world, while the Ego's creative power is shown in unfolding it into the reality of Virtue.

So this Conception of Virtue will have a process, just the process of the Ego, which now we may see passing through its three stages.

1. There is, primarily, Virtue in its most immediate form, as an instinct, feeling, sentiment; as yet it is undeveloped; it has nevertheless the Ideal End of the moral Will, though wrapped up in the bud. This is the undetermined stage, yet capable of determination; man can act virtuously from instinct or sentiment; indeed some writers on Morals have held that this was the original source of moral conduct.

As an instance of this stage we may take the

soul of the child, which is not blank, as it might seem, is not a white sheet of paper upon which training and culture can write whatever they please, though it appears as if nothing were written upon it; that child-soul is really written over and over as well as through and through in sympathetic ink by all past time and all past ancestry; it has all the acquisitions and possibilities of its race inscribed there in latent symbols, which require the warming, fostering power of education to bring out into reality and visibility. The thought is there, the characters are there, yea the very language, still this all has to be learned, has to be made over, recreated, so to speak, by the new citizen of the world, who inherits so much, yet must earn anew his inheritance.

Thus it is with Virtue; it has its undeveloped, unconscious condition, which descends out of the past; the very language of Virtue, like all language, comes down from the long aforetime to the child, who, having it, has yet to acquire it, to realize it and himself. The child is getting hold of the fundamental soul-forms of its society and its race through human speech, which comes to it ready-made, yet has to be re-made, and filled with the creative meaning which primordially called forth the word out of the Ego. The infant acquires terms, which it may not at first understand, indeed may never fully under-

stand. Such a term is Virtue often, which the full-grown man may not *realize* adequately, though he may unconsciously act from it throughout his life. The child and the man, hearing words coming out of the social environment and expressing the same, are trained by them to an institutional order.

But this instinctive, unconscious state, in which the moral Ego is one with its environing society, must change, must separate within itself and become conscious; it must not only be Virtue, but also must know Virtue — whereat a new phase of the process makes its appearance.

2. Virtue, in the full process of its Conception, will show itself as self-knowing, which is verily the path of wisdom. The Ego as Virtue must know itself as such, in order to mount to higher ways; the universal Virtue is not to be limited to instinctive action, else it were indeed not universal; it must go through the self-separation, which is the condition of knowledge.

Every improvement in knowledge ought to bring with it, does bring with it in the virtuous soul, an improvement in virtue. Thereby you realize your new insight in conduct; but you also realize your limit-transcending spirit which is freedom, this being the true moral realization. The thing attained is just the attaining, is the moral process of the Free Will which continually wills Free-Will. Virtue is the realization of the

Psychosis (as Free-Will) in action. You must know, know the excellent, then transcend it, then have this transcending power as your end, as the only perfection of the Self.

It was a great epoch in the history of man, the chief epoch in his moral history, when he began to separate Virtue from its immediate instinctive unity in conduct, and to look at it abstractly, as it is in itself. Specially the time of the old Greek philosophers was such a period, of which the culmination was reached in Socrates, through whom the movement passed to Plato and Aristotle. For all Virtue and all the Virtues are an abstraction from the concrete institutional life of the time, and they were to a large extent defined, formulated, and ordered by those old Greek thinkers, from whom we have inherited the science of morals quite in its present form.

We may now ask, what is Virtue? One has to think abstractly in order to grasp it; the Ego makes this abstraction from the immediate act, and holds it fast, separated from any particular form of it, and then names such abstraction. Virtue belongs to the Ego, is the Ego seized as having the Ideal End (that of willing freedom) in itself, and knowing itself as having such Ideal End. Not till the Ego is virtuous in the deed, and then can hold itself apart from the deed, and know itself purely as Virtue, is any moral science possible. Thus has the consciousness of Virtue

arisen, and with it a new life, separated from all particularity, a truly universal life. For Virtue, being held apart from its particular manifestation, is imageless, an abstract term; then it is also universal, being thus elevated out of the particular. From this fact it comes that moral science is imageless, abstract, universal, and is the expression of an inner universal life of the Ego.

Still the self-knowing Ego as Virtue, having wisdom, cannot remain within its own internality, but as truly universal, must go forth into the world and again do the deed, which is not now its instinctive working, as in the first stage, but is its self-conscious, purposed activity.

3. Virtue as character has both sides, knowing and doing, the inner wisdom and the outer realization in conduct, in the deed. The virtuous character is the Ego not only willing the Good or the Ideal End, but also aware of itself having such an End and so being virtuous. Still in such a character wisdom likewise becomes a habit, a kind of unconscious activity, which, however, is no longer a merely natural instinct, but a habit which has wisdom in it determining the total man. Such is the wise man, doing and knowing, uniting the practical and theoretical, action and knowledge, in the conduct of life. In a character of the present elevation, there is no divorce between Will and Intellect, or between practice and theory.

But now, as such a character knows itself, knows what constitutes its inmost nature, it can tell what it is, it can impart itself to others not only by example but also by speech; thus it becomes an expositor and promulgator of its own essence; in other words, it becomes a teacher of Virtue. It refuses to be cooped up in speculation alone, or in action alone; the virtuous character must share its good, and help transform the world into its own image; by its own inner necessity it cannot rest till it makes others like itself.

The virtuous character does the virtuous thing and thinks the virtuous thought; but what is even greater, it imparts itself as universal, as Virtue, not alone by example, but in the universal form of the word, unto the fellow-man who will listen. The incarnation of the perfect man, doing, knowing, imparting — we may call him, in the best sense of the term, the philosopher; he is the harmonious unity of the highest deed, thought, word; he makes himself the best, and then gives his best self away, to the end that others be as good as he. Thus he is truly universal, being not merely himself as this individual, but making himself all and all the best. His means is also universal, namely Virtue, universal as word and thought.

The men who have given the supreme utterance of Virtue are justly esteemed the heroes, the moral heroes of the race. Two such char-

acters in our Occident have towered over all others, Socrates and Christ, who have been the exemplars and the teachers of the moral life, as well as of its science. Each has had his special sphere of Virtue, the one developing that of secular life, the other that of religious life. From both issue streams which have poured down through time and which are still fructifying our own moral life in the present.

But this suggestion brings us to a new fact: this one character being the embodiment and realization of Virtue as universal, must act in the world, must relate itself to the particular affairs of the world, that is, it must differentiate itself into many activities, each of which is filled with Virtue and indeed is a Virtue. Thus the stage of separation enters the present sphere, the universal Virtue or its Conception divides itself up into many Virtues, all of which, however, have in them something of the common principle. Thus while raying out in every direction into the practical world, they can be organized, having this principle of order.

II. The System of Virtues. We have accordingly come to the stage of separation in the sphere of Virtue, in which the one Virtue differentiates itself into many Virtues. This is a necessary phase in the development of the Ego; particularly does it spring from the Ego as Will, which has to act in all the diverse relations of life,

and, thus, as virtuous, has to manifest itself in these relations, which take the form of special Virtues. The virtuous character acting realizes itself in deeds; from such deeds the Ego abstracts this character, which is thereby an abstraction and is named a Virtue, and is furthermore knowable in its universal nature.

Again we must emphasize the truth that the science of Morals deals in abstractions necessarily, and must be finally grasped by reflection, by the abstract faculty. Virtue is such an abstraction, being separated from its living embodiment in the act, and held up by itself for the understanding. The same is true of Vice. Such an act of abstraction must be regarded in itself as a moral discipline, it enthrones Virtue in the Intellect and makes it self-knowing; it is the Ego seeking to grasp the universal principle of itself in conduct, hence abstracting from the sensuous and particular element of the deed. Still there must be always a return to this particular side, morality pertains to the Will; Virtue, after being abstracted and known, must go back and moralize conduct knowingly; thus conduct is no longer instinctive and immediate but mediated by Virtue. The moral process contains the act of abstracting, the abstraction as such or the Virtue, and the return to the particular element in life and conduct.

From Virtue, then, we pass into the multi-

plicity of Virtues. One of the leading questions of Ethics is, How shall they be ordered? Or, antecedent to this, can they be ordered? Some writers maintain that they cannot, with any degree of success. Still that would be a very serious surrender of a most important portion of the science. All systematic schemes have their difficulties, but they also have, in general, their merits, which more than counterbalance their drawbacks. In fact, no science of Morals can be complete without some kind of a system of Virtues. Undoubtedly the subject is very complex, as complex as human activity, still it must be capable of an order if mind, of which it is a product, has any such capability. The old Greeks grasped the problem aright on this side, they sought to find the order of the Virtues, and to embody the same in life. We moderns cannot leave out of account their work.

Every age, as is well known, has developed its characteristic Virtue and Virtues, which, once born and realized in the world, have not been lost to man, but have been transmitted as the precious moral inheritance of the spirit, to succeeding ages. To be sure, every such Virtue, unfolded into its primal life in one epoch, takes a different form in another later epoch; for instance, Temperance is not now what it was in the ancient Greek world. One of the functions of the science of morals is to trace this develop-

ment not only of Virtue but of each single Virtue; all have gone through the inevitable evolutionary process and have been transformed. The ultimate ground of such transformation can be found only in the movement of the Ego itself.

It behooves us, therefore, to try to classify the great moral process of the ages, which has, so to speak, precipitated in its passage all the Virtues now possessed by man, according to its historical order. This means not merely the outer adjustment to Time, but the inner movement in Thought, of the Moral Idea. As surely as the new Deed is called for and is done, the new Virtue or the new form thereof is abstracted from that Deed and becomes known, a part of the science of Morals.

As already stated, the separation or abstraction which lies at the root of Moral Science, was made by the Greeks. The Orientals had virtuous conduct and abounding exhortation thereto; they had also made in certain cases the abstraction of special Virtues; still they had no science of morality, certainly not in a developed form. So we shall begin with the Greeks, from whom the Occident has inherited, among many other spiritual treasures, that of Moral Science.

In this Occidental development of our subject we shall note three stages: —

1. The Heathen System of Virtues.

2. The Christian System of Virtues.
3. The Modern System of Virtues.

This last we shall not attempt to develop into anything like a system, inasmuch as it has hardly yet developed itself. Still its outlines may be noted as well as its fundamental Virtue. The Heathen and Medieval Christian Systems, on the contrary, have crystallized themselves into definite shapes, in spite of numerous diverse elaborations. Accordingly we may look at the development of the world's leading Virtues in their historical order.

1. *The Heathen System of Virtues.* This was developed in ancient Greece, specially in Athens by the great Attic philosophers, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Before them a beginning had certainly been made by the Sophists, and after them the development of Moral Science was carried on by the various Schools of Philosophy, particularly by the Stoics and Epicureans. There were many different classifications of the Virtues, but the one which has lasted longest and which has had the most important influence in organizing the moral nature of man, is that of Plato. In his *Republic* he divides the people into classes; in like manner he makes a division of Virtue into four chief Virtues, which have received many names, and are still called often the Cardinal Virtues. These are Wisdom, Courage, Temperance,

Justice, and have descended in full force to the present time, as a valid phase in the ordering of the Virtues.

On this line, then, the science of morality has unfolded in a most important aspect. We shall endeavor to give not merely the abstract definition of these Virtues, but (what is far more significant) their process in itself and with one another, as well as their movement out of antiquity into the present.

(1.) *Justice.* The great Virtue of the Heathen World was Justice, whose nature was seen by its sages, and made actual in Law and Institutions. The most famous definition of Justice ever given is probably found in the Pandects: *Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuendi.* The desire to give to each his own is the source of Justice in the human breast, and this desire is constant, never-ceasing, a habit. Such is indeed the Virtue of Justice in the individual.

The Ego as Free Will in Justice is ready to grant to every other Ego its right of action: each is to have its own essence, which must be finally freedom. To recognize the equivalency of all Egos, that one is worth as much as the other, is the foundation stone of the temple of Justice. It is not solely altruistic (other-regarding) nor egoistic (self-regarding); every Ego is of equal worth, to whomever it belongs; one is

to be as just to himself as to his neighbor, and as just to his neighbor as to himself.

Justice accordingly implies always the other Ego, and is founded upon the recognition of it as Ego. Justice has primarily this process: (1) this Ego, mine; (2) the other Ego, not mine; (3) the identification of the other Ego as mine in essence, which is their ideal unity. Its symbol from time immemorial is the balance with the two sides which are to be made equal by the Ego weighing or balancing internally. So Zeus, the world's Justiciary, weighs the fates of Troy and Hellas in the Iliad. The Golden Rule is based upon this equality of Egos, which we are commanded to recognize in our conduct.

Justice, therefore, in its pure form is quite identical with Virtue itself, is indeed the universal secular Virtue, something of which manifests itself in every particular Virtue. Justice may be found in Temperance, in Wisdom, in Punctuality, in the sense of Honor. Still it must have its own special manifestation, and so we shall regard it as the return of the Deed to the doer, the treatment of the Ego according to its desert, this desert being measured by what it has willed. I, as just, invoke the equivalent of my Deed upon myself; in like manner, I, as just, invoke the same equivalency upon the other Ego, thus regarding it as identical in essence with mine. Be just; have this process ever present in thy

soul when thou art dealing with others or with thyself. The return of thy Deed is thy deepest right, and thou must have it, whether thou desirest it or not; it cannot be refused at last either from within or from without.

Justice as the return of the Deed has in it the triple process: it is, first, positive, giving to the good Will the reward of the good; it is, secondly, negative, punitory, giving to the bad act its return in punishment; thirdly, it is remedial, or is intended to be so in the long run, though it may not be so in particular cases, for that depends on the individual punished. He may decline to take the just penalty, and blaspheme the moral order of which Justice is an integral element; he may not negate his own negative conduct, undo his wicked disposition, of which the punishment is the bitter reminder. Such a person is infernal in temper, and has put himself into Inferno, which is made for him inasmuch as he makes it himself.

Justice is the chief discipline of the individual, the nation, and the race. All are to be served to their Deed, and thus learn to know what it is and what they are, in their shortcomings, follies, sins. In this way and in this way alone do they get to know themselves and become able to rise to the higher conduct. Justice is never to be left out of the school, the kindergarten, the family, the business relation; it is

the soul of the state. There is a World's Justice which takes in hand the nation, scourges and may destroy it, in return for its deeds—so saith History.

Plato in his *Republic* (Book IV.) makes Justice the pervasive Virtue, the fundamental element of all the other Virtues. In a similar thought Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* Book V. 1. 12) declares Justice to be the most excellent of the Virtues, "perfect, because its possessor is able to exercise it toward another person, and not only in reference to himself." In the Athenian democracy, the citizen, who was a kind of a general judge both in public affairs and in private litigation, had a great field for exercising his sense of Justice. But this individual Justice of Greece was raised out of its subjective capricious condition and made universal and objective in Rome through Roman Law. Yet here too a capricious element entered in the Emperor, who was above the Law. Of this dualism the world has struggled long to free itself, and to bring the ruler also under the law as well as the humblest individual, which final act of Justice seems to be most completely accomplished in the Constitution of the United States. Thus there has been a great development of Justice from the old Greek Republic to the modern American Republic, from the ideal thought of it in those Athenian philosophers to its realization in the institutions of these days.

(2) The fundamental Virtue, Justice, is now to differentiate itself into three leading forms or Virtues which are distinct from itself yet partake of its essence. These are Courage, Temperance, Wisdom.

Justice, as already said, goes back to the recognition of the equivalency of Egos. When I act justly by you, I recognize your Ego as of equal worth with mine. When Justice gives you back your Deed, it declares your equality with all other Egos, who are subject to the same law. Justice asserts your freedom, it wills the self-determined Free Will. Now this universal Virtue whose end is freedom is going to particularize itself in three forms, each of which will be a Virtue itself as well as unfold the process of Virtue.

Courage. The Ego as Free Will asserts itself against an external determinant of itself, against some power which seeks to subject it from the outside. The individual rises in his majesty and attacks this foreign assailant, not shrinking from the conflict. Herein he shows the Virtue of Courage, maintaining his freedom against an outer force which threatens him with pain or even loss of life. Thus we have in courage the self-assertion of the free Ego against being determined by the external world.

But this special Virtue will also have its movement, its Psychosis, being born of the Ego.

(*a.*) There is, first, the immediate impulse on the part of the Ego to rush forth and to defend itself against assault. The response to the external stimulation is direct, instinctive as it were, and gives rise to that phase of Courage which may be called Valor, which, however, being uncontrolled by wisdom, leads to an excess, to recklessness, which must be put down.

(*b.*) There is, secondly, the inhibition of this valorous impulse, which drives outwardly; the blow, seen to be unavoidable, is allowed to take its course. This is the Virtue of Endurance, the other side to Valor; it is the Courage of passivity, of sufferance, and is often greater than the explosive courage of impulse. In an army the soldier must have both, he must be able to make the charge with impetuosity or to stand the charge without fear or panic.

(*c.*) This demands the complete possession of both Valor and Endurance united in a higher Virtue, which we may call Fortitude. Such is the supreme Courage, which accepts pain, misfortune, suffering, but will not let them determine the soul internally; this still asserts its fealty to the moral order, and does not drop down to pessimism or to despair or even to indifference. Nor is this Courage mere Endurance or Stoicism, it is active and works over misfortune into a new life. Old pictures of

Fortitude are Eumæus in the Odyssey, and at his best the Psalmist.

Thus we note the never-ceasing process of Virtue in Courage, which is itself a specialized Virtue, but, being the Psychosis, still further specializes itself into Valor, Endurance, Fortitude. In such fashion Virtue is self-defined — self-separating yet self-unifying.

Temperance. Connected with this Virtue is the notion of an inhibition, more or less explicit, which pertains not so much to an external, as to an internal determinant. With Temperance, therefore, the moral world starts in a pronounced manner, inhibiting Impulse, Desire, Caprice, and all subjective determinations which interfere with Free Will, or which prevent the soul from being absolutely just.

Temperance differs from Courage inasmuch as the determinant is not external, but internal, some form of the Ego itself, which stops itself in the immediate exercise of its freedom, such as appetite, passion, pleasure, even whims and notions. It resists the alluring temptation from within, not the threatening assault from without. Yet Courage cannot do without the inhibition, as we saw in the case of Endurance and Fortitude.

Temperance may, in a general way, be regarded as the Ego with its assertion of Free Will putting down all kinds of determinism — Impulse, Desire, Caprice. Thus it is the coun-

terpart and corrective of the sin of determinism, which has been previously considered. Here, too, we shall find a process, which indicates, like that of Courage, the Psychosis.

(*a.*) There is the immediate inhibition of the determinant in the form of appetite, passion, pleasure. Such is the phase of Self-denial, at least in its first crude manifestation, which violently suppresses all gratification. Asceticism, monasticism, and other similar doctrines take this view of Temperance, in which the inhibition is prohibition, and so Self-denial in its excess reaches out toward self-negation. But such conduct is seen to be really intemperate, and destroys what it seeks to further; hence it in turn must be negated, inhibited.

(*b.*) Then Temperance arrives at the inhibition of the inhibition, whereby the Ego possesses the ability to indulge or to stop indulgence. This is not yet the positive, but only the negative mastery of Temperance, the power of permitting or vetoing the determinant. This we may call Self-possession.

(*c.*) But the positive mastery must be directive, is Self-control, which has the power of choosing its determinant in view of the supreme end of freedom. Temperance also must have and must manifest the ideal purpose of all Virtue, which is the realization of Free Will, and this it does in Self-control, which asserts itself over all

determinants, selecting the right one, and inhibiting the rest.

Such is the process of Temperance, the great Virtue, which unfolds itself into the cycle of temperate Virtues — Self-denial, Self-possession, and Self-control. For Virtue, partaking of the nature of the Ego, must generate its own varied forms, and reveal a Psychosis of Virtues in its movement; the Virtues, consonant with the psychical activities of the Ego (from which indeed they spring) are not to be picked up at any point, examined, and then dropped for something else which may happen to turn up. Their genetic relation must be discovered and set forth; thus they form a true moral order and unfold into the true science of Morals.

Temperance was especially the Greek Virtue, which shunned all excess and sought the golden mean or moderation. This is the word of their art, of their religion, of their philosophy, and of their character at its best. They were not ascetics, they did not eschew delight; they would prefer a temperate intemperance, to an intemperate temperance.

When the individual has realized within himself both Courage and Temperance, he is the master of the outer and the inner determinant, he controls outer fate and inner passion, he may be called the wise man, whose Virtue we shall next consider abstractly.

Wisdom. The meaning of the term has not only a practical but also a theoretical side; not without a profound suggestiveness does Wisdom imply the union of Will and Intellect in their highest manifestation. You think the best and you do the best; your best thought and your best deed are one in Wisdom at its best. The wise man is active as in Courage, is self-controlling as in Temperance, and, at the same he sees the Ideal End for which he is active and for which he controls himself. Knowing is doing, and doing is knowing, each having as its content the Good, or at the highest, the ultimate Good, which is freedom.

The wise man, however, is not complete in Wisdom if he stops with himself; he must impart what he has, he must share his treasure, making himself a mediator for others. Of Wisdom it may be said more than of any other spiritual thing, that he alone possesses it who gives it away. Thus he may approach the divine embodiment of Virtue, he becomes the creative source of it, creating a virtuous world by his own fiat. Plato and Aristotle were virtuous men, taught by the discipline of life and of thought to be wise; but Plato and Aristotle as makers and expounders of the System of Virtues, imparting the same to their own age and to future ages, have a new supreme Virtue, that of Wisdom, for

all time, Wisdom eternal, union of the universal Thought and Deed.

We shall find that Wisdom, like all Virtue, has its process, which may be given as follows: —

(*a.*) There is, first, a native Wisdom, quite instinctive, the gift of nature, implicit as yet in the Ego, not aware of itself, though active. Its vision is immediate, its knowledge intuitive; this is the natural foundation upon which the final completed structure is reared. For there must be in the individual a potential wisdom, which is to be made real, an original bent that way which shows itself unconsciously.

(*b.*) Then there is a worldly Wisdom so-called, which sees the means for finite ends. Life, every day indeed is full of such ends, which the practical requirements of our existence demand to be accomplished. An inhibitory power is involved in this kind of wisdom, we inhibit what does help forward our purpose. "Neither a borrower nor a lender be," says Polonius, whose parting speech to his son in *Hamlet* is a code of worldly Wisdom. Such people are usually called practical, being little troubled about any ideal end; their life is made up of lesser ends of personal interest, and their Wisdom consists in seizing the means for such ends as they appear on the surface of the moment. Prudent such

persons are often called and their Virtue may also be named Prudence, an inferior Wisdom, though by no means to be despised, for without it even the philosopher, gifted with his higher Wisdom, is apt to get wrecked.

Manifestly Prudence (or wordly Wisdom), both in its positive and in its inhibitory forms shows Wisdom divided, cut up, applied to a multiplicity of ends and means, and of finite relations generally. It calculates, weighs, judges, and then acts, though sometimes it also works in the manner of an instinct. Such is the separative stage of Wisdom, which, however, is ultimately one and has one end.

(c.) The third stage is the Wisdom which may be called philosophic; it has insight into the ultimate end and acts from the highest point of view, in contrast with worldly Wisdom, and also in contrast with native Wisdom, which acts unconsciously in harmony with the ultimate end. Still the unconscious and the conscious Wisdom have in common the one ideal purpose or content, which is the realization of Free Will. But you do not realize your best Self in the best way till you have imparted your best to others and made them best too; thus they become wise men imparting Wisdom.

Such is the Psychosis of Wisdom as a Virtue, in which thought reinforces action, in which reason clarifies conduct. Each stage by itself

may be regarded as a Virtue; thus we have another garland of three Virtues — native Wisdom (immediate Vision), worldly Wisdom (Prudence), philosophic Wisdom (Insight), all of which, however, constitute one process of Wisdom.

(3.) It is manifest that the three Virtues above set forth — Courage, Temperance, Wisdom — form a Psychosis in themselves, they belong together in one process, they intermingle and flow together. Hence comes the frequent statement that they have no hard-and-fast bounds against one another; each is a part of the other, yet is itself, also. This finds its ground in the fact that they all, being born of the Ego, participate in its fundamental movement.

For the same reason each of these Virtues, though a part or a stage of a higher Psychosis, becomes a complete Psychosis in itself, and thus generates a new cycle of Virtues. Such we have seen to be the case in Courage, in Temperance, and in Wisdom; each is genetic and shows itself a creative principle in the moral cosmos; each being a Virtue brought forth and ordered, brings forth and orders in turn a small family of Virtues.

Thus the procedure is a continued genesis of forms, and the science of morals is not determined from without, but is a self-evolution according to its own inner creative energy. In particular, the system of Virtues systematizes itself.

We may indicate in brief outline the fact that the three mentioned Virtues form a Psychosis. Courage is more the immediate, positive stage, corresponding to the direct fiat of the Will. Temperance on the other hand suggests more the inhibitory element, thus indicating the second or separative, negative stage. Wisdom holds in itself the mastery over the immediate and the inhibitory, or the positive and the negative stages through its intellectual element, which, however, utters itself in action, thus showing a return to the positive fact of Courage. Still each of these forms plays into the other, not being crystallized into hard lines, but being itself a full process of the Ego and thus a new Psychosis.

Justice, which returns to the doer the equivalent of his Deed, becomes a conscious principle in Wisdom, and thereby completes its movement. The doer can now have within himself the total process of Justice, he knows his own inadequate act, punishes it (repentance), and is restored out of his negative condition to harmony with the moral order.

2. *The Christian System of Virtues.* The Ego now has its own inner process of Justice, being culprit, judge, punisher, or rewarder, returning his own deed on himself. Thus he internally satisfies the Law and the Lawgiver, who grants to him pardon, forgiveness, freedom, whose principle is, therefore, merciful, seeking penitence

and salvation for the finite man. Thus the negative side of Justice is negated, and the human being, though a transgressor, can be saved, can save himself, in a new World-Order with its new principle of Mercy or Love. Such is Christendom in contrast to Heathendom with its Justice.

Christendom, therefore, will have its own set of Virtues, with its own central Virtue, which may be called in this its most general form, Love. Christendom, however, does not set aside or destroy Justice, it rather preserves the same, keeps it from destroying itself. For the world in its finitude had perished by mere Justice, and therein Justice itself must have perished. The Heathen world was tragic, knew itself to be tragic, and became in its fundamental fact the theme of tragedy. So mediation arrives and rescues the perishing soul, which greatest turning point in the history of the race is represented in the person of the Mediator.

Love, this central Virtue of Christendom, has as its essence, the giving up of the Self, and the living in and for another, but just this sacrifice of Self is its own true attainment and possession. Love has in it always the process: first is the Self-assertion, the hard, unbroken individuality; second is the Self-surrender, "the broken and the contrite heart;" third is the Self-return, the reconciliation which is bliss.

In the religious sphere of Christianity Love is

made the fundamental attribute of divinity. God is Love, "he so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten son;" that son, Christ, is Love, revealing its entire process in his life, death, and resurrection; to the Father's and the Son's Love, must be added the Mother's Love in Mary. From this divine source is manifested Love, which man is to appropriate and make the basis of a new order of things, named after its founder and prototype, Christendom. Justice in Heathendom smote the transgressor and smites him still; but now, if within himself he can perform the total process of Justice, and thereby vindicate his own infinite nature, he can be received and restored by Love, having made himself one with God. Love is, therefore, the fulfillment of Justice, the real end and purpose of the Law, which without Love is negative, and becomes, or may become, the destroyer.

The Christian Virtues, like the Heathen Virtues, are an abstraction from concrete life. There was, first, the living embodiment in the act, then came the separation of the Virtue from its outward manifestation whereby it could be known in itself and was made universal. As the Greek philosophers elaborated their System of Virtues, abstracting the same from its unconscious realization in the Heathen world, so the Christian theologians elaborated the moral System of Christendom from the existent reality.

(1.) *The religious medieval Virtues.* These are the well-known three — Faith, Hope, Charity (or Love) — often called the theological Virtues, as having been specially worked out by the Christian Theologians, or as expressing man's relation to the Divine, to the unseen world. They all spring out of the universal Christian Virtue, Love, and are various applications of it; they all have the process of self-sacrifice and self-recovery.

They are first manifested in the individual deeds and sayings of Christ as reported in the Gospels of the New Testament, which contain them in their implicit, unseparated form. Then they are theologized, or wrought over into their abstract shape by the Christian writers; St. Paul makes the beginning which is continued by the Fathers and Theologians of the Church. Still these Virtues, though defined and formulated, have their content in the Divine Person. Finally they are completely moralized, whereby faith in God becomes also faith in the moral order of the world. These Virtues, therefore, go through an evolution in the course of the ages; they are at first biographical or perhaps mythological, expressed in a life or a story; then they are theological, expressed in an abstract form which, however, does not let go the personal element; at last they are moral purely both in form and content.

Faith. This Virtue in the Christian sense is an act of the Intellect accepting God and the Divine Process in the Trinity, and submitting the Self to His Will. There are many kinds of finite faith or beliefs in the world, but divine Faith has just the Divine for its Content. It is the conviction of Godhood, it beholds, has the celestial vision, and "sees God."

Faith as a moral doctrine regards the ethical order of the world and rests upon its supremacy. It feels and finally sees the great ultimate to be freedom; it holds that the universal Ego as Free Will is forever realizing Free-Will. Such is moral Faith, the grasping of the Divine Spirit as ethical, as willing Free-Will.

Faith has also its process within itself, it is subject to the Psychosis which reveals its deepest nature.

(*a*.) There is, first, the implicit Faith, which has no question, no doubt, no separation. Image and dogma are one, undivided; the Ego is not troubled with their conflict.

(*b*.) Faith explicit, divided, dogmatic; it has become a formula whose content, however, is still the image, the sensuous fact, in which we must believe.

(*c*.) Faith moralized banishes the image and puts in its stead an abstract content; thereby it becomes the conscious reliance on the moral order which is to realize to man his Free-Will.

Hope. The Virtue of Hope as conceived by the Christian mind is well defined in one of the sentences of Peter Lombard: *Est enim Spes certa expectatio futuræ beatitudinis veniens ex Dei gratia et meritis precedentibus.* Hope is of the future, and of all time; Hope is an act of Faith which relates to the individual hoping; my Faith affirms a Divine Order, my Hope believes that I, this individual, will be saved in that Divine Order. God exists (Faith), and so man will be saved (Hope).

Morally my Hope is that I, willing the good which is freedom, will have the good imparted to me by the supreme order. Here, too, we may unfold a process in Hope.

(*a.*) Hope as immediate, which expects future blessedness, or the attainment of Paradise, through the Mediator. Religious Hope.

(*b.*) Hope as a separate Virtue, separated from its immediate unity with the Divine Person, yet consciously having him as its content. Dogmatic Hope.

(*c.*) Hope moralized keeps before the individual the sustaining ideal of moral perfection. I shall realize the good if I pursue the good; the promise of hope is, Ye shall be perfect, "as your Father in Heaven is perfect." Moral Hope.

Charity (*Love*). This Virtue, to be a celestial or theological Virtue, must have the Divine Per-

son as its content or object. If we love God who loves man, we are led through him to love humanity, indeed to realize in ourselves the Divine Process of Love, which in the supreme sense of the word is Charity. Thus Charity transforms its follower into the image of God, and makes that follower a second Providence in his sphere, manifesting love and providential care for his fellow-man. This Virtue like the others has its process.

(*a.*) There is the immediate stage of Charity, which springs from the direct imitation of the Divine Person in his earthly career. His actions are followed with more or less literalness, and so the believers in him become charitable through imitation.

(*b.*) Charity must be theologized, that is, separated from its embodiment, and held up by itself as a doctrine, which is to be grasped abstractly, yet as having its sanction from the Divine Exemplar.

(*c.*) Charity will also be moralized, whereby the individual is to make himself into a kind of moral order for the world around him, doing works of benevolence and especially willing and establishing Free Will for his fellow-man as the greatest gift possible.

It has always been felt that these three religious Virtues — Faith, Hope, Charity — stand in deep kinship with one another, so that all

three are often spoken of together, as if making the one grand cycle of Christian Virtue. They unquestionably show that process which we have so frequently called the Psychosis. Faith is the immediate stage, showing the direct acceptance of the Divine Person by the Ego as a fact, the unhindered seeing of Him by the soul in the present. Hope implies the separation between the Ego and the Divine into the Present and the Future, yet it also aspires for the unity between the two; and hence is "the future expectation of blessedness." Charity is this unity realized here and now, on earth; I become one with God through Charity; I, loving God who loves man, take up Him into myself along with His love, and thus I realize in my present life His spiritual nature. Through Faith we get God immediately; through Hope we become aware of our real separation from Him, and of ideal unity with Him, in Heaven; through Charity we overcome this separation, and realize this unity on earth, becoming like Him in Love. Thus Charity is the perfection and fulfillment of Faith and Hope, which, however, are necessary stages of the Ego's rise to an ideal end, here the assimilation to God.

Nor must we forget the important fact that each of these Virtues, though forming by itself a stage of the Psychosis, has also a total Psychosis within itself. Each portion, however small,

sprung of the Ego, must show the latter's complete movement; thus each is all, though it be a part likewise. Lines absolutely fixed, definitions rigidly laid down, cannot be imposed upon the free spirit, which is at home only in its own process. The Ego must generate its Virtues in moral science as well as in moral life.

(2.) *The secular medieval Virtues.* The great dualism of the Middle Ages was the separation into the religious and secular worlds, of which the latter was at first subordinate to the former, then an equal conflicting antagonist, then triumphant. The Ego, being separated from the Church, that is, from the religious mediation with the Divine, falls back upon itself, and determines itself quite apart from its institutional relations. For the realm of secular institutions had declined from its ancient and had not yet risen to its modern validity; the ecclesiastical overshadowed the secular organism; State and Family were indeed tolerated, but the true life was the religious life. This great historical movement of a thousand years produced its own peculiar class of Virtues, derived from the Ego, which when out of the sphere of the Church, was left to itself, having no other content but itself, if deprived of its religious world. The result is, we witness an intensely subjective principle the moment we pass outside of the devotion to the Church.

The Knight is thus quite the opposite of the Saint, the latter yields up absolutely his Ego to the service and the glory of God, the former performs his service from a profound sense of his own selfhood and its infinite worth.

The Knight takes his starting-point from his Ego, and acts from an overwhelming and sometimes distressful reverence for himself, which he calls his personal Honor. Now this self-reverence is a good quality within its limits, but it has clearly some dangers. Being so purely subjective, it is exposed to all the caprices, notions, and fantastic turns of the Ego, and therein dissolves in its own unreality. (See Don Quixote, *passim*).

There can be no doubt, however, that chivalry sprang from the Christian Occident, though it passed over into the Mohammedan Orient. It is also manifest that its fundamental Virtue is Love, which is likewise that of religious Christendom. But that Love, though starting from the Ego, is bent around directly into the Ego, without passing through the Divine World in its return; there is still the ready sacrifice of pleasure, selfish ends, cares of life, but not so much for God and His Church as in obedience to the idea of a lofty personal selfhood. The Self is the Divine and I must realize it divinely, says the Knight at his best. Therewith he develops the Virtues of Chivalry, genuine Virtues still valid

and ever to remain so, which place their stress upon the infinite worth of the Person.

Of these Virtues of Chivalry we can distinguish three leading ones, which are the parents of many others, yet they form one cycle of chivalrous Virtue. These are Honor, Loyalty, Love (romantic).

Honor. This is the most immediate Virtue of Chivalry, expressing the reference and the subjection of all external relations whatever to the inner Self. Everything in the world in the way of action the Ego is to determine as consistent or inconsistent with its conception of Honor, that is, of itself. The Knight is a warrior and fights for his religion or his country; still back of these he is fighting for his Honor, and in all that he does there is this reference to his own subjectivity, this intimate internal relation to himself. Thus he asserts the primal independence of the Ego, and makes it the inner secret tribunal of all his conduct. It is his true Holy of Holies, the sanctuary of his spirit, which he deems his first duty to keep inviolable. To it he makes the sacrifice of the whole outer existence of himself, for the sake of its sanctity he may defend the sanctity of the Church or of the State, or may not. He is in love with his own Ego as he loves God; he venerates himself as he might venerate a deity. Thus his secularity turns about and yet retains his religiosity.

Honor is roused by many different objects, or it has manifold stimulants which cause it to assume diverse forms. Herein we may observe its process.

(*a.*) Honor is first in immediate unity with its religious world, or also with its secular institutional life. The Knight goes on a crusade for the sake of his Church, deeming it a point of honor to do so; he will also battle for his State and his Family for the same reason. There is as yet no separation between his subjective Self with its injunction, and the behest of the religious or political institution. Still this separation is sure to come, as it lies in the very nature of Honor.

(*b.*) The Ego, acting in an external world and in relation to other Egos, is violated, for it is not recognized at its own estimation of its worth. Deeming itself of infinite value, and asserting itself as final judge of that value, it is certain to collide, sooner or later, with another Ego which has the same opinion of itself. Hence the ever-recurring conflicts and the meetings on the field of Honor, whereof the duel is a pale relic, illegal now in most countries.

(*c.*) Honor may become moralized by filling it with an institutional content whose end is the realization of Free Will. I am not to dishonor man or woman, but recognize them in their infinite worth.

Loyalty. This Virtue involves the Will of another, the lord or the sovereign, to which the Ego now subordinates itself and thus gives up its own Will in appearance. Yet this surrender of Self is simply to another similar Self, which asserts its own subjectivity in like fashion, whose Virtue is Honor, and will recognize and protect the Honor of the vassal. Thus the mutual personal service of feudalism comes to light, the Knight devotes himself to his lord personally, not to the State or to some great cause which the latter represents. Thus each finds the reflection of himself in the other, which fact constitutes the reciprocal bond. In this Virtue we may note the following movement: —

(*a.*) There is the immediate unity between the two Egos, the vassal and the lord, each respecting and defending the other's Honor as his own. If that Honor is assailed in the one, it is in the other, and personal Loyalty is called upon to make defense.

(*b.*) Still the breach between the two Egos is bound to make itself felt in time, since each is the determinant of its own Honor. The lord or the vassal may do a wicked act, thereby religion may conflict with Loyalty. Which is the loyal vassal to obey, the Church or the Sovereign, in case of a collision between the two authorities? Such a question often arose in the Middle Ages, the wars in consequence form no small

portion of medieval history. The Loyalty, however, which clings to the person who is in deep error or is guilty of positive wrong, begins to undo itself.

(*c.*) Loyalty, therefore, must go back to the unity of the two Egos, and base itself upon their having a worthy end as their content, and not merely upon a common empty subjectivity. Thus I can be loyal to the man who has a noble purpose in life, and he can return Loyalty to me as his knight or vassal, who will serve him faithfully in the fulfillment of his purpose. Loyalty is to be fully moralized by putting into it the great end of freedom, which thus becomes the tie binding loyal souls.

Love. This medieval Love, taking its color from chivalry, is usually called romantic Love. The Ego in its full intensity gives itself up to one of the opposite sex, and therein gains itself, and finds supreme happiness in such a return to Self. Romantic Love does not have the Family as its content, but exists for its own sake; the Ego as having an infinite worth enjoys its own Love and does not look to any institutional end. When there is no return through the lady's Self, when she gives no requital to the lover's sacrifice, the result is a deep scission which sings its pain, like Petrarch. Love, too, will have its process in this sphere.

(*a.*) There is the immediate unity between

the man and the woman, the lord and lady, who surrender and recover each other through each other without passing through the breach, possibly at first sight.

(*b.*) But many things occur to break up this harmony and to separate the two Egos. These are known in the drama and novel and in other kinds of literature which deal with this theme as the collisions of Love. "The course of true love never did run smooth," says Shakespeare; the other relations of life assert themselves strongly against this emotion, which may conflict with its own institution, the Family.

(*c.*) Love, even romantic Love, can only preserve itself by realizing its true end in the institution. The lord must have just this lady and none other, and she must have just this lord and none other; thus each Ego asserts its absolute right; still this emotion must find its true outcome not merely in its enjoyment of itself but in the Family. I am not to love another man's wife, for thus I assail the very purpose of Love, which is to help realize the moral life of man.

From what has been said it is manifest that these three secular Virtues — Honor, Loyalty, Love — of the medieval period form a Psychosis which may be seen in the following way of connecting them in thought. Honor is the Ego turning back upon itself and making itself the determiner of conduct and therein asserting its

own infinite worth. Loyalty is the Ego as inferior or vassal subordinating itself to another Ego which is superior, the lord; thus the Egos are separated by an external relation, yet internally both are united by the one principle of Honor, which both possess. Love is the overcoming of all separation between the two Egos, now of different sexes, which immolate themselves to each other, yet recover themselves and become completely one in feeling and thought through such mutual sacrifice.

(3.) *The central medieval Virtue.* We have come back to the central Christian Virtue, which we have already designated as Love. This Virtue developed to its fullness during the Middle Ages, when Christianity controlled the world, at least the European world. Of course Love as the sexual passion had been known and celebrated from time immemorial, and Love as the deep emotional unity of husband and wife was a favorite theme with Homer, as is seen in his Hector and Andromache, Ulysses and Penelope, Alcinous and Arete. But Christendom transforms it and makes it a universal Virtue, the central one of the great new order arising. That simple injunction, "love one another," has been indeed a most marvelous little piece of leaven, leavening ages and continents.

It will be observed by the careful reader that in the preceding account Love has taken both a

religious and secular form — Charity and Romantic Love. Just as the Christian medieval world was dualized into Church and Laity, so its fundamental Virtue divided itself into the two leading Virtues, which still further reproduced themselves in many other special Virtues according to the relations of life.

Love as Charity was the sacrifice of Self to the Divine Ideal and to its institutional organism, culminating in the individual making himself the dispenser of Love to others, as God does. So the lover unites himself with the deity, and becomes the latter's embodiment and providential agent.

Love as secular (romantic) was also the sacrifice of Self, but to another person of the opposite sex, who now takes the place of God and Church, in reflecting Love back to the one who loves. Thus romantic Love fills the woman with the Divine Ideal, of which she is the representative or substitute. Each side, the lover and the lady-love, becomes the Divine Ideal to each other, which is thus divided and incorporated in two living persons.

Love as institutional breaks up the medieval idea at last, since it has as its end the Family which it realizes and sanctifies. Love finds its corresponding institution and so turns away from the Church with its monasticism and celibacy. So it returns to institutional life, but to a

secular one, yet in such return keeps its religion and its romanticism, marriage being sealed by the Church on the one hand and by the mutual devotion of the individuals on the order.

The dualism between romantic Love and the institutional bond is what furnishes perhaps the most strange and enigmatic fact in the life of Dante. His romantic Love was for Beatrice Portinari whom he almost deifies, placing her in Heaven and making her his guide through the Paradiso. But his wife was Gemma Donati, the mother of his six children; yet he never mentions her in any of his works. This apparent contradiction in his life has always puzzled modern readers of his poem, who find it difficult to understand why he should idealize his Love for another woman and leave wholly out of the account his own wife. The Ego in romantic Love enjoys itself purely, and feels itself obstructed or even tainted by the actual domestic tie, or perchance by the actual presence of the person. So Dante's Beatrice was not only not his wife but was not even alive when his Love was at its most glowing point of intensity.

When we come down to Shakespeare we have a very different conception of Love. With him its grand object and content was the Family, all its collisions were to be harmonized at last by the individual rising to the institution. The end of the comedy is that the pair, whose Love encoun-

ters some kind of obstacle, get married, and thus realize their Love, which may have been and may continue to be very romantic. Moreover, Shakespeare throws the chief burden of Love's conflict upon the woman, who has to mediate the conflict in some way, and vindicate the right of Love as institutional. She wills the home, the Family, as her world, and hence is the chosen mediatrix of its collisions.

But with Love, the central Virtue of medieval Christendom, taking a secular institutional content and becoming the means for that, we have receded out of the religious and secular world of the Middle Ages. When Love finds its true and supreme end in the Family, and subordinates its devotion to that institution, the age of ecclesiasticism and of chivalry and of monasticism is passing away. A new time begins which will call to life new Virtues and transform the old ones into its spirit.

3. *The Modern System of Virtues.* This has by no means rounded itself off as yet to the fullness and completeness of the two preceding Systems (Heathen and Medieval Christian). The modern Theory of Ethics shows a vast uncertain groping, with struggling pangs, not unlike birth throes; but the science will not get itself born somehow, and settle down to an ordered organic life. Doubtless such a condition is a phase of the moral process now going on, showing a de-

cided contrast with the circumscribed, but completed, Systems of former epochs.

Still we may draw with becoming modesty a few outlines in this fermenting mass of old Virtues transforming themselves and of new Virtues beginning to be.

That which we call the modern spirit gets its main character from the great movement known as the Renascence, which was a return to antiquity with its culture, a revival of the Heathen world. Yet it was Christendom which made this return to Heathendom; it was the Christian spirit which went back and communed fraternally with the Classic spirit. In art, science, literature, there was a wonderful rejuvenescence; in Morals Christian Virtue, no longer exclusive, sought out and embraced Heathen Virtue, studying anew Plato and Aristotle. Dante, in the narrow spirit of the medieval Christian, could damn the good Heathen; but now the good, Heathen and Christian, must be saved by the new universal Love which has arisen in men's hearts. So the Renascence produces a grand transformation of all culture, which extends itself to the Virtues likewise.

1. The supreme Heathen Virtue of Justice will undergo a change, retaining its essence, yet deepened with Love. Justice is no longer simply to destroy the transgressor without his knowing his transgression; we must first give him what

we have in knowledge and civilization, we must make him a responsible being before punishing him for violating his responsibility. Humanity is thus underlying and continually modifying Justice, yet not doing away with it by any means. Hence, too, arises on the other hand modern sentimentality, whose tendency is, not to deepen and transfigure the conception of Justice, but to destroy it utterly, and to let the guilty go free.

2. The Supreme Christian Virtue of Love will undergo a change, transcending its narrow medieval boundary and making itself universal. When the Christian no longer confines his Love to the good Christian brother, but can also love the good Heathen as a brother, the brotherhood of man has dawned in his soul, the ideal of a common humanity has begun to work, and the conception of a universal good has started to transfigure the moral character.

Here, too, undoubtedly a negative element may enter. The return to Heathendom, which is all right, may become a relapse to Heathendom, which is all wrong. The narrow Christian, dropping backwards, runs the danger of turning to a narrow Heathen; thus there is no regeneration, but degeneration. In the actual Renascence, many were heathenized, even Popes and Cardinals; the Renascence called forth its angelic Virtue, but also it begat its devil (Mephistopheles). The Heathen world perished through

its own inner insufficiency and corruption; yet it has and always will have a wonderful transforming power, which makes it the great source of all spiritual Renascence or New Birth.

3. The distinctively modern Virtue may be called Humanitarianism, in spite of the fact that it is not yet by any means realized in individual, state, or society. Even warfare is usually restrained, confined, and sometimes brought to an end by humane considerations. There is an inner movement of humanity now asserting itself in most hearts throughout the civilized world. Not merely to civilize but to humanize the peoples is at present the moral process working toward fulfillment.

We still use the word *humanities* for those studies, chiefly classical, which have in them this return to the first sources of culture in Greece and Rome. Such studies are not to heathenize you, but to humanize you, to make you universal. A person devoted to this kind of culture has long been called a humanist, who has or ought to have his moral counterpart in humanitarianism.

The humane tendency is, however, to be not merely an intellectual matter, but is to reach down and to transfigure the humblest calling; it is to enter into work and to enshrine itself there as the very soul of all productive industry. Thus we behold rising in our industrial age a cor-

reponding industrial Virtue, which realizes the highest Self in labor. When you perform an act or make a thing, there is to be no slight, no skimping; you must not tell a falsehood in your product, which you easily can; you must show justice in your daily task, justice to the purchaser who is your fellow-man; you must manifest love in your work, love of mankind, realizing your best Self in whatever you do. Every thrust of the laborer's spade, every prick of the tailor's needle may have in it a lie or the truth and the whole truth.

Thus in modern life the Christian Virtues have had to undergo a process, as well as the Heathen Virtues; they are becoming secularized more and more, or humanized into new forms of Virtue, which have, however, their roots in the old.

But Humanitarianism will develop limitations quite like those which we noticed in Benevolence. The Love of Humanity can become so broad that it flattens out the Love of the Individual. The exceedingly humane person has been known to neglect family, society, and country, in the ardent pursuit of philanthropy. This is not incidental, but inherent. The purely philanthropic man or woman has a tendency to become anti-institutional — if not hostile to, at least neglectful of, institutions which secure Free Will. The Ideal End, the Supreme Good of man is freedom, and true Humanitarianism must

at last have this as its content and thus become institutional.

But just thereby another and higher Virtue, indeed the highest, begins to manifest itself. The Love of Humanity must be transmuted into a Love of Human Freedom, and of that world which secures such Freedom. The supreme duty of man toward mankind must seek to realize in conduct and to embody in life the supreme End, and so develop a supreme Virtue, the source as well as the object of all Virtues.

(For the Heathen System of Virtues the best authority is ancient Plato in the *Republic*. For the Christian system of Virtues the best source is still Dante, especially in his *Paradiso*. His teacher, Aquinas, should also be mentioned. If the reader is fully to appreciate these Systems, he must not simply read them, as he does a newspaper, for the facts, "the hard facts," but he must enter into them and re-create them in his own mind and heart. For the transformation of Greek Virtues into their modern forms, see Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Book III., Chap. V. This is the best chapter in Green's Work. He shows for example how Fortitude and Temperance of the Greek philosophers have been evolved into their counterparts in the present time. One cannot help thinking that if Green had made his whole book move through a similar process and thus organize itself from within, it

would have been a greater work, great as it now is. It may be here added that Green has brought into currency that lofty ethical category *perfection*, or *perfect self-realization*, which is the ultimate moral End. Sometimes he almost interprets this word as meaning the Will willing Free Will, thus giving to it a definite content; but for the most part he keeps the simple category, which in itself is indefinite and vague, as he himself states. As to the medieval secular Virtues, Hegel in his *Aesthetic*, *Band II*, has a very suggestive account, which has furnished us with important hints.)

III. INSTITUTIONAL VIRTUE. We now pass out of the multiplicity of Virtues to their restoration to unity, to that Virtue which is the unification of all Virtue, which we shall call institutional. If Virtue, as already defined, is the habit of willing Free Will in general, Institutional Virtue is the habit of willing that actualized world which is to return and to will Free Will.

Every individual is born not only into a physical, visible world, but into an invisible world of Institutions which from his very infancy he takes up into his action. There is a societary system around each human being, it is the body of customs domestic, social, political, religious, reaching down even to external etiquette, which he is to assimilate into his spiritual organism, thus nourishing the unseen body of his social life.

Now the great object and end of these Institutions is to make the individual a free man in the highest sense of the term, for if he is free he must be virtuous, not capricious, not negative. The institutional world comes back to man and wills his freedom. On the other hand, man is to embody in spirit and in conduct just this institutional Will; then he can be said to have institutional Virtue. It is true that the entire moral process as unfolded hitherto has had such an end, and every special Virtue finds its consummation in this outcome, though the person exercising it may not be aware of the fact.

It is manifest that the particular Virtue, whatever it be, presupposes a world outside of itself, a world of actualized Free Will, which is really the soul of that Virtue. Justice must be filled with the spirit of the political Institution, whose function is to secure to man his own, that is, his Free Will in secular life. Charity must be filled with the spirit of the religious Institution, which grants to the erring but repentant soul absolution, restoration, freedom. Good manners have the same institutional content bearing upon the more external relations of life.

The second mother to the child and to the man is this institutional world which gives him his spiritual nurture; it is not the physical mother, who, however, may be and ought to be its representative to her infant. The world of Institu-

tions may be said to suckle the born child with its mother-milk of the social life; its image might be that of Diana genetrix with her million breasts giving her own vital forces to earth's children.

The individual of Good Will, therefore, is to will this institutional order at which he has been suckled into freedom, and whose object is to suckle the rising generation as he has been suckled, giving him his education, the opportunity for his career, security for his work; even truth for his brain and religion for his heart are furnished him by this order, and he must give them all back again through his Free Will. Thus he has Institutional Virtue — Righteousness. He must not only will the Right, but must will what wills the Right. If he wills simply the Right, his neighbor can will the same, and yet both may be wholly different in their acts; yea, may fall into bitter conflict. Both indeed will the Right, but they must will what wills the Right for both, which is just the sphere of Institutions. The destiny of the virtuous man is not only to be right (subjectively), but be righteous (objectively).

To be sure, the Ego as Free Will can ignore or assail this institutional order. Thus the man becomes negative, he is like the infant that falls out with and scratches or smites the breast which suckles it; he may even try to slay his own



mother, guilty, like another Nero, of spiritual matricide. Often people of good intentions are anti-institutional in conduct; they may have honesty, conscientiousness, devotion to a good cause, and many other Virtues, still they may not have the Institutional Virtue, which responds with heart and will to the Institution when it makes its call. Such persons may have a strong sense of rightness but not of righteousness; thus they do the just thing individually, not universally; not merely through their personal Will willing the Just but also through the institutional Will willing the Just, do they reach up to the Justice of God.

Looked at from this point of view, no man can rightfully take his own life, for it is not his to take, he abstracts something not his own, he commits the final grand larceny, for which according to the World-Judge voiced by Dante he is sent not to the penitentiary but to the Inferno, far down in the seventh Circle. His life as physical is given him at the start, his life as institutional was also a present from the social order about him; in like manner his education, protection, vocation, and a hundred other things. His first mother bore him and suckled him, so did his second mother in her fashion; to both are due his gratitude and his service.

The great end of moral education in the school is that the pupil who enters it should be

trained to Institutional Virtue. The school is in the true sense of the word an institution, and is the greatest of all trainers to an institutional life. The child coming into the school feels the order and adjusts himself to it, he breathes its atmosphere, and it becomes ingrown into his being. He is to become a Free Will which wills Free Will, and he is to make a start for that goal down in the primary grade. The teacher is the supreme man in his calling who can make the pupil realize in spirit and in conduct that the school organism with all its regulations is to give freedom. Thus when the pupil obeys the behest of the school, he is to feel that such obedience comes back to himself and secures his liberty, and without it he could not have liberty. In this way, too, he is trained to be the free citizen of a free country, that is, a country whose institutions have as their expressed object the safeguarding and asserting of Free Will. Such an Institutional Virtue he must acquire at first unconsciously, but the teacher is to possess this Virtue consciously, as a fundamental principle of his pedagogics, and is to apply the same in his instruction with knowledge.

As Institutional Virtue is the third stage in the general Psychosis of Virtue, we have to see in it the return to the first stage, while remaining itself. It will manifest its own process, which will be seen to be similar to that unfolded pre-

viously under the head of the Conception of Virtue.

1. There is, first, the immediate form of Institutional Virtue, when the Ego is one with the ethical life of the community. Such a person wills the public morality of his people unconsciously, he lives in instinctive unity with the order around him; he is in this respect the infant drawing his nourishment from invisible yet maternal fountains, whose milk-drops seem to fall from Heaven.

We have often noticed this immediate stage in the course of the present work, and it is never to be left out, if we would grasp the total process. It was noticed in Natural Goodness, it was observed as an element in the Conception of Virtue, where it showed itself simply as the instinctive tendency to the overcoming of Evil, of the Negative. In the present case it is the immediate unconscious oneness of the soul with the institutional life environing it on every side.

But the destiny of the Ego is to become conscious, especially conscious of itself; so it will by its very nature proceed to break up this simple unity, and make itself object to itself. Thus it becomes self-knowing.

2. The second stage, therefore, introduces us to the Ego knowing, or getting to know, this institutional content of itself. The previous intimate relation, that of the institutional suck-

ling, must come to an end, as the baby has at last to be weaned from and by its own mother.

Thus we can have a continuous development in this form of Virtue. Through knowledge and specially Self-knowledge, the Ego is perpetually limit-transcending; when it knows its bounds, it is already beyond them, in knowing if not in doing. Then this improved knowledge is not simply to stay locked up in the Intellect, but is to pass over into the Will and become improved conduct. Thus Virtue is or ought to be always advancing itself through insight. Every little piece of knowledge you acquire renders you more responsible before God and man. You are now (it may be supposed) getting an increased acquaintance with the Institutional World; such an acquaintance means little, unless you are also getting a proportionate increase in Institutional Virtue, which comes only through your own personal resolution and effort.

It is true that the Ego may, on good grounds, fall out with the morality of its time and country. Here, too, it must show itself limit-transcending, seeking to elevate the moral standard of the age and helping to transform the institution in accordance with that standard. Again we say that knowledge must realize itself in conduct, and thus reach its true fruition in character — wherewith we have reached the next stage.

3. The institutional character is the grand ob-

ject of ethical attainment, the goal toward which the moral process has been incessantly moving. Such a character has not only the insight into the world of institutions, but also the never-failing activity which realizes this insight in life. The Ego as Free Will is now consciously to will actualized Free Will (the Institutional World) and to be ever creating it anew in accord with the new ever-developing, limit-transcending spirit. Such is the Wisest Man, the Philosopher of all Philosophers, building not merely a free inner world for himself, but a free outer world for himself and his people.

Inasmuch as he knows the excellent, he can impart his knowledge and make others as good as he is. He must have the trinity of true manhood — doing, knowing, imparting; the supreme content of his doing, knowing, and imparting must be the world of institutions, of which he becomes the incarnation, and is thereby ethical in the highest sense. Thus the Conception of Virtue, with which we started, has realized itself in a human character.

The Moral Will through its long meanderings has now found its source, from which is eternally flowing into man's activity the ethical ideal of excellence. Virtue has mounted up to its fountain-head and discovered its own generative principle. Righteousness we may call this universal

Virtue, embracing as it does all institutions; not simply holiness or the Holy Life, which is apt to confine itself to the religious institution, the Church. The Holy Life is a very lofty and worthy ideal, still we have to think of it with its medieval, ecclesiastical connotation, which makes it neglectful of and even antagonistic to secular institutional life, that of the Family, State, Society. The holy man is supposed to retire from the secular world and to devote himself to the cultivation of religious Virtue. But such an existence is now felt to be narrowing; the very object of religion is to go forth and to transform what is not religious. Institutional Virtue is the underlying soul of every Virtue, both secular and religious, the universal Virtue, which is the generative energy of all particular Virtues.

If we glance backwards and consider the movement hitherto unfolded, we find that the Ego has now embodied or realized in itself — in its thought and conduct — the self-determined Free Will. It has completely mediated its own individual Free Will through the actual Free Will objectified in institutions; it wills its own Free Will, not subjectively and capriciously through itself, but through a world whose object is to secure all Free Will, in which, therefore, all can be free. Acting in such a way

and with such a light, the Ego possesses Institutional Virtue.

This realm of institutions embraces not merely the State, but also Family, Society, Church — that is, both the secular and the religious Institutional World. And this is not all, it likewise embraces Art, Science, and Philosophy, which are bound together in thought and form a part or phase of the great institutional movement of man. Hence the State often assists Art, Science, Letters, these being the institutional element which is to reflect institutions, and so demanding protection.

The Moral Will, seeking to realize the Ideal End in its process, has come to the fount of ideality, and has realized that in a character and in a virtue both of which we call institutional. The Ego, through self-knowledge always mounting up beyond its limit, and embodying its new insight in deeds, will manifest the true Progress. Moreover, it will also put its own Progress into its environing spiritual world, that of institutions, which become progressive in this way, ever developing and ever realizing their development in new forms.

Thus the Ideal End, so long pursued in the Moral Will, has been *realized*, but it is not yet *actualized*. The Institutional World, implicit hitherto in the movement of the Moral Will, is

next to become explicit, and to reveal itself objectively in its own forms, whose grand object is to secure Free Will.

Moral Science, therefore, ends in a strong aspiration which seems to utter itself in a loud call for a new Science, namely the Science of Institutions.

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